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How Long Can We Cope?*
THE HONORABLE WARREN E. BURGER
Chief Justice
The Supreme Court of the United States
It may seem premature to be thinking about the next significant bicen-
tennial celebration in our national life, but our experience with the
bicentennial of 1976 demonstrates the desirability for long advance
planning. It is not too soon to turn our minds to the 200th anniversary
of the document signed in Philadelphia almost exactly 191 years ago.
We take considerable pride, and I think appropriately, in the fact that
we have functioned as a nation under this one written Constitution for
nearly two centuries. No other nation can match that.
The events of the past 40 years have brought home to us very
forcefully that freedom is fragile. This is particularly true of the freedom
of our open society where we not only permit, but at times almost seem
to invite attacks, because of our commitment to flexibility and change
and our dedication to the values protected by the First Amendment.
Eric Hoffer, with his uncomplicated logic and simplicity of style, has
expressed his deep concern that our system of government and our free
society may be more fragile in many respects than other societies, and
he has suggested that "the social body" is perhaps more vulnerable and
fragile than the human body.'
It has been an article of faith with us that the artificial and manipu-
lated systems of authoritarian regimes, no matter how strong they seem
for a time, do not possess the powers of restoration or recuperation
possessed by our kind of government. It is within the memory of all of
us that a great many people in the 1930's, and even later, accepted
Hilter's boast that he was creating a "1,000 Year Reich." They remem-
bered, too, that even before Hitler, as well as in more recent times, other
people saw Soviet communism as "the wave of the future." It was
Lincoln Steffens who said after a visit to Russia that he had "been over
* Remarks to the Seminar on Legal History, The National Arcliives, Washington,
D.C., Thursday, September.21, 1978.
1. Letter from Eric Hoffer to Warren E. Burger dated March 21, 1969.
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into the future and it works." 2
Surely the events of the last 40 or more years in world history
underscore the importance of both the philosophy of freedom and the
mechanisms and practices we have set up to insure a continuance of
freedom.
We are surely committed to a significant celebration of the creation
of our constitutional system under the Constitution, which in 200 years
took us from three million struggling pioneers into a great world power,
and individual initiative was the secret of this success. It is, therefore,
not too early ,to begin thinking and planning to be sure that what we do
will be an appropriate recognition of the importance of the event and
to serve as a guide to correct whatever flaws we see and to plan for the
years ahead.
I submit that an appropriate way to do this will be to reexamine
each of the three major articles of our organic law and compare the
functions as they have been performed in recent times with the functions
contemplated in 1787 by the men at Philadelphia. The Constitution was,
of course, intended to be a mechanism to allow for the evolution of
governmental institutions and constitutional concepts. But we should
examine the changes which have occurred over two centuries and ask
ourselves whether they are faithful to the spirit and the letter of the
Constitution, or whether, with some, we have gone off on the wrong
track.
This undertaking is too serious, too broad in scope and too impor-
tant to be accomplished within one year. I suggest for your considera-
tion, and to those with similar interests, that we set aside, not one year
or even two years, but three years for this enterprise. Although the
sequence need not be rigid, I would suggest that in 1985 we devote
ourselves to an examination of Article I; in 1986, we should address the
powers delegated by Article II; in 1987, we should address Article III.
Let me briefly suggest a few of the differences between the expectations
of the framers and present-day practices, bearing in mind Marshall's
statement that the Constitution was "intended to endure for ages to
come, and consequently, to be adapted to the various crises in human
affairs."
2. LINCOLN STEFFENS, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF LINCOLN STEFFENS (New
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 799.
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Article I
Under Article I, all legislative powers were vested in the Congress
of the United States, or as Jefferson said, "The great council of the
nation." It does not require the skills of historians or political scientists
to observe that Congress in 1978 is a very different institution from what
was contemplated in 1787. But we must do more than study how the
Congress of today is different; we should proceed to assess whether the
Congress is functioning according to the spirit of the Founding Fathers,
even as we recognize that changes were inevitable with changing times
and new problems.
What are the kind of changes that ought to be looked at? Surely,
the growth factor is one. The House of Representatives has grown from
45 to 435; the Senate from 26 to 100. In the original contemplation,
membership in the Congress was not to be a full-time occupation. The
framers anticipated part-time public service of the leading citizens of
each state. They were to come to Philadelphia (and later to Washington)
for only a few months out of the year and spend the remaining seven or
eight months back home on a farm or at a law practice or lumber mill.
Now, it is a full-time profession-and necessarily so-given what we ask
of them.
Obviously members of the Congress cannot be expected to function
today as they did in the time of Clay, Calhoun and Webster when there
were no typewriters, no computers, and when both communication and
travel were very different from the present day. But some of the changes
which we now observe in the functioning of the Congress are so funda-
mental that they can profitably be reexamined in light of original expec-
tations about the functioning of the legislative branch. For at least the
first 100 years, each member of Congress could do all his own home-
work very largely as members of the British House of Commons still
do. Each diligent member of Congress could readily read every bill
proposed and understand what was being presented. Members of Con-
gress are now torn between their mounting obligations to assist individ-
ual constituents in their dealings with the bureaucracy-to respond to
mail-and the demands of the numerous subcommittees and commit-
tees upon which they serve. The mail is increased-perhaps-by new
word processing equipment available to interest groups, with one set of
word processing machines communicating with another machine.
Added to all this is the constant need to mend political fences-which,
of course, is democracy at work.
These cross-pressures, the immense increase in the volume of legis-
13-1979
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lative business and the need to match the size and specialized capabili-
ties of the Executive Branch experts accounts in large measure for the
enormous expansion of congressional staffs. Indeed, some say that Con-
gress is now not 535 persons but rather 535 plus thousands of staff
members in the House and Senate. The Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report tells us that currently the congressional staffs aggregate
about 16,500.1 The increase in the size of staffs seems to have induced
some proliferation of the number of lobbyists-or perhaps it was the
other way around. The number of corporations maintaining offices in
Washington bas grown in 15 years from about 50 to 300. More than
16,000 trade associations and labor unions have offices in this capital.
But the central focus in reexamination of the operations under
Article I are the new problems which have added to the burdens of the
Congress. Observers say that floor debate no longer occupies the role it
did in times past. Members of Congress tend to become special-
ists-concentrating on the work of their own committees-rather than
the generalists of an earlier day. A large part of the work of congres-
sional staffs is devoted to "servicing" constituents entirely apart from
the legislative process itself. This may be an appropriate part of the
democratic ethos, but it is surely some distance from what the authors
of the Constitution intended. This is not said critically but rather as the
reality of present day life. Indeed my reflections on this subject rest on
what members of Congress have said-publicly and privately.
A well-informed and highly sophisticated journalist, Elizabeth
Drew, recently described the dilemma of members of Congress attempt-
ing to cope with the flood of bills submitted and the lesser but still
overwhelming flood of proposals emerging from committees.4 Many
members of Congress have stated that it is almost impossible for any
member to read all the proposed legislation. Some critics suggest that
the increase in staffs has led directly to this increase in the number and
length of proposed bills and committee reports. I do not know. But it
is possible that a senator with a staff of 50 to 60 or 70 persons may have
more burdens than benefits given the inexorable workings of Parkin-
son's Law. I do observe that rather than having their workload lessened,
Congressmen seem to find themselves overwhelmed and many are retir-
ing prematurely. We also see what perhaps is another result of current
operations, and that is a legislative product where, all too often, the
3. The Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, February 11, 1978.
4. Elizabeth Drew, "A Tendency to Legislate," The New Yorker, June 26, 1978,
pp. 80-86.
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meaning and intent of Congress are blurred and the entire policy issue
winds up in the courts for resolution.5 And often the courts have great
difficulty discerning the true intent of Congress.
The purpose of these observations is neither to challenge nor to
criticize the process. It is simply to point out the world of difference
between functions contemplated in 1787 and the reality of 1978. A full
year is needed to make a concentrated analysis by political scientists,
historians, and other specialists-and members of Congress-to stimu-
late a serious national discussion. Such an analysis can be made in a
more orderly and rational way if the discussion of one branch is con-
ducted entirely independent of discussion of the other two branches. It
is, therefore, desirable to set aside the year 1985 for comprehensive
reexamination of the Article I functions.
Article II
The operations of the Executive Branch, like those of the Congress,
have also undergone dramatic evolution and change. In 1789 there was
only a handful of "executives" in the Executive Branch along with
customs collectors and postmasters.' The total budget of the federal
government in dollars was smaller by far at the beginning than that of
a modest sized city-Colorado Springs-for example.7 Communication
between the first Executive and the Legislative Branch was casual and
informal.'
Although the members of the first Supreme Court wisely resisted
President Washington's request for advisory opinions and declined to
perform other functions which they deemed to be executive in nature,
there is little doubt that Chief Justice Jay gave advice to Washington
over the dinner table and even in writing. The President had no profes-
sional staff for himself. His close advisors also included the cabinet
secretaries and the Vice President.
Although the Executive Branch grew greatly from 1789 to the First
World War, our wartime president, Woodrow Wilson, pecked away at
5. See Carl McGowan, Congress and the Courts, 62 AMERICAN BAR AssocIA-
TION JOURNAL at 1588-90 (Dec. 1970); and see TVA v. Hill, 98 S. Ct. 2279 (1978); SEC
v. Sloan, 98 S. Ct. 1702 (1978).
6. See LEONARD WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS (Toronto:. Collier, MacMillan, 1948).
7. The expenditures of the federal government were 5.1 million dollars in 1792.
The expenditures of Colorado Springs in 1977 were 53.7 million dollars.
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his Hammond typewriter, turning out speeches and messages to Con-
gress-and an outline of the League of Nations.
President Hoover had three or four staff aides, then called
"secretaries," who assisted him with his problems, including one former
Congressman who presumably handled legislative relations. Franklin
Roosevelt, as a candidate, attacked Hoover for his excessively large
staff. Yet, as we know, the great expansion of the White House staff
began under President Franklin Roosevelt as the whole Executive
Branch burgeoned to meet the emergencies created by the world-wide
depression. Thus one matter to be reflected upon in 1986 is the implica-
tions of the size of the Executive Branch. Another question deserving
analysis is what we now understand from the provision of Article II
stating that the executive power shall be vested in the President. Today
executive power is actually in the hands of a few thousand of nearly
three million civilian employees of the Executive Branch. There are
150,000 employees in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
alone-more than the standing army of the country in early parts of this
century.
There are other changes. For nearly a half century the Executive
Branch initiated much of the significant legislation. It is interesting to
note that the Civil Service Commission is holding a workshop this
December-and I use the Commission's language-to "help train
agency personnel who will be assuming assignments in the formulation
of legislation." This is entirely appropriate but it perhaps in part ex-
plains why Congress needed specialist staffs to cope with the Executive.
The growth in the rule-making activity of the federal agencies has given
rise to concern and indeed to challenges by recent presidents who
thought their policies were being frustrated.
One example of changes brought on in the electronic age is the
relationship of President with the media. Perhaps we should ask whether
any President should be expected to have at his fingertips, and on the
top of his head, a comprehensive and totally accurate response to every
question submitted from an audience consisting of several hundred po-
litically sophisticated media reporters? At times we read a superficial
comparison to the British system where the Prime Minister and his
cabinet ministers appear in the Commons for the question period. But
the comparison is flawed because in Britain there is a fixed agenda for
the question period. The Prime Minister or any member of his cabinet
need be well-informed only on the specific and limited subjects covered
by that agreed agenda.
Is it possible that the media, the Presidency, and the nation would
12
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be better served if presidential press conferences were-at
least-confined to agreed subjects? For example, the problems of the
Middle East, or inflation or energy-rather than having every press
conference open to the entire range of problems confronting the coun-
try. The evening news and the morning papers would be able to focus
with greater clarity and in greater depth on particular policy issues and
the media might thus be better able to inform the public in the long run.
These are just a sample of some of the issues and problems which
might be discussed during the year 1986 by political scientists, histori-
ans, journalists, and those who have actual first-hand experience in
government. Others having broader experience in government will see
many areas for inquiry.
Article III
Questions about the present functioning of the judiciary compared
with original expectations could be dealt with in 1987. Since I cannot
qualify either as a total expert witness on the subject or as totally
unbiased, I will leave it to others to flesh out the full scope of the inquiry
for there is a long list of questions deserving serious study.
I suspect that, by the time the delegates reached Article III, they
were getting weary in the hot and humid Philadelphia summer. The
entire judicial Article contains only 369 words. The first Judiciary Act
of 1789 authorized 13 U.S. District Judges and six members of the
Supreme Court. Perhaps the feeling of those weary delegates at the
Constitutional Convention was that a branch of government which
would consist initially of only 19 judges did not call for much rhet-
oric-or much attention. The Constitution provided that the federal
courts would have a limited and special function-in that day largely
deciding admiralty cases.
The number of judges has grown from those first 19 to 397 author-
ized District Judges, 97 judges of Courts of Appeals, and another 21
judges of three specialized tribunals-a total of 515. Another 130 senior
judges continue to serve-fortunately for us. This number will soon
increase by approximately 150 when Congress passes the Omnibus
Judgeship Bill.
The Supreme Court has increased from six justices to nine, remain-
ing at that figure for over a century. I do not know of anyone advocating
increasing the membership of the Supreme Court-least of all the pres-
ent justices. One wag commented that nine members of the Supreme
I 3:1979
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Court have produced sufficient mischief in this country and any increase
would be intolerable.
With 19 federal judges in 1789-and for at least 100 years-there
were no significant "management" problems. Even with the 100 or
more judges during the time Taft was Chief Justice, the management
problem was not enormous. But Taft saw into the future and fought for
the creation of the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges (now the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States) to assist in "managing" the busi-
ness of the courts, as he called it. The Administrative Office of the
United States Courts was created in 1939 with essentially housekeeping
functions. The Federal Judicial Center began operations in 1968 as the
research, development and educational arm of the Judiciary. In 1971 the
position of Circuit Executive-a management assistant for the Chief
Circuit Judges-was created for each circuit. We must also count sup-
porting personnel-court clerks, bailiffs, court reporters and so forth,
or a total of 9,377 persons.9 We see, therefore, that the Judicial Branch,
while small, has increased greatly since 1789.
For nearly nine years Congress has failed to create a single new
judgeship and the courts have had to cope with the enormous increase
in workload with additional law clerks and staff lawyers. The pressure
of caseloads has led to an increase in the proportion of cases decided
without oral argument and often without a formal,, written opinion.
Lawyers oppose this.
Some responsible and well-informed lawyers and scholars have
criticized the increasing complexity of judicial procedure arguing that
overuse of pre-trial processes complicate and delay trials. Others have
echoed the criticism, made first by Roscoe Pound in 1906, that the
excesses of the adversary system hinder rather than promote the ends
of justice. The processes of administrative law are being challenged and
questions are raised as to the soundness of trying complex anti-trust
cases before 12 lay jurors picked at random from the population.
These developments inspire a series of questions, questions about
the efficiency of courts functioning under such demands, questions
about the growth of a judicial "bureaucracy," and even questions about
the duties placed on the Chief Justice are emerging. Should it be ex-
pected that the Chief Justice, with all the duties of other justices of the
Court, be called upon to be the "Chief Executive" of the Judicial
Branch. Congress made the Chief Justice Chairman of the Judicial
9. Excluding 2,902 probation officers.
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Conference of the United States with duties that absorb hundreds of
hours each year. It made him Chairman of the Federal Judicial Center,
with similar demands. These two organizations are expected to develop
innovative programs and mechanisms to improve and speed up justice.
Because Chief Justices have somehow been able to manage up to now
does not mean this can continue to be true in the third century under
the Constitution. Seven years ago a committee of distinguished lawyers
and scholars, chaired by Professor Paul Freund of Harvard, recom-
mended that another court be created to take part of the work now
resting on the Supreme Court. No action has been taken on that pro-
posal.
There are serious questions as to how long justices can work a sixty
hour week and maintain appropriate standards.
At least as important as the need to examine the increase in the
size of the Judicial Branch is the need to examine the powers exercised
by the Judiciary. The authors of the Constitution did not contemplate
that the Judiciary would be an overseer of the other two branches. At
most, they expected that the judicial function would be confined to
interpreting laws and deciding whether particular acts of the Congress
or of the Executive were in conflict with.the Constitution, but even that
was not explicit. Surely, that is all Marshall's opinion in Marbury v.
Madison means.
Paradoxically, in recent years, the Supreme Court has been sub-
jected to criticism from both ends of the spectrum. On the one hand,
there are critics who suggest that the Supreme Court, like the other two
branches, has become "imperial" in the sense of exercising powers not
assigned to it by the Constitution. On the other hand, there are those
who say that the Supreme Court has been too passive: and has not
undertaken to engage in wide ranging social and political activism
thought by some to be called for by contemporary problems. It will be
for others to evaluate these contentions. All this is rich fodder for sym-
posia in 1987.
We make a large point of the independence and separateness of the
three branches, but the authors of the Constitution also contemplated
that there would be coordination between the branches deriving from a
common purpose. That they should consult on some matters is beyond
doubt. How far that should go is a subject for careful study.
The uniqueness and true genius of the document is that it has
precluded any one of the branches from dominating any other. This will
continue so long as we are faithful to the spirit and letter of the Constitu-
tion.
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Project '87 is already underway and the Judicial Conference of the
United States last year authorized the appointment of a special commit-
tee to prepare for an observance of this significant historic event. If
we-collectively-use the "lead time" now available to us, we can de-
velop a program worthy of the importance of the occasion.
Although none of us can alone determine the totality of what the
Bicentennial of 1787 should be, you-today-are uniquely quali-
fied to evaluate the merits of this proposal and to help with its imple-
mentation if you find merit in it.
If we concentrate along these lines for one year on each of the three
branches and their functions, perhaps with the latter part of the third
year devoted to an overview of all that has been discussed, debated and
analyzed in the preceding years, conceivably we may produce a series
of papers comparable in utility, if not in quality, with the Federalist
Papers of 200 years ago.
Whatever the program is to be, the time to begin planning is now.
16
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
Fair Trial-Free Press:
The Camera in the Courtroom Dilemma Continues
MARIANNA SMITH*
Marcia R. Powellt
The Conference of Chief Justices' meeting in Burlington, Vermont,
August 2, 1978 adopted Resolution I allowing the presence of television,
radio and photographic coverage of judicial proceedings.' In spite of this
* B.S. Pharmacy, Purdue University, 1959; J.D., Indiana University-
Indianapolis, 1975; LL.M., University of Texas, 1976; Assistant Professor of Law,
Nova University Law Center.
t B.A. Broadcast Journalism, University of South Carolina, 1974;
M.A.-Broadcast Journalism, University of South Carolina, 1976; Student, Nova Uni-
versity Law Center, expected J.D., 1979, Member of Society of Professional Journalist,
Sigma Delta Chi.
I. TELEVISION, RADIO, PHOTOGRAPHIC COVERAGE OF
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
"WHEREAS, the Conference of Chief Justices appointed a sixteen member com-
mittee in February, 1978, to study the possible amendment of Canon 3-A (7) of the Code
of Judicial Conduct to permit electronic and photographic coverage of the courts of our
nation under guidelines that would preserve the decorum and fairness of our judicial
proceedings; and
"WHEREAS, the Conference has discussed, debated and considered the judicial
canon which bans broadcasting, televising, audio recording or taking photographs dur-
ing trial and appellate proceedings for new purposes; and
"WHEREAS, the highest court in each state has the authority and responsibility
to provide ethical standards, to upgrade the quality of justice administered and to
improve the contact with the public in each state; and
"WHEREAS, the news media, both print and electronic, serve an important role
in informing the public and it is in the best interest of the public to be fully and
accurately informed of the operation of judicial systems;
"NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Conference of Chief Justices
that the Canon 3-A (7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct be amended by adding the
following paragraph and the commentary:
Notwithstanding the provisions of this paragraph, the (name the supervising ap-
pellate court or body in the state of federal jurisdiction) may allow television,
radio and photographic coverage of judicial proceedings in courts under their
supervision consistent with the right of the parties to a fair trial and subject to
express conditions, limitation, and guidelines which allow such coverage in a
17
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Resolution, the American Bar Association House of Delegates refused
consideration of a camera-in-court provision at the 1978 annual Ameri-
can Bar Association meeting, deferring the matter until the February,
1979 meeting.2
State courts in at least fourteen states3 are conducting experiments
allowing the electronic media access to court proceedings. This paper
is provided as a review of the history of the media's struggle for entry
into the courts and the present state experiments.
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. Its func-
tion in this regard is documented by an impressive record of service over
several centuries. The press does not simply publish information about
trials, but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the
manner that will be unobstrusive, will not distract the trial participants, and will
not otherwise interfere with the administration of justice.
Commentary:
If television, radio, and photographic coverage is permitted it should be super-
vised by the appropriate appellate body which supervises the courts within its
jurisdiction. It is necessary that there be express conditions and guidelines
adopted by the supervising court or body in order to provide a specific manner
and means for this type of media coverage. These guidelines should include the
type and location of equipment, the discretion left to the individual trial or appel-
late court, and the necessity, if any, to obtain the consent of the participants.
Absent special circumstances for good cause shown, no consent appears necessary
in appellate courts. Special circumstances may exist in all courts for the restric-
tion of this type of coverage in cases such as rape, custody of children, trade
secrets, or where such coverage would cause a substantial increase in the threat
of harm to any participant in a case.
"BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Conference designate the National
Center for State Courts as the Clearinghouse for all photographic and electronic-in-the-
courthouse information for various states and federal jurisdictions. In order to provide
the complete exchange of information, the Conference recommends that each jurisdic-
tion forward to the National Center all rules, statistics, guidelines, opinion, reports and
other information pertaining to the use of photographic and electronic devices in the
courtrooms of their states, and that all information be made readily available to the
courts upon request.
"Adopted at the Thirtieth Annual Meeting held in Burlington, Vermont, August
2, 1978."
2. 64 A.B.A. J. 1342 (Sept., 1978). At the February, 1979 ABA National Conven-
tion in Atlanta, the ABA's House of Delegates voted overwhelmingly against cameras-
in-the-courtroom. Associated Press, February 12, 1979.
3. See Appendix infra.
.
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police, prosecutors and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and
criticism.4
The Constitution of the United States offers "a right to speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury . . . ."I This right was created .to
prevent a recurrence of the well known and oppressive English Star
Chamber judicial proceedings. On the other hand, the Constitution's
First Amendment states that: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridg-
ing the freedom of speech and the press ... ." The philosophies of the
first and sixth amendments dictate an enforceable power that are often
f6und to be in conflict. The clash between the interests represented by
these two amendments may be heard in the background of the dramatic
judicial confrontation between the press seeking admittance to court
proceedings and the judiciary's concern that the presence of the media
can deny a defendant his right to a fair trial and invade the privacy of
all trial participants. Therefore, it is necessary that compromises be
struck between these interests to safeguard the ultimate freedom pro-
vided by each amendment. The press and judiciary have struggled to-
ward this goal for years.
This paper is designed to be a brief overview of the current struggle
between the broadcast media and the courts. The scope of the paper is
limited to use of electronic equipment in courtrooms as a news gathering
process by the print and broadcast media. However, use of electronic
devices, particularly video taping equipment for utilization as part of the
judicial process is another area which warrants consideration by the
bench and bar, but goes beyond the scope of this paper. The paper will
be divided into three sections. The first section will give an overview of
the history of press and media coverage in judicial proceedings. The
4. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350, citing to Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367, 374 (1947).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
6. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances."
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second section will look to both the pro and con arguments which have
been presented on the issue of media in the courts. The last section is
an appendix and will deal with contemporary court rulings and experi-
ments currently being conducted throughout the United States in an
attempt to resolve the dilemma of whether to allow cameras in the
courtroom.
1. HISTORY
The first broadcast of a trial to gain national interest was WGN
Chicago's coverage of the Scopes Monkey Trial in Dayton, Tennessee7
in 1925. Photography and broadcasting were allowed in the proceedings,
with no reported complaints registered about the process.
The print media became notorious for sensational coverage of trials
in 1926 during the Halls-Mills case, a sex-murder scandal in Sommer-
ville, New Jersey.8 At the trial, there were over 200 reporters, necessitat-
ing a giant telegraph switchboard with 120 positions set up in the base-
ment of the courthouse to send out reports. In addition, eight telephone
operators were hired to handle the load. After acquittal, the defendants
brought a libel suit against the New York Daily Mirror seeking
$1,500,000 in damages, which was purportedly settled for $850,000.'
Today's concern with the risks inherent in having reporters with
cameras in the courtroom is the direct .result of the case involving the
kidnap-murder of the Lindberg baby.10 The kidnaping occurred on
March 1, 1932, and the body of the baby was not found until March
12th of that year. The accused, Bruno Hauptmann, was arrested during
September of 1934. The story had remained front page news since the
time of the kidnaping. The trial, which commenced in January of 1935,
is stated to have "probably received the most extensive media coverage
of any American criminal case up to its time."'" The trial has been
described as a "Roman Holiday."' 2 "Photographers clamored on coun-
sels' tables and shoved flash bulbs into the faces of the witnesses. The
judge lost control of his courtroom and the press photographers lost
7. Danna, TVs Fight for Courtroom Access,.200 F.0.1. RPT. I (May, 1968).
8. J. LOFTON, JUSTICE AND THE PRESS, at 98-100 (1966).
9. id.
10. State v. Hauptmann, 180 A. 809 (1935), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 649 (1935).
11. Roberts and Goodman, III, The Televised Trial: A Perspective, 7 CUME. L.
REv. 327 (Fall , 1976).
12. Danna, supra note 7.
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control of their senses. '1 3 There were more than seven hundred report-
ers in attendance. "Some two hundred newspapers sent their own corre-
spondents and each of the major press services maintained a full staff
at the scene. More than eleven million words were sent over the wires
during the trial, about a million of them the first day."' 4 Although the
judge ordered the doors locked the day the verdict was due, ingenious
press people created ways to inform their employers of the verdict. One
of the most creative schemes was that of Francis Toughill of the Phila-
delphia Record who scraped the insulation from the courtroom tele-
phone wires and hooked in a telephone headset. Crouched in the balcony
of the courtroom, he called his city desk and announced the verdict.,5
Although the New Jersey Court of Errors and Appeals did not find
the abuses in the Hauptmann trial sufficient to overturn a death sen-
tence, 6 a barrier was created between the courts and the press. The
organized press fought with the bench and bar about who was responsi-
ble for the chaos of the Hauptmann trial. In a September 18, 1937
edition of the media periodical, "Editor and Publisher," the editors
agreed that a portion of the blame must be placed upon the press, but
laid most of the responsibility upon the bench and bar. "So long as you
have publicity-hungry lawyers and judges, you'll have newspapers ready
to sate their appetite and make money as well."' 17 As one broadcaster
put it, "so we had a witches brew of journalistic excesses, judicial lax-
ness, legal hamming and political maneuvering."' Despite the repri-
mands and excuses, it was clearly the press, the defendants and the
general public who were penalized for the unfitting activities which
accompanied the Hauptmann trial.
The true punishment was felt when the House of Delegates of the
American Bar Association adopted Canon 35 on September 30, 1937.1
Canon 35 stated:
13. Id. at 1.
14. Lofton, supra note 8, at 104.
15. Reed, Canon 35: Flemington Revisited, 177 F.O.I. RPT. 3 (March, 1967),
citing to TIME, Feb. 25, 1935.
16. The Appellate Court said prejudicial publicity was inevitable and upheld the
conviction. See A. FRIENDLY and R. GOLDFARB, CRIME AND PUBLICITY, at Ch. I (1967).
17. Reed, supra note 15, at 4.
18. Canon 35 and the Broadcast Media, 61 F.O.I. RPT. (1961). (Based on a
speech by Frank Fogarty).
19. Murrill gives a complete report of Canon 35 as it evolves from inception to
adoption. See Murrill, Canon 35: A Summary, 77 F.O.I. RPT. (1962).
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Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and deco-
rum. The taking of photographs in the courtroom during sessions and the
broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract from the
essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create miscon-
ception with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be
permitted. 20
Although the Canon was not controlling upon the state courts, many
states considered it an adequate basis for keeping the press from the
courtroom.2' In 1952, the Canon was amended to prohibit "the taking
of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting-televising of court proceed-
ings. .. - By 1966, all states except Colorado, Texas and Oklahoma
had adopted some form of Canon 35 either by statute or by court
ruling.21 The essence of the Canon is applied in Federal Courts as
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure No. 53.24 The Judicial Conference
of the United States also adopted Canon 35 as a suggestive but not
binding resolution.21 Numerous committees met and debates were held
in the decade following the adoption of Canon 35 with one result, a
group of guidelines which the broadcast media created for themselves
entitled the National Association of Broadcasters Standards of Conduct
for Broadcasting Public Proceedings. 6
The first reversal of a state court criminal conviction on the
grounds of adverse pretrial press publicity was by the Warren court in
1961 in the case of Leslie "Maddog" Irvin.27 Irvin was indicted for one
20. D. GILMORE, FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, at 23 (1966).
21. Neither Canon 35 nor Canon 3-A (7) of the ABA Codes of Judicial Conduct
are binding law. They are created by the ABA as suggestions. States are free to adopt
such suggestions by statute or by court rules or are free to create their own rules. The
preface to the 1972 ABA Code of Judicial Conduct adopted August 16, 1972 states:
In the judgment of the association this code consisting of statements of norms
denominated as Canons, the accompanying text setting forth the specific rules and
the commentary, states the standards the judges should observe. The Canons and
text establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated. It is hoped that
all jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary procedure
for its enforcement.
22. Danna, supra note 7, at 1.
23. D. GILMORE and J. BARRON, MASS COMMUNICATIONS LAW, at 452 (1974).
24. Id., citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 53.
25. Id.
26. J. BITTNER and D. BITTNER, RADIO JOURNALISM, at 199 (1977).
27. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
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of six local murders in the Evansville, Indiana area. His attorney asked
for and received a change of venue based upon forty-six newspaper
accounts, some of which claimed Irvin's confession to the six murders.,
Venue, however, was moved only to the next county, an area which the
same press served,29 and the trial began in November of 1955. Of four
hundred and thirty prospective jurors examined by the prosecutor and
defense attorney, three hundred and seventy had formed some opinion
about Irvin's guilt.3 After twelve jurors were chosen and the defense
had used all peremptory challenges, the defendant's counsel argued that
four of the jurors had stated Irvin was guilty.31 Consequently, Irvin was
found guilty and sentenced to death in the electric chair. 2 After being
denied a new trial by the Indiana Supreme Court, 33 Irvin twice ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court.34
This was the first opinion in which the United States Supreme
Court had thoroughly discussed trial by newspaper. Justice Frankfurter,
in a concurring opinion, stated:
This court has not yet decided that the fair administration of criminal
justice must be subordinated to another safeguard of our constitutional
system-freedom of the press properly conceived. The court has not yet
decided that while convictions must be reversed and miscarriages of jus-
tice result because the minds of jurors were poisoned, the poisoner is
constitutionally protected in plying his trade.3
The problem of pretrial publicity and the prejudice thereby created still
remains exactly as a juror in the Irvin trial stated, "you cannot forget
what you hear and see."'36
Soon after this trial by newspaper, a trial by television occurred in





33. Irvin v. State, 236 Ind. 384, 139 N.E. 2d 898 (1957).
34. Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 398 (1959), and Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717
(1961). See also K. DEVOL, MASS MEDIA AND THE SUPREME COURT, at 272 (1976);
NELSON and TEETER, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS, at 305 (1974); and GILMORE,
FREE PRESS AND FAIR TRIAL, at 11 (1966).
35. 366 U.S. at 730'(1961), as cited in H. NELSON and D. TEETER, LAW OF MASS
COMMUNICATION, at 304 (2d ed. 1973).
36. 366 U.S. at 730 (1961).
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Rideau v. Louisiana37 during 1963. Six days after his arrest, and with-
out the presence of counsel, Wilbur Rideau admitted to kidnaping, bank
robbery and murder. Interviewed in his cell by a sheriff and two police-
men, moving pictures complete with sound track recorded the entire
twenty minutes of interrogation. Leading questions were climaxed by
Rideau's confession to the charges. 38 Later that day, television station
KLPC in Lake Charles, Louisiana broadcast the interview three times
to a viewing audience of approximately one hundred and fifty thou-
sand.39 The defendant's request for a change of venue was denied.
Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death for murder, with the
Louisiana Supreme Court affirming the conviction." The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari." Seven of the Justices felt that
pretrial broadcasts had prevented the defendant from a fair trial and
reversed the decision, giving Rideau a new trial.4" Justice Potter, deliv-
ering the opinion of the Court, said:
We hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request
for change of venue after people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed
repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing
in detail to the crimes of which he was later to be charged. For any one
who has ever watched television, the conclusion cannot be avoided that
this spectacle to the tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it in
a very real sense was Rideau's trial . . . subsequent court proceedings in
a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle would be hollow
formality.13
The landmark case of Estes v. Texas44 in 1963 virtually over-
shadowed the sensationalism of Rideau. This case resulted in an abso-
lute ban of television in the courts. Texas financier Billy Sol Estes was
tried in 1962 for fraud against the federal government." Despite a five
hundred mile change of venue to Reeves County, the trial was a cele-
brated occurrence with a packed courtroom. Over Estes' objection, the
televising of the trial was allowed with rules established for the media.
37. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 724.
40. 242 La. 431, 137 So. 2d 283 (1962).
41. 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
42. Id.
43. 373 U.S. at 726 (1963).
44. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
45. Id. at 535.
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The only live coverage was the prosecutor's argument to the jury and
the jury verdict, 4 although portions of the trial were filmed without
sound and shown on nightly newscasts with commentaries.4 7 The defense
attorney objected to his person being filmed during his summation, so
the camera was focused on the judge while the defense attorney con-
cluded his case. Estes' conviction was affirmed by the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals. 41
Estes appealed to the United States Supreme Court; one of the
grounds being that he had been deprived of due process of law by the
television of his trial. 49 The Court, in a five to four decision, reversed
Estes' conviction holding broadcasting of both the pretrial hearing and
the trial deprived the defendant of due process as afforded by the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution." The Court was
curiously divided, with six separate opinions constituting eighty-five
pages including numerous photographs of the courtroom. Consensus of
four of the five majority opinions indicates that the act of televising a
criminal trial is in itself a violation of due process and thus unconstitu-
tional." It is worthy to note that four of the five Justices who held this
restrictive view are no longer on the Court as of this date.5"
Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark began by describing the
conditions of the court in the initial hearing:
The video tapes of these hearings clearly illustrate that the picture pre-
sented was not one of that judicial serenity and calm to which the peti-
tioner was entitled. . . .1 Indeed, at least twelve cameramen were en-
gaged in the courtroom throughout the hearing taking motion and still
pictures and televising the proceedings. Cables and wires were snaked
across the courtroom floor, three microphones were on the judge's bench
and others were beamed at the jury box and counsel tables.
Based on his finding of the conditions of the trial court, Justice
46. Id. at 537.
47. Id.
48. 354 S.W. 2d 161 (Crim. App. 1961).
49. 381 U.S. at 533.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. They were Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Tom Clark, Justice Arthur
Goldberg, and Justice William 0. Douglas.
53. It is noted that the Supreme Court used both still photographs and videotapes
in making its determination in Estes.
54. 381 U.S. at 536.
o _
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Clark continued to discuss these effects on the press and trial partici-
pants. He found it was a misconception of the rights of the press" to
say the broadcasters were discriminated against in favor of the print
media simply because cameras, the tools of the broadcast trade, were
not allowed in the courtroom. The majority of the Court supported the
public's right to know what occurs in the courtroom but.not to the
extent it would deny the defendant a fair trial and due process. Revers-
ing the Texas decision, the Court delineated the problems created by the
presence of television equipment in the courts. A major concern of the
Court was the potential impact of television on the jurors, including the
distraction created by cameras and similar equipment. The fear that
jurors will be unable to properly perform their function in a "carnival"
atmosphere pervades the Estes opinion.
Moreover, the Estes Court recognized televising trials may create
potential problems including impairment of criminal trial testimony,
because witnesses could be influenced by what they saw or heard on
television or radio and a resulting additional burden could be placed on
the trial court. The Court conceded that some of the problems are
inherent in allowing print media reporting of courtroom activities, but
explained that the impact of the broadcast media could be more detri-
mental to courtroom decorum. The Court discussed the impact of televi-
sion on the defendant as a form of mental harassment."
Despite the holding of the majority that the judgment be reversed
because of the denial of the defendant's due process, the opinion ac-
knowledges the limitations of media equipment and technology as of
that date:
It is said that the ever-advancing techniques of public communications
and the adjustments of the public to its presence may bring about a
change in the effect of telecasting on the fairness of criminal trials. But
we are not dealing here with future developments in the field of electron-
ics. Our judgment cannot be rested on the hypotheses of tomorrow but
must take the facts as they are presented today.57
Chief Justice Warren, speaking for Justices Douglas and Goldberg,
concurred with the holding of Justice Clark, stating:
55. Id. at 539.
56. Id. at 545-52.
57. Id. at 551-52.
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I believe that it violates the Sixth Amendment for Federal Courts to allow
criminal trials to be televised to the public at large. I base this opinion
on three grounds: 'I) The televising of trials diverts the trial from its
proper purpose in that it has inevitable impact on all the trial partici-
pants; 2) that it gives the public the wrong impression about the purpose
of the trials, thereby detracting from the dignity of the court proceeding
and lessening the reliability of trials, and 3) that it singles out certain
defendants and-subjects them to trials under prejudicial conditions not
experienced by others."
The Chief Justice warned that unethical directors may choose to air only
the parts of films that depict their points of view leaving the defendant
in a false light before the public.-9 Moreover, if a mistrial were the result
of a broadcast trial, it would be difficult to find an impartial jury for a
second trial. In summary, Chief Justice Warren's opinion is that, "the
television camera. . . is not entitled to pervade the lives of.everyone in
disregard of constitutionally protected rights."' 0
In his dissent, Justice Stewart, speaking for Justices Black, Bren-
nan and White, found the televising of judicial proceedings had not been
shown unconstitutional on its face.6' He warned that because of pro-
gressing technology, the Court's firm decision on the subject in 1965 was
premature. 2
There are three noteworthy limitations regarding the case of Estes
v. Texas.63 First, the decision applies only to criminal trials; second,
there was no consent given by the parties; 4 third, Canon 28 of the Texas
Canon of Judicial Ethics, which allowed broadcast coverage of court
proceedings at the trial judge's discretion, contained a warning that
close supervision by the judge would be necessary to protect the dignity
of the proceedings. 5 At the conclusion of Estes in the United States
58. Id. at 565.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 585.
61. Id. at 601-602.
62. Id. at 615.
63. 381 U.S. 532.
64. Some commentators think the requirement of mandatory consent might have
led to a different decision. Electronic Media in the Courtroom, 385 F.O.I. RPT. (Febru-
ary, 1978). (Based on speech by Hon. J.P. Morgan, Chief Justice of the Missouri
Supreme Court).
65. B. McDonald, TV and News Coverage of the Courtroom, TEx. BAR J., at 170
(March, 1967). This article gives a good discussion of Texas' somewhat unique legal
views toward cameras in the courts during the decade of the 1960's.
A. .
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Supreme Court, Texas Canon 28 was so criticized that Texas prohibited
photographic coverage of all future state judicial proceedings."
In the following year, 1966, the United States Supreme Court
made a strong attempt to balance free press and free trial in the case of
Sheppard v. Maxwell.67 Following the trend already established, the
Court reversed denial of the petition for writ of habeas corpus of Dr.
Samuel Sheppard on the grounds that due process as guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment had been violated by press publicity resulting in
an unfair trial. 8 This decision brought about a new trial for Sheppard
and resulted in acquittal and freedom.69
According to Dr. Sheppard's version of the events of July 4, 1954,
he was awakened by the screams of his twenty-nine year old pregnant
wife.7" He ran upstairs to her room and wrestled with a shadowy form
of a man who knocked him unconscious. After recovering, Sheppard
checked his wife's pulse and found she was dead. He then checked his
son's room and found that he was not injured. Hearing a noise down-
stairs, Sheppard chased the shadowy form out of the house to the beach
of his lakefront property where he was again knocked unconscious.
After awakening, he returned to the house and called a neighbor. The
neighbor reportedly found Dr. Sheppard dazed and injured. Mrs. Shep-
pard was found dead in her bed having been beaten to death with a blunt
instrument.7 '
Media attention was focused on Dr. Sheppard almost immediately
and the press fell on the case like birds of prey. They began acquiring
information from Sheppard's family and neighbors; from Dr. Gurber,
the coroner, who told the press and his professional associates that it
was evident Sheppard had committed the crime and they should get a
confession from him; and from Captain Kerr of the Cleveland police
who, among other officials, urged that Dr. Sheppard be arrested. 72 The
66. Id.
67. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
68. Dr. Sheppard's conviction was affirmed by the Ohio Court of Appeals, 100
Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E. 2d 471 (1955); the Ohio Supreme Court denied his writ of
habeas corpus, 170 Ohio 551, 167 N.E. 2d 94 (1960); the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio granted a writ of habeas corpus, 231 F. Supp. 37
(1964), but the order was reversed by the appellate court, 346 F. 2d 707 (1964), cert.
granted, 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
69. 384 U.S. 333.
70. Id. at 336-37.
71. Id. at 337-38.
72. FRIENDLY and GOLDFARB, supra note 16, at 14.
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press repeated every allegation and suspicion.
Dr. Sheppard was arrested on July 30, 1954. All of the Cleveland
newspapers praised the arrest and reported favorable official comments
by the mayor and police chief. Extensive media coverage of the pretrial
proceedings continued until September 23rd.73 The United States Su-
preme Court took judicial notice of five volumes filled with newspaper
clippings representing the press' reporting from the time of the murder
until Sheppard's conviction in 1954.74
The trial began in mid-October and lasted forty-seven days with
almost ten thousand pages of transcript. 75 The courtroom during the
trial was in bedlam. This scene is described during the selection of the
jury: "courtroom overrun by cameras and cameramen . . . flashbulbs
were popping and huge lighting devices backed by powerful reflectors
were sprouting from chairs, tables and the floor. Defense counsel, Corri-
gan, rose to protest. . . 'They're standing on tables, sitting on railings
and hanging from the chandeliers,' he asserted. 'They're even taking
pictures of the jurors-that is, when they can get their lens past the
assistant prosecuting attorney trying to get into the picture!' -17
Although trial court Judge Blythin ruled that no pictures of any
kind could be taken in the courtroom during the duration of the trial,
this ruling was frequently and openly disregarded.77 The facts presented
on appeal clearly indicated the trial judge had lost control of his court-
room.78 It was noted by the United States Supreme Court that the trial
judge and chief prosecutor ran in elections which occurred during the
Sheppard trial with both incumbents being re-elected. 79
Jurors had access to all publications throughout the trial and were
sequestered only during their five days of deliberation." During the time
73. During the 53 days between arrest and trial, the Cleveland Press gave the
story a banner headline 23 times, lead position 28 times and front page story 31 times.
The Cleveland Press was the largest newspaper in Ohio at the time with a circula-
tion of 310,000. It was distributed in the afternoons. The Cleveland Plaindealer served
the area in the mornings. It is noted that the day the Sheppard verdict was announced
by the Ohio Court, 30,000 extra issues of the Press were printed and sold. See FRIENDLY
and GOLDFARB, supra note 16.
74. Justice Clark speaking for the Court, 384 U.S. at 341-42.
75. 384 U.S. at 346, 348.
76. FRIENDLY and GOLDFARB, supra note 16, at 18, made in reference to P.
HOLMES, THE SHEPPARD MURDER CASE (1967).
77. Id.
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the jury was sequestered, the jurors were allowed to make phone calls
to friends and family without any restrictions."1 As the result of the trial
in 1954, Dr. Sheppard was convicted of second-degree murder.82 Upon
petition for certiorari, Sheppard was granted a new trial on the ground
due process had been violated by the trial court's failure to protect the
doctor from prejudicial publicity."
Justice Clark, writing the opinion of the court, described the preju-
dicial nature of the events:
There can be no question about the nature of the publicity .. . . We
agree, as did the court of appeals, with the finding of Judge Bell's opinion
for the Ohio Supreme Court; "Murder and mystery, society, sex and
suspense were combined in this case . . . to intrigue and captivate the
public's fancy . . . .Throughout. . .the nine week trial, the circulation
conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the American public
in the bizarre. . . .In this atmosphere of a Roman Holiday for the news
media, Sam Sheppard stood on trial for his life."84
After describing and discussing these specified abuses by the press
in the Sheppard trial, the Clark opinion supports the traditional Ameri-
can values placed on freedom of the press:
A responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field ....
The press does not simply publish information about the trials, but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors
and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. 85
Justice Clark continued that, because of this function of the press as a
watchdog of the judiciary, the courts have been unwilling to totally
restrict the press from the courtrooms. Yet, as Justice Clark makes
clear, the due process afforded to a defendant must be carefully pre-
served with a jury able to come to a verdict based only on the evidence
submitted at trial rather than from distracting extraneous sources. 8
The United States Supreme Court found the fundamental error of
81. Id.
82. Id. at 335.
83. 382 U.S. 916 (1965).
84. 384 U.S. at 356, citing to State v. Sheppard, 165 Ohio St. 293, 294; 135 N.E.
2d 340, 342 (1956).
85. Id. at 350.
86. Id. at 361-62.
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the court below was that the trial judge, believing he lacked the power,
had not properly controlled the courtroom. He failed to restrain the
press and curtail the excessive publicity. The Supreme Court, stating
that the courtroom and courthouse premises are subject to the control
of the trial judge, found the carnival atmosphere could have been
avoided had appropriate measures been taken. 7 The following guide-
lines were suggested: 1) The number of reporters should be limited and
assigned seating areas selected; 2) certain prohibitions should be
clearly defined, such as keeping the press away from the exhibits; 3) the
trial court should insulate the witnesses; 4) the court should proscribe
extrajudicial statements by any witness, party, attorney or court offi-
cial. TheCourt further suggested that the jury should be sequestered
throughout the trial.8"
In reversing the denial of the Sheppard habeas corpus petition, the
Court stated that, where prejudice prevents a fair trial, a new trial
should always be granted. However, the Court suggests that justice will
be better served by the prevention of abuses in lieu of granting a new
trial: "[W]e must remember that reversals are but palatives, the cure
lies in those remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its
inception. The court must take some steps by rule and regulation that
will protect their processes from prejudicial, outside interference." 9
The warnings of the Supreme Court in Sheppard have been heeded
by both the press and the bench. The impact resulted in rulings in which
the courtroom doors were virtually locked to the press throughout the
country. Zealous, overly protective judges fought with equally zealous
reporters during the several years following Sheppard with perhaps the
American judicial system and the American public suffering the greatest
loss in most of the battles.
Finally, in 1972, the restrictive ban of the press from the courts was
lifted."
87. The state experiments re cameras in the court set out in the Appendix reveal
that the recommended guidelines have been established in response to Justice Clark's
warning.
88. 384 U.S. at 361-63.
89. Id. at 363.
90. The Code of Judicial Conduct including Canon 3-A(7) was adopted by the
House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on August 16, 1972.
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2. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
In 1972, a new Code of Judicial Conduct was unanimously ap-
proved by the American Bar Association House of Delegates. Canon
3-A(7) 9 of this new Code replaced former Canon 35. The new Canon
allowed a judge, at his discretion, to permit electronic or photographic
equipment in the courtroom for purposes of preserving evidence, mak-
ing the trial record and other specified judicial purposes. These purposes
included the following: 1) closed circuit television to another room to
accommodate a larger courtroom audience when necessary; 2) closed
circuit television to a press room so the press could move about with-
out distracting the trial participants; 3) closed circuit television to the
cell of a defendant who had proven unruly in the courtroom, and 4)
filming trials for editorial purposes as long as the trial participants
would not be distracted or the dignity of the proceedings impaired.
Film procured under these guidelines could not be shown to the public
until all appeals have come to final judgment. In addition, all parties
and witnesses must consent to the recording and reproduction. The
commentary following 3-A(7) states: "temperate conduct of judicial
proceedings is essential to the fair administration of justice. The re-
cording and reproduction of a proceeding should not distort or drama-
91. ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, CANON 3-A(7):
A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking photo-
graphs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto during sessions
of court or recesses between sessions, except that a judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation of evidence,
for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of investitive, cere-
monial, or naturalization proceedings;
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of appropriate
court proceedings under the following conditions:
(i) the means of recording will not distract participants or impair the
dignity of the proceedings;
(ii) the parties have consented, and the consent to being depicted or re-
corded has been obtained from each witness appearing in the recording and
reproduction;
(iii) the reproduction will not be exhibited until after the proceeding has
been concluded and all direct appeals have been exhausted; and
(iv) the reproduction will be exhibited only for instructional purposes in
educational institutions.
Commentary: Temperate conduct of judicial proceedings is essential to the fair
administration of justice. The recording and reproduction of a proceeding should
not distort or dramatize the proceeding.
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tize the proceedings." Although 3-A(7) was apparently more liberal
than Canon 35, it did not substantially affect the status quo because the
judicial type of proceedings which were allowed to be televised under
3-A(7) had little, if any, newsworthiness. The Code was in keeping with
the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Sheppard which gave the
trial judge the responsibility of maintaining courtroom decorum, but
3-A(7) provided little additional opportunity for the press to serve its
function as "handmaiden of effective judicial administration," as the
United States Supreme Court aptly described in the Sheppard
decision.92
Prior to the adoption of 3-A(7) by the American Bar Association
in 1972, only three states had experimented with modification of the
prohibitions of Canon 35.93 Texas had formerly allowed electronic
media into courts at the trial judge's discretion under its Canon 28 of
the Integrated State Bar of Texas.9" After the United States Supreme
Court's reversal of Estes v. Texas, 5 the State of Texas adopted the
American Bar Association's Canon 35." Continuing to adhere to the
American Bar Association guidelines, Texas adopted Canon 3-A(7) to
replace Canon 3597 in 1972.
Oklahoma, in an attempt to experiment with media in the court-
room, began its first live coverage of a trial in Oklahoma City in Decem-
ber, 1953." The state supreme court ruled in 1958 that the decision to
televise the trial was a matter of judicial discretion.9 A conflict was
created in 1959 when Oklahoma adopted a modification of Canon 35
which prohibited televising of actual proceedings. °10 The question of
cameras in Oklahoma courts became more enigmatic in 1961 when the
Oklahoma Supreme Court again held that the matter lay at the discre-
tion of the trial judge.' These conflicts were apparently resolved in
1976 when Oklahoma adopted 3-A(7) of the American Bar Association
92. 384 U.S. at 350.
93. Danna, supra note 7 at 3, and OKLAHOMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No.
35. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §1, App. 4 (West 1966).
94. See 27 TEx. BAR J. 102 (1964).
95. 381 U.S. 532.
96. Id.
97. TEXAS CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 3-A(7), TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN.
(Vernon Cumm. Supp. 1972).
98. GILMORE, supra note 20, at 31.
99. Lyles v. State, 330 P. 2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
100. OKLAHOMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 35, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§ I, App. 4 (West 1966).
101. Cody v. State, 361 P. 2d 307 (Okla. Crim. App. 1961).
Am •
33
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
28 Nova Law Journal 3:1979
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The third state to experiment with modification of the prohibition
of Canon 35 before 1972 was Colorado. In 1956, the Colorado. Supreme
Court adopted its own modified version of Canon 35.103 From that time
until the present, Colorado has allowed some form of electronic cover-
age of trials. Because of the lengthy and also current experiments by
Colorado, the full story of its experience is included in the Appendix
under current usage of experiments of cameras in the courtroom. 104
In recent years, numerous states have attempted to create specific
and special codes by which their judiciary may experiment with cameras
in the courts. A complete explanation of these experiments can be found
in the Appendix.
3. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST CAMERAS IN THE
COURTROOM
The discussion of these arguments pertains to the general issue of
whether there should be audio and/or visual recording of court proceed-
ings under established guidelines and limitations. The type of filming
and recording within the limitations and purposes of allowing such ac-
tivities may vary; therefore, the arguments for cameras in the courtroom
are not aimed at expressed unlimited access. Rather, the argument for
allowing broadcast media in the courtroom is defined as falling within
a range of any position opposite a complete ban or prohibition of cam-
eras in the courts.
PRO: The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press de-
mands that the broadcast media not be discriminated against in
favor of the print media.
CON: The obtrusive nature of electronic media demands that it
be prohibited from the courts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Estes v. Texas01 s
is still the governing law on this issue. Justice Clark, speaking for
102. OKLAHOMA CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS No. 3-A(7), OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
5, § 1, App. 4 (West Cumm. Supp. 1976).
103. In Re Hearings concerning Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, 132
Col. 591, 296 P. 2d 465 (1956).
104. See Appendix.
105. 381 U.S. 532.
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the Court, said, "so long as a television industry, like other communica-
tions media, is free to send representatives to trial and report on those
trials to viewers, there is no abridgment of the freedom of the press."' 6
Yet, the Justice continued, "when the advances in these arts (broadcast
news reporting) permit reporting by printing press or by television with-
out their present hazard to a free trial, we will have another case."',"
Controversy on this subject continues. In response to the challenge
to advance the art and skills of televising, substantial improvements in
equipment have been made by the industry. These advancements in
quality of televising techniques have created contradictory results in the
courts. This is dramatically illustrated by the directly opposite results
regarding" permission for broadcast media to cover state executions. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has ruled it is
constitutional to exclude television from executions while admitting the
print media; but a United States District Court in Texas has ruled it is
discriminatory to exclude television from an execution when print media
is admitted. These and other judicial opinions"°s which are clearly in
conflict are the result of courts taking notice of the advancements in
broadcasting technology and the current judicial experiments allowing
cameras in the courtroom. The uncertainty resulting from the conflict-
ing opinions suggest that the time has arrived for the United States
Supreme Court to hear the "other case" predicted by Justice Clark.
PRO: The public has a right to know.
CON: The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a public
trial to the defendant; not to the public.
The Estes decision also spoke to this issue. Justice Clark stated the
purpose of the constitutional requirement was "to guarantee that the
accused would be fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned."'' 9 An
argument may then be made that, as long as a courtroom remains open
to the public, there is no reason why electronic media should be auto-
matically eliminated. The theory behind the people's right to know is
well illustrated by the case of Minnesota v. Laura Miller, an unreported
106. Id. at 585.
107. Id.
108. See Morgan, Electronic Media in the Courtroom, 385 F.O.I. Rpr. (Feb.
1978). This author cites other examples including a U.S. District Court in California
ruling that it is discriminatory to admit the print media into prisons while excluding
television.
109. 381 U.S. at 538-39.
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criminal case, broadcast by radio.110 In that decision, Judge Moriarity
stated:
This is the people's court and the people have the right to know what is
going on and how it is conducted. It is true and fundamental that all the
people cannot assemble in the courtroom and be present while cases are
tried; yet, all the people have a right to do that. That is why we have, in
every courtroom in the United States of America a place for the people
to come into the courtroom and to sit down and observe what is transpir-
ing. That rule is just as sacred and recognized in the Supreme Court of
the United States as it is here in this town. So that for the benefit of those
who are not present, when cases are tried, the very essence of democracy
requires that the information which is produced in the course of a trial
and the way and manner in which a trial is conducted, and the proceed-
ings of the trial should be reported to the people."'
The present trend to allow limited access to the courtroom is apparently
in sympathy with this view expressed by Judge Moriarity.
Included within an accused's sixth amendment rights is that of a
public trial. This guarantee has been recognized by the United States
Supreme Court to be a benefit afforded the defendant as a safeguard
against the use of our judicial system as an instrument of persecution.112
Commentators have long endorsed the theory that the right of a public
trial belongs to the defendant.113 Accordingly, the United States Su-
preme Court established in the case of In Re Oliver"4 that:
The requirements of a public trial is for the benefit of the accused; that
the public may see he is fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned and
that the presence of interested spectators may keep his triers keenly alive
to a sense of their responsibility, and to the importance of their func-
tion. .... "I
It would constitute a misstatement of the sixth amendment to convert
110. Lerner, Limitation Imposed on Television and Radio: A Problem That
Needs Immediate Attention, 39 A.B.A. J. 570 (July, 1953).
i11. Id.
112. In Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948).
113. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, at 647 (8th ed. 1927), and Douglas,
The Public Trial and Free Press, 33 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1960). Radin, The Right
to Public Trial, 6 TEMPLE L. J., 381 (1932).
114. 333 U.S. 257.
115. Id. at 270.
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what is essentially the right of a particular accused into a privilege of
entry into every trial by the press. It is conceded, however, that criminal
trials will be open to the public and the press. There is a general agree-
ment that the respective interests of the public's right to know and the
defendant's right to a fair and public trial will most often coincide;
however, when these interests come into conflict, the rights of the de-
fendant should be superior.
PRO: Electronic coverage of court proceedings guarantees dig-
nity and decorum in the courtroom.
CON: Electronic coverage of court proceedings creates loss of
dignity and decorum in the court.
In Sheppard and Estes, along with other sensational cases discussed
in the historical section of this paper, the sanctity of the courtroom was
obviously desecrated. A principle reason for this desecration was the
broadcast media's obtrusive, noisy equipment employed at that time.
The current experiments show that these types of annoyances have been
eliminated or seriously curtailed. Also, reports of current court proceed-
ings reveal that the press has matured and has therefore become more
professionally responsible. It is an obvious fact that dignity and deco-
rum cannot be disrupted by the presence of broadcasters unless the
presiding judge loses control of the courtroom. In the areas where press
and bench have established standards for allowing electronic coverage
of court proceedings, the underlying premise is that the discretion of the
presiding judge controls. The judge's orders govern the activities of
everyone, including the press; inside the courtroom and often in areas
adjacent to the courtroom as well."'
116. The effect of cameras on court decorum is best evaluated by participants of
a filmed trial. The following questions were submitted to Florida trial participants-
reported in a sample survey of the attitudes of individuals associated with trials involving
electronic media and still photography coverage in selected Florida courts between July
5, 1977 and June 30, 1978:
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic, or radio coverage in
the courtroom disrupt the trial?
Juror Witness
1. Not at all 77.6% 1. Not at all 57.0%
2. Slightly 14.3% 2. Slightly 24.3%
3. Moderately 5.3% 3. Moderately 11.1%
4. Very 2.6% 4. Very 4.4%
5. Extremely .2% 5. Extremely 3.3%
1 3:1979
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Testimony for the enhancement of courtroom decorum due to the
presence of the broadcast media was given by an Alabama Circuit
Judge. "I have never seen such decorum," Circuit Judge Robert Hod-



















To what extent were you aware of the presence of television, photographic or radio
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Alabama, "the prosecutor was on his toes, the clerks- remained seated
for the first time in 30 years."117 Therefore, it can be reasonably con-
cluded that the earlier fear that the broadcast media would necessarily
constitute a threat to judicial dignity in the courtroom is no longer a
valid reason for total exclusion of all electronic coverage in all court
proceedings. It must be conceded, however, that this conclusion is based
upon the expectation of the high level of maturity and dignity exhibited
by members of the press in their continued attempt to convince the
judiciary that they should be allowed into the courtroom. Nevertheless,
at the first indication that this high level of conduct is in lapse, the judge
has and should exercise the power to immediately remove the press from
the courtroom.
PRO: Cameras in the courts will educate the public and gain its
respect for the judicial system as well as serve as a crime deterrent.
CON: Cameras in the courts entertain the public, giving them the
wrong idea about our judicial system by sensationalizing and com-
mercializing; thus creating public resentment and disrespect for the
judicial system.
In his opinion in Estes, Chief Justice Warren expressed a serious
concern with the commerciality of television and its effect on the view-
ing public. He worried that there is no assurance the public would not
inherently distrust the entire system of justice following an intimate
association with such a commercial enterprise as television. He found
that the sense of dignity and integrity, which should be associated with
the courtroom, would become lost if the presentation of the trial was
too commercialized."" "Televised trials," the Chief Justice argued,
"would not only affect those involved in the trial process, but those who
During the trial, to what extent did you want to see or hear yourself in the media?
Juror Witness
I. Not at all 72.3% 1. Not at all 62.5%
2. Slightly 18.6% 2. Slightly 18.5%
3. Moderately 5.7% 3. Moderately 12.5%
4. Very 2.9% 4. Very 4.2%
5. Extremely 5% 5. Extremely 2.2%
117. Television Gaining in Courtroom Access, 65 THE QUILL 7 (May, 1977).
118. 381 U.S. at 574.
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observe the trial process."' 9 "The purpose of a trial is not to entertain
or even to educate the public, valuable as those goals may be," Chief
Justice Warren declared.' He implied that, whatever its educational
potential, a trial could easily be changed into a propaganda vehicle.' 2,
The problem of commercialization and sensationalism may con-
tinue to exist. It is necessary to seek workable solutions for these prob-
lems. On the other hand, it is equally difficult to formulate exacting
regulations since each proceeding covered by the media has its own,
unique problems. For example: in Florida the Public Broadcasting Ser-
vice televised State of Florida v. Ronney Zamora,22 thus avoiding
commercials in the broadcast of the proceedings. In addition, some
state guidelines have specifically discouraged opinionated commentary
on the part of the broadcasters.'2
Sensationalism may inadvertently be the result of inaccurate and
superficial reporting by the news media. Although newspaper editors
have dealt with this problem for years and some have abused it while
others have not; it would seem that, due to the stronger impact of
television on the general public, the burden of responsibility is heavier
on the broadcasters. Because of this greater potential impact, the courts
have been less likely to trust the broadcast media with the burden.
The broadcast industry has been given a public trust and is bound
to act in the public interest, convenience and necessity. 24 As gatekeepers
of the news, broadcasters have an ethical duty to fairly and accurately
report legal proceedings. However, inherent in reporting is a risk of
inaccuracy or misstatement due to portions of the trial being presented
out of context. It quickly becomes apparent that the present state ex-
periments do not resolve this difficulty because, although the discretion
of the trial judge controls the actual courtroom filming procedure and
technique, it remains completely within the discretion of the broadcaster
to determine what is actually shown to the public on the air. One pro-
posed remedy for resolving this potential problem of inaccurate report-
ing is to permit electronic coverage of trials in their entirety. While this
remedy removes the potential harmful effects resulting from discretion-
ary editing, it imposes the equally impossible burden of filming com-
119. Id. at 575.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Case No. 77-25123-A (1lth Cir. Ct. 1977).
123. See Appendix for the state experiment.
124. Federal Communications Act 1934, 47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (1934).
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plete court proceedings despite their length. The result of such a require-
ment would virtually prohibit electronic broadcasting of trials due to the
expense and the airtime required for audience viewing.
Therefore, a delicate balance must be maintained between the
broadcast industry's responsibility to report newsworthy events to the
public and its equally important responsibility to fairly protect the re-
spective interests of the trial participants. An ethical burden reflecting
this balance is imposed upon the decision-making broadcast personnel
who handle the reporting of courtroom activities.
This problem and its potential ramifications have not been ade-
quately addressed by the American Bar Association or the courts. It is
submitted that a joint study conducted by the American Bar Association
and the National Association of Broadcasters is necessary to establish
general guidelines upon which broadcasters may rely when making edi-
torial decisions. Moreover, legal remedies should be established for
breach of these standards.
.It has been alleged that cameras in the courtroom, with full cover-
age of trials, would act as a deterrent to crime. In researching, the
writers surprisingly found that there was virtually no information to
support or defeat this theory, not because it is not a valid suggestion,
but simply because not enough time has elapsed since the current usage
of cameras in the courts has begun to substantiate a valid study on
criminal deterrence. Until a substantial study has been completed, the
effect cannot be determined. A prime consideration is whether or not
the public will actually watch televised court proceedings enough to
cause a deterrence. Viewers in Florida expressed a high degree of inter-
est in the case of Florida v. Ronney Zamora characterized by higher
Neilson Ratings than any other program in its time period.12 Whether
this is due to an intellectual curiosity or an appetite for the sensational
is unanswerable. Again, only the passage of time will reveal if the public
is watching televised trials because they are entertainment or because
of a genuine educational motivation.
PRO: Impact of the presence of the broadcast media on trial
participants causes the quality of the proceedings to be enhanced.
125. Report to the Supreme Court of Florida, re: Conduct of Audio-visual Trial
Coverage of State v. Zamora, submitted by Circuit Judge H: Paul Baker of the Eleventh
Judicial District of Florida, Criminal Division, pages 2 and .3. This report addresses
itself to each paragraph of the Supreme Court's order originally allowing such electronic
coverage in the courts.
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CON: Impact of the presence of the broadcast media on trial
participants causes the quality of the proceedings to be diminished.
Justice Clark, stating the majority opinion in Estes, gave the gen-
eral rule of the Court on this issue. The potential impact of the televising
on witnesses, jurors, trial judge and defendant was a major concern. The
court expressed a fear that the television crew and equipment would
distract the jury. In addition, awareness of the media's presence could
potentially distract the trial participants and create fear and excitement,
resulting in forgetfulness or over-statement. Moreover, the trial judge
could exhibit undesirable psychological reactions to the presence of
cameras."' 8 Current experiments with cameras in the courtroom indicate
the fears expressed by Justice Clark have proven to be overstated. 121
Jurors: There is inherent, in electronic coverage of court proceed-
ings, a possibility that jurors will be distracted by media equipment and
personnel. The current experiments being conducted attempt to elimi-
nate these distractions through the use of unobtrusive film and recording
devices and by requiring that personnel and their equipment remain
stationary throughout the trial. Reports from Florida indicate jurors
have not been particularly distracted from their jobs as fact finders.12s
126. 381 U.S. at 548.
127. See note 116 supra.
128. See note 116 supra for the source of these statistics.
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
the courtroom make the jurors self-conscious?
Court Personnel Attorney
I. Not at all 29.0% I. Not at all 32.6%
2. Slightly 36.0% 2. Slightly 26.4%
3. Moderately 18.0% 3. Moderately 17.8%
4. Very 11.0% 4. Very 12.4%
5. Extremely 6.0% 5. Extremely 10.9%
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
the courtroom make the jurors more attentive?
Court Personnel Attorney
1. Not at all 55.1% 1. Not at all 55.4%
2. Slightly 21.4% 2. Slightly 26.9%
3. Moderately 11.2% 3. Moderately 14.6%
4. Very 8.2% 4. Very 2.3%
5. Extremely 4.1% 5. Extremely .8%
1 36 3:1979 1
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A study done by Florida Technological University (now University of
Central Florida), cited by Judge Paul Baker when addressing the So-
ciety of Professional Journalists in Mobile, Alabama, reported that the
jurors in Florida have not been detrimentally affected by cameras and
recorders in the courtroom.12 ' Judge Baker, in a report to the Florida
Supreme Court, 30 specifically responds to Justice Clark's prediction as
to the impact of the cameras on the jurors, saying, "no such problems
were apparent in the Ronney Zamora trial."131
The potential problems can be virtually eliminated if a trial judge
makes use of his control over the participants. Sequestration and judi-
cial admonishment of the jury should insure consistent quality of the
court proceedings despite the broadcast media's presence.
Witnesses: Justice Clark's prediction of the effect of cameras on
witnesses has the support of Florida's Judge Baker. He says:
This court must concur with Mr. Justice Clark's concern regarding the
possible violation of the rule against witnesses. The rule, of course, is
discretionary but when invoked should not be violated. It is felt, however,
that the learned Justice misplaced his concern when he directed it toward
television and radio broadcast. Trials of great public interest are not
confined to greater detail on the printed page. The witness who would
violate the rule by watching portions of a trial on television or listen to
radio broadcasts is the same witness, who without hesitation, devours
every word in a newspaper article which he had been instructed not to
read. Compliance with the rule is a matter of integrity on the part of the
witness, and if he violates the court's instructions, there are sufficient
sanctions available to the trial judge to admonish him.132
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
the courtroom make the jurors nervous?
Court Personnel Attorney
I. Not at all 47.0% 1. Not at all 36.1%
2. Slightly 28.0% 2. Slightly 30.8%
3. Moderately 16.0% 3. Moderately 12.0%
4. Very 3.0% 4. Very 15.0%
5. Extremely 6.0% 5. Extremely 6.0%
129. Address by Judge Baker, Region III Convention of the Society of Profes-
sional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, in Mobile, Alabama (March 17, 1978).
130. See note 125 supra.
131. Id. at 15.
132. Id.
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Other possible effects on witnesses which may diminish the quality
of proceedings are that witnesses may be intimidated by the media, be
given to understatement, or even be afraid to come forward as a wit-
ness. 33 One rebuttal to these objections is that a responsible citizen
133. See note 116 supra for the source of these statistics.
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
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who becomes a witness will fulfill what is considered to be a public
responsibility no matter what type of press coverage is present. This, of
course, does not resolve the objection of press intimidation raised by a
witness who does not voluntarily testify but is subpoenaed to appear.
While there is a possibility that the presence of the broadcast media.may
enhance the quality of a witness' testimony by causing witnesses to
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
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speak more precisely, accurately and with less tendency to wander and
roam in their presentations of evidence; the true value of the media's
presence lies in its effect of reducing the likelihood that witnesses will
perjure themselves because of the knowledge that there are potential
viewers who are aware of their veracity. On the other hand, the witness'
knowledge of observation by the general public may intimidate and
inhibit the witnesses or cause their failure to testify truthfully due to fear
of reprisal.
While some of the potential problems that may be created for a
witness by electronic media coverage of court proceedings can be alle-
viated by stressing the obligations of duty of a responsibly minded
citizen, this does not eliminate all the potential problems.
Attorneys: It may be argued that attorneys will resort to theatrics
to dramatize the televised trial. However, the Clarence Darrow trials of
the past rarely occur and cases today are decided more on the basis of
a presentation of relevant and logical evidence, than on a fiery, emo-
tional oration to a jury. The final determination of this issue is placed
on the integrity of the particular attorneys involved. A responsible attor-
ney will be concerned only with what is best for his client, and will be
oblivious to the type of reporters or equipment in the courtroom. 134
134. See note 116 supra for the source of these statistics.
a. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the attorneys nervous?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the opposing attorney nervous?
c. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make you nervous?
a. Court Personnel b. Attorney's view c. Attorney's view
of opposing of him/herself
attorney
I. Not at all 42.9% I. Not at all 59.8% 1. Not at all 60.0%
2. Slightly 32.4% 2. Slightly 27.9% 2. Slightly 26.7%
3. Moderately 6.9% 3. Moderately 5.7% 3. Moderately 8.0%
4. Very 4.9% 4. Very 4.9% 4. Very 3.3%
5. Extremely 2.9% 5. Extremely 1.6% 5. Extremely 2.0%
a. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the attorneys better prepared?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the opposing attorney better prepared?
c. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make you better prepared?
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a. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom distract the attorneys?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
iri the courtroom distract the opposing attorney?
c. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage































a. To what extent .did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the attorneys self-conscious?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the opposing attorney self-conscious?
c. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make you self-conscious?
a. Court Personnel





























a. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic coverage in the
courtroom make the attorneys more attentive?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic coverage in the
courtroom make the opposing attorney more attentive?
c. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic, or radio coverage
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Judge Baker suggests that any attorney who solicits television publicity
to enhance his case should be disbarred."' It is submitted that a sanc-
tion of this nature is a valid study which should be undertaken by the
American Bar Association while considering new rules pertaining to
cameras in the courtroom.
Judges: The situation-comedy-stereotype of a judge portrayed as
sleeping-on-the-bench or preoccupied with members of his audience
may be real or imagined. In either case, one potential benefit created
by allowing cameras into the courtroom is a guarantee of judicial atten-
tiveness and a decrease in the abuse of judicial discretion. 3 There is a
a. Court Personnel





























a. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the attorneys' actions flamboyant?
b. To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make the opposing attorney's actions flamboyant?
c. To what extent did the presence of teleyision, photographic or radio coverage
in the courtroom make your actions flamboyant?
a. Court Personnel





























135. Address by Judge H. Paul Baker, Circuit Judge of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit of Florida (Criminal Div.), Ethics, Television and the Courtroom, Nova Uni-
versity Law Center in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (April 3, 1978).
136. See note 116 supra for the source of these statistics.
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
the courtroom make the judge more attentive?
Court Personnel
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chance, however, that the new attentiveness of the trial judge may be
aimed toward the television camera rather than toward the best interest
of justice. Some of the plans for media coverage have recommended
remedies to prevent a judge from becoming preoccupied with camera
locations or lighting arrangements. Florida's Judge Baker suggests .that
a judge should not have personal contact with the press during the trial
because it leads to abuses by both the press and the judiciary."' Judge
Baker, as a result of his personal experience with cameras in the Florida
courts, has stated that:
Mr. Justice Clark (in his opinion in Estes) points out that television is
particularly bad when the judge is elected and notes that such is the case
in all but six states. He noted that it would be difficult for judges to
remain oblivious to the pressures that the news media can bring, both
directly and through the shaping of public opinion. This court, with the
deepest respect to Mr. Justice Clark, disagrees. The judge's conduct in
the course of a trial should not be screened from public scrutiny. This is
especially true since the judicial branch of this government is the only
bulwark that stands as a shield between the people and the executive
sword. The public has the right to know whether a judge is decisive or
indecisive; attentive or inattentive; courteous or rude; whether or not he
can maintain control over trial proceedings, and if he appears learned or
confused. To this extent, it makes little difference whether the judge is
observed by spectators in the courtroom or by spectators during televi-
sion.'
Another problem which must be recognized is that the media may
attempt to exert political pressure on a judge. Many of the judges in this
4. Very 5.7% 4. Very 6.4%
5. Extremely 3.8% 5. Extremely 4.3%
To what extent did the presence of television, photographic or radio coverage in
the courtroom make the judge nervous?
Court Personnel Attorneys
I. Not at all 78.1% 1. Not at all 60.1%
2. Slightly 14.3% 2. Slightly 23.2%
3. Moderately 3.8% 3. Moderately 10.1%
4. Very 3.8% 4. Very 2.9%
5. Extremely 0% 5. Extremely 3.6%
137. See note 135 supra.
138. See note 125 supra.
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country are elected and therefore in need of the press as an advocate;
not as an adversary. Political pressure can be exerted by press criticism
or even political blackouts from the media. Due to the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of the press, the media is able to exercise great
discretion in determining which public officials or candidates for public
office will be given editorial attention. Due to the subtle nature of this
discretion, it can be used unscrupulously and does not lend itself to
control. It must be remembered that the judge and prosecutor of the
Sheppard case were political candidates and benefited from the noto-
riety of the press coverage. While these candidates appear to have
gained public support from the press attention, a contrary result is
equally likely. Although this type of situation may be remote, chances
for such political pressure on judges continues to exist. The integrity of
the judge and the press and the adequacy of the governing standards are
key factors in preventing potential detriment to a judge due to the
presence of cameras in the court. Again, it is submitted that the Ameri-
can Bar Association and the National Association of Broadcasters
should join forces to create appropriate guidelines and sanctions to
prevent such abuses by the press.
The Defendant: There are meritorious benefits to the criminal de-
fendant when the electronic media is admitted into the courtroom. The
presence of live cameras can substantially augment the court's efforts
to provide a fair trial by giving an accurate presentation of the proceed-
ings to the public. On the other hand, there are serious detriments which
may be suffered by the defendant. The most significant of these are the
invasion of privacy and the denial of a fair trial due to prejudicial
publicity. These will be discussed in the next section of this paper.
Because of biases inherent in human nature, the viewing of a trial
by mass television audiences can create a. potential irreparable prejudice
to the defendant regardless of whether he is found guilty or innocent.
One may be acquitted by the jury, but convicted by the public, thus
preventing the defendant from living a normal life. The emotional im-
pact on home viewers of exposure to the realism of a criminal trial
combined with the enormous size in both numbers-of-people and
geographic-viewing area, forces the defendant to become a post-trial
public figure whether he is convicted or acquitted. This status of public
figure will pervade his entire personal and private life. The potentiality
of this harm to a defendant is so expansive and of such enormous
magnitude that a legal tort remedy for the benefit of the defendant must
be created before our judicial system can sustain the burden of subject-
ing a party to such a risk.
1 44
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An equally compelling theory of irreparable prejudice is presented
to a co-defendant granted a severance and tried at a time after the first
co-defendant's trial was conducted with cameras in the courtroom. The
televising of the first trial destroys the value of the severance and the
public exposure makes it potentially impossible for the second defend-
ant to obtain a fair trial.
The potential tort liability of the broadcast media and court admin-
istrators and the threat to a co-defendant's rights to a speedy and fair
trial are areas which need to be studied by a combined committee
organized by the American Bat Association and the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters.
PRO: Electronic coverage can prevent prejudicial publicity.
CON: Electronic coverage of court proceedings invade the pri-
vacy of the defendant and create unfair publicity before, during
and after the proceedings.
In an exploration of a defendant's constitutional guarantee to a fair
trial, the matter of the invasion of a defendant's right to privacy must
first be examined. Obviously, any rule established regarding press cover-
age of the defendant and his trial must strike a balance between the right
of a free press and the defendant's right to privacy. The Brandeis treatise.
on "The Right to Privacy" establishes the standard, "the right to pri-
vacy does not prohibit the communication of any matter, though in its
nature private, when the publication is made under circumstances which
would not render it a privileged communication according to the law of
slander and libel." ' Applying this standard, the publication of any
statement made in a court of justice does not constitute an invasion of
privacy.
While the application of the Brandeis standard can resolve the
invasion of privacy issue, the defendant's objection of prejudicial public-
ity is far more compelling and difficult to resolve. The Sheppard and
Estes decisions clearly indicate a realization by the United States Su-
preme Court that trial publicity may be of such an inflammatory nature
that it is inherently prejudicial to the defendant. As a result, a defendant
may be granted a reversal of his conviction on the ground he has been
denied due process as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, without
showing any specific instances of prejudicial publicity.
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The basic approach of our criminal justice system has been to allow
an occasional abuse on the ground that such an abuse is the price a free
society must pay to protect the broader fundamental freedoms. In an
attempt to provide the defendant a fair trial, without curtailing the
activities of the press, corrective adjustments have been utilized. These
include: 1) a change of venue to an area beyond the publicity zone; 2)
voir dire examination to eliminate prospective jurors who have been
influenced by pre-trial publicity; 3) the sequestration of juries; 4) the
postponement of a trial; 5) mistrials; 6) new trials and 7) express in-
structions from judge to jury regarding publicity."' While these rec-
ommendations are helpful, they do not provide a complete and satis-
factory resolution to the problem of prejudicial publicity.
Several state court systems are presently utilizing an additional
precaution of requiring the broadcaster to obtain the defendant's affir-
mative consent to have his trial televised or filmed by the electronic
media.'4 The consent requirement goes to the heart of the constitutional
dilemma since the failure of the defendant to grant consent would result
in barring the press from the courtroom. Whether or not the provision
for an affirmative consent by the defendant or other trial participants
is a constitutional requirement can only be determined by the judiciary,
but guidelines should be established on this issue.
Pre-trial prejudicial publicity can best be corrected by a change of
venue and careful selection of jurors. The threat of prejudicial publicity
from electronic reproduction of the trial may be highly exaggerated. The
viewer is exposed to testimony carefully controlled by the rules of evi-
dence which are designed to eliminate all irrelevant or highly prejudicial
material. Moreover, the viewing audience can observe that, in a trial
designed to ascertain the truth, the accused is innocent until proven
guilty. It is submitted that publicity of this nature is less prejudicial than
the current speculation by a poorly informed public whose source of
information is the press conferences conducted by prosecutors and other
attorneys.
The threat of prejudicial publicity due to the presence of cameras
in the courtroom continues. Only a mature and responsible press and
judiciary working together can minimize this threat.
140. L. Powell, The Right to a Fair Trial, 51 ABA J. 536 (June 1965).
141. These state requirements of consent are set out in the Appendix.
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3. SUMMARY
Since the mid-1970's, there has been a renewed interest in whether
the electronic media should be admitted to court proceedings. Gener-
ally, the broadcast media with its tools of trade-the cameras and re-
corders-has been barred from the American courtroom.
Meanwhile, television has become the number one news source in
the country. Prior to the present experiments allowing limited media
access to the courts, artist sketches of judicial proceedings had to satisfy
the visual report of the news.
The principle issue which must be resolved is whether allowing
electronic media access to the courtroom is compatible with the consti-
tutional guarantee of a fair trial and the orderly administration of jus-
tice.
The interest of the press has been devoted to criminal trials but
questions remain unanswered. The media should be allowed"to electron-
ically reproduce trials of a highly personal or domestic nature. Besides
proving costly, no positive benefits to society can likely be obtained.
Admittance or denial of the media into a courtroom should be based
on the nature and purpose of the trial, rather than the traditional classi-
fication of criminal versus civil. The acknowledged public interest in the
general newsworthiness of criminal trials and civil trials designed to
redress or remedy a wrongful act may justify the courts' admission of
the broadcast media into the courtroom. However, there are cases which
fall even within these classifications which have limited newsworthiness
and subject the parties to personal indignities and embarrassments. Jus-
tice and common decency demand that such parties have access to the
courts without being subjected to electronic press coverage to merely
satisfy public curiosity. This is well illustrated by the publicity and
undesirable social impact that would be imposed upon a rape victim by
the electronic coverage of a rape prosecution. Moreover, hearings for
the dissolution of marriage or for determining the custody of children
are trials of a personal nature having no legitimate public interest. The
broadcasting of such trials would constitute sensationalism designed to
fulfill public curiosity and can only have detrimental effects on the
parties. It is conceded that a substantial number of civil trials may prove
worthy of news coverage and that audio and video excerpts from the
actual trial proceedings can bring the reality of our judicial system
closer to the citizenry than our present system of artists' cardboard
sketches and attorney press releases.
The press, bench and bar have made substantial progress in the
maturation process since the time of the Hauptmann trial. The over-
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reaction resulting from Estes and Sheppard has diminished as the bench
and bar created committees to consider the feasibility of electronic
media in the courts. Moreover, both decisions were five to four votes
and a major change in Justices in the United States Supreme Court has
occurred since those cases were heard. How the Court would resolve the
issue of cameras in the courts today is a matter of conjecture. Only three
facts are clear: 1) the electronic media can be compatible with the
administration of justice if proper standards and guidelines are estab-
lished; 2) a new United States Supreme Court decision on the subject
of a constitutional guarantee is needed and 3) a cooperative study by
the American Bar Association and the National Association of Broad-
casters is indicated to establish reasonable and uniform standards.
There is clearly a current trend in favor of electronic coverage of
court proceedings as indicated by the recent experiments initiated by
various state bar associations.' Public opinion polls, based on inter-
views with attorneys' judges and community leaders, indicate a general
approval of electronic media coverage.4 3 The organized bar revealed a
change in attitude at the 1978 mid-year meeting of the American Bar
Association,' but the American Bar Association, at its 1978 annual
meeting, failed to adopt any change in Canon 3-A(7)"4 in spite of the
142. See Appendix for explanation.
143. See note 116 supra for the source of these statistics.
Overall, would you favor or oppose allowing television, photographic or radio
coverage in the courtroom?
Juror Witness
I. Completely in Favor 49.1% I. Completely in Favor 41.3%
2. Slightly in Favor 15.8% 2. Slightly in Favor 14.6%
3. No Opinion 8.8% 3. No Opinion 8.3%
4. Slightly Opposed 10.7% 4. Slightly Opposed 11.5%
5. Completely Opposed 15.6% 5. Completely Opposed 24.3%
Court Personnel Attorney
I. Completely in Favor 36.1% I. Completely in Favor 38.9%
2. Slightly in Favor 11.1% 2. Slightly in Favor 17.4%
3. No Opinion 11.1% 3. No Opinion 2.0%
4. Slightly Opposed 16.7% 4. Slightly Opposed 12.8%
5. Completely Opposed 25.0% 5. Completely Opposed 28.9%
144. See note 2 supra.
145. Id.
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fact the National Conference of Chief Justices had approved a camera
in the courts provision at its July, 1978 meeting.'46
One conclusion is clear. "The press and judiciary are mutually
interdependent-the press must have an uncoerced judiciary to maintain
freedom of the press-the judiciary requires an uncensored press to
maintain an uncoerced judiciary."' 47 Because of this interdependence,
the cooperation and experiments between the press, bench and bar
should continue; but the path will be more swift and sure if lighted by
carefully constructed standards and guidelines.
These guidelines and standards can best be created by a joint effort
of the judiciary and the broadcasters. In response to the August, 1978
Resolution of the Conference of Chief Justices, the National Center for
State Courts has established a clearinghouse to provide a repository for
information and guidelines governing the use of cameras in the courts.
The service provided by the National Center for State Court will give
all state courts access to statistics, guidelines, opinions and reports per-
taining to the use of electronic devices in the courtroom. This undertak-
ing uniquely qualifies this oxganization to serve as the nucleus of an
advisory committee for the benefit of the judiciary and broadcasters to
conduct extensive studies of the various potential benefits and detri-
ments produced by electronic media coverage of court proceedings.
146. See note 1 supro.
147. TV-in-the-Courts Issue in Sharp Meeting Focus, 64 A.B.A.J. 314 (March,
1978).
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APPENDIX
Current Usage and Experiments
With Cameras in the Courtroom
Colorado
This state's experimentation with cameras in its courtroom has
enjoyed a much longer lifespan than the Oklahoma or Texas attempts
discussed in this paper. Indeed, Colorado's liberal experimentations are
still viable and successful and form a foundation for what may be called
contemporary history of cameras in the courtroom. In 1956, hearings
were conducted by the Colorado Supreme Court to consider the matter
of televising trials.18 The hearings included exhibits of the modern meth-
ods of photography, recording and televising.' As a result of these
hearings, the Colorado Supreme Court, in February 1956, rejected the
ABA version and adopted its own Canon 35 which left the issue of
cameras in the courts to the discretion of the trial judge. The electronic
media covered trials in Colorado with few problems, but elicited much
comment and debate from jurists throughout the country. In 1969,
Justice Douglas addressed the experiment using pessimistic terms in a
speech at the University of Colorado Law School.5 0 In part, Justice
Douglas said:
With all respect to the Supreme Court of Colorado, I feel that a trial on
radio or television is quite a different affair than a trial before the few
people who could find seats in a conventional courtroom. The already
great tensions of the witness are increased when they know that millions
of people watch their every expression, follow each word . . . The pres-
ence and participation of a vast unseen audience creates a strain and tense
atmosphere that will not be conducive to the quiet search for truth.,"
In retrospect, Frank Hall, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of Colorado, who was Chief Justice in 1961 when Justice Douglas made
his speech, appraised the experiment of cameras in the Colorado court-
148. The contents of these hearings can be found at 132 Col. 591, 296 P. 2d 465
(1956).
149. Id.
150. Address by Justice Douglas, The Public Trial and Free Press to the Univer-
sity of Colorado Law School (May 10, 1960), printed in 46 A.B.A. J. 840 (December
1960) and 33 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. 1 (1960).
151. 46 ABA J. at 842; 33 ROCKY MOUNTAIN L. REV. at 5.
3:1979 1Nova Law Journal
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room in 1962. Justice Hall states, "[w]ith six years of experience behind
us, I think it may be stated that none of the ominous possibilities that
filled Mr. Justice Douglas with so grave apprehensions, have come to
pass in Colorado."'' 2 Justice Hall, lauding the Colorado system, notes
that, although thousands of photographs and film frames have been
made of proceedings, no fiascos have occurred and no complaints have
been registered.5 3 The justice credited this success to a responsible
Colorado press, bar and judiciary."' The cooperation of the three
groups was embodied in guidelines promulgated by the broadcasters
which provided for the pooling of equipment, information and work
force among the stations, with each under the control of the trial judge.
It was agreed that only one camera and recording device would be used
in the courtroom at a given time. Justice Hall believes this method gives
the public a better understanding of the entire judicial process.155
The continuing success was placed as a burden on the trial judge:
"The final test as to whether a court is degraded or lacks essential
dignity as a result of operation of the rule rests with the presiding judge.
Canon 35 will not serve as a substitute for judicial ability, integrity and
dignity."' 5 15 Despite success, Colorado's canon was modified in 1966 as
a direct result of the Estes decision. The new rule required the defend-
ant's consent before any telecasting could occur. The version adopted
in 1966 is virtually the same as the one presently in effect: Colorado's
Code of Judicial Conduct 3-A(7) now states,
1. A judge may authorize:
(a) the use of electronic photographic means for the perpetutation
of the record, or for purposes of judicial administration;
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of
investitive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings.
2. There shall not be any photographing, or broadcasting by radio or
television, of court proceedings unless permitted by order of the trial
judge and then only under such conditions as he may prescribe.
3. A judge should prohibit the broadcasting by radio or television of
court proceedings, or the taking of photographs in the courtroom, where
he believes from the particular circumstance of a given case, or any
152. Justice Frank H. Hall (Colorado Supreme Court), Colorado's Six Years'




156. Id. at 1122.
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portion thereof, that the broadcasting or taking of photographs would:
(a) detract from the dignity of court proceedings;
(b) distract a witness in giving his testimony;
(c) degrade the court; or
(d) otherwise materially interfere with the achievement of a fair
trial.
4. A judge shall prohibit:
(a) the photographing, or broadcasting by radio or television of
testimony of any witness or juror in attendance under subpoena or order
of court who has expressly objected to the photographing of broadcasting;
and
(b) the photographing, or broadcasting by radio or television of
any portion of any criminal trial, beginning with the selection of the jury
and continuing until the issues have been submitted to the jury for deter-
mination, unless all accused persons who are then on trial shall have
affirmatively given consent to the photographing or broadcasting. 7
As of 1976 and as far as can be presently determined, there have been
no reversals of decisions in Colorado of broadcasted trials on the ground
of unfairness. Thus, Colorado's long standing experience of having cam-
eras and electronic media in the courts continues successfully to date. "
Alabama5 9
Alabama adopted its own version of Canon 3-A(7) in December of
1975.16° It provides,
157. COLORADO CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT CANON 3-A(7), Appendix C at
674. The Supreme Court of Colorado in a telephone interview in February 1978, stated
that this particular publication of the Code went into effect January 1, 1973. Copies of
these canons may be obtained from the National Center for State Courts, Williamsburg,
Virginia.
158. M. Roberts and W. Goodman, Televised Trials: a Perspective. 7 CUMB. L.
REv. 323-42 (Fall 1976).
159. Order of the Supreme Court of Alabama authorizing the use of electronic
media equipment in the Alabama Supreme Court. Dated October 14, 1976. Petition For
and Approval of, a Plan For News Media Coverage in the Circuit Court of the Thir-
teenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama (The Mobile Plan). Order dated June 28, 1976.
Petition For and Approval of, a Plan for News Media coverage in the Circuit Court of
the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit of Alabama (The Montgomery Plan). Order dated April
12, 1977. Copies of these petitions and orders and plans may be obtained from the
Alabama Supreme Court. Copies are permanently filed at the Nova Law Journal Of-
fice, Nova University, Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale,
Florida 33314. See also note 157 supra.
160. See "Forward" to Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics No. 3-A(7), 37 ALA.
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the authorized plan to set forth the safeguards to insure that such
photographing, recording or broadcasting by radio or television of such
proceedings will not detract from the dignity of the court proceedings,
distract any witness from giving testimony, degrade the court or other-
wise interfere with the achievements of a fair trial ....
Alabama's Canons 3-A(7) and 3-A(7B) were created by an advisory
committee of the State Bar with the aid of the attorneys throughout the
state. Pertinent provisions of Canon 3-A(7B) allow broadcast coverage
live or by tape or still photography of trials and hearings if written
permission is sought by the press and granted by the trial judge before
the commencement of the proceedings. Written consent of the accused
and the prosecutor is required in both criminal and civil proceedings. A
significant sanction is that the broadcasting or photography may be
halted at any time during the trial proceeding if any juror, party, attor-
ney or testifying witness objects. Canon 3-A(7B) accepted by the same
Supreme Court order, places the same restrictions on the televising,
recording, broadcasting or photographing of appellate proceedings.
In accordance with Canon 3-A(7) and 3-A(7A), several plans have
been submitted to Alabama courts. The first was the Mobile Plan ap-
proved by the Alabama Supreme Court on July 28, 1976. This plan is
more restrictive than required by the Alabama Canon. It requires the
consent of witnesses and jurors in addition to the prosecutor and defen-
dants. It further prohibits televising or broadcasting in such a way that
any member of the jury might be identified. Another more stringent
safeguard prohibits pre-verdict interviews of jurors, witnesses or parties.
The media is restricted by the requirement that it refrain from making
speculative comments in its newscoverage of the proceedings. In more
detail, the Mobile Plan discusses the type of electronic equipment to be
used, along with its positioning in the courtroom, and provides consent
forms for the media to supply to the participants in the trial. Because
of the stringent requirements, few cases have been broadcast under this
plan.
The few cases which have met the test to be televised under the
Mobile Plan have been successful. Speaking before the Northeast
LAW 10 (1976). See also Roberts and Goodwin, supra note 158, an excellent and
thorough article on the status of Alabama's experience with cameras in the courts up
through 1976.
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Broadcast News Association, Circuit Court Judge Robert Hodnette, Jr.
complimented the conduct of all trial participants in his courtroom
stating that public reaction was extremely favorable and that he felt
camera coverage made judges, prosecutor and defense lawyers more
responsible.''
A second plan approved by the Alabama Supreme Court in 1976
provides for supreme court proceedings to be televised, broadcast or
recorded as per the provisions of Canon 3-A(7B) which applies to appel-
late proceedings. This plan sets forth in detail guidelines as to how much
and what type of equipment may be used, along with positioning of
reporters and their equipment in the courtroom. It further requires
written consent by the attorneys and the parties. Moreover, electronic
coverage may be stopped at any time by the objection of a witness, a
parent or guardian of a testifying witness, an attorney, judge, or party
who express an objection to the photographing and recording. Consent
request forms for the media are provided in the order. The court makes
note of Disciplinary Rule 7-107 of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity of the Alabama State Bar which covers the conduct of attorneys as
to pretrial publicity.
The third plan approved by the Alabama Supreme Court provides
for media coverage of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit in the Montgomery
County area. This plan is similar to the other two Alabama plans
and provides for pooling of media resources with written requests made
to the trial judge and the attorneys and parties involved. The press
coverage may be terminated by the objections of the judge or any testi-
fying witness. No video coverage of the jurors is allowed. One major
difference from the other Alabama plans is that the reports of a grand
jury may be covered under this plan if the district attorney and members
of the grand jury give their consent.
A comparison of the Alabama and Colorado plans reveals that the
Colorado scheme provides only a general set of guidelines for the press
to follow, while the detailed Alabama standards provide an exacting
outline so the press knows precisely what is expected and allowed. The
rigid consent requirements indicate that the Alabama Supreme Court
may be giving with one hand and immediately taking away with the
other. The final result is not far removed from the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Canon 3-A(7) which prohibits electronic coverage of court
proceedings. It must be granted that the Alabama guidelines are a major
161. "Television Gains in Courtroom Access," THE QUILL, 7 (May 1977).
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step toward broadcast media's access to the courts, but a more liberal
ruling would more effectively serve the present need.
Washington'
A bench, bar and press committee recommended an amendment to
the Washington Judicial Canon 3-A(7) to allow electronic coverage of
court proceedings. The change, adopted July 23, 1976 by the State
Supreme Court and made effective September 20, 1976, requires the
media to procure express permission from the trial judge. Further, the
media must insure there will be no distractions of the participants nor
impairments of the proceedings. One specific sanction is that no witness,
juror or party should be photographed or subjected to telecasts if any
prior objection is raised to the judge. Published along with the amend-
ments are illustrative guidelines for both the broadcast and print media.
These guidelines were not adopted by the court and are merely advisory
in nature. They establish a procedure for the pooling of press equipment
and the bailiff serving as liason between the judge and the press. The
Washington Canon was designed to provide a workable method of elec-
tronic media coverage of court proceedings. The entire plan, as Wash-
ington Chief Justice Charles F. Stafford points out, will still "be a
matter of discretion for the individual trial judge."'6
Georgia'
Similiar to Alabama's statute on cameras in the courts, Georgia's
162. Washington Canon of Judicial Conduct No. 3(A)(7) as amended July 23,
1976, effective September 20, 1976. Includes illustrative broadcase guidelines. The peti-
tions, orders and proposed guidelines may be obtained from the Washington Supreme
Court. A copy is kept on permanent file at the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova
University, Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida
33314. See also note 157 supra.
163. Washington Permits Cameras in Courtroom, 62 ABA J. 1416 (November
1976).
164. Order of the Supreme Court of Georgia Authorizing the Use of Electronic
Media Equipment in the Georgia Supreme Court. Order dated September 1, 1977.
Petition for and Approval of, a Plan For News Media Coverage in the Superior Court
Courtrooms of the Dougherty Judicial Circuit of Georgia. Order dated October 7, 1977.
Petition For and Approval of, a Plan For News Media Coverage in the Superior Court
Courtrooms of the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit of Georgia, Order dated October 20,
1977. The petitions, order and plans can be obtained from the Georgia Supreme Court.
Copies are kept on permanent file in the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova Univer-
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Supreme Court has approved three plans for electronic coverage of such
proceedings. The three plans were made possible by an amendment to
Judicial Canon 3-A which added 3-A(8) authorizing the supreme court
to allow televising, broadcasting, recording, filming and the taking of
photographs of judicial proceedings in Georgia's courtrooms if submit-
ted plans were approved by the supreme court and the respective trial
judge. On September 1, 1977, the Georgia Supreme Court approved a
plan, its first, based on recommendations of an advisory committee on
news media to allow electronic coverage of its own supreme court pro-
ceedings. Following the lead of the three prior states in taking such
steps, Georgia requires a timely request to the court, a guarantee that
the dignity of the court not be impaired, the pooling of media resources
and written consent from the attorneys and parties.
The second plan approved by the Georgia Supreme Court permits
news photography and television and radio broadcasts of proceedings
in a Superior Court of the Dougherty Judicial Circuit in the Albany
area. It was the most detailed plan of its type in the country when
approved. This plan, known as the Albany Plan, is as restrictive as
Alabama's procedure in that it requires consent of the parties, their
attorneys, and the witnesses as well as the judge. One aspect is some-
what less restrictive than.Alabama's Plan in that, once consent is given,
only the judge can halt the proceedings. A unique conclusion in the
Albany Plan is paragraph 16: "reporters and technicians must keep in
mind the most important factor in covering a court event is not getting
the story, but preserving the dignity and decorum of the court."'' 5 Geor-
gia's third plan for media coverage of courtroom proceedings applies to
the Superior Courts of the Chattahoochee Judicial Circuit in the Co-
lumbus area. In effect, this plan approved October 20, 1977 is the same
as the one approved for the Dougherty Circuit. The Georgia rules allow-
ing cameras in its appellate courts are precisely detailed. While the plans
adopted in Georgia express a more commendable flexibility than is
found in the Alabama plans, the rigidity of the consent requirement may
prove to hinder and devalue the overall merits of Georgia's guidelines
for electronic coverage of its court proceedings.
sity, Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314. See
also note 157 supra.
165. Plan for News Media Coverage in Dougherty Superior Courtroom, Dough-
erty County, Georgia (approved October 7, 1977), paragraph 16.
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Wisconsin6 '
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has superseded Rule Fourteen of its
Code of Judicial Ethics for a one-year experimental period of cameras
in its courts which began April 1, 1978. Standards of conduct to be
followed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court were approved during March
of 1978. The experiment, which will be monitored by a court-appointed
committee representing the press, bar and public, permits the use of
audio and visual equipment in the courtroom at the discretion of the
presiding judge. Similar to the plans in the four states previously dis-
cussed, the ruling requires pooling of media equipment and personnel,
and restricts their number and positioning in the courtroom.
There are three distinctions in the Wisconsin Plan which the pre-
vious plans of its general type have not provided. First, there is a re-
quirement that a media coordinator be chosen by the press in each
administrative district to work with the judge in implementing the
standards. Secondly, the guidelines expressly state that any audio or
visual reproduction made of any proceedings are inadmissible as evi-
dence. Thirdly, the standards state that "the presiding judge may for
cause prohibit photographing of a participant with a film, video tape or
still camera on the judge's own motion or the request of a participant
in the court proceedings. 16 7 The third distinction appears more judi-
cially provident than its counterpart in the Georgia and Alabama orders
in that the latter allows any party to the proceedings to object and thus
halt the electronic coverage at any time because of a change of mind as
to the advisability of it. Letting the presiding judge make a for cause
determination on the objections to specific media coverage seems the
most fair and desirable way to handle such problems. The Wisconsin
media coverage plan has recently gone into effect and its actual utility
is not yet proven.
166. Order of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin in re the Code of Judicial Ethics.
Order dated March 16, 1978. Includes Standards of Conduct Governing Use of Audio
or Visual Equipment in Courtrooms for the period April 1, 1978 through March 31,
1979. The petitions and orders may be obtained from the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
Copies are kept on permanent file at the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova Univer-
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Florida68
After two years of petitions, requests and hearings, the Supreme
Court of Florida agreed to the televising of one criminal and one civil
trial as a basis for making a decision in modifying Canon 3-A(7) of the
Florida Judicial Code. This prospective test failed to occur because of
a full consent requirement placed on all parties. No cases were found
in which all witnesses would consent to electronic coverage prior to the
April 1, 1977 deadline which had been set by the court."9 Still deter-
mined to make a complete investigation on electronic coverage of court
proceedings before modifying Canon 3-A(7), the Florida Supreme
Court established a pilot program to last one year,
during which the electronic media including still photography may tele-
vise and photograph, at their discretion, judicial proceedings, civil, crimi-
nal and appellate in all courts in the State of Florida, subject only to the
prior adoption of standards with respect to the types of equipment, light-
ing, noise levels, camera placement, audio pick up and to the reasonable
orders and discretions of the presiding judge in any such proceedings.'
After rejecting the plan for the experimentation in only two judicial
circuits in the state, the Florida Supreme Court approved guidelines
meeting the above criteria in an opinion filed July 14, 1977. This opinion
set the experiment to run from June 5, 1977 until June 30, 1978. At the
end of the pilot program, "all media participants in the program and
all parties hereto and all participating judges are requested to furnish
the court a report of their experiments under the program so that the
court can determine to what extent Canon 3-A(7) should be modi-
fied."''7 The plan provided that no more than one portable camera be
168. Petition For and Approval of, a Plan to Change the Code of Judicial Con-
duct to Allow News Media Coverage in Courts in the State of Florida. Opinion of the
Florida Supreme Court filed June 14, 1977. Report To The Supreme Court of Florida
re: Conduct of Audio-visual Trial Coverage by Judge Paul Baker of the Eleventh
Judicial Circuit Court of Florida, Criminal Division. Filed November, 1977. Copies of
the petitions, order and report may be obtained from the Supreme Court of Florida.
Copies are kept on permanent file at the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova Univer-
sity, Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314. See
also note 157 supra.
169. See Supplemental Interlocutory Decision of the Florida Supreme Court, In
Re: Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc. for change in Code of Judicial
Conduct. (Opinion filed April 7, 1977).
170. Opinion of the Supreme Court of Florida filed June 14, 1977.
171. Id.
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used or trial proceedings and not more than two for appellate proceed-
ings; each camera with only one camera person to operate it. One audio
visual system using audio visual facilities already existing in the court-
room would be available. Further, no artificial lighting was to be uti-
lized. The trial judge had the discretion to modify existing courtroom
facilities to better accommodate the media if necessary. The appendix
to the order designated specific types of cameras and recorders ap-
proved for their quietness and unobtrusiveness. Broadcasters were pro-
hibited from moving around the courtroom, changing film or making
other technical adjustments in the course of proceedings, except during
recesses. No audio or video close-up coverage of attorneys conferring
with their clients or with the judge was allowed. No interviews with
anyone participating in a current trial were to be conducted in the
courtroom or any adjacent area, such as in the hallways. Because of the
experimental nature of this project, films, video tapes, still photographs
and audio reproductions from earlier trials were not admissible as evi-
dence in subsequent trials or appeals. Further, broadcasters and photo-
graphers could not appeal the trial judge's decision as to media cover-
age. The most notable aspect of the plan was that no consent was
required for parties to the action or their attorneys before media cover-
age could occur. The decision of the Florida Supreme Court was unani-
mous in approving the plan. Justice J. Carlton concurred separately
because he felt that the Florida Plan was still restrictive and that the
standards created went further than necessary.
The first case to come under the pilot program was somewhat less
than successful. The murder case of Johnson v. Florida occurred in the
Tampa area in August of 1977. The state's witnesses were two felons in
the State Department of Corrections and one felon under indictment.
These witnesses refused to testify if they were to be photographed and
televised for fear of reprisal in prison. Trial Judge Andrews ordered that
there be no video coverage of these particular witnesses. Two reporters
tried to photograph them and the judge ordered them from his court-
room. Despite this ominous beginning, Florida's experiment had far
fewer problems than anticipated.1 2 The most publicized case to date is
that of the State of Florida v. Ronney Zamora.1 3 The Zamora trial
was the first criminal trial to be fully covered by electronic media. The
fifteen year old was tried for first degree murder for the slaying of his
eighty-two year old neighbor. The trial created an unusual amount of
172. See note 125 supra.
173. See note 122 supra.
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publicity and notoriety because of the unique defense raised by Za-
mora's attorney who argued that his client was addicted to television
and acted as though insane through the influence of prolonged, intense,
involuntary, subliminal television intoxication.'74
At the close of the one-year experiment admitting electronic media
into the courtrooms in Florida, a survey of the attitudes of all those
associated with such trials was taken by the Judicial Planning Coordina-
tion Unit Office of the State Courts Administrator of Florida. 175 The
survey included questions concerning thoughts and reactions of jurors,
attorneys, witnesses and court personnel to the experiment. 76 Responses
were sought only from those persons who had participated in or were
associated with trials that had electronic or still photography cover-
age. 1 77 Because of the format and length of the survey, it is impractical
to publish the entire results herein. However, some of the main thrusts
of the responses were reflected in the discussion of arguments for and
against (supra) the use of electronic media in the courts. Overall, the
trial participants favorably reacted to the experiment. The margin be-
tween the favorable and opposed responses was narrow.
174. Id.
175. A Sample Survey of the Attitudes of Individuals Associated With Trial
Involving Electronic Media and Still Photography Coverage in Selected Florida Courts
between July 5, 1977 and June 30, 1978.
176. Judges were not included because a survey of trial judges had previously been
conducted by the Circuit Judges Conference.
177. Number of Question- Number of Question-
naires Initially naires Undeliverable
Mailed Out by Date Deadline
I. Witness 1,566 87
2. Attorney 236 4
3. Court Personnel 154 4
4. Juror 704 29
Number of Questionnaires Percentage





In the survey, "media" reters to any television, radio, newspaper or still photogra-
phy. The groups sampled were attorneys, witnesses, jurors, and court personnel (baliffs,
court clerks and court reporters).
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Nevada7 '
Canon 3-A(7) of the Nevada Code of Judicial Conduct allows elec-
tronic coverage of court proceedings at the trial judge's discretion as
long as all parties, through their counsel, expressly waive objection and
consent to the coverage. The first case authorized for electronic cover-
age was held November 7, 1977 at the City Hall Chambers in Las
Vegas. There have been no reported complaints from parties or wit-
nesses involved in televised trials under this plan.
Louisiana'
In the spring of 1978, Louisiana sponsored a seminar to consider
electronic coverage of court proceedings in that state.' People from all
over the country who had been involved in prior similar experiments
were invited to attend. The result of the study is a one-year pilot project
allowing electronic coverage of court proceedings in Division B of the
Ninth Judicial District for Rapides Parish. An advisory committee
made up of press personnel and judicial administrators will supervise the
project. The guidelines call for pooling of media personnel and re-
sources, allowing only two film and two still cameras to be used in the
courtroom at any one time. Equipment and personnel are to remain
stationary in appointed areas of the room. The most significant require-
ment is that written permission of the parties and their counsel is re-
178. Order of the Supreme Court 9 f Nevada Authorizing News Media Coverage
of (a particular trial Mangeris v. Gordon) pursuant to Canon 3-A(7) of the Nevada
Code of Judicial Conduct. Order filed November 3, 1977. Canon 3-A(7) of the Nevada
Supreme Court Rules. Rule of the Nevada Judicial Department No. 1.220. Provision
No. 178.604 of the regulation of Criminal Court proceedings in Nevada. Rule 12 of the
General Rules of the U.S. District Court for Nevada. Copies of the petitions, orders
and guidelines may be obtained from the Supreme Court of Nevada. Copies are kept
on permanent file in the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova University, Center for
the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314. See also note 157
supra.
179. Order of the Supreme Court of Louisiana approving a pilot project on
camera and electronic coverage of court proceedings in Division B of the Ninth Judicial
District Court for Rapides Parish, Louisiana. Plan adopted February 23, 1978. Copies
of the petition and order may be obtained from the Louisiana Supreme Court. Copies
are kept on permanent file in the office of the Nova Law Journal, Nova University,
Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314. See also
note 157 supra.
180. See note 129 supra.
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quired before any electronic media coverage can occur. In criminal
cases, the victim and the district attorney must also consent. Louisiana's
one-year project began February 23, 1978.
Montana s18
After numerous meetings and discussions, the Supreme Court of
Montana suspended Canon 35 of its State Judicial Code of Ethics which
did not allow cameras in the courtroom. A revised Canon 35 established
April 1, 1978 supersedes the former Canon 35 until further orders from
the court. The Montana Supreme Court order provides an experimental
period for operation of the new Canon which will last for two years after
its inception on April 1, 1978. This revised Canon permits broadcasting,
recording or photographing in any court of the State. No consent is
required but the trial judge may, for good cause shown, prohibit such
media activities in the courtroom. The illustrative guidelines for the
media aim at unobtrusiveness and preservation of courtroom decorum.
As in other states, there is a suggestion for the pooling of media equip-
ment and personnel. The success of Montana's two-year experiment is
still to be seen.
SUMMARY OF THE STA TES' EXPERIMENTS
As of February 1, 1979, twenty-one states allow some form of
electronic coverage of court proceedings, although this coverage is not
expansive. 18 2 It is suggested that this may be due to (1) the rigid consent
181. Order of the Supreme Court of Montana in the matter of Canon 35 of the
Montana Canons of Judicial Ethics. Order dated February 3, 1978. Includes illustrative
broadcast and print media guidelines. Copies of the petition, order and guidelines can
be obtained from the Montana Supreme Court. Copies are kept on permanent file at
the Nova Law Journal, Nova University, Center for the Study of Law, College Avenue,
Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314.
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requirements in some states or (2) the nature of court proceedings as
undeterminable in length and of little interest to the general public.
Moreover, extensive media coverage of trials would tie up media per-
sonnel for an extended time, creating additional expense. There have
been no recent reports of the press creating "carnival atmospheres" as
those found in Sheppard and Estes. In Florida, where the one-year plan
is over, the supreme court is reviewing a statistical survey of the results.
In Montana, the experiment is to run for two complete years. This may
indicate a trend to expand the state experiments for a longer period of
time. All sources indicate that further study and consideration are re-
quired.
Oklahoma Trial Coverage I year Jan. 1, 1979
only
Tennessee Interim Cover- May 24, 1978
age only
Texas Appellate Court Nov. 9, 1976
only
Washington Trial and Appellate Sept. 20, 1976
Courts
Wisconsin Trial and Appellate 1 year April 1, 1978
Courts
The authors wish to thank the National Center for State Court for much of the informa-
tion in this chart.
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Government Regulation of In Vitro Fertilization,
Recombinant DNA and Cloning Biotechnologies:
Where Powers End and Rights Begin
ANITA C. PORTE*
In this age of bureaucratic proliferation it is hard to imagine any aspect
of our lives that is not somehow affected by government regulation. In
particular realms, the power of the government to regulate is regarded
not as an option but as a duty. The American legal system has tradition-
ally held that the protection of the public health is one of the first duties
of government,' and that there is no public policy more important than
* Roach Fellow, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri-Kansas
City; Member, Eta Zeta Chapter of Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science
Society; Member, The Chancellor's Committee for Educational Broadcast Media, and
The University Publication Board. The author wishes to thank Professor David N.
Atkinson, and Gary C. Robb for their guidance and encouragement in the preparation
of this article.
1. U.S. CONST., preamble, states: "We the People of the United States, in Order
to. . . promote the general Welfare. . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for
the United States of America." For a discussion of the government's responsibility to
protect the public health, see Tobey, Public Health and the Police Power, 4 N.Y.U.
L.REv. 126 (1927). The United States Supreme Court affirmed this tenet in Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). Subsequently, a number of cases from various
jurisdictions have based their decisions on the premise that the protection of the public
health is one of the first duties of government. See, e.g., People v. Robertson, 302 II1.
422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922) (quarantine imposed by legislature held constitutional as an
exercise of government's duty to preserve the public health); Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal.
350, 287 P. 455 (1930) (Bovine Tuberculosis law is designed to promote the public health
and is thus a matter on which the government is necessarily authorized to take action);
Central States Life Ins. Co. v. State, 80 S.W.2d 628 (Ark. 1935) (since one of the first
duties of government is the protection of the public health, funds set aside by legis-
lature to promote the public health is a necessary expense of any government, and thus
constitutional); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (it is the duty of Congress
to exclude from commerce articles which may be injurious to the public health or
welfare); Lewis Food Co. v. State Dept. of Public Health, 110 Cal. App.2d 759, 243
P.2d 802 (1st DCA 1952) (statute regulating the sale of horse meat is a reasonable
exercise of the government's duty to conserve the health of its citizens); Yaworski v.
Town of Canterbury, 21 Conn. Supp. 347, 154 A.2d 758 (1959) (ordinances relating to
garbage disposal are reasonable exercises of government's duty to safeguard the health
of its people); Ellis v. City of Grand Rapids, 257 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1966) (renewal
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the protection of citizens from practices which may injure their health.2
Historically, the promotion or protection of public health and
safety has been a matter particularly for the state government.3 Where
the federal government has acted to regulate a particular field of health
and safety, a state or local government cannot act 4 unless the state or
local regulation is consistent with and does not invalidate any section
of the federal law.5 If the federal government has not acted, the state is
free to legislate regulations, for a state has broad power to make and
enforce standards to promote the health of those within its borders.'
In the nQt too distant future, the promotion of the public health will
take on added meanings. Members of the human race will have wide-
and expansion of medical care centers through urban renewal projects is a public service
in accordance with the government's responsibility to protect the public health and
welfare).
2. See, e.g., 'State ex rel. Andergon v. Fadely, 180 Kan.652, 308 P.2d 537 (1957)
(statute authorizing allocations for the protection of persons and property from
"extraordinary conditions" should be liberally construed, since no obligation of govern-
ment is more important than the preservation of the public health); Friedlander v.
Cimino, M.D., 385 F. Supp. 1357 (D. D.C. 1974), rev'don other grounds and remanded,
520 F.2d 318 (2nd Cir. 1975) (proficiency testing programs for laboratories operated
by nonphysicians are essential to protect the public health, which is the most important
of all public policies).
3. Tobey, supra note 1. For cases, see, e.g., In re Seiferth, 137 N.Y.S.2d 35
(1955), rev'd on other grounds, 127 N.E.2d 820 (Ct. App. 1955) (Act ordering surgical
care of neglected children is valid, since the state has an enormous interest in the
physical and mental health of its inhabitants); Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough
of Caldwell, 138 A.2d 402 (N.J. 1958) (the power of the state government to regulate
and control public health and sanitation is an essential governmental function, and
cannot be surrendered or impaired by contract).
4. For preemption provision, see Chemical Specialties Mfrs. Ass'n., Inc. v. Low-
ery, 452 F.2d 431 (2nd Cir. 1971) (because in enacting the Federal Hazardous Sub-
stances Act, Congress used the phrase "precautionary labeling" in preemption provision
to refer to all labeling of hazardous substances covered by the Act, city regulations in
question are inconsistent with FHSA, and thus preempted).
5. See, e.g., Cohen v. Bredehoeft, 290 F. Supp. 1001 (1968), affd, 402 F.2d 61
(5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1086 (1969) (city ordinance ordering the destruc-
tion of any fireworks within the city's jurisdiction is valid and enforceable where state
and federal statutes do not restrict the power of home rule city to enact such ordinances).
6. See, e.g., Barsky v. Board of Regents of University of State of New York,
N.Y., 347 U.S. 442 (1954) (New York State Education Law is not unconstitutional, as
the state has broad power to protect the public health); Stephens v. Dennis, 293 F. Supp.
589 (D.D.C. 1968) (a state has broad power to protect the health of its citizens; including
the plenary power to fix terms of admission into the practice of any profession con-
cerned with health).
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Government Regulation of Biotechnologies
spread access to new technologies which will critically affect the public
health and safety: the biotechnologies of in vitro fertilization,7 recombi-
nant DNA,s and cloning.9 Since the potential effects of these techniques
could significantly transform our world and even life as we know it, the
public policy decisions made regarding their use are of great impor-
tance.
The effects of these biotechnologies are frequently fantasized in a
science-fiction like manner by the media and, as a result, are rarely
examined in a rational, systematic manner. The constitutional basis and
need for regulation in this field have been all but ignored. It is crucial,
however, that the constitutional ramifications of these technologies be
fully explored. Accordingly, it is the intent of the author to help fill this
void by formulating a solid constitutional framework for assessing the
implications of these three biotechnologies.
Part 1 focuses on the ninth amendment's guarantee of individual
rights in this area and Part 2 addresses the issue of the extent to which
the commerce clause can be invoked as a basis for government regula-
tion. In Part 3 a model for making constitutional public policy decisions
of a regulatory nature is proposed. Parts 4, 5 and 6 apply this model to
the biotechnologies of in vitro fertilization, recombinant DNA and clon-
ing, ultimately suggesting the extent to which government regulatory
policy is necessary and proper in each field.
1. THE ROLE OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
In matters of government regulation, the courts have assumed that
the power to regulate lies somewhere, whether it be with the federal,
state or local governments. This assumption has been based at least in
part on the tenth amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are re-
served to the States respectively, or to the people."'10
The widespread preoccupation with the power of the government
to regulate has resulted in a failure to give the last words of the tenth
7. See text accompanying notes 93 through 96 infra for an explanation of this
technique.
8. See text accompanying notes 119 through 134 infra for an explanation of this
process.
9. See text accompanying notes 224 through 230 infra for an explanation of this
technique.
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amendment the attention they merit. The fact that this amendment
reserves powers to the people themselves, as well as the states, has been
largely ignored."
Furthermore, rights which preclude grants of power are also re-
served to the people 2 in the ninth amendment of the Constitution: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 3
A. Historical Interpretations
Upon a preliminary reading, one might conclude that the ninth
amendment is a fountainhead of rights." Instead, this single sentence
has emerged over the years as a fountainhead of consternation and
controversy, and widely varying theories of interpretation have been
proposed.
Perhaps the predominant method of construing the ninth amend-
ment has been simply to avoid it. Feelings of uncertainty regarding how
to approach this cryptic amendment are common even among experts,
such as Mr. Justice Jackson: "[T]he ninth amendment rights which are
not to be disturbed . . . are still a mystery to me."' 5 Thus, rather than
wander into this uncharted territory, many constitutional scholars have
refrained from entering the mainstream of ninth amendment contro-
versy.
A second theory of interpretation was highlighted in Griswold v.
Connecticut," one of the few recent Supreme Court cases to deal with
the ninth amendment issue.'7 In. his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice
11. Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 INDIANA L.J.
30( (1936).
12. Id. at 309.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
14. Kelley, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U.CHI. L.
REV. 814 (1966).
15. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT,
74-75 (1955).
16. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
17. Previous Supreme Court cases interpreting the ninth amendment are Ashwan-
der v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (the ninth amendment's insuring
of rights retained by the people does not negate the government's constitutional author-
ity to dispose of electric energy generated at the Wilson Dam); Tennessee Elec. Power
Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (the ninth amendment gives
power companies no standing to object to TVA power activities); United Public Work-
ers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding constitutionality of Hatch Act limitations
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Goldberg concluded that the ninth amendment is only a rule of con-
struction to apply to the Constitution as a whole. The Justice saw it as
a guidepost, the sole purpose of which was to call the courts' attention
to other portions of the Constitution, such as the due process clauses of
the fifth and fourteenth amendments. While these selected portions
might then be used as a vehicle for unenumerated rights, the Justice did
not see the ninth amendment as a source of and vehicle for protecting
unenumerated rights in itself."8
B. A Positive Declaration of Unenumerated Rights
Even proponents of the above theories admit that they do not help
solve the problem of "where one draws the dividing line between...
the rightful exercise of. .. powers and unconstitutional infringement
of individual rights."" This problem lies at the very heart of the philoso-
phy of limited government and individual rights, as expressed in the
Constitution."0 Indeed, the fundamental theory of American govern-
ment is founded upon the concepts of reserved rights and delegated
powers.2" The ninth amendment of the Constitution refers to reserved
rights, and the tenth amendment'refers to delegated powers.
The fact that both these provisions were included in the Constitu-
tion and the fact that they were placed side by side in the Bill of Rights
makes it evident that there was some distinction in the minds of the
framers between declaration of right and limitations on power.2 If this
had not been the case, the limitations of power and reservations of rights
contained in the body of the Constitution, taken along with the tenth
on federal employees' political activities against ninth amendment claims); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity is not protected through ninth amend-
ment rights).
18. Since the Griswold decision, there has been a good deal of scholarly activity
regarding ninth amendment theories and issues. See Franklin, The Ninth Amendment,
40 TUL L. REV. 172 (1966); Kitner, Neglected Ninth Amendment: The Other Rights
Retained by the People, 51 MARQ. L. REV. 121 (1967); Comment, Ninth Amendment
Vindication of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 42 TEMP. L.Q. 46 (1968); Moore,
Ninth Amendment - Its Origins and Meaning, 7 NEw ENGLAND L. REV. 215 (1972);
Rhoades, Ninth Amendment: A Survey of Theory and Practice in the Federal Courts
Since Griswold v. Connecticut, 50 DENVER L.J. 153 (1973); Towe, Natural Law and
the Ninth Amendment, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 270 (1975).
19. Kelley, supra note 14, at 834.
20. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 309.
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amendment reservation of power to the states and to the people would
have sufficed, and the ninth amendment would have been unneces-
sary.
Thus, the ninth amendment cannot simply be ignored. It has been
held that, when interpreting the Constitution, no section, sentence or
even word is unnecessary.2 No word was included needlessly, and subse-
quently nothing in the Constitution can be held to be superfluous.2
It is inconsistent with such a holding that the ninth amendment
could be viewed as a mere rule of construction, a guidepost pointing to
other sections of the Constitution, as Mr. Justice Goldberg maintained
in Griswold v. Connecticut."8 Rather, "[i]t must be a positive declara-
tion of existing through unnamed rights, which may be vindicated under
the authority of the amendment whenever and if ever any govern-
mental authority shall aspire to ungranted power in contravention of
'unenumerated rights.' "2
The theory that the ninth amendment is indeed a positive declara-
tion of rights is not a new one. Mr. Justice Story said of the ninth
amendment:
This clause was manifestly introduced to prevent any perverse or ingen-
ious misapplication of the well known maxim, that an affirmation in
particular cases implies a negation in all others ...a conclusive answer
is, that such an attempt may be interdicted (as it has been) by a positive
declaration in such a bill of rights, that the enumeration of certain rights
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the peo-
ple.29
C. Finding the Unenumerated Rights
The rights enumerated in the Constitution 31 constitute an impos-
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 323.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
27. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 323.
28. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Vol.
11, 623-27 (1833).
29. Id. at 626, §1867.
30. The enumerated rights include: freedom of speech, religion, the press, assem-
blage, petition (amend 1); to keep and bear arms (amend. II) on quartering troops
(amend. Ill); from search and seizure (amend. IV); of presentment and indictment,
against double jeopardy, against self-incrimination, against deprivation of life, liberty
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ing catalogue of human rights." The positive declaration theory of
interpreting the ninth amendment asserts that rights enumerated in the
Constitution by means of guarantee, limitation or prohibition do not
preclude the existence of other rights retained by the people. With this
rule of construction in mind, it is necessary to operate under the assu.mp-
tion that, in the minds of the framers, other non-enumerated rights did
exist. The next question is how to determine what these rights are.
(1) INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
One method of determining the unenumerated rights protected by
the ninth amendment is to consult the several documentations of the
basic human values and liberties that were most likely among those
cherished by the framers of the Constitution.32 Perhaps these rights
were best expressed and most familiar to the framers and colonists alike
in Blackstone's Commentaries, nearly as many copies of which were
sold in the colonies as in England.3 Blackstone classified the natural
rights of human beings under three categories: (I) Personal Security,
(II) Personal Liberty and (III) Private Property.34 To these, Black-
stone's American counterpart Chancellor Kent added the American
contribution of (IV) Religious Freedom.35
Two rights cherished by the framers are crucial in formulating
regulatory policy. One of the rights most important to the framers was
the right of the people to have a government which functions in the
public interest and for the common good.3s Statements to this effect
or property, against taking of property, (amend. V); for fair and speedy criminal trials
(amend. VI); for jury trials in civil suits at common law (amend. VII); against excessive
bail, against cruel and unusual punishments (amend. VIII); against abridgement of
privileges and immunities, deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process
of law, for equal protection of the law (amend. XIV); against denial of suffrage (amends.
XV, XIX, XXIV and XXVI); limitations on taxation (art. I, sec. 8, cl. I and art. I,
sec. 9, cl. 4 and 5); limitations on suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (art. I, sec. 9,
cl. 2); freedom from bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, laws impairing the obligation
of contract (art. I, sec. 10, cl. 1); limitations on conviction of treason (art. III, sec. 3);
prohibitions on corruption of blood or forfeiture (art. III, sec. 3, cl. 2); the guarantee
of a republican form of government (art. IV, sec. 4).
31. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 312.
32. Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment - A New Form of
Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 231 (1975).
33. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 313.
34. W. BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 129-45 (1884).
35. J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1858).
36. Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 DICKINSON L.REv. 122
77
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
72 Nova Law Journal 3:1979
were included in the constitutions of the various colonies.3 7
In addition, the framers believed that each citizen had an equal
political interest in all questions of public policy and that each had equal
political rights, including access to the governmental process and the
right to have a voice in its decision. This right has been expressed as
the right of "access to a free and full shaping and sharing of power," 3
and Thomas Paine regarded it as one of the foremost redeeming quali-
ties of a representative democracy.39 It follows that effective denial of
the individual's right to political participation in governmental decision-
making, resulting from deference to the minority views of special inter-
est groups, is in itself a denial or disparagement by decisional bodies of
the citizens' right to full participation in government-an "undue" pro-
cess of law and government."
(2) JUDICIAL DETERMINATION
The second and perhaps best method of determining which enumer-
ated rights are protected by the ninth amendment is the gradual process
of judicial determination by inclusion and exclusion.4 Apart from
Griswold, no case has decided the scope of the ninth amendment, even
in part.42 Furthermore, no opinions have cited the ninth amendment as
the basis for the assertion or vindication of a right.4"
However, certain rights have been confirmed or rejected on the
basis of whether or not they are "natural rights." For example, the right
to attend state educational institutions" and to serve as a juror 5 have
(1959). See also Declaration of Independence (1776); U.S. CONST. preamble.
37. E.g., The Constitution of Pennsylvania, as adopted on September 28, 1776
states: "All powers are inherent in the people, and all free governments are founded on
their authority, and instituted for their peace, safety, and happiness. The community
hath an indisputable, inalienable and indefensible right to reform, alter, or abolish
governments, in such a manner as shall be, by that community, judged most productive
to the common total. All officers of the government are their trustees and servants,
and at all times accountable to them."
38. Paust, supra note 32, at 261.
39. See T. PAINE, 2 THE RIGHTS OF MAN 26 (1794).
40. Paust, supra note 32, at 261.
41. 16 AM. JUR.2D, Constitutional Law, §331 (1964). See also In re Morgan, 58
P. 1070 (Wash. 1899); Blair v. Ridgely, 41 Mo. 63 (1867).
42. See note 17 supra.
43. Kelsey, supra note 11, at 319.
44. Board of Trustees of University of Mississippi v. Waugh, 62 So. 827 (Miss.
1913), affd, 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
45. People ex. rel. Murray v. Holmes, 341 Ill. 23, 173 N.E. 145 (1930).
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been found not to be natural rights, but rather gifts of our civilization
and the legislature. Rights judged to be natural and inherent include the
right of a natural affection between parents and offspring,48 the right to
travel from state to state," and the right to certain governmental serv-
ices."'
Two such natural rights are directly affected by government regula-
tion of biotechnology. In dictum in Griswold v. Connecticut,49 the Su-
preme Court suggested that the right of "freedom of inquiry" is a
fundamental right within the penumbra of rights entitled to constitu-
tional protection. This freedom, which scientists have struggled to
achieve since the time of Galileo, 5 has been an important factor in the
formulation of scientific policy. 51
Another right which the courts have determined to be natural and
constitutional is the right to beget children. 52 Although this right was
upheld over fifty years ago in a lower court, the right has never been
subsequently denied. If judicial determination was indeed to be em-
ployed as a means of designating protected ninth amendment rights,
perhaps the United States Supreme Court should be viewed as the only
court qualified to make such determinations. It must also be considered
that predictions of an imminent population explosion might outweigh
this right. Nonetheless, the right to beget children has at least been
suggested to be a natural right protected by the ninth amendment.
Accordingly, regulations burdening decisions to beget children may be
justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn
to express only those interests.53
46. Lacher v. Venus, 177 Wis. 558, 188 N.W. 613 (1922).
47. Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall 35 (1868).
48. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). See also notes 77
through 85 and accompanying text infra.
49. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
50. Lederberg, The Freedoms and the Control of Science: Notes from the Ivory
Tower, 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 596-97 (1972).
51. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 903 (1976). A central concern of the National Institutes of
Health [NIH] was apparently whether or not the guidelines for recombinant DNA
research "balanced scientific responsibility to the public with scientific freedom to
pursue new knowledge."
52. Smith v. Command, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140 (1925).
53. Carey v. Population Services Intern., - U.S. , 97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977)
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2. THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Although widespread government regulation is an accepted reality,
the constitutional basis for and limitations on the power of the govern-
ment to regulate must be considered. The commerce clause is the
primary constitutional basis for regulation by the federal government
in the areas of the environment and public health.5 Congress could
enact some regulations regarding the interstate shipment of materials
pertaining to genetic activity, such as recombinant DNA materials,
under the commerce clause. The ultimate question is to what extent
Congress can enact such regulations when they are held to conflict with
constitutional rights of the people, especially when the activities in ques-
tion are intrastate or privately sponsored.
A. The "Affecting Commerce" Standard
The interpretation of the commerce clause as originally articulated
by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden57 defined Congress'
power as extending to "that commerce which concerns more states than
one." 8 Supreme Court decisions of the late 1930's and early 1940's
established that Congress had power under the commerce clause to
regulate nearly all aspects of the interrelated American economy. 9 The
courts have indicated that an activity "affects" interstate commerce, so
as to be subject to federal regulation under the commerce clause,6" as
54. The commerce clause states: "The Congress shall have power. . . to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the Several States. . ." Art. I, sec. 8, cl.
3. See also Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GEORGIA L.REV.
832 (1977).
55. See, e.g., Toxic Substance Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2601 (Supp. Dec. 1976);
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §1857 (1970); Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§1251 (Supp. I 1972).
56. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 914 (1976).
57. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 194 (1829).
58. Id.; see also Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More States Than One,
47 HARV. L.REV. 1335 (1934).
59. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited - The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, 15 ARIz. L.REv. 271 (1973). For the story of how the Supreme Court arrived
at this conclusion, see BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE,
1937-1970 (1970); TRIBE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN GOVERN-
MENT - SEPARATION AND DIVISION OF POWERS (1978); Stem, The Commerce Clause
and the National Economy 1933-46, 59"HARV. L. REV. 645, 883 (1946).
60. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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long as interstate commerce is a "practical" consequence of the activ-
ity.61
The "affecting commerce" rationale was construed so broadly as
to subject seemingly all local activities to federal regulation. InWickard
v. Filburn2 the Supreme Court upheld Federal regulations of the .pro-
duction of wheat grown solely for home consumption on the grounds
that such activity in the aggregate could affect the interstate market by
depressing the farmer's demand for wheat or by ultimately being mar-
keted itself.63
The Court went even further in Perez v. United States,64 where it
upheld the application of a statute to a particular intrastate crime with-
out requiring the government to demonstrate any interstate nexus. In
this apparent extention of the Wickard principle, Mr. Justice Douglas
stated, "[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise
as trivial, individual instances of the class.""
B. Regulations to Further Non-Economic Purposes
In recent cases, it has been shown that Congress may regulate
interstate commerce, for a variety of reasons, as long as the conditions
themselves violate no other constitutional prohibition or grant of
rights.66 One permissible and especially potent form of federal regula-
tion of commerce is the congressional imposition of "protective condi-
tions" on the privilege of engaging in commerce. The intent of such
regulations has been to combat activities disfavored by Congress for
primarily non-commercial reasons. The Court has upheld the constitu-
tionality of such legislation since it ruled that legislation banning the
interstate transportation of lottery tickets was constitutional in the fa-
mous "Lottery Case" of Champion v. Ames."7
61. 301 U.S. at 41-42.
62. 317 U.S. It1 (1942).
63. Id. at 127-29
64. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
65. Id. at 152, 154.
66. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 238.
67. 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In the single case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S.
251 (1903) the Supreme Court reversed itself in holding that Congress could not prohibit
interstate commerce in the products of child labor, since it involved regulating produc-
tion by standardizing the ages at which children could be lawfully employed, rather than
regulating interstate transportation. Apart from this isolated instance, the Supreme
81
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The significant challenges in recent years to the exercise of the
federal commerce power have dealt with its application for non-
economic purposes. The public accommodation act of the Civil Rights
Act of 19648 prohibited racial discrimination by hotels, restaurants or
other establishments receiving transients or interstate travelers. 9 Ob-
viously, this Act was directed at practices especially prevalent in the
Southern states, which substantially handicapped and inhibited the in-
terstate movement of many persons, primarily blacks.70
In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,7' the Supreme
Court upheld Congress' power, exercised in Title II of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, to prohibit racial discrimination in places of public accom-
modation on the grounds that Congress had a rational basis for finding
that racial discrimination by motels affected commerce, and that Con-
gress had selected a reasonable and appropriate means to eliminate this
evil. 72 Similarly, in Katzenbach v. McClung,73 the Court upheld the
Civil Rights Act's extension of the prohibition to all restaurants serving
food which had moved in interstate commerce, since the restaurant, due
to its failure to serve blacks, was either subject to federal regulation of
all of its practices, or would reduce the amount of food moving in
commerce.
74
In these cases the Court reaffirmed current commerce clause doc-
trines. First, the slightest interstate connection can provide an adequate
Court has upheld such congressional regulations to impose "Protective conditions" on
the activities of interstate commerce. See Hypolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U.S.
45 (1911); Hale v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); Brooks v. United States, 267
U.S. 432 (1925) and United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Here the Court stated
its philosophy regarding cases of this nature: "Congress . . . is free to exclude from
[such] commerce articles whose use in the states for which they are destined it may
conceive to be injurious to the public health, morals, or welfare. . . ." According to
Charles Black, the constitutionality of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 could
have been more straight-forwardly justified along the lines of this "protective principle"
in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) and Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW, 55-57 (1969).
68. 42 U.S.C. §2000(a) et seq (1970).
69. Id. at §§ 2000(a), (b)(1), (c).
70. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. at 254-58.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
74. Stern, The Commerce Clause Revisited - The Federalization of Intrastate
Crime, supra note 59, at 272.
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basis even for federal commerce regulations which serve a non-
economic purpose. 5 Second, Congress has the power to regulate acts
which in isolation have no significant effect on interstate commerce but
are part of a class which as a whole could be said to have such an effect.76
C. A Less Expansive Interpretation
For the first time since Wickard, the Supreme Court has retreated
from its expansive interpretation of Congress' power under the
commerce clause in a case which is one of the Court's major federalism
decisions of the post-1937 era.77 In the 1976 case of National League of
Cities v. Usery,18 the Court invalidated the 1974 amendments to the Fair
Labor Standards Act which had extended federal maximum hour and
minimum wage provisions to all state and municipal employees," thus
holding a congressional regulation of commerce to be an unconstitu-
tional intrusion upon the sovereignty of state and local governments for
the first time in forty years."0
While the Court's decision in National League of Cities that Con-
gress had violated state sovereignty came as a surprise to some, the
Court had recently handed down numerous decisions protecting rights
of states in the federal system." Yet, this very familiarity of the federal-
ism theme poses the danger that the decision will be read as a general
75. Id.
76. 379 U.S. at 300-301.
77. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 236.
78. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
79. . Pub. L. No. 93-259, §§6(a)(1), (5), (6); 88 Stat. 58 (1974), codified at 29
U.S.C. §§203(d), (s), (x).
80. The latest such holding was Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
81. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (absent bad faith or extraor-
dinary circumstances, federal court is precluded from enjoining pending state criminal
prosecution by considerations of equity, comity, and federalism); O'Shea v. Littleton,
414 U.S. 488 (1974) (holding there is no equitable relief against state criminal magis-
trate and judge for alleged practice of discriminatory bond setting and sentencing);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (eleventh amendment prevents liability for
damages payable from state treasury); Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975) (hold-
ing that Congress may not exercise power in a way that impairs the states' integrity or
their ability to function effectively in a federal system); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976) (federal court may not order structural changes in police departments which have
invaded constitutional rights unless high-level official encouragement of such miscon-
duct is shown); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (restricting range of property and
liberty interests protected by the fourteenth amendment).
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vindication of the autonomy of states and municipalities to the detri-
ment of individual rights." If the case is regarded as such, problematic
distinctions arise in the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist. For ex-
ample, it seems that the Court is anomalously asserting that Congress
retains the power to strike down state regulation of private conduct, but
does not possess the same power to control the regulation of state
employees u Furthermore, this decision and others84 make a proble-
matic distinction between federal legislation regulating commerce, and
similar legislation enforcing rights under section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. 5
(1) THE THEORY
Professor Tribe has suggested an alternative interpretation of
National League of Cities which resolves the conflicting priorities of the
decision without doing violence to the Court's established notions both
of federalism and of the judicial accommodation of conflicting values.86
He sees the decision as one based on the protection of individual rights,
in this instance, the right to basic government services. 7 Basically, the
argument is that policy-based congressional legislation which threatens
the provision of vital services is unlike similar legislation directed at
private parties in that it presents the consitutional problem of endanger-
ing efforts by state and local governments to meet their citizens' legiti-
82. For an analysis of the decision as imposing limitation on the congressional
power under the commerce clause by asserting the rights of the states under the tenth
amendment, see Comment, Constitutional Implications of a Federal Collective Bargain-
ing Law for State and Local Government Employees, 1I CREIGHTON L. REV. 863
(1978).
83. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 312.
84. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (application to state employees
of a federal antidiscrimination statute sustained as an exercise of Congress' power under
section 5 of the fourteenth amendmenti.
85. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 313.
86. Id. at 314. See also Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New
Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Governmental Services, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1977).
87. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 313. Tribe's theory has not achieved widespread
support, a fact which he anticipated: "That the account suggested here is unconven-
tional seems clear enough . . . others will surely seek to defend National League of
Cities in terms that focus on state autonomy as such, paying only secondary attention
to the underlying concern for adequate provision of essential services . . . Doubting
. . . such an explanation, I have relied upon my own quite speculative thesis."
84
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mate expectations of basic government services. The language of Justice
Rehnquist could well be read to assert such a theory:
Even if we accept [the Federal Government's] assessments concerning
the impact of the [wage and hour regulations], their application will none-
theless significantly alter or displace the states' abilities to structure
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation. These
activities are typical of those performed by state and local governments
• . . Indeed, it is functions such as these which governments are created
to provide, such services as these which the states have traditionally
afforded their citizens. s
If such individual rights against the government for basic services
do exist, there must be a means to enforce these rights. National League
of Cities could be seen as the precedent for enforcing individual rights
against the government for certain basic services in areas where the
federal government has left to the states and localities the responsibility
of providing these services."9
(2) RAMIFICATIONS OF THE THEORY
The recognition of rights of individuals to basic governmental serv-
ices is a two-edged sword. In instances where, due to the national char-
acter or other aspects of the problem, congressional action results in a
lesser degree of restriction on individual rights than state action, the
congressional action would prevail.9" Thus, this decision does not pro-
pose a wholesale reallocation of powers in our federal system in favor
of state and local government. As long as congressional legislation re-
flects a compelling government interest and does not jeopardize individ-
ual rights, the courts should not be expected to object. The crucial point
is that, barring overriding governmental concerns," the courts must
88. 426 U.S. at 851. For an analysis dealing with this aspect of the case, see
Michelman, States Rights and States' Roles: The Permutations of 'Sovereignty' in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L.J. 1165 (1977).
89. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 315.
90. Id. at 316-17.
91. In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist distinguished Fry v. United
States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), where the Court upheld the application of the national
wage freeze to state and local employees. He noted the emergency character of the
legislation and the national scope of the problem. Furthermore, the federal action re-
sulted in reducing rather than increasing the burden upon state budgets, thus enhancing
the ability of the state and local governments to provide basic governmental services.
13:1979
85
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
80 Nova Law Journal 3:1979
insure a "necessarily over inclusive protection of individual rights. 19 2
In summary, the Court's decision in National League of Cities
asserts two principles of particular relevance to determining the consti-
tutionality of government regulation. The Court did not question the
fact that the amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act were
"undoubtedly within the scope of the commerce clause,"93 but rather
objected to the legislation on the ground that it deprived the states of
the sovereignty necessary to insure individual rights to basic governmen-
tal services. Thus, the first principle is that, if federal government regu-
lation imposed via the commerce clause unduly risks infringement of
affirmative individual rights, Congress must justify actions which would
otherwise clearly be within its powers. 4 Second, the courts are obliged
to insure a necessarily overinclusive protection of individual rights and,
when conflicts arise, defer to either the federal or state and local actions
by determining which of the two infringes least on the exercise of legiti-
mate individual rights.95
3. THE MODEL AND ITS RATIONALE
The following pages will discuss whether and the extent to which
research and application of the technologies of in vitro fertilization,
recombinant DNA, and cloning should be regulated by the government.
In the past, it has been widely assumed that the government had the
power and even the duty to regulate such areas. The power was seen as
arising from the Court's interpretation of the commerce clause as allow-
ing Congress to legislate to further its non-economic purposes via the
imposition of protective conditions on the privilege of engaging in any
activity seen to affect commerce. Furthermore, the promulgation of
regulations to protect the public health has traditionally been seen as a
foremost duty of both state and federal governments.
However, the Court's recent construction of the commerce clause
in National League of Cities, viewed in conjunction with the positive
declaration of unenumerated rights theory of the ninth amendment,
provides grounds for the formulation of a new approach to government
regulation in these areas. I have combined these two themes to derive
the following model, which serves as the guidepost to the central theme
92. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 316-17.
93. 426 U.S. at 841.
94. TRIBE, supra note 59, at 316.
95. Id.
86
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
3:1979
Government Regulation of Biotechnologies 811
of the later secions of this article: Although the government might
technically have the power to regulate in a given area under the com-
merce clause, if such regulation threatens to infringe upon enumerated
rights, or unenumerated rights protected by the ninth amendment, the
government must insure a necessarily overinclusive protection of these
rights, and must prove that there is a compelling need for the regulation
which justifies the infringement of these rights.
To determine whether the present extent of regulation imposed on
the research and application of in vitro fertilization, recombinant DNA,
and cloning is appropriate and, if not, to suggest an alternative, both
the compelling need for government regulation under the commerce
clause, and the individual ninth amendment rights which such regulation
would threaten, will be assessed in each respective field.
Four basic regulatory options with respect to the use of these tech-
nologies will be considered: 8
(1) No regulation/Marketplace - Decisions made by individuals.
Physicians inform persons what can or should be done in a particular
case, and individuals make their decisions based on this information.
(2) Decisions Made by the Medical Community - Such as medical
associations or quasi-public bodies like the National Institutes of Health.
While such pronouncements are not legally binding, they have great
moral force and can effectively resolve issues which would otherwise be
settled in court or by formal regulation.
(3) Judge-Made Law - Legal standards relating to the use of ge-
netic technology will eventually emerge as people seek legal remedy for
the consequences of such activities. The first such cases will be decided
by reference to precedents involving general medical procedures and
other relevant precedents. Eventually, however, a body of judge-made
laws pertaining specifically to genetic technology will evolve.
(4) Direct Legislation - Made either by legislative bodies or by
regulatory agencies to which the legislature delegates the authority to
regulate.
There are three assumptions implicit in the following analysis. The
first is that the unenumerated rights mentioned in Part 1 as being im-
plicit in and protected by the ninth amendment merit the same protec-
96. The following four options are taken from Green, Law and Policy for the
Brave New World, 48 INDIANA L. J. 559, 572-74 (1973) and TRIBE, CHANNELLING
TECHNOLOGY THROUGH LAW 52-60 (1973). Professor Tribe theorized that technologies
which meet with public approval will be encouraged by increased public consumption,
while those rejected will be limited or eliminated by lack of demand.
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tion as rights expressly enumerated in the Constitution. The unenumer-
ated rights considered in this article are: (1) The right of the people to
have a government which functions in the public interest and for the
common good; (2) The right to full participation in government and
access to a free and full shaping and sharing of power through participa-
tion in the governmental decision-making process, unencumbered by
undue deference to minority views or special interest groups; (3) The
right to freedom of inquiry; and (4) the right to beget children.
Second, Professor Tribe's interpretation of the commerce clause as
seen through the National League of Cities decision is regarded as the
status quo. In other words, if federal regulations imposed via the com-
merce clause infringe upon the rights of individuals, the regulations can
be justified only by demonstrating a compelling need for the regulations.
The third and perhaps most crucial premise from which the follow-
ing conclusions are drawn is that governs best which governs least.
Government is created to serve the people, rather than for the people
to serve government. Regulations are not an end in themselves, and
should be imposed only when necessary to protect the exercise of vital
individual rights. Thus, regulations should never impose more restric-
tions on the exercise of rights than would be the case in their absence.
4. IN VITRO FERTILIZATION
With the birth of Louise Brown on July 25, 1978,11 the prospect of
successful in vitro fertilization has become a reality. The process in-
volved in vitro fertilization is conceptually straightforward. 8 Ripe eggs
are removed from the female's ovary through an incision in the abdom-
inal wall and placed in a glass "petri" dish containing blood serum and
nutrients. Sperm cells from the male, which have been prepared for
fertilization, are added to the petri dish and, within a few hours, fertili-
zation occurs. The fertilized egg divides for between two and six days
until it is approximately a 100-celled embryo called a blastocyst. The
blastocyst then is placed in the women's uterus where, if all goes well,
97. Test-Tube Baby: It's a Girl, TIME, August 7, 1978 at 68. Since the Brown
baby, there have been other reported test-tube births. See, e.g., "Test-Tube Baby" Born
in India, Facts on File, October 27, 1978 at 824.
98. For detailed descriptions comprehensible to the lay person, see In Vitro Fertil-
ization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? 201 SCIENCE 698 (1978); The First Test-Tube Baby,
TIME, July 31, 1978 at 58. See also Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization:
Unethical Experiments on the Unborn? 285 N.E.J. MED. 1174 (1971).
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it attaches to the uterus wall and normal embryo development and birth
result."
The potential benefits of this technique, if perfected, are significant,
since it provides a means whereby women who are infertile due to
fallopian tube disorders can have children.""0 In addition, Dr. Carl
Pauerstein of the University of Texas states that in vitro research "has
the potential for adding greatly to the knowledge of the reproductive
biology of our species." 10'
A. Existing Government Regulation
The government has felt that the risks involved in the process out-
weigh its advantages, and has imposed an unofficial federal moratorium
which has halted all United States research involving in vitro fertiliza-
tion in humans as of 1975.102 In a 1975 federal order, the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare was barred from funding any in vitro
fertilization"0 experiments unless they were first approved by the Na-
tional Ethics Advisory Board appointed by the Secretary of HEW.,0 4
Perhaps due to its controversial nature, this panel was not formed
until January of 1978, and did not meet to begin deciding whether or
not to recommend that the moratorium be lifted until the following
September. Strong opposition to federal financing of in vitro research
has surfaced at regional hearings of the Board, although a final determi-
nation has not yet been made. 05 In the face of such delays, scientists
such as Joseph D.- Schulman of the National Institute of Child Health
and Human Development lament that, "for every year that we wait,
99. This scenario is taken from the sources supra note 98. Since the birth of
Louise Brown, Dr. Patrick Steptoe claims to have improved the technique of test tube
fertilization and implantation. See Gain Claimed in Test Tube Baby Method, The New
York Times, Dec. 2, 1978, section C at 6.
100. Green, Law and Policy for the Brave New World, 48 INDIANA L. J. at 562
(1973).
101. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
102. Id. at 62.
103. Private foundations have also hesitated to fund such experiments in the
United States. Ironically, America's own Ford Foundation pays the salary through
endowment of Robert Edwards, the physiologist responsible for the birth of Louise
Brown. See In Vitro Fertilization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699.
104. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 62.
105. In Vitro Fertilization: Is it Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699. For
a report of testimony at one such regional hearing, see Testimony Opposes Test-Tube
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thousands of infertile American women will, because of their ages, lose
forever their opportunity to have children."' 6
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
The government and others opposed to in vitro research see basi-
cally three potential dangers. First, there is the medical danger that the
process would result in abnormal babies.07 As Dr. John Marshall, head
of obstetrics and gynecology at Los Angeles County's Harber General
Hospital puts it, "the potential for misadventure is unlimited . . . What
if we got an otherwise perfectly formed individual that was a cyclops?"' 18
The vast preponderance of research and expert opinions suggest
that these fears of biological disaster are totally unfounded. According
to Schulman, "there are no data to support the hypothetical fears that
in vitro fertilization will lead to abnormal babies." ' 9 Schulman points
out that, in the course of the substantial amount of work that has been
done with animals ranging from mice to sheep, pigs, horses and cows,
there has been no confirmed evidence that in vitro fertilization leads to
genetic or morphological abnormalities in the offspring of any species.
Furthermore, these pre-implantation embryos are remarkably re-
sistant to manipulation, and may even be fused or frozen and still result
in normal offspring." 0 Perhaps the ultimate evidence of the process'
safety was the birth of normal, healthy Louise Brown, the first "test-
tube" baby.
Schulman also contends that, even if there is a risk of abnormality,
the decision to have a child should be left to the prospective parents, as
is the customary procedure in the medical profession when similar risks
are involved."' For example, if one or both parents are thought to carry
traits of various genetic diseases, such as hemophilia or sickle cell ane-
mia, the couple is not told that they cannot have children. Rather, they
are often encouraged to undergo genetic counseling and to assess the
106. Id. For federal legislation regarding this technology, see National Research
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348 (1974); Part 46 of 45 C.F.R. subtitle A and amendments in
43, No. 7 Fed. Reg. 1759 (1978).
107. In Vitro Fertilization: Is It Safe and Repeatable? supra note 98, at 699.
108. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
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condition of the developing fetus through amniocentesis." 2 The ultimate
decision is left to the parents. There is no reason why a similar proce-
dure could and should not be used in cases of in vitro fertilization and
embryo transplantation.
The second perceived need for government regulation stems from
anticipated ethical problems feared to result from in vitro fertilization.
In the words of Nobel Laureate James Watson, there is the potential
for "all sorts of bad scenarios. 113 Foremost is the question of the
morality of this experiment, even with the informed consent of the
parties involved, and the specter at the end of the road of maintaining
a fetus in vitro to the point of birth.11 4 There is the possibliity of surro-
gate motherhood, or "wombs for rent" in which a woman's egg would
be fertilized and implanted in another woman for biological reasons, for
the sake of convenience, or perhaps even without the consent or knowl-
edge of the donors.1 Some fear that so-called "baby factories" could
result in which people would be bred for specific desirable traits. Finally,
if an embryo developing in vitro were to be terminated at the will of the
donors, doctors or both, would this be regarded as murder if done
beyond a certain stage of embryonic development?
Fears that such dangers would result from the application of in
vitro technology, while commonly held, are largely unfounded. Use of
the technology could be restricted to cases in which the donors are a
married couple and the fetus is implanted in the uterus of the biological
mother. Such situations would not be essentially different from ordinary
biological parenthood."' If in vitro fertilization and embryo transplan-
tation involved using the sperm of a donor, the case would be similar
to artificial insemination"7 which has been used successfully and without
significant controversy for a number of years.'
The chance that widespread human "breeding" would occur seems
112. The surgical procedure of inserting a hollow needle through the abdominal
wall into the uterus of a pregnant woman and extracting amniotic fluid for analysis to
determine the presence of disease, genetic defects, etc.
113. The First Test-Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 562-63.
114. Green, supra note 100, at 562-63.
115. Id.
116. Hudock, Frankenstein is Still a Myth, But it Should be Read Periodically,
48 INDIANA L. J. 553 (1973).
117. The impregnation of a female by artificial introduction of semen taken from
a male.
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unlikely in view of the fact that, in the past, this has not been attempted
by either artificial insemination or natural conception, except perhaps
in isolated cases. Standards regarding the "killing" of embryos develop-
ing in vitro could be the same as those set for abortions.
Lest the possibility be overlooked, it should be mentioned that
maintaining a fetus in vitro to the point of birth could prove to be highly
beneficial, in terms of both convenience for the mother,"' and the provi-
sion of a controlled and risk-free artificial womb for the fetus.
The third feared danger of in vitro technology is that unmanageable
legal complications would result. In the eyes of the law, would the child
belong to the donor of the egg, or the surrogate who bears the child?,"0
Who would be responsible for providing monetary support? In the case
of death or deformity of the fetus, should responsibility lie with the
biological parents, the surrogate mother, the doctor or perhaps even the
government?2 1
The resolution of such legal questions should not be as difficult as
it might first appear. In vitro fertilization and embryo transplantation
would be performed only by qualified and licensed persons. Rights,
responsibilities, and the potential liabilities of all involved could be
contractually pre-determined before any action was taken. 22 Thus, any
legal controversy which arose could be resolved by customary means in
the courts of law.
In conclusion, the case foreshowing a compelling need for govern-
ment regulation of in vitro fertilization is negligible at best in terms of
biological dangers, ethical controversies, and legal entanglements.
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
The constitutional rights of individuals which would potentially be
infringed if in vitro fertilization was subjected to government regula-
tion 23 are several. There is the right to freedom of scientific inquiry and
research. Also affected is the right to beget children. The exercise of this
right justifies the use of any means which does not subsequently infringe
the rights of any other party. Such means might include the taking of
fertility drugs, the use of artificial insemination, or application of the
technology of in vitro fertilization.
Related is the right of the people to have a government which
functions in the public interest and for the common good. It is in the
119. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
120. Green, supra note 100, at 562.
121. The First Test Tube Baby, supra note 98, at 59.
122. Hudock, supra note 116, at 553-55.
123. As has been the practical case since 1975.
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common interest to have a government which does not infringe upon
constitutional rights of individuals when compelling dangers are not at
stake. Since the right to have children is a constitutional right, it is in
the public interest to allow for the exercise of this right by artificial
insemination, if necessary.
Finally, there is the right to full participation in and access to a free
and full sharing of power and shaping of public policy unencumbered
by undue deference to minority views of special interest groups. The
option which would allow for the greatest public participation in in vitro
decisions would be to impose no regulations, and allow decisions regard-
ing this technology to be made in the marketplace or on an individual
patient-doctor basis.
D. Policy Assessment
Available evidence suggests that application of in vitro technology
poses no danger that would justify the need for government regulations.
Scientists should be free to do research in the area, and persons should
be free to decide whether, when and to what extent they wish to use these
technologies on an individual basis. Any legal controversies arising out
of such actions could be settled in the courts.
5. RECOMBINANT DNA
The distinctive traits which characterize each species on earth are
determined by inheritance factors known as genes.124 These genes have
been identified as strings of matter called chromosomes, which consist
of segments of deoxyribose nucleic acid [DNA]'2 and are found in the
nucleus of every living cell. It is the myriad of potential sets of molecular
combinations of DNA which is responsible for the particular gene pools
which define each species. The species maintain their identities because
they are unable to mix their gene pools with those of any other species
through reproduction.1 28
124. Note, Recombinant DNA and Technology Assessment, 11 GEORGIA L.REv.
at 791 (1977).
125. Although Mendel first hypothesized the existence of genes in the nineteenth
century, their location was not identified for another fifty years until the work of Watson
and Crick. See Watson and Crick, Molecular Structure of Nucleic Acids: A Structure
for Deoxyribose Nucleic Acid, 171 NATURE 737 (1953). See also WATSON, THE DOUBLE
HELIX (1963).
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Molecular biologists have recently acquired the remarkable ability
to break through these natural barriers by developing techniques to
"recombine" or"splice" DNA segments from one species into.the DNA
chain of another species, where the combined segments will replicate as
a part of the normal metabolism of the host cell.121 This technique of
"gene splicing" or recombinant DNA'2 was developed in 1972 and, for
the first time, allowed researchers to manipulate DNA within cells of
lower organisms.' The technique involves utilizing an enzyme 3 1 to cut
a segment of DNA from the chromosome of one organism and place it
in the chromosome of another organism, thus constructing a molecule
containing portions of DNA from two organisms. When placed inside
a host cell, the cell replicates normally, each subsequent cell containing
identical sets of the newly constructed DNA strands . 31
This process was first used to recombine DNA segments from the
same bacterial species, E. coli. 32 Subsequently, biologists have success-
fully combined segments from two unrelated species of bacteria, and
DNA from a toad into E. coli. 33 All recombined molecules have
demonstrated normal replication and metabolism, in addition to show-
ing the appropriate cellular effect of the spliced gene. Theoretically, it
is now possible to isolate a DNA segment from any species of plant or
animal and recombine it~into a new host cell, which would then exhibit
certain specific characteristics of the foreign species. 34
The development of recombinant DNA technology represents a
major breakthrough in the field of the biological sciences . 3 An obvious
127. For a detailed description of this technique, see Cohen, The Manipulation
of Genes, 233 Sci. AMER. 24 (1975).
128. For scientific discussion of recombinant DNA research intelligible to the lay
person see, e.g., Grobstein, The Recombinant DNA Debate, 237 SCIENTIFIC AM. 22
(1976); Recombinant DNA: Impacts and Advances, 109 SCIENCE NEWS 389 (1976);
Miller, Recombinant DNA Research, 111 Sci. NEws 216 (1977); Schneider, Genetic
Engineering: Threat and Promise, TECH. REv. (1976).
129. Comment, Law v. Science: Legal Control of Genetic Research, 65
KENTUCKY L.J. 880 (1977).
130. A type of protein that promotes the chemical processes of life without itself
being altered or destroyed.
131. Comment, supra note 129, at 881.
132. Cohen, supra note 127, at 31. E. coli. stands for Escherichia coli. Strain K-
12 is the most commonly used.
133. Id.
134. Note, supra note 124, at 792.
135. See Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 426, 431-32 (1976).
1 88 3:979 1
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advantage of this work is the advancement of scientific knowledge,'
specifically of the biological processes. The technique could be used for
the cheap and efficient production of medically important substances
such as insulin, for which a world-wide shortage appears imminent.',
Certain genetic diseases such a sickle-cell anemia might be cured simply
by replacing the responsible gene.'38 Pollutants could be neutralized by
manufactured microbes."9 The number of potentially beneficial appli-
cations of this technology is indeed staggering.
A. Existing Government Regulation
There are presently various existing and proposed regulations re-
garding research on and application of recombinant DNA technology.
Shortly after the recombinant DNA technique was developed, scientists
became concerned with the potential for danger and a worldwide mora-
torium was called until hazards could be evaluated and standards devel-
oped." Eight months later, the first attempt at regulating the research
came from the scientists themselves at the international Asilomar Con-
ference which was held in California in 1975.111 The prominent research-
ers participating in the Conference agreed that subsequent recombinant
DNA research should proceed under a set of guidelines adopted by the
Conference.' The adopted guidelines lifted the worldwide moratorium
and imposed a voluntary ban on research judged to be too dangerous
under any circumstances.' 3 All other experiments were allowed to pro-
ceed, provided that set safety conditions were maintained to insure that
the experimental organisms were adequately "contained."'" Although
not legally enforceable, these guidelines were generally followed. 45
136. Cohen, Recombinant DNA: Fact and Fiction, 195 Sc'. 654-55 (1977).
137. Note, supra note 124, at 792-93.
138. Id.
139. General Electric reported the creation of a petroleum consuming microbe
potentially useful in the eradication of oil spills. See NAT'L. GEOGRAPHIC, September
1976, at 374-75.
140. Committee on Recombinant DNA molecules, Potential Biohazards of Re-
combinant DNA Molecules, 185 ScI. 303 (1974).
141. Comment, supra note 129, at 884-85.
142. Id.
143. Wade, Genetics: Conference Sets Strict Controls to Replace Moratorium,
187 Sci. 931-33 (1975). See also Summary Statement of the Asilomar Conference on
Recombinant DNA Molecules, 188 Scr. 991 (1975).
144. Id.
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The Asilomar guidelines served as a basis for the first controls
imposed by the federal government, the National Institutes of Health 4"
Guidelines which govern federally funded research.14 Though both sci-
entists and the general public were consulted in the development of the
guidelines, "' the result remained essentially scientific self-regulation.
Compliance with the NIH Guideline is mandatory only for all NIH
funded research, and compliance in research done by private industries
such as pharmaceutical companies 149 is strictly voluntary.
Recently, HEW Secretary Califano announced that the NIH
Guidelines will be relaxed, due to the fact that the likelihood of harm
now appears more remote than was once believed. The revised guide-
lines, while continuing the ban on six categories of potentially dangerous
research such as that involving deadly disease organisms, will exempt
one-third of the genetic research covered by the present rules. In addi-
tion, the new guidelines will permit the National Institutes of Health
director to grant case-by-case exemptions.
Although the new guidelines will still be mandatory only for feder-
ally financed research, Califano said that, for the first time, the govern-
ment will seek to require the compliance of private industry through the
Food and Drug Administration, which will propose regulations applying
to all the industries it regulates. 5 ' Whether or not the FDA will in fact
impose such regulations, and the impact that these regulations might
have, remain to be seen.
A number of existing laws can be viewed as enabling the federal
government to control some aspects of recombinant DNA research.,',
One statute under which such regulation could be promulgated is the
tional Legal Control, 16 VA. J. INT'L. L. 403, 420 (1976).
146. Hereinafter referred to as NIH.
147. 41 Fed. Reg. 27, 902 (1976) and 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 427 (1976).
148. Roblin, Reflections on Issues Posed by Recombinant DNA Molecule
Technology, 265 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. Sci. 59 (1976) and Wade, Recombinant DNA:
Guidelines Debated at Public Hearing, 191 Sci. 834 (1976).
149. Grobstein, Recombinant DNA Research: Beyond the NIH Guidelines, 194
Sci. 1133-34 (1976). At least several major pharmaceutical companies are actively
involved in recombinant DNA research. Comment, Considerations in the Regulation
of Biological Research, 126 UNIV. PENN. L. REv. 1420 (1978); Wade, Gene-Splicing:
At Grass-Roots Level a Hundred Flowers Bloom, 195 Sci. 558 (1977).
150. U.S. Set to Relax Guidelines for Gene-Splitting Research, The Washington
Post, Dec. 17, 1978, sec. C at 1. See also The Public Interest in Gene Splitting, The
Washington Post, Jan. 13, 1979 at 18.
151. See generally Balmer, Recombinant DNA: Legal Responses to a New
Biohazard, 7 INVT'L. L. 293, 308 (1977).
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Public Health Services Act.' Under the PHSA, the Surgeon General,
with the approval of the Secretary of HEW, has the power to create and
enforce regulations "as in his judgment are necessary to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases,"'5 3
such as might result from an organism with unknown properties created
via gene-splicing.'
The National Environmental Policy Act 5 gives the federal agen-
cies certain procedural and substantive duties to promote a national
policy of environmental protection. Since recombinant DNA biotech-
nology poses a risk of disrupting the environment through the creation
of new and harmful species, NEPA offers an opportunity for public
review of federally sponsored recombinant DNA research.'
The Toxic Substances Control Act' requires users of potentially
dangerous chemical substances to notify the Environmental Protection
Agency,' which will test the substance's environmental or health risks.
If results suggest imminent danger, the EPA may enact controls as it
deems appropriate. "9
The Occupational Safety and Health Act,"10 administered by the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, protects employees
from injury by employment-related toxic substances."' Thus, it could be
used to enforce appropriate safety regulations in laboratories engaged
in work with recombinant DNA."2
For two years, Congress has been struggling to enact legislation to
control recombinant DNA research but, as of yet, no bill has been
passed into law. In February of 1977, Senator Dale Bumpers introduced
a bill entitled The DNA Research Act of 1977,"' which would require
the Secretary of HEW to promulgate guidelines for such research within
152. 42 U.S.C. § 201 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as PHSA].
153. 42 U.S.C. § 264 (1970).
154. Balmer, supra note 151, at 310-11.
155. 42 U.S.C. §4321 (1970 and Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as
NEPA].
156. Parenteau and Catz, Public Assessment of Biological Technologies: Can
NEPA Answer the Challenge? 64 GEo. L. REv. 679 (1976).
157. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-29 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as TSCA].
158. Hereinafter referred to as EPA.
159. 15 U.S.C. §2603(4) (1976).
160. 29 U.S.C. §§651-78 (1970).
161. 29 U.S.C. §655(b)(5) (1970).
162. Balmer, supra note 151, at 312, n. 99.
163. S. 621, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 2272 (1977).
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ninety days of the bill's enactment."' During and since that time, both
houses have considered a number of similar bills,' the most recent of
which include bills sponsored by Representative Rodgers, 6 ' Senator
Nelson, 167 and Senator Kennedy.'
When Congress may approve legislation in this area and the ulti-
mate nature of the legislation are uncertain. Whether such legislation
will ever be passed has itself become questionable. In a recent letter to
HEW Secretary Califano,' 6' Senator Kennedy threw the recombinant
DNA initiative back into the lap of the administration, suggesting that
Congress is no closer to passing legislation to control recombinant DNA
research than it was two years ago.
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
There are three areas of public concern regarding the biotechnology
of recombinant DNA. The most common fear is that a dangerous new
microorganism might escape from the laboratory, causing the death of
millions as the result of a bubonic-like plague.' Since this technique
creates essentially new species of organisms, these organisms could pos-
sibly produce some unnatural or unpredicted substances which might
become serious pests.'
The spread of recombinant organisms might be irreversible, and
thus the possibility that these molecules may escape from laboratories
into the environment must be regarded with great concern. 7 2 The likeli-
hood of such danger is enhanced by the fact that the organism most
commonly used in recombinant DNA research is E. coli., a bacterium
164. id. at§ 4.
165. See, e.g., S.945, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 3699 (1977); S.1217,
95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 5335 (1977); H.R. 3191, 95th Cong., Ist Sess.,
123 Cong. Rec. 917 (1977); H.R. 4232, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 1552
(1977); H.R. 4759, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 Cong. Rec. 1929 (1977).
166. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
167. S. 1217, amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
168. S. 1217, amend. No. 1713, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
169. Senate Passes Back Gene-Splice Cup, 200 Scl. 1368 (1978).
170. Kilpatrick, Regulation and the Search for Truth, NATION'S BuSINESS, Jan.
1978 at 13-14.
171. Bennett and Gurin, Science That Frightens Scientists, 239 THE ATLANTIC,
Feb. 1977 at 44.
172. See Recombinant DNA Research Guidelines, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement, 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 429-31 (1976).
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that inhabits the human gut.'73 Although E. coli. in its natural state is
relatively harmless, the fear is that an escaped pathogenic strain of
recombinant E. coli. would colonize in the intestines of humans.74
Many experts have predicted that the risks involved in recombinant
DNA biotechnology would lead to the above mentioned disasters.' 5
However, such risks are entirely potential and speculative, and have
never, in any way, been demonstrated. 7 ' Scientists have pointed out the
extreme unlikelihood that such risks would be manifested, and have de-
emphasized the dangers of this research.' Nobel Laureate Watson, the
discoverer of DNA's structure, has commented, "the dangers involved
[in recombinant DNA research] are probably no greater than working
in a hospital."' 78
The inescapable conclusion, however, is that the likelihood of dan-
ger resulting from recombinant DNA research is simply not known. 79
Therefore, according to Dr. Philip Handler, president of the National
Academy of Sciences, some regulations of recombinant DNA biotech-
nology are necessary in the interest of the public health and safety."08
At least three recent incidents have demonstrated potential risks
and hazards.'' Yet, the scientific community is in general agreement
that an outright ban is not warranted. The situation has been compared
with the remote possibility of pathogenic organisms being returned to
earth by the Apollo missions."' In that instance, rather than forfeit the
missions, reasonable safeguards were imposed. The potential risk in-
volved in recombinant DNA research is sufficient to justify the imposi-
tion of similar safeguards.
Perhaps the most ominous justification for controlling recombinant
DNA research is the possibility that the technology could be deliber-
ately misused for such purposes as biological warfare., These fears are
173. Comment, supra note 129, at 882.
174. 41 Fed. Reg. 38, 430 (1976).
175. Sinsheimer, An Evolutionary Perspective for Genetic Engineering, 73 N~w
SCIENTIST 150 (1977).
176. Berg, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecules, 185 Sci. 303
(1974).
177. A British scientist illustrated this view via the use of mathematical probabil-
ities. Holliday, Should Genetic Engineers Be Contained? 73 NEw SCIENTIST 399 (1977).
178. Wade, supra note 143, at 933.
179. Comment, supra note 129, at 883.
180. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
181. Wade, Dicing With Nature; Three Narrow Escapes, 195 ScI. 378 (1977).
182. A Scientist-Senator on Recombinant DNA Reasearch, 201 Sci. 15 (1978).
183. Gene War? Reds Play Catch-Up in Genetic Research, Atlanta Journal &
1 3:1979
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reminiscent of the waves of controversy that erupted when the tech-
niques of atomic fission and fusion were understood to embrace the
capacity for both social good and social catastrophe. 4 Some might
argue that, in retrospect, the A-bomb should never have been put to-
gether. 1'
The ideal solution would be to impose regulations which would
allow society to reap all the benefits of the technology and risk none of
the disasters. Unfortunately, such a solution might be possible only in
a Utopia. Perhaps the next best remedy would be not to ban recombi-
nant DNA research entirely, but to impose regulations tight enough to
minimize opportunities for deliberate misuse of the technology.
A third appeal for the imposition of governmental regulations has
been made on ethical grounds by those who do not wish to see a world
in which babies are "custom made to order." The argument given in
such cases is that it would be best to prevent the development of such
capabilities by permanently halting all research on recombinant DNA
on the grounds that there are some facts that members of the human
race are better off not knowing.1m
Such appeals are reminiscent of the Promethean187 myth and, car-
ried a step further, echo of Pandora and her box of troubles. Application
of this biotechnology has been regarded as crossing a barrier between
the "will of God" and the acts of humanity by tinkering with the evolu-
tionary process.188 Other critics have suggested that the creation of new
species through gene splicing would upset the precarious "balance of
nature," and result in environmental chaos.189
There is little likelihood that such arguments would be used as
grounds for a case showing compelling need for government regulation.
In the United States the traditional view has been that it is more danger-
ous to live in ignorance than to live with knowledge."' Unlike some
totalitarian governments, it is not the policy of the United States to
regulate ideas simply out of fear of the ideas themselves.' Thus, the
Constitution, Feb. 20, 1977, sec. C at 16, col. 1.
184. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. In Greek mythology, Prometheus created the human race by stealing knowl-
edge that Zeus wanted to keep to himself. In his anger, Zeus punished Prometheus by
nailing him to a mountain and dooming him to the eternal fate of having an eagle tear
out his liver every day, only to have it grow back every night.
188. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
189. Sinsheimer, supra note 175, at 150.
190. Kilpatrick, supra note 170, at 14.
191. Id.
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prospects of using the power of government to regulate recombinant
DNA research for the purpose of suppressing ideas that might otherwise
flow from such research are slim.
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
The right most commonly debated in the field of recombinant
DNA research is the right to freedom of inquiry, which has been held
to be guaranteed by the first and ninth amendments. 1 2 Since pure re-
search has traditionally been unregulated,"' scientists are generally
fearful of the imposition of any legal control,"' and warn of the
"dangers facing modern society if it chooses to foreclose avenues of
knowledge and discovery which might lead to the emancipation of man-
kind from the chains of ignorance and disease."" 5 The prospect of any
controls on research is often equated with the Vatican's inquisition of
Galileo.19
However, inquiry loses its constitutional protection when research
constitutes a threat to the public health, 97 as is the case with recombi-
nant DNA research. Thus, while scientists could claim constitutional
protection in their desire to conduct research free from restrictions, the
degree of their success would be limited by deference to official assess-
ments of the degree to which the public health and environment would
be endangered by the research activity.199 Perhaps the most that scien-
tists could reasonably expect is that regulations ultimately implemented
would be drawn with utmost deference to imposing minimal infringe-
ments on the right to freedom of inquiry.199
The constitutional right to beget children does not imply that this
would include the right to "custom made" or even healthy offspring.
Thus, regulation of recombinant DNA research would not seem to
infringe upon the right to beget children.
Whether or not such regulation would violate the right to have a
government which functions in the public interest and for the common
192. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also text accompanying
notes 30 through 53 supra.
193. Comment, supra note 145, at 417.
194. Lederberg, supra note 50.
195. Comment, supra note 143, at 416.
196. Lederberg, supra note 50, at 596-97.
197. Note, supra note 124, at 836.
198. Comment, supra note 129, at 886-87.
199. Id. at 887.
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good is not an easy issue to resolve. Scientists would undoubtedly con-
tend that such regulations were not in their interest."' Similarly, there
might be those who would maintain that the creation of a race of blond-
haired, blue-eyed giants would indeed be in the common good.2 1
The interests of such special interest groups aside, there is no func-
tion of the government that is more in the public interest and for the
common good than the protection of its citizens, especially from epi-
demic and widespread loss of life. It is certainly in the interest of persons
to survive. Indeed, the survival instinct has been said to be the primary
goal of all liying organisms. Thus, government regulation of recombi-
nant DNA would serve to enhance the right of the people to have a
government which functions in the common interest and for the com-
mon good.
D. Policy Assessment
The above paragraphs suggest that there is indeed a compelling
need for some form of institutionalized preventive control over the re-
search and application of recombinant DNA techniques. Unlike in vitro
technology, application of recombinant DNA techniques posts a poten-
tial threat to the public health and safety that could result from labora-
tory escape or deliberate misuse. While there is no apparent cause for
a ban on such research altogether, the remote possibility of mass con-
tamination is cause for comprehensive governmental regulation of the
area. In the words of G. Raltray Taylor,
I am therefore forced to the conclusion that society will have to control
the pace of research, if it can, and will certainly have to regulate the
release of these new powers. There will have to be a biological "icebox"
in which the new techniques can be placed until society is ready for them
• . . the social consequences . . . could be so disastrous-nothing less
than the breakup of civilization as we know it-that the attempt must be
made.202
The questions which remain to be answered are whether the status quo
satisfies this need and, if not, what course of action should be pursued.
Upon examination it becomes apparent that existing measures are
200. Id.
201. HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (1925).
202. TAYLOR, THE BIOLOGICAL TIME BOMB (1968).
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not sufficient. The NIH Guidelines are not legally enforceable,0 3 and
apply only to federally funded research." 4 The PHSA is ill-equipped to
act as a basis of regulation of biological research,"0 ' since the purpose
of the act is to "prevent the spread of disease."2 ' Because of this lan-
guage and the Act's historical usage, an interpretation of the Public
Health Services Act as allowing for control over the spread of a particu-
lar DNA molecule would be an extremely liberal if not implausable
construction.207
The problem with environmental acts such as the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act is that they deal with preventing the discharge of
hazardous substances in harmful quantities.2 18 Since there are no known
safe exposure links of the new organisms which could potentially be
created by gene splicing, such laws provide no useful basis for the for-
mulation of regulations in the area.2°9
The Toxic Substances Control Act would not be an appropriate
vehicle in this area for a variety of reasons. Directed to chemical sub-
stances, the Act would have to be amended to apply also to biological
organisms. 210 The efficiency of this Act as a source of regulation is
diminished by the fact that EPA uses the TSCA as a statute of last
resort when no other statute will solve a pressing problem.', Perhaps
most importantly, the TSCA is used to test chemical substances before
commercial production: with recombinant DNA, the issue is regulation
of the research itself, regardless of possible future exploitation.
212
Finally the Occupational Safety and Health Act does not meet the
need because the Act covers neither government employees nor workers
employed by other federal government agencies,213 two categories in
which recombinant DNA researchers are concentrated.
Having determined that some new form of governmental control
over recombinant DNA research is necessary, the next issue to be re-
203. Supra note 147.
204. Comment, supra note 129, at 885.
205. Comment, supra note 149, at 1437.
206. 42 U.S.C. §264 (1970).
207. Balmer, supra note 151, at 310-12.
208. Kraus, Environmental Carcinogenesis: Regulation on the Frontiers of
Science, 7 ENVT'L L. at 87-89 (1976).
209. Comment, supra note 149, at 1438.
210. Id. at 1436.
21i. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c), 2608(a) and (b) (1976).
212. Comment, supra note 149, at 1436.
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652 and 653 (1970).
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solved is whether such legislation should emanate from the federal or
the state and local level." 4 Upon examining the alternatives, there seem
to be compelling reasons for the federal government to totally preempt
regulations in this field." 5
Rather than giving sufficient deference to the scientific right of free
inquiry, states and localities might politicize the decision-making pro-
cess by responding to scare tactics and uninformed public hysteria. 21
Furthermore, it is questionable "whether a system of piecemeal regula-
tion would be effective in protecting the public, for microbes fleeing
from a low-§afeguard locality are unlikely to recognize the political
boundary of an adjacent high-safeguard jurisdiction. ' '2t 7
A final reason for federal control is that local regulators could not
reasonably be expected to have access to the same quality of informa-
tion available to a national body.218 The federal government is best
equipped to keep in step with the most recent scientific developments. 219
If localities were allowed to regulate independently, it is likely that a
time lag in the receipt of current scientific data would result in standards
that would be either too restrictive for optimal research or not restrictive
enough, thus either unnecessarily preventing valuable discoveries or cre-
ating an unreasonable risk to public health.22 For these reasons, it is
not surprising that the scientific community strongly favors federal
rather than state and local regulation.21
The final key issue in implementing regulations on DNA research
is whether Congress should assume responsibility for making the basic
policy decisions, or delegate this responsibility to an administrative
agency.222 In the past, when Congress has legislated in areas of consider-
able controversy, factual uncertainty, and unknown policy impact, it has
214. Comment, supra note 149, at 1424.
215. Id. at 1425.
216. Id. Although the Cambridge Laboratory Experimentation Review Board
and City Council passed useful and legitimate guidelines in this area in 1977, other
localities might not be as "enlightened" as Cambridge. Furthermore, the board itself
believed that federal controls should be implemented. See Cambridge Experimental
Review Board, 33 BULL. ATOM. Sci. 23 (1977) and Culliton, Recombinant DNA:
Cambridge City Council Votes Moratorium, 143 SC. at 301.
217. Comment, supra note 149, at 161.
218. Guilbert, The Relationship Between State and Federal Regulation of Air
Polluting Energy Sources in Oregon, 54 ORE. L. REv. 525 (1975).
219. Comment, supra note 149, at 1426.
220. Id.
221. Gene Legislation: NAS Urges Caution, 211 SC. NEWs 293 (1977).
222. Comment, supra note 149, at 1438.
198 3:1979 1
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deferred to the judgment of administrative agencies, as was the case
regarding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Recently proposed
DNA regulation bills similarly delegate significant decision making to
non-legislative bodies.22' While this pattern of delegation should not be
automatically assumed, it is not practical to expect members of Con-
gress to acquire expertise in all of the wide ranging and complex activi-
ties in which our government is involved today.2
No existing agency has a membership of scientists and laypersons
suited to making the difficult value and policy choices necessary for
adequate regulation of this area. A suitable guide for Congress to
follow in establishing a commission to regulate the field of recombinant
DNA is the composition of other bodies which make policy decisions
of uncertain scientific or technological risks, such as the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission.27
An especially apt membership example, on which the latest House
bill is based, m is the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, which is composed of
eleven persons coming from the fields of "medicine, law, ethics, theol-
ogy, the biological, physical, behavioral and social sciences, philosophy,
humanities, health administration, government, and public affairs. ' 12 A
commission of similar composition would be capable not only of evalu-
ating the technical data involved, but also of representing the public
interest at large in the formulation of recombinant DNA regulations.2
6. CLONING
The technique of cloninge has received a great deal of recent
attention from the media. Unlike in vitro fertilization, which lets nature
223. 42 U.S.C. §2201(b) (1970). This Commission was authorized to impose reg-
ulations on the use of nuclear materials as it deemed necessary to promote the common
defense and protect the public health.
224. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., § 201 (1978); S. 1217, amend. No. 1713,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201 (1978); S. 1217, amend. No. 754, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.,
§ 481 (1977).
225. Bazelon, Coping with Technology Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL
L. REV. 817, 829 (1977).
226. Comment, supra note 149, at 1440.
227. Id.
228. H.R. 11192, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 218(f) (Supp. 1974).
230. Comment, supra note 149, at 1440.
231. From the Greek klon, meaning twig.
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take its course in a test tube, cloning produces a genetic copy of its single
parent through asexual reproduction."' This technique is facilitated by
the biological fact that every cell in a living organism carries the same
genetic material as every other cell in the organism. The cause of differ-
entiated cell functions is that different genes are "turned on" in, for
example, a blood cell than in a skin cell. 3 In cloning, the nucleus of
an egg or sperm cell, which contains only half the normal number of
chromosomes, is replaced by the nucleus of a body cell containing the
full number of the organism's chromosomes. The cell, having been
"fooled" intq thinking it has been fertilized, begins to divide and devel-
ops as would a normal embryo.24 The end result is an organism biologi-
cally identical to that which donated the nucleus, thus enabling the
production of multiple biological "carbon copies" of any given organ-
ism.?35
This technique has tremendous implications for animal husbandry
and laboratory research. For example, a particular strain of mouse
needed for crucial experiments could be duplicated in mass; prize dairy
cows, sheep and pigs could be mass produced, thus improving the qual-
ity of the world's food supply.?6 Theoretically, it would also be possible
to make clones of great humans, ultimately creating a "superrace" or
perhaps even a new species of human being entirely?217
A. Existing Government Regulation
There are presently no specific constraints on cloning research or
the application of the biotechnology.
B. The Compelling Need for Government Regulation
Under the Commerce Clause
Few people feel that the cloning of mice or of "grade-A" cattle is
a danger creating a compelling need for government regulation. By
contrast, the prospect of cloning humans evokes a sharply different
response of fear, and even hysteria, provoked by thoughts of misuse
232. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, TIME, July 31, 1978 at 65.
233. Id.
234. Green, supra note 100, at 563.
235. Id.
236. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
237. Green, supra note 100, at 563, 573.
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such as tyrannical clones taking over the world. While such scenarios
might not endanger the public health as such, they could cause sufficient
emotional, political and social trauma to justify the imposition of gov-
ernment controls if it is determined that these fears are justified.
An examination of the most recent evidence suggests that these
feared effects of human cloning are unjustified, as the chances for effec-
tive human cloning are minimal. According to Nobel Laureate James
Watson, "there's no future in [cloning]." 8 While researchers in the
field can now effectively clone frogs, the cloning of mammals is much
more complex and, by expert estimations, "a long way off.'"u This is
due in large part to the fact that mammalian eggs are one-tenth to one-
twentieth the size of frog eggs and thus much harder to manipulate. 0AO
Yet, even if scientists were some day able to clone humans, M there
is reason to believe that the effectiveness of the human cloning process
would be minimal. In the first place, unlike domesticated or laboratory
animals, Homo sapiens is a mongrel breed, still containing a number
of harmful or even lethal genesYm While such genes exist in the recessive
state and are thus normally suppressed by dominant normal genes,
certain cloning methods would allow these recessives to express them-
selves, thus causing deformities, genetic illness, or even the death of the
clone.243
The second probable obstacle to effective human cloning stems
from the difference between genotype 24' and phenotype.2 5 Cloning
would produce a person genetically identical to its nuclear donor. 26
However, the genotype of an organism alone does not completely deter-
mine the phenotype, which is instead the result of the interaction be-
tween the genotype and the environment.247 The same genotype can
produce very different phenotypes in the presence of variant physical
and social influences .2 s Thus, even if human clones were produced, the
238. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
242. Id.
243. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
244. Genetic make-up of an organism; All genes present in the nucleus of a cell,
both dominant and expressed, recessive and unexpressed.
245. Minifest characteristics of an organism; dominant and expressed traits
such as skin color and blood type that result from both heredity and environment.
246. Hudock, supra note 116, at 555.
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clones would not necessarily exhibit the desired traits of the nuclear
donor.249
Until conflicting and valid evidence or conditions are at hand, the
difficulties and probable ineffectiveness of human cloning do not pose
risks which would compel government regulation of technology. The
effects of such efforts would apparently be benign. In the words of
Watson,
What's to be gained? A carbon copy of yourself? Oh, if the Shah of
Iran wanted to spend his oil millions on cloning himself, that's fine with
me. But if either of my young sons wanted to become a scientist I would
suggest he stay away from research in cloning humans. There's no future
in it.210
C. Threatened Ninth Amendment Rights
Since there is not presently a compelling need for government regu-
lation of cloning, individual rights in this area could be fully exercised
without the threat of infringement. Researchers could exercise their
right to freedom of inquiry. Results of such research, such as improve-
ments in the world's food supply, would be in the public interest and
for the common good. While it could be argued that cloning oneself is
not protected by the right to beget children,251 there is no reason for
restricting this benign activity. As it is the right of individuals to have
full access to the decision-making process, the decision whether or not
to clone oneself should be left with the people.
D. Policy Assessment
The cloning biotechnology should be conducted without the imposi-
tion of government regulations. If future evidence suggests that effective
human cloning is indeed possible, the need for government regulation
should at that time be reassessed. Until such a time, the status quo
should be maintained.
249. Id.
250. A Test-Tube Baby is Not a Clone, supra note 232.
251. Cloning is asexual reproduction. Sexual reproduction is implicit in the defini-
tion of beget.
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7. CONCLUSION
Once a technology is developed, it is very difficult to "turn off. ' ' z52
It is unlikely that society could completely prevent the emergence of
the applications of new genetic knowledge even if it so desired. The best
that can be hoped for is that the consequences of these technologies
be carefully considered, and that they be wisely used.23
While some government regulations will always be necessary, in the
words of Commerce Secretary Jerry Jasinowski, "our regulatory system
is out of control."' ' The excessive regulation by our bulging bureauc-
racy is expensive and unnecessary, and our nation needs desperately to
find a reasonable midpoint between too much regulation and too little.
Recent legislation freeing the airline industry from federal regulation,
the first instance of deregulating a major industry in decades, has re-
sulted in better passenger service and lower prices.255
This experience should serve as a lesson that government regula-
tion is not the best solution to all problems. It is true that movement
toward the "brave new world" should be the result of conscious decision
by society, taking into consideration the ultimate social consequences.
However, there is a place in this scenario for both government regu-
lation and individual, marketplace decision-making.
Finally, this article has demonstrated that these biotechnological
issues can indeed be considered in a rational and systematic manner.
By viewing their implications from a constitutional perspective, with a
focus on the compelling need for government regulation under the com-
merce clause balanced against threatened ninth amendment rights,
reasonable policy decisions can be made. This kind of logical assess-
ment has unfortunately been markedly absent in the past. Hopefully, it
will become the rule rather than the exception in the future.
However, the establishment of the much discussed "science
court," z which would seek to resolve close technical issues in an adver-
sary setting, is unnecessary. Scientific "facts" in many areas, such as
DNA research, are conjectural and not amenable to resolution in an
adversary process.21
252. Green, supra note 100, at 574.
253. Id. at 575.
254. Palmer, The Rising Risks of Regulation, TME, Nov. 27, 1978 at 85-87.
255. Flying the Crowded Skies, TIME, Aug. 14, 1978 at 50-55. See also Help for
Full Fares, TIME, Oct. 16, 1978 at 90-91.
256. Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. LAW REV. 1058 (1977).
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Recombinant DNA research should be regulated by a newly
created administrative agency. However, the biotechologies of in vitro
fertilization and cloning should be left unregulated. Controversies
arising from individual applications of these techniques could be
handled in the traditional courts of law,2s facilitated by the eventual
evolution of a body of case law pertaining specifically to these bio-
technological questions.
258. At least two such cases have already been resolved. See Mack v. Califano,
447 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that government scientists cannot be prelimi-
narily enjoined from recombinant DNA research which is in accordance with National
Institutes of Health Guidelines); see also DelVio v. Presbyterian Hospital, Facts on
File October 13, 1978 at 770 (Federal court jury awarded Doris and Don DelVio
$37,000 for emotional stress suffered when their laboratory-conceived baby was halted
the day after its test tube feihilization).
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Sentencing: A Discretionary Judicial Function
GARY L. SWEET*
1. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The Supreme Court has clearly stated the general rule that sentencing
lies properly within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that, in
exercising his discretion, a judge is not restricted by technical rules of
evidence.' He can consider many sources and types of evidence "to assist
him in determining the kind and extent of punishment to be imposed
within limits fixed by law."' 2 This principle has also been expressed by
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,3 and cases where an abuse of discre-
tion by the sentencing court has been found by an appellate court are
indeed rare.4
* B.J., University of Texas at Austin, J.D. Nova University Law Center, Law
Clerk for the Honorable Norman C. Roettger, Jr., Federal District Judge for the
Southern District of Florida.
This article was originally prepared at the request of Judge Norman C. Roettger,
Jr. for use at the Sentencing Institute for judges in the Southern District of Florida.
I. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 69 S.Ct. 1079 (1949).
2. Id. at 246.
3. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971) ("in absence of other
constitutional provision or of statute, this Court has no power to review the length of
sentence within the limits permitted by statute") Id. at 409; United States v. Menichino,
497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence within statutory limit "does not ascend to the
orbit of a constitutional violation," Id. at 945, and sentence will be disturbed only for
abuse of discretion); United States v. White, 524 F.2d 1249 (5th Cir. 1975) (length of
sentence, if within statutory limits, is not a matter for consideration of appellate court);
United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1976) (sentencing court exercises broad
discretion, not subject to review except for arbitrary or capricious action amounting to
a gross abuse of discretion).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1974) (sentence
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act [FYCA] which was harsher than that allowed
under the substantive statute was repugnant to the legislative intent of FYCA, and thus
an abuse of discretion. Also, a rigid policy of always imposing the maximum for drug
offenses is an exercise of no discretion and thus an abuse of discretion); Dorszynski v.
United States, 418 U.S. 424, 94 S.Ct. 3042 (1974) (limited appellate review is available
when no sentencing discretion is exercised at all).
111
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
106 Nova Law Journal 3:1979 I
However, as with all general rules, there are exceptions. Thus, a
criminal defendant at sentencing does retain some due process protec-
tion. He is entitled, for example, to rudimentary notions of fairness,5 to
have materially untrue matters in his record disregarded,6 to have con-
stitutionally invalid convictions disregarded7 and to be sentenced no
more than once for the same offense in compliance with the ban against
double jeopardy.'
2. AREAS OF CONCERN
From a survey of appellate opinions which deal with challenged
sentences, it appears that sentencing judges within the Fifth Circuit
should be aware of several issues which concern appellate courts and
which seem to recur with some frequency. Most frequently, the fact
situations giving rise to those issues occur: (1) when the sentencing court
may be considering another prior conviction which is constitutionally
defective; (2) when the court may be considering materially untrue infor-
mation or potentially unreliable hearsay; and (3) when the court has not
allowed the defendant to examine and attempt to refute information in
the presentence report.
A. Invalid Convictions
In United States v. Tucker,9 the Supreme Court held that sentences
5. See, e.g., United-States v. Huff, 512 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1975) (ex parte memo
from prosecutor to judge deprived defendant of due process right to hear and rebut
information it contained).
6. Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948). (Court erroneously
considered charges for which defendant had been acquitted. Supreme Court considered
these to be materially untrue assumptions).
7. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1972) (two of three prior
convictions explicitly relied on by sentencing judge had been obtained in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright).
8. United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976) (defendant sentenced
originally to 12 years, then prior conviction that the sentencing court had considered
was set aside. Relying on Tucker, the sentencing court vacated the 12-year sentence and,
considering defendant's criminal activity while on parole, gave him a 15-year sentence.
Held: not an abuse of discretion, but a violation of the ban against double jeopardy.)
See also United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
9. 404 U.S. 443, 92 S.Ct. 589 (1972). The crucial issue upon remand, according
to the Tucker Court, would be whether the sentence in the instant case would have been
different if the judge had known that the prior convictions were constitutionally invalid
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must be vacated and reconsidered when the sentencing court explicitly
relies on constitutionally invalid prior convictions. This decision was
reached after the Court discussed at length and expressed agreement
with the general rule regarding a sentencing court's wide range of discre-
tion.
This decision has led to circuit court opinions which offer refine-
ments to its general holding. Thus, in Russo v. United States," the court
held that, where a Tucker situation is asserted, the judge should "cause
the record to factually reveal the processes through which the Judge has
gone."" The procedure for this "factual outline" was stated in
Lipscomb v. Clark.2 There the court said,
First, the district court should review the records involved in this convic-
tion and determine if, treating the state convictions alleged to have been
unconstitutional as void and thus not to be considered in sentencing, the
five-year maximum sentence would still be the appropriate sentence based
on the records of the trial and petitioner's adjusted conviction record
(which would still consist of a twenty-five year sentence on a federal
counterfeiting charge). If the district court finds that the maximum sen-
tence would still be appropriate, an order so setting forth would seem
sufficient to comply with the requirements of Tucker. If, on the other
hand, the district.court finds that should these prior convictions be proven
unconstitutional and void that the maximum sentence would not be ap-
propriate, then it should grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing and allow
him to present evidence on his claim that the prior convictions in question
were unconstitutional due to Gideon. If the district court is convinced of
the validity of petitioner's allegations after such a hearing, it may then
properly resentence. Such a procedure seems best designed to fully pro-
tect petitioner's rights.' 3
However, the presence of constitutionally invalid convictions in a de-
fendant's record does not mean that Tucker automatically applies and
brings into play the Lipscomb procedure. In Rogers v. United States,"
the court held Tucker inapplicable because the sentencing judge had
and not whether the convictions would have been obtained even if the defendant had
been represented by counsel. Looking at the facts of this case, the Court said yes. Id.
at 448.
10. 470 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1972).
II. Id. at 1359.
12. 468 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1972).
13. Id. at 1323.
14. 466 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1046 (1972).
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"specifically certified that the sentence was not enhanced by the exist-
ence of the earlier conviction." 15 Tucker was also held inapplicable in
Houle v. United States," where the court relied on Canadian convic-
tions which were allegedly obtained without the benefit of counsel. The
court reasoned that Tucker was concerned with convictions invalid
under the United States Constitution, and the United States judicial
precedents "cannot be imposed on Canadian proceedings."'' 7 The court
explicitly stated that the Canadian convictions were permissibly consid-
ered by the sentencing court, and that the defendant was free to submit
any explanatory material concerning the circumstances of those convic-
tions."6
B. Untrue Information and Presentence Reports Disclosure
Closely related to the right to have invalid convictions disregarded
is the right to have materially untrue information also disregarded. This
principle was established by Townsend v. Burke," and has been rigidly
observed by the Fifth Circuit. In a recent case, United States v.
Woody, 0 the court construed Townsend as establishing a constitutional
right on behalf of a defendant "to know and to test the accuracy of any
statement in the presentence report upon which the judge relies."', In
that case, the court held that the judge's summary of confidential infor-
mation relied on was not sufficient to provide the defendant with any
notice of the nature of the information being held against him, and thus
15. Id. at 513-14. See Wheeler v. United States, 468 F.2d 244 (9th Cir. 1972) for
an example of where the appellate court remanded for a more particular description of
the sentencing court's reasoning. The statement by the lower court that he relied more
on the seriousness of the crime than on the invalid convictions in the presentence report
was not specific enough.
Another case which was remanded was United States v. Bishop, 457 F.2d 260 (7th
Cir. 1972), where the sentencing court relied on convictions of a person who had the
same name as the defendant. Although the appellate court relied on Tucker, it would
seem that the same result would be compelled by Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68
S.Ct. 1252 (1948) which prohibited the sentencing judge from considering any facts in
the criminal record that are materially untrue.
16. 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974).
17. Id. at 916.
18. Id.
19. 334 U.S. 736, 68 S.Ct. 1252 (1948).
20. 567 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1978).
21. Id. at 1361.
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was not sufficient compliance with FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(c)(3)(B).12
"[T]o do otherwise [not remand] would mean that we would be doing
no more than paying lip service to the right of the defendant to rebut
possibly erroneous information without providing a viable opportunity
for him to do so." 3
The court in Woody discussed at length the history and purpose of
FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32(c), which deals with disclosure of contents of
presentence investigation reports.2 The rule has been interpreted to
allow wide discretion by the trial judge in deciding how much of the
report to disclose to the defendant. 25
Before the 1966 amendment to Rule 32,28 there was no language
22. FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c) (3) provides in full:
(3) Disclosure
(A) Before imposing sentence the court shall upon request permit the
defendant, or his counsel if he is so represented, to read the report of the pre-
sentence investigation exclusive of any recommendation as to sentence, but not
to the extent that in the opinion of the court the report contains diagnostic
opinion which might seriously disrupt a program of rehabilitation, sources of
information obtained upon a promise of confidentiality, or any other information
which, if disclosed, might result in harm, physical or otherwise, to the de-
fendant or other persons; and the court shall afford the defendant or his counsel
an opportunity to Comment thereon and, at the discretion of the court, to intro-
duce testimony or other information relating to any alleged inaccuracy con-
tained in the presentence report.
(B) If the court is of the view that there is information in the pre-
sentence report which should not be disclosed under subdivision (c)(3)(A) of
this rule, the court in lieu of making the report or part thereof available shall
state orally or in writing a summary of the factual information contained therein
to be relied on in determining sentence, and shall give the defendant or his
counsel an opportunity to comment thereon. The statement may be made to the
parties in camera.
(C) Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be
disclosed to the attorney for the government.
(D) Any copies of the presentence investigation report made avail-
able to the defendant or his counsel and the attorney for the government
shall be returned to the probation officer immediately following the imposition
of sentence or the granting of probation, unless the court, in its discretion other-
wise directs.
(E) The reports of studies and recommendations contained therein
made by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or the Youth Corrections Divi-
sion of the Board of Parole pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 4208(b), 4252, 5010(e),
or 5034 shall be considered a presentence investigation within the meaning of
subdivision (c) (3) of this rule.
23. 567 F.2d at 1363.
24. Id. at 1358-61.
25. Id. at 1358.
26. That amendment added the following: "The court before imposing sentence
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relating to disclosure by a court to a defendant of a report's contents.
Consequently, disclosure was made or withheld solely as a discretionary
choice of the individual judge.2?
The two-sentence amendment in 1966 to Rule 32(c) codified the
existing practice of allowing judges to use their discretion in determining
whether to disclose the contents of presentence investigative reports.
Although the 1966 amendment contained an Advisory Committee's
note that urged a policy of disclosure, the amendment failed to accom-
plish the goal intended by its draftsmen. 2
In 1975, the rule was amended again in an effort to encourage
disclosure.29 Now, the rule contains mandatory language, and it pro-
vides that the defendant and his lawyer are to be allowed to see the
report's contents unless the material falls into the enumerated excep-
tions contained in FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c) (3) (A)? However, to
may disclose to the defendant or his counsel all or part of the material contained in the
report of the presentence investigation and afford an opportunity to the defendant to
comment thereon. Any material disclosed to the defendant or his counsel shall also be
disclosed to the attorney for the government."
27. See 567 F.2d at 1358-59, n. 10, which states: "For example, in United States
v. Durham, 181 F.Supp. 503 (D.D.C. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 854, 81 S.Ct. 83, 5
L.Ed. 2d 77 (1960), the court held that presentence investigation reports are strictly
confidential and not to be disclosed to the defendant." See also Hoover v. United States,
268 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir. 1959); Powers v. United States, 325 F.2d 666, 667 (1st
Cir. 1963). Other courts disclosed the contents of the presentence investigation report
and permitted comment thereon. See Shields v. United States, 237 F.Supp. 660 (D.C.
Minn. 1965); Smith v. United States, 223 F.2d 750, 754 (5th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other
grounds, 360 U.S. 1, 79 S.Ct. 991, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1041 (1959).
A survey conducted in 1963 by the Junior Bar Section of the Bar Association of
the District of Columbia revealed the diverse treatment of the contents of presentence
investigation reports. Questionnaires were sent to 294 active district judges and 51 senior
district judges. The questionnaire contained the following question: "Is it the practice
of your Court to divulge any information contained in presentence reports to defense
counsel?" Of the 157 responses received, 63 (43%) stated that the reports were exhib-
ited to defense counsel and 83 (57%) stated that the disclosure was refused. The re-
sponse also indicated that 11 judges exhibited the entire report to counsel, 19 judges
provided excerpts of the reports to counsel, and 13 judges provided summaries. Junior
Bar Section of the District of Columbia, Discovery in Federal Criminal Cases, 33
F.R.D. 101, 125 (1963).
28. See Baker v. United States, 388 F.2d 931 (4th Cir. 1968), where the court
noted the differing practices relating to disclosure by district judges.
29. For the text of the rule in its present language, see note 22 supra.
30. In a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, United States v. Ruiz, 580 F.2d 177 (5th
Cir. 1978), the court held that the disclosure requirements of the present rule can only
be activated by a request of the judge. The request may be made to the judge at the
1 I1 0
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promote disclosure and further the rule's intent, if a judge relies on
information that was withheld under one of the rule's exceptions in
imposing sentence, he must still provide an oral or written summary of
that information to the defendant or to his lawyer.31 It was the ade-
quacy of this summary that was at issue in Woody.
In Woody, the court also approved the Ninth Circuit's holding in
United States v. Weston,32 which required the setting aside of a 20-year
narcotics sentence that was based on uncorroborated hearsay testi-
mony.3 At sentencing, the defendant had staunchly denied the truth
of the allegations, and had been given an opportunity by the judge to
refute them. However, the appellate court felt the burden of "proving a
negative"-that she was not a large scale herion dealer as an anony-
mous informant had said she was-was too heavy.34
A similar case which dealt with allegedly untrue material in the
presentence report is Shelton v. United States.35 There, a defendant
convicted on income tax charges objected to the truthfulness of material
in the presentence report linking him to drug traffic. Citing a line of
precedent, the court held that Shelton should be afforded an opportunity
to refute the information.36 Upon remand, the court directed the sen-
sentencing, or by a prior written motion properly filed with the court. The court refused
to accept the proposition that an informal request to a probation officer is equivalent
to a formal request to a federal judge.
31. The policy behind the Rule's latest amendments is reflected in the Advisory
Committee's notes which state:
The Advisory Committee is of the view that accuracy of sentencing information
is important not only to the defendant but also to effective correctional treatment
of a convicted offender. The best way of insuring accuracy is disclosure with an
opportunity for the defendant and counsel to point out to the court information
thought by the defense to be inaccurate, incomplete, or otherwise misleading.
32. 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971).
33. 567 F.2d at 1364.
34. 448 F.2d at 634.
35. 497 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1974).
36. See also United States v. Espinoza, 481 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1973) for an
example of where the trial judge abused his discretion in refusing to allow the defendant
to refute factually the reasons given orally by the judge for the sentence, when the
defendant claimed that the reasons were factually erroneous.
By endowing the district court with discretion in sentencing, it is presupposed that
such discretion will be exercised consistent with both the appearance and reality
of due process. The action of the court below, in refusing to permit rebuttal of
the stated factual basis for the sentence, is tantamount to an abuse of discretion
and is inconsistent with the need for enlightened sentencing.
Id. at 558. United States v. Battaglia, 478 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1973) establishes a
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tencing judge to weigh his authority to withhold the confidential con-
tents of the report against the defendant's rights to be fairly advised of
the information which formed the basis of that sentencing.
3 1
A case where inadequate disclosure was made to a defendant is
United States v. Hodges.3" The facts there indicate that the judge re-
vealed only portions of the information contained in the presentence
report and asked the defendant to refute it if possible. This was found
to violate FED. R. CRIM. PRO. 32 (c)(3)(A) which, except for confidential
material and other limited exceptions, "removes the judge's discretion
to refuse requested disclosure of presentence reports. 39 After remand,
the court sustained the new sentence ° and strengthened its prior hold-
ings that the burden is on the defendant to show that his sentence was
based on a tainted record, and that the sentencing court actually relied
on misinformation in handing down the sentence."
3. SPECIFIC FACTORS
Despite these procedural safeguards afforded a defendant at
defendant's right to a hearing when he disputes factual matter so that he "may seek to
remove any lingering doubt the court may have had about the true situation." Id. The
Shelton court construed Rogers v. United States, 466 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1972) as
imposing the burden of showing that the trial judge relied on inaccurate information
concerning the defendant. 497 F.2d at 160.
37. Id. at 159.
38. 547 F.2d 951 (5th Cir. 1977).
39. Id. at 952.
40. 559 F.2d 1389 (5th Cir. 1977).
41. Ia.at 1391. Cases distinguishing the Espinoza and Shelton line of decisions
include Uniied States v. Ashley, 555 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1977). Where a defendant has
been given an opportunity to refute information considered in imposing sentence, the
wide latitude allowed by Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949) comes into play.
It is "essential that the [judge] '[possess] the fullest information possible concerning the
defendant's life and characteristics."' 555 F.2d at 466, citing Williams. See also United
States v. Garcia, 544 F.2d 681 (3rd Cir. 1976), where disputed material in presentence
reports did not invalidate the court's use of those reports. The court assured one de-
fendant it would not rely on a challenged allegation, and the other defendant declined
to have a court-offered evidentiary hearing. Id. at 684.
In United States v. Menichino, 497 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1974), the court found no
due process violation where defense counsel had been afforded an opportunity to exam-
ine and deny "anonymous accusations" of criminal activity against the defendant.
"Counsel for the defendant made an able and effective argument for leniency, and his
client received a sentence less than the statutory maximum. Since he did not ask that
sentencing be delayed, he cannot now object to its result." Id. at 945-46.
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sentencing, a judge is by no means confined to the strict evidentiary
rules which govern during trial. The wide latitude given to judges by
Williams has been, and continues to be, the law in the Fifth Circuit.
42
As an indication of some of the factors which have been permissibly
and impermissibly considered by sentencing judges, the following cases
have been summarized. The Fifth Circuit has held that a judge, in
imposing sentence, may consider a person's arrest while on bail awaiting
trial, even if it does not result in an indictment." Foreign convictions
may also be considered." The court has also stated, in general language,
that a judge may consider a defendant's activities, "including his rela-
tion to public and police authorities, his position in the community and
other factors" which aid the judge in balancing among "(i) punishment,
(ii) deterrence and (iii) rehabilitation."45 In sentencing narcotics law
violators, accurate information concerning a defendant's prior use of
cocaine "is an integral part of those factors which the sentencing judge
should consider in framing the appropriate sanction."" A judge, at
sentencing, may also consider a defendent's prior state law violations
which show a propensity to violate the law, or which show that he does
not respond to certain types of punishment.17
United States v. Bowdach" dealt with a sentence imposed pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. §3575, the Dangerous Special Offender statute. It calls for
enhanced punishment if the judge makes certain findings, one of which
is that the defendant is dangerous, as defined in the statute. In that case,
the Fifth Circuit approved the sentencing judge's consideration of facts
underlying two firearms convictions that were overturned on appeal;
those facts were deemed relevant to finding the defendant dangerous for
purposes of the statute." The court also said that a sentencing judge can
consider "evidence of crimes for which the defendant has been indicted
but not convicted, and evidence of other crimes."5 A judge may not,
42. See United States v. Ashley, 555 F 2d 462, 466 (5th Cir. 1977), where the
court cites Williams as controlling authority, and additionally cites Houle v. United
States, 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974) and United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993 (5th
Cir. 1970) cert. denied 398 U.S. 959, reh. denied 399 U.S. 938.
43. Houle v. United States, 493 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 916.
45. United States v. Marcello, 423 F.2d 993, 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) cert. denied
398 U.S. 959, reh. denied 399 U.S. 938.
46. United States v. Hartford, 489 F.2d 652, 656 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. United States v. Jones, 533 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1976).
48. 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977).
49. Id. at 1175-76.
50. Id. at 1175. It is important to note, however, that a defendant, under this
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however, in any situation, rely on hearsay computer statistics which seek
to establish how many sales a narcotics dealer may have made before
he was apprehended. 51
A defendant's associates, or his alleged status in the Mafia, can be
considered in arriving at a comprehensive judgment about a convicted
defendant.52 In allowing this, however, the Seventh Circuit pointed out
that it was in no way "advocating a policy of guilty by association."53
In the circumstances of a sentencing, where the person's guilt has al-
ready been determined, that problem is not present. "4
Where a defendant wins a right to be resentenced, the judge may
consider lawless behavior or criminal activity while on parole from the
earlier sentence. However, the limits of the first sentence may impose
double jeopardy restraints on the second sentence.55 Likewise, in a revo-
cation of probation hearing, the judge is not confined, in his considera-
tion of sentencing to the original crime or the offenses of which proof
was offered at the revocation hearing. He can permissibly consider the
defendant's progressive criminal history.56
A judge may also consider facts which are disclosed at trial, out of
statute, is entitled to an evidentiary hearing before sentencing. At this hearing, the
defendant is entitled to assistance of counsel, compulsory process, and the right to cross
examine witnesses. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(b). Thus, due process safeguards are provided. See
also United States v. Sweig, 454 F.2d 181 (2d Cir. 1972), where the court said that a
judge could permissibly consider a defendant's failure to cooperate with government
officials in their investigation of influence peddling, and evidence adduced at trial relat-
ing to counts of which the defendant was acquitted. This, however, is not the law in this
circuit. See text accompanying notes 66 and 67 infra. United States v. Martinez, -
F.2d - No.78-5204 (Nov. 22, 1978) indicates that a judge can also consider the
factual basis of counts in an indictment that are dismissed.
51. United States v. Cavazos, 530 F.2d 4 (5th Cir. 1976).
52. United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309 (7th Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 313.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., United States v. Durbin, 542 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1976).
56. United States ex rel Sluder v. Brantley, 454 F.2d 1266 (7th Cir. 1972). In this
case, the defendant was sentenced to 20 to 40 years on revocation of probation which
stemmed from a burglary conviction. The judge permissibly considered the progression
of criminal activity by the defendant which culminated in a kidnapping and alleged
aggravated statutory rape. Compare Hailer v. Robbins, 409 F.2d 857 (1st Cir. 1969),
where the court said that "a kidnapper's conduct towards his victim is of great relevancy
in determining sentence," Id. at 859, but nonetheless held that an ex parte communica-
tion from the prosecutor to the judge concerning the details of the conduct was a
violation of due process.
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the presence of the jury. For example, in United States v. Hodges,5 the
court held that the district judge had properly considered statements by
witnesses, out of the jury's presence, that the defendant had successfully
robbed other banks. Although on appeal the defendant claimed surprise
at the judge's reliance on those statements, they appeared in the presen-
tence report and the defendant declined to refute them at sentencing.
The court specifically found that the sentencing did not lack fundamen-
tal fairness.5"
In the Fifth Circuit, it is permissible for a judge to consider his
feelings that a defendant has perjured himself during trial. 9 However,
in the context of a new trial, it is impermissible for a judge to consider
the possibility that the defendant perjured himself, and then impose a
57. 556 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1977).
58. Id. at 369.
59. United States v. Nunn, 525 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1976). In Nunn, the appellate
court adopted the words of Judge Frankel's opinion in United States v. Hendrix, 505
F.2d 1233 (2d Cir. 1974), which said that the argument contending that consideration
of possible perjury amounts to a conviction without due process.
[It] ignores the nature of the sentencing process as it exists in our system and of
the factors the trial judge may consider in exercising a frequently enormous
range of discretion. If there is no clear consensus on these factors, it is certainly
clear that they include, as aggravating circumstances, conduct that is not literally
"6criminal," or at least has not been duly adjudged criminal in the case in which
sentence is being imposed.
The effort to appraise "character" is, to be sure, a parlous one, and not necessar-
ily an enterprise for which judges are notably equipped by prior training. Yet it
is in our existing scheme of sentencing one clue to the rational exercise of discre-
tion. If the notion of "repentance" is out of fashion today, the fact remains that
a manipulative defiance of the law is not a cheerful datum for the prognosis a
sentencing judge undertakes. Compare, Bazelon, C.J., with Leventhal, J., in Scott
v. United States, supra, 419 F.2d 269 and 282, respectively. Impressions about
the individual being sentenced-the likelihood that he will transgress no more, the
hope that he may respond to rehabilitative efforts to assist with a lawful future
career, the degree to which he does or does not deem himself at war with his
society-are, for better or worse, central factors to be appraised under our theory
of "individualized" sentencing. The theory has its critics. While it lasts, however,
a fact like the defendant's readiness to lie under oath before the judge who will
sentence him would seem to be among the more precise and concrete of the
available indicia.
525 F.2d at 960-61, quoting from 505 F.2d at 1235-36 (2d Cir. 1974).
For further Fifth Circuit authority which allows a judge to consider the possibility
of perjury, see United States v. Gamboa, 543 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1976). This view is not
accepted by all circuits; see 525 F.2d at 960, notes 4 & 5.
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harsher sentence after the second trial than that imposed after the first.6"
This was described by the court as an adjudication of guilt, "of the
crime of perjury without a presentment to a grand jury, without a trial
by a jury of his peers, without the right to present evidence in his behalf,
and without other procedural safeguards designed for the protection of
an accused."61 That conclusion, however, was reached on the basis of
double jeopardy considerations; not as an abuse of discretion.
Courts have also not been receptive to the argument that different
sentences for co-defendants convicted of essentially similar criminal
conduct violate a defendant's entitlement to equal protection. 2 As long
as sentences are within the statutory limits, courts generally will not
disturb them. 3 One case of disparate sentence dealt with two defend-
ants convicted of marijuana charges, wherein one received a six-month
prison term and the other received probation. 4 However, the defendant
who received probation had plead guilty and had cooperated with the
government. Since the sentence was within the statutory limits, it was
not reviewable on appeal as an abuse of discretion.65
Fifth Amendment considerations, however, do prevent trial judges
from relying on a defendant's failure to cooperate with the government
in imposing a harsher sentence than would have been imposed had he
cooperated.66 Likewise, a court may not penalize a defendant for not
"coming clean" after conviction and before sentencing.6 7 It is permissi-
ble, however, to consider as a factor among a range of others, that a
60. United States v. Bell, 457 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1972).
61. Id. at 1236.
62. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
DeLaFuente, 550 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1977).
63. 550 F.2d 309.
64. Government of Canal Zone v. O'Calagan, 580 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1978).
65. Id. at 165.
66. United States v. Rogers, 504 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1974), where the court
stated: "When it has been made to appear that longer sentences have been imposed by
the courts because the defendants refused to confess their guilt and persisted in their
claims of innocence we have vacated the sentences." Id. at 1085. The court termed the
comparison of the issues of confessing guilty with cooperating with the government as
a "distinction without a difference." Id.
67. United States v. Wright, 533 F.2d 214, 215 (5th Cir. 1976). See also Thomas
v. United States, 368 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1966), where the rule was established that a
court may not pressure a defendant to confess his guilt prior to imposition of sentence.
In Bertrand v. United States, 467 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1972), the rule was extended to
the situation where a trial court may pressure a defendant to admit his guilt in a crime
other than that to which he had originally pleaded.
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defendant exhibits no remorse for his crime."8
One final situation which requires attention is sentencings in the
context of plea bargains. In this setting, it is important that the judge
know all of the terms of a plea agreement before imposing sentence. If
the sentence is entirely within statutory limits, but the judge is not
informed fully of the terms of the agreement, he will still be reversed
for a sentence based on what the judge perceives to be the defendant's
non-compliance with those terms. 9 In accepting a guilty plea, it is also
imperative that the district judge personally advise the defendant of the
maximum possible penalties. Permitting the United States Attorney to
advise the defendant of the maximum possible sentence, instead of the
judge doing it personally, constitutes reversible error. 7
4. CONCLUSION
Although the cases may seem to create unnecessary exceptions and
overly complex issues, the time honored general rule that sentencing is
a discretionary function stands basically intact. Judges should keep in
mind the motive behind the latest amendment to Federal Rule 32(c),7
which is accuracy of information. All protections given to a convicted
defendant serve that single function. The law allows a judge to consider
a wide range of human qualities and instances of conduct on the part
of the defendant, but the judge's sources of information must have some
indicia of reliability. If that purpose is honored, and the various proce-
dures supporting it are followed, sentences within the statutory maxi-
mum will probably not be vacated on appeal.
68. United States v. Richardson, 582 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978).
69. United States v. Shanahan, 574 F.2d 1228 (5th Cir. 1978). In this case, the
government mentioned no conditions of cooperation when the guilty plea was accepted
by the district court. However, at sentencing, it argued to the court that the defendant
had not fulfilled his part of the bargain because he had not cooperated. The sentence
was vacated and remanded to another judge for resentencing.
70. United States v. Clark, 574 F.2d 1357 (5th Cir. 1978).




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
Protecting Municipalities Against Unnecessary State
Infringement: The Unrealized Wake of the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act and Temple Terrace
CHERYL RYON EISEN*
In 1976 the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Second
District Court of Appeal in Hillsborough Association for Retarded Citi-
zens, Inc. v. City of Temple Terrace,' wherein the issue was the extent
to which the state or its agencies may ignore local zoning regulations
in carrying out their proper functions, be they governmental or proprie-
tary in nature.2 In adopting the district court's opinion as its own, 3 the
Florida Supreme Court established the "balancing of interests" test as
the measure for determining on a case-by-case basis whether a state
agency enjoys immunity from local zoning provisions.4 In embracing
this test, the district court rejected the "superior sovereign ' 5 and "power
* B.A.E., J.D. University of Florida, 1970, 1974. Associate Professor of Law,
Nova University. The author wishes to thank her research assistant, Mary Jane Merola,
for her invaluable assistance in researching this article.
1. 332 So. 2d 610 (Fla. 1976), affg 322 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
[hereinafter referred to as Temple Terrace].
2. A distinction between governmental and proprietary functions is frequently
used by courts to determine whether a political subdivision of the state attempt-
ing to locate an institutional facility is immune from local zoning regulation.
Proponents of the distinction contend that when the institutional use is "govern-
mental" the political unit performing such a function is immune from the con-
flicting zoning ordinance; when the use is "proprietary," however, the zoning
ordinance prevails . . . . [A] political unit performs a governmental function
if it is acting pursuant to and in furtherance of obligations imposed by legisla-
tive mandate. The unit performs a proprietary function if the act is permissive in
nature. . . .The classification of specific functions as governmental or proprie-
tary varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Note, Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REV. 869,
869-70 (1971) (footnotes in the original are omitted). This governmental/proprietary
function distinction was essentially rejected by the district court in Temple Terrace. 322
So. 2d at 577-78.
3. 332 So. 2d at 612.
4. See 322 So. 2d at 578-79.
5. 322 So. 2d at 576-77. Under this test, "where immunity from a local zoning
oridnance is claimed by an agency occupying a superior position in the governmental
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of eminent domain"' tests as well as the "governmental/proprietary"
theory.7 In addition, the court noted that the "statutory guidance" test
was still valid but inoperative in Temple Terrace because there was no
applicable legislation to consult.' In addition to establishing the balanc-
ing of interests test for judicial use in settling inter-governmental zoning
squabbles, the district court9 and the supreme court"0 clearly placed on
the state the burden of seeking compromise with local authorities."
hierarchy, it is presumed that immunity was intended in the absence of express statutory
language to the contrary." Id. at 574.
6. Id. at 578. "Where the power of eminent domain has been granted to the
governmental unit seeking immunity from local zoning, some courts have concluded
that this conclusively demonstrates the unit's superiority where its proposed use conflicts
with zoning regulation." Id. at 574.
7. See note 2 supra.
8. Id. at 578. "While we acknowledge that a specific legislative statement on the
subject would control, in the absence of such a statement we must look to other criteria
in order to reach a decision." Id.
9. [T~he governmental unit seeking to use land contrary to applicable zon-
ing regulations should have the burden of proving that the public interests favor-
ing the proposed use outweigh those mitigating against a use not sanctioned by
the zoning regulations of the host government.
... [U]nder normal circumstances one would expect the agency to first
approach the appropriate governing body with a view toward seeking a change
in the applicable zoning or otherwise obtaining the proper approvals necessary
to permit the proposed use.
Id. at 579.
10. We conceive that the effect of our decision will be that the state will
always cooperate with local government when it has decided to achieve an objec-
tive by means of a non-conforming use. . . . [Liocal administrative proceedings
will provide the forum in which the competing interests of governmental bodies
are weighed.
332 So. 2d at 613.
Petitioner has raised here its concern that local governments will be able to thwart
state policy by refusing to approve zoning for legislative projects. The courts are
available, however, to review the balance struck in administrative proceedings.
Beyond that, . . . the State of Florida possesses the power to exempt itself from
local zoning ordinances.
Id. n.5.
1I. For general discussion of Temple Terrace, see Note, State Immunity From
Zoning: A Question ofReasonableness, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV. 191 (1976), and Commen-
tary, Immunity of State and State Related Activities from Local Municipal Zoning
Regulations: Florida Focus, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 800 (1976).
The balancing of interests test was probably first fully proposed, though not so-
named, in a Note which appeared in the Harvard Law Review in 1971. Note,
Governmental Immunity From Local Zoning Ordinances, 84 HARV. L. REv. 869, 883
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The purpose of this brief article is to explore the possibility of the
extension of the holding of Temple Terrace beyond inter-governmental
zoning disputes to state/local conflicts in other areas of municipal con-
cern.
I. CASE IN POINT: THE BOCA BANYAN TREE
In 1978, the City of Boca Raton filed a complaint in Palm Beach
County Circuit Court against a construction company and the State of
Florida's Department of Transportation (F.D.O.T.). 12 The complaint
sought to enjoin the defendants from destroying a banyan tree located
within the right-of-way for improvements to a street without first apply-
ing for and obtaining from the city a tree removal permit pursuant to a
city ordinance. 13 Essentially, the ordinance provided that no tree could
be removed by any person without first obtaining a city permit and also
set forth certain conditions which must exist for a removal permit to
issue." Public rights-of-way were specifically included within the pur-
(1971). Since that time, a number of jurisdictions have embraced this test to resolve
inter-governmental zoning disputes involving various levels of government. See, e.g.,
City of Newark v. University of Delaware, 304 A. 2d 347 (Del. Ct. Ch. 1973), Kunimoto
v. Kawakami, 56 Haw. 582, 545 P. 2d 684 (1976), Brown v. Kansas Forestry, Fish &
Game Comm'n, 2 Kan. App. 2d 102, 576 P. 2d 230 (Ct. App. 1978), Town of Oronoco
v. City of Rochester, 293 Minn. 468, 197 N.W. 2d 426 (1972), Rutgers, State University
v. Piluso, 60 N.J. 142, 286 A.2d 697 (1972), Lincoln County v. Johnson, 257 N.W. 2d
453 (S.D. 1977). Additionally, Florida courts before Temple Terrace, were using a
balancing test to resolve zoning conflicts between governments. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Helseth v. Du Bose, 99 Fla. 812, 128 So. 4 (1930), and Palm Beach County v. Town of
Palm Beach, 310 So. 2d 384 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
Interestingly, in Lincoln County v. Johnson, supra, while the court applied the
balancing of interests test in deciding when a city was required to seek county ap-
proval for locating a sanitary landfill in the county on property owned by the city outside
the city limits, it also pointed out the possibility that:
State agencies such as public utility commissions or state highway authorities
have a political jurisdiction and a concomitant planning responsibility statewide
in scope transcending local boundaries. To be compelled to comply with local
zoning regulations might well thwart the state agency's attempt to perform its
public service function.
257 N.W. 2d 453, 457.
12. City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir.
Ct., filed March 21, 1978).
13. See generally, BOCA RATON, FLA., CODE ch. 21A (1978).
14. Id. § 21A-12.
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view of the ordinance. 15 In this case, circumstances were such that the
mandatory conditions were partially satisfied and the city was willing
to issue the removal permit if the defendants were willing to comply with
a permissive condition under the ordinance that the tree in question be
relocated or that trees and landscaping of equal value be placed in the
near vicinity.'6 Defendants refused.
In its memorandum in support of its request for permanent injunc-
tion, the city argued by analogy to Temple Terrace that the balancing
of interests test requires state agencies to apply for appropriate munici-
pal permits and to cooperate with local governments in any instance
where proposed state action would conflict with municipal ordinances. 17
In granting defendant F.D.O.T.'s Motion to Dismiss, the circuit court
found that Temple Terrace was "limited in impact of decision to zoning
matters only"" and in effect decided the case on the basis of a superior
sovereign test, finding no statutory waiver of the sovereign immunity of
the F.D.O.T. as an agency of the state.20
If the City of Boca Raton had appealed the banyan tree case,2' it
15. Id. § 21A-25.
16. Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Request for Permanent Injunction at
6, City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct.
1978).
17. Id. at 4-6. The city recognized that this contention assumes that the source
of authority for the questioned municipal regulation probably must be Article VIII,
Section 2(b) of the Florida Constitution, in light of the supreme court's decision in
Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975), upholding state immunity
from municipal taxation. See text accompanying notes 23-24 and 31-35 infra. It must
also be noted that the city was not contending that it had the power to pass ordinances
in conflict with state law. See City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So.
2d 801, 806 (Fla. 1972). Instead, the city was attacking state action contrary to munici-
pal ordinance, which action was not specifically protected from municipal control by
state statute, the state constitution, or the general concept of sovereign immunity. See
text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
18. F.D.O.T. responded to the city's complaint with a motion to dismiss on
various grounds. The road contractor, Crabtree Construction Company, filed a cross-
claim against F.D.O.T. and a counter-claim against the city. The dismissal was with
prejudice as the city stated at the hearing that it had nothing further to plead. The
dismissal operated in favor of Crabtree as it was acting as an agent of F.D.O.T.
19. City of Boca Raton v. Crabtree Constr. Co., No. 78-1035 CA (Fla. 15th Cir.
Ct., April 4, 1978).
20. Id.
21. The road project was delayed by other causes and, accordingly, the threat to
the banyan tree was removed. The remaining pleadings were dismissed by the parties
with stipulations that would permit the banyan tree to be removed when required and
127
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
Municipalities v. State Infringement
might have participated in some important law-making. It is the thesis
of this article that the position taken by the City of Boca Raton advocat-
ing the extension of the Temple Terrace rule beyond zoning matters was
well-founded and supportable by significant state constitutional and
legislative predicate.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR THE EXTENSION OF
THE TEMPLE TERRACE RULE: ARTICLE VIII,
SECTION 2(b)
In its review of the district court's decision in Temple Terrace, the
Florida Supreme Court was careful to distinguish that case from the
case of Dickinson v. City of Tallahassee," decided by the supreme
court after the district court issued its opinion in Temple Terrace:
In Dickinson we held that the state was immune from a municipal utility
tax, in part because Article VII, Section 9(a) of the Florida Constitution
did not expressly waive the state's sovereign immunity from taxation and
in part because the applicable statute did not expressly confer on munici-
palities the power to impose a utility tax on the state. Sovereign immunity
is no guide here as we deal with a zoning power of municipalities which
is derived from Article VIII, § 2(b) of the Florida Constitution ....24
From this language it is arguable that the supreme court should be
willing to favorably consider the application of the balancing of interests
test to state/local disputes regarding a municipality's exercise of any
power having the same constitutional lineage as municipal zoning pow-
ers, assuming no applicable legislation preserving sovereign immunity
(thus necessitating the use of the statutory guidance test rather than the
balancing of interests test)." What is the basis for the special signifi-
cance attached by the supreme court to Florida municipalities' Article
VIII, Section 2(b) powers?
the city to demand and enforce relocation or replacement landscaping. Interview with
Robert A. Eisen, Assistant City Attorney for the City of Boca Raton, Florida, in Boca
Raton (November 1, 1978).
22. To date, there is no case law, in Florida or elsewhere, concerning the extension
of the balancing of interests test to state/local conflicts outside the area of zoning.
23. 325 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975).
24. 332 So. 2d at 612.
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A. The 1968 Revision of the Florida Constitution: Home Rule
With respect to the existence and powers of municipalities, the 1885
Florida Constitution, as amended through 1967, provided in pertinent
part:
The Legislature shall have power to establish, and to abolish, municipali-
ties to provide for their government, to prescribe their jurisdiction and
powers, and to alter or amend the same at any time. 6
With the 1968 revision of the Florida Constitution came the follow-
ing replacement provisions in Article VIII, Section 2, regarding munici-
palities:
(a) ESTABLISHMENT. Municipalities may be established or abol-
ished and their charters amended pursuant to general or special law
(b) POWERS. Municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and
proprietary powers to enable them to conduct municipal government,
perform municipal functions and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise provided
by law.?
The new Article VIII provision was apparently proposed for the
purpose of granting "home rule" powers to Florida municipalities. s In
the past municipalities had been constitutionally reliant on the legisla-
ture to grant municipal powers by general or special law, but now it
appeared cities could exercise any power assuming a municipal purpose
for such exercises and no state legislation to the contrary.29 The realiza-
26. Art. VIII, § 8, FLA. CONST. (1885). This section also provided that if a
municipality were abolished, provision must be made for the protection of its creditors.
27. (Emphasis added.) This revised section also retained the "protection of credi-
tors" provision of the former constitution and added the provision that municipal legis-
lative bodies be elected.
28. It was not generally conceded that the new Article VIII would accomplish
home rule for municipalities, however. See M. DAUER, C. DONOVAN, & G. KRAMMER,
SHOULD FLORIDA ADOPT THE PROPOSED 1968 CONSTITUTION? 33-36 (1968) (Public
Administration Clearing Service of the University of Florida: Studies in Public Admin-
istration No. 31, 1968). For a general discussion of the concept of municipal home rule,
see Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269 (1968).
29. It should be noted, however, that prior to the 1968 constitutional revision the
legislature had chosen to grant limited legislative home rule to Florida cities.
("Although difficult to define, legislative home rule may be said to exist when the state
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tion of this change did not occur until 1973, however.3 0
B. Sovereign Immunity
Analysis of the home rule provisions of the 1968 constitution not-
withstanding, the question of state immunity to exercises of municipal
power still remains. Accepting the elementary premise of the state's
sovereign immunity, one seeking to deny such immunity must identify
a waiver of the privilege.31 The supreme court in Temple Terrace took
for granted the need tofind an express constitutional or statutory waiver
with respect to municipal exercise of powers under Article VII, and the
existence of an implied waiver with respect to exercise of Article VIII
legislature, in the absence of constitutional provision, empowers municipalities to adopt
and exercise home rule powers." Vanlandingham, supra note 27, at 273). This came
about in 1915 when a general act on municipal charter amendment was passed. Chapter
6940, §§ 1-15, Laws of Florida (1915). The first section of the chapter limited the scope
of municipal home rule to modification of local government structures, election proce-
dures, and the mode of exercising existing powers:
Every city . . . may . . determine the manner in which its corporate powers
shall be exercised, by amending its charter, or adopting a new charter, consistent
with the constitution and the general laws of this state; or . . .consistent with
• ..[applicable] special laws; provided, however, that this article shall not be so
construed as to authorize any city . . . to enlarge its corporate powers beyond
the limitations prescribed by law .
Section 166.01, FLA. STAT. (1971).
30. The legislation referred to in note 29, supra, remained on the books after the
adoption of the 1968 constitution until 1973 when the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act was passed (see notes 37-39 infra, and accompanying text) although in 1969 a new
section appeared in Chapter 167, Florida Statutes, the general chapter on municipal
powers:
(I) In accordance with the provisions of § 2(b), Art. VIII of the state
constitution, municipalities shall have governmental, corporate and proprietary
powers to enable them to conduct municipal government, perform municipal
functions, and render municipal services, and may exercise any power for munici-
pal purposes, except when prohibited by general or special law.
(2) The provisions of this section shall be so construed as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the constitution.
Section 167.005, FLA. STAT. (1969). The result of including this provision at the begin-
ning of a laundry list of enumerated municipal powers in Chapter 167 as well as leaving
intact the very restrictive-sounding provision in § 166.01, recited supra, was understand-
able judicial confusion. See note 38 infra, especially, City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood
Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
31. Buck v. McLean, 115 So. 2d 764, 768 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1959).
1 3:1979 125 1
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powers.32 The court appeared to support this approach on the basis that
a municipality's Article VIII general home rule powers flow directly
from the constitution and are, therefore, self-executing, 33 whereas its
Article VII taxing powers are mandatory or permissive, but not self-
executing, therefore requiring legislative implementation. 3 "This con-
stitutional delegation of municipal authority differentiates [the two]."35
The necessary conclusion is that sovereign immunity is implicitly pre-
served by the constitution where there remains the opportunity, if de-
sired, of legislative waiver, but is implicitly waived when not preserved
in a constitutional provision granting self-executing powers.
3. LEGISLATIVE BASIS FOR EXTENSION OF THE
TEMPLE TERRACE RULE: THE MUNICIPAL
HOME RULE POWERS ACT OF 1973
In Temple Terrace, the supreme court pointed out that it was
dealing with a power of municipalities (zoning) derived from the state
constitution by way of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act.3" The
court was referring to the 1973 revision of Florida Statutes37 belatedly
enacted by the legislature to reflect the reality of Article VIII, Section
32. 332 So. 2d at 612, as set forth in the text accompanying note 24 supra.
33. Home rule provisions are generally classified as self-executing, manda-
tory, and permissive. A self-executing provision . . . enables a city to adopt and
exercise home rule powers immediately without the necessity of state implement-
ing legislation. A mandatory provision ...stipulates that the state legislature
"shall" enact implementing legislation to provide for home rule adoption. A
permissive provision . . . merely authorizes home rule and empowers the state
legislatures to grant it at its discretion.
Vanlandingham, supra note 28, at 278 (footnotes in the original are omitted). That
Article VIII, Section 2(b) is self-executing is by no means an incontestable conclusion.
In fact, the supreme court did not expressly state in Temple Terrace that Article VIII,
Section 2(b) is self-executing or that Article VII, Section 9(a) is mandatory or permis-
sive only. However, that the court now accepts this principle is a logical inference to be
drawn from its comparison of the two provisions. But see note 38 infra.
34. In pertinent part, Article VII, § 9(a) provides: "[Miunicipalities shall. . . be
authorized by law to levy ad valorem taxes and may be authorized. . . to levy other
taxes. . . except ad valorem taxes on intangible personal property and taxes prohibited
by this constitution." (Emphasis added.) Compare Article VIII, § 2(b) as set forth in
the text accompanying note 27 supra.
35. 332 So. 2d at 613.
36. Id. at 612-13.
37. Ch. 73-129, § 1, Laws of Fla.
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2(b) of the 1968 Florida Constitution and to clear up judicial confusion
over the meaning and intent of the constitutional revision.
38. Compare City of Miami Beach v. Fleetwood Hotel, Inc., 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla.
1972) with City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1974).
This is not the initial appearance of a rent control ordinance before this Court.
We dealt with a prior rent control ordinance of the city in [Fleetwood]; there we
affirmed a trial court order invalidating that ordinance. In so doing we stated that
a municipality has no power to enact a rent control ordinance "absent a legislative
enactment authorizing the exercise of such a power by a municipality"...
[Tiherefore, we must consider whether the municipality now has the power
to enact such an ordinance; that is, whether the enactment of [the Municipal
Home Rule Powers Act] after our decision in Fleetwood Hotel necessitates a
change in the result there reached. I believe it does .
Id. at 764-65 (Dekle, J., concurring specially).
In pertinent part, the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act (§§ 166.011-.411, Fla.
Stat., 1977) provides:
§ 166.021 Powers.-
(1) As provided in Section 2(b), Article VIII of the State Constitution,
municipalities shall have the . . . powers to enable them to conduct municipal
government, perform municipal function, and render municipal services, and may
exercise any power for municipal. purposes, except when expressly prohibited
from law.
(2) "Municipal purpose" means any activity or power which may be exer-
cised by the state or its political subdivisions.
(3) The Legislature recognizes that pursuant to the grant of power set forth
in § 2(b), Article VIII of the State Constitution, the legislative body of each
municipality has the power to enact legislation concerning any subject matter
upon which the state Legislature may act, except:
(a) The subjects .. which require general or special law pursuant to...
the State Constitution;
(b) Any subject expressly prohibited by the Constitution;
(c) Any subject expressly preempted to state or county government by the
Constitution or by general law; and
(d) Any subject preempted to a county pursuant to a county charter
adopted under the authority of. . . the state constitution;
(4) The provisions of this section shall be so construed, as to secure for
municipalities the broad exercise of home rule powers granted by the Constitution
. . . and to remove any limitations, judicially imposed or otherwise, on the exer-
cise of home rule powers other than those. . . expressly prohibited.
§ 166.042 Legislative intent.-
(I) It is the legislative intent that the repeal [of certain statutes pertaining
to municipal powers] shall not be interpreted to limit or restrict the powers of
municipal officials, but shall be interpreted as a recognition of constitutional
powers. It is, further, the legislative intent to recognize residual constitutional
home rule powers in municipal government, and the Legislature finds that this
can best be accomplished by the removal of legislative direction from the statutes.
127 113:1979
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Prior to the passage of the 1973 act it was necessary to find legis-
lative authorization to municipalities to legislate in the field of zoning,
tree removal, and all other areas of municipal concern. This was true
even during the period after the 1968 constitutional revision until pas-
sage of the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act, the broad language of
Article VIII, Section 2(b) notwithstanding. 9 Under the act, however,
a municipality may legislate with respect to almost any subject pur-
suant to Article VIII, Section 2(b).10 This means that most powers
exercisable by a municipality are Article VIII powers, as was the zoning
power in Tem ple Terrace.41
Recalling the holding of the supreme court in Temple Terrace that
sovereign immunity was no guide in a case dealing with the zoning
power of municipalities "which is derived from Article VIII, § 2(b) of
the Florida Constitution by way of the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act,"42 the logical conclusion is that sovereign immunity would be in-
operative, in the absence of preservative legislation, as to most of the
powers exercisable by municipalities today. By further analogy to
Temple Terrace, the duty of the state to seek compromise with munici-
pal authorities where city regulations pose an obstacle to state action is
clear, as is the necessity of using the balancing of interests test in judicial
solution of unresolved state/local conflicts.
4. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates the existing opportunity for
Florida courts to recognize in an appropriate case the pre-eminence of
municipal authorities vis-A-vis the state and its agencies where neither
the state constitution nor the legislature has expressly provided sover-
eign immunity from local rules and regulations. It is nonetheless possi-
ble that courts will be reluctant to extend the Temple Terrace rule to
It is, further, the legislative intent that municipalities shall continue to exercise
all powers heretofore conferred on municipalities. . . but shall hereafter exercise
those powers at their own discretion, subject only to the terms and conditions
which they choose to prescribe.
39. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
40. For those subjects on which a municipality may not legislate, see § 166.021(3),
Fla. Stat. (1977) as set forth in note 38 supra. The municipal taxing power is not an
Article VIII power, being specifically spoken to in Article VII.
41. See 332 So. 2d at 612.
42. Id. at 612-13.
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non-zoning cases. Accordingly, it is proposed that the Florida Legisla-
ture amend the Municipal Home Rule Powers Act as follows:*
An Act relating to the powers of municipalities; creating section
166.042(3), F.S., to provide a statement of legislative intent that the state,
the counties, and their agencies must comply with, or obtain waivers of
compliance with, municipal regulations in those municipalities in which
they operate; providing the criterion to be judicially applied in deciding
questions of wrongful denial of waiver.
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
166.042 Legislative Intent.-
(3)(a) It is the legislative intent that municipal ordinances and
other regulations passed pursuant to s. 2(b), Art. VIII of the State Consti-
tution and this Act shall be complied with by the state and counties and
their agencies unless otherwise provided by general or special law, includ-
ing county charters. This requirement may be fulfilled by applying for
and receiving from the appropriate municipal authority a variance or
other waiver of compliance.
(b) In the event a state or county or an agency thereof is denied
a requested variance or other waiver of compliance with a municipal
ordinance or regulation, the state or county or agency thereof may seek
judicial review in a court of competent jurisdiction, which court shall
determine which governmental authority, on balance, possesses the
greater interest in maintaining its course of action. Sovereign immunity
shall not be inferred from any legislative grant of power in the absence
of a specific provision for sovereign immunity.
The effects of this proposal would be to translate to legislative
mandate the judicial rule in Temple Terrace beyond the limited applica-
tion inferred by the circuit court in the Boca banyan tree case and to
lend added significance to local ordinances evidencing the will of a local
citizenry on important local issues which are not transcended by state
necessity.
* Editor's Note: The author's proposed legislation has been pre-filed for consider-
ation in the 1979 session of the Florida Legislature as House Bill 531.
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Municipal Regulation of "Adult Entertainment"-
The Game Without Rules?
GEORGE F. KNOX, JR.*
ROBERT D. KLAUSNERt
"Perhaps I could never succeed in
intelligibly [defining obscenity].
But I know it when I see it."
Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring in Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964).
Historically, local governments have been empowered to regulate the
health, safety, welfare and, more significantly, the morals of their citi-
zens. The exercise of these powers is subject to a standard of reasonable-
ness, except where there exists some threat to the exercise of
"fundamental rights" of those persons who are to be governed by the
regulations.
The courts have decided that the sale or distribution of materials
previously determined to be obscene is not a right protected by the first
amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
While there have been varying opinions regarding the precise defi-
nition of obscenity, this article will address the ability of local govern-
ments to regulate the distribution of those materials that have been
judicially determined to be obscene and the measures which may
properly be applied to those individuals who have previously been con-
victed of some offense relating to obscenity.
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In addition to utilizing the power to revoke occupational licenses
for infractions relating to obscenity, local authorities have sought to
circumvent the legal difficulties associated with the infringements upon
free speech by fashioning zoning regulations which are designed to con-
fine "adult entertainment" activities to specified geographical areas, to
disperse these activities throughout a wide geographical area, or to
abate these activities as nuisances.
Local governments have often imposed rules and procedures which
may be designed to frustrate the "adult entertainment" activities. These
procedures include background investigations of operators, officers and
employees of adult entertainment businesses; the taking of police photo-
graphs and fingerprints of employees; requiring that lists of names and
addresses of customers be maintained; and the strict (and sometimes
selective) enforcement of building and fire codes.
The judiciary has sought to balance the competing interests of
governments, which seek to regulate and proscribe a mode of conduct
and those citizens who seek to exercise their right of expression and their
freedom to earn a living. The result of the courts' judicious scrutiny has
been that cases involving the propriety of certain regulatory measures
have been decided, each on its own facts. As a result, there are few
precise guideposts for legislative bodies to follow.
In an effort to discover whether there exist consistent patterns of
legislation which appear to be a permissible exercise of the police power
in a manner designed to regulate the morals of the citizens, this article
will explore some of the enactments by local governments and the re-
view processes.
1. HISTORY
"Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life, has indis-
putably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind throughout the
ages."' The interest in sexual matters was first "squarely presented" to
the United States Supreme Court in 1957,2 when it was called upon to
determine the permissibility of having local governmental bodies pro-
scribe the extent to which sexually-oriented materials may be sold, ad-
1. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957).
2. Id. The court did note that, in its previous opinions, it had always assumed that
obscenity was not protected by the "freedoms of speech and press." 354 U.S. at 481.
However, this was the first case actually holding that obscenity is not a constitutionally
protected area. 354 U.S. at 485.
1 132 3:1979 1
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vertised or distributed to the public.
There have been early determinations that municipalities may
adopt ordinances which regulate the exhibition of obscene motion pic-
tures3 and the distribution of obscene literature as a valid exercise of
the police power. However, in these earlier cases, the concepts' of ob-
scenity were limited to whether a theatre operator should lose his license
for exhibiting a film relating to the repeal of a birth control law,' a
picture which portrayed in harrowing detail the capture and death of a
spy,5 or a certain picture dealing with the American Civil War recon-
striction period and having a tendency to stimulate class hatred.' Cur-
rent concern for regulation is motivated by a desire to limit the distribu-
tion of materials which explicitly depict sexual intercourse, fellatio,
cunnilingus, brutality, sodomy and, more recently, the depiction of the
foregoing activities by children, known as "kiddi-porn."
Inasmuch as the intensity of the sexual activity which is depicted
has increased over the years, the need for heightened emphasis upon the
regulation of morals by governments is apparent. Concurrently, how-
ever, the courts are reluctant to countenance a manner of regulation
which would infringe upon an individual's "fundamental rights." All
ideas having even the slightest social importance-unorthodox ideas,
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opin-
ion-have the full protection of the constitutional guaranties of free
speech and press, unless excludable because they encroach upon the
limited area of more important interests.7 The difficulty, from the view
of local governments, is that the "more important interests" have not
been precisely defined. The Supreme Court, in United States v.
O'Brien," held that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if:
(1) it is within the constitutional powers of the government; (2) it fur-
thers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3) the govern-
3. See, e.g., Brooks v. Birmingham, 32 F.2d 274 (N.D. Ala. 1929).
4. Universal Film Manufacturing Co. v. Bell, 100 Misc. 281, 167 N.Y.S. 124
(1917), affd, 179 App. Div. 928, 166 N.Y.S. 344 (1917). The film in question portrayed,
as a martyr, the confessed violator of a law forbidding the imparting of information
pertaining to birth control. The intent of the film's maker was, unquestionably, to argue
in favor of repealing the law. The court upheld the suspension of the theatre operator's
license under a city ordinance allowing same where such a film or play is "immoral,
indecent or against the public welfare." 167 N.Y.S. at 128.
5. City of Chicago v. Fox Films, 251 F. 883 (7th Cir. 1917).
6. Thayer Amusement Corp. v. Moulton, 21 R.I. 117, 7 A.2d 682 (1939).
7. 354 U.S. at 484.
8. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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mental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
(4) the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.9 The Court
referred to "an important governmental interest," but failed to define
it. In the opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan noted that "[tjwo members of the
Court steadfastly maintain that the first and fourteenth amendments
render society powerless to protect itself against the dissemination of
even the filthiest materials." 10 However, there is also a reluctance to
admit that the states are powerless to protect their citizens from expo-
sure to patently offensive materials. "The concepts involved are said to
be so elusive and the laws so inherently unenforceable without extrava-
gant expenditures of time and effort by enforcement officers and the
courts that basic reassessment is not only wise but essential."', The
Court believes that the "task of restructuring the obscenity laws lies
with those who pass, repeal and amend statutes and ordinances. "12
While the courts have had little difficulty in permitting the regula-
tion of those materials which are determined to be offensive to children
and non-consenting adults,' 3 the question of whether states and munici-
palities may regulate distribution to "consenting adults" is not so well
settled.
The United States Supreme Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton," announced that, even though it had often pointedly recognized
the high importance of states' interest in regulating the exposure of
obscene materials to juveniles and non-consenting adults, "this Court
has never declared these to be the only legitimate state interests permit-
ting regulation of obscene material." 5 The Court held, in particular,
"that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide
9. Id. at 377.
10. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 705 (1968). The "two
members" to whom Harlan is referring are Justices Douglas and Black, both of whom
set out this idea in their dissenting opinions in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
508, and in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 476, 482 (1966).
I1. United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 357 (1971).
12. Id.
13. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18 (1973). (Unsolicited offering of sexually
explicit books sent through the mails).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). (Where the court found that the first and
fourteenth amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with pornog-
raphy which might fall into the hands of children or offend the general public.)
14. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
15. Id. at 59.
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of commercialized obscenity . ". .. I' "These included the interest of the
public in the equality of life and the total community environment, the
tone of commerce in the great city centers, and possibly the public safety
itself. . that there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene
material and crime."17
In distinguishing between an individual's private right to "expose
himself to indecency" and his demand for a right to obtain books and
pictures in the marketplace, the Court noted that to grant this right is
to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge on other
privacies.18
By its holding in Paris, the Court opened the door for local govern-
ments to regulate, pursuant to a recognized state interest and subject
to procedural safeguards, the distribution of obscene materials. Such a
right does invite the innovative and imaginative exercise of the power.
However, again the Court failed to provide standard to be applied. The
result has been that state and local governments have adopted certain
measures, the operators of "adult entertainment" establishments have
attacked these measures and the courts have treated each of the cases
separately, with no apparent emerging judicial policy regarding the par-
ameters within which the governments may regulate.
The courts of the state of Florida have already ruled upon such
issues as whether the seizure of certain motion pictures by municipal
officers and a subsequent court injunction against their showing consti-
tute a prohibited prior restraint"9 and whether a charging information
which tracks the language of the Florida obscenity statute 0 while specif-
ically naming the publication involved in a prosecution is "sufficient to
put the defendant on notice and prevent double jeopardy." 21 Thus far,
16. Id. at 57.
17. Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, (Hill-Link Minor-
ity Report) (1970).
18. Berns, Pornography vs. Democracy, The Case for Censorship, 22 THE PUB.
INTEREST 3 (Winter 1971) (emphasis added).
19. State ex rel. Little Beaver Theatre v. Tobin, 258 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1972). The injunction was upheld as to certain seized films, although the court found
such a restraint could not be imposed against any showing which would occur outside
of Dade County, Florida, (the jurisdiction in which the court sat) as the circuit court
had ordered. In addition, the court held invalid those portions of the injunction which
prohibited the showing of "any motion picture which portrayed certain listed acts"
without reference to any seized or specific film. 258 So. 2d at 32.
20. § 847.011 FLA. STAT. (1977).
21. Johnson v. State, 351 So. 2d 10, 12 (Fla. 1977).
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the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida has
determined that vigorous enforcement of obscenity laws constitutes an
invalid restraint on first amendment rights if its purpose is to force a
sexually-oriented enterprise to cease doing business or to refrain from
dealing in presumably protected sexually-oriented materials. 2
2. PRIOR RESTRAINT-AN OVERVIEW
In attempting to regulate the distribution of printed or recorded
material based on its content, municipalities have found themselves
inexorably enmeshed in the doctrine of prior restraint. That is, a re-
straint on a form of speech before any actual expression occurs, with
an absence of judicial safeguards.23
The historical genesis of this doctrine is traced in Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson.2 In reversing a finding of public nuisance against an
anti-semitic publication, the Court quoted Blackstone z5 in holding that
liberty of the press consisted in laying "no previous restraints upon
publication. 126
Prior restraints on free speech are not, however, per se unconstitu-
tional. In Time Film Corp. v. Chicago," the Supreme Court refused to
strike down a section of a Chicago city ordinance requiring the submis-
sion of a film to a censor prior to its being exhibited.2 Although the
22. P.A.B., Inc. v. Stack, 440 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
23. Southeastern Publications, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Here, munic-
ipal authorities denied a promoter of theatrical productions the use of a municipal
theatre in which to present the rock musical "Hair," on the basis that the presentation
of such a show "would not be 'in the best interest of the community.'" Id. at 547-48.
The Supreme Court found such denial constituted a prior restraint because the munici-
pal authorities had denied "use of a forum in advance of actual expression." Id. at 553.
The Court further held that the municipal authorities violated the promoter's first
amendment right of free expression when they effected the prior restraint without imple-
menting "procedural safeguards that reduce the danger of suppressing constitutionally
protected speech." Id. at 559.
24. 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931). In this landmark case, the United States Supreme
Court held that a state statute which prohibited, as a public nuisance, the publication
of a newspaper or periodical, imposed "an unconstitutional restraint upon publication."
Id. at 723.
25. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 151, 152
(1765). The full quote reads: "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature
of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication." Id.
26. 283 U.S. at 715.
27. 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
28. Id. at 46.
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Court admitted that the ordinance imposed a prior restraint, it indicated
that its ruling dealt solely with the issue of the censor's authority to
impose a prior restraint for the protection of the public welfare and not
with the validity of "any statutory standards employed by the censor or
procedural requirements as to the submission of the film." 9 Relying
upon the opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in Near v. Minnesota,0 the
Court found support for the legitimacy of imposing prior restraints on
expression for the protection of the public welfare.3 1
The most significant crystallization of the prior restraint doctrine
is found in the Supreme Court decisions of Freedman v. Maryland32
and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birminghan.33 Although the former con-
cerned obscenity and the latter was a product of the civil rights move-
ment, each decision was used by Court to firmly establish strict guide-
lines to insure a minimum of interference with first amendment rights.
In Freedman, unlike Time Film Corp.,3' the Court was presented
with the issue of the validity of procedural standards used to implement
a prior restraint on the exhibition of a film. The Court, per Justice
Brennan, first warned that any system of prior restraints or expression
comes to the United States Supreme Court "bearing a heavy presump-
tion against its constitutional validity." 3 More particularly, the Court
held that "while the .state may require advance submission of all films
. , to bar all showings of unprotected films. . . only a judicial deter-
mination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to
freedom of expression [and] only a procedure requiring a judicial deter-
mination suffices to impose a valid final restraint. '36 Thus, before any
restraint on expression may properly occur, there must be a prompt
adversary hearing initiated by the censoring authority and resulting in
a final judicial determination. 7
29. Id. at 47.
30. 283 U.S. at 715-16. See also Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 667 (1925),
where the court held that "a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those
who abuse this freedom [of speech] by utterances inimical to the public welfare."
31. In Near, the Court listed public policy exceptions to the first amendment
protection against prior restraints, including "the primary requirements of decency
[that] may be enforced against obscene publications." 283 U.S. at 716.
32. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
33. 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
34. Note 27 supra and accompanying text.
35. 380 U.S. at 57, quoting from Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58,
70 (1962).
36. 380 U.S. at 58.
37. Id. at 59.
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Shuttlesworth8 arose from the refusal of the city of Birmingham
to grant a parade permit to civil rights marchers."9 The city had
adopted an ordinance which permitted the city commission to refuse a
parade permit if, in its judgment, the "public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be
refused."40 In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the ordi-
nance as an unconstitutional prior restraint for its failure to have
"narrow, objective and definite standards to guide the licensing author-
ity."41 Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion, applied the Freedman
requirement of "speedy" judicial review," finding that the entire licens-
ing process should "be handled on an expedited basis so that rights of
political expression will not be lost in a maze of cumbersome and slow-
moving procedures."43
Shuttlesworth is particularly significant in that it dealt with the
issuance of a license. More precisely, the Court held:
Although this Court has recognized that a statute may be enacted which
prevents serious interference with normal usage of streets and parks, ...
we have consistently condemned licensing systems which vest in an ad-
ministrative official discretion to grant or withhold a permit upon broad
criteria unrelated to proper regulation of public places.4
Thus, it would appear that the United States Supreme Court has
clearly expressed serious doubt as to the validity of a prior restraint on
any recognized form of expression.
A municipality which desires to curb the proliferation of a class of
expression, such as pornography, is faced with a difficult problem.
Administrative licensing officials must be provided with some objective
guidelines and any determination resulting in a restraint must be pre-
sented by officials for judicial review.
While the practical mechanics of licensing as a method of control
will be discussed infra, one more philosophical question remains to be
answered: What if the judicial determination of obscenity has already
occurred before the licensing authority becomes involved?
38. 394 U.S. 147.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 149-50.
41. Id. at 150-51.
42. Id. at 163.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 153, quoting from Kuntz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293-94 (1951).
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It is established beyond peradventure that once a communication
is determined to be obscene, it no longer retains the protection of the
first amendment." Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that "there
are legitimate State interests in stemming the tide of commercialized
obscenity .. . [and] [t]hese include the interest of the public in. the
quality of life and the total community environment."" Therefore,
where a particular book or film has already been adjudged obscene, it
may be entirely permissible to enjoin its further exhibition.,
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, following this line of reason-
ing, has held that a prior conviction for obscenity serves the same pur-
pose as a pre-restraint judicial determination. In 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop," challenge was made to the city of Athens, Georgia, ordinance
which permitted the mayor and city council to revoke the business
license of a movie theatre operator for violation of a Georgia state law
prohibiting the exhibition of obscene films. Petitioner's challenge was
based on the argument that the ordinance operated as a prior restraint.
The District Court for the Middle District of Georgia" rejected the
claim of prior restraint and, relying on Near v. Minnesota,"0 held that
"a publisher cannot be restrained by a prior order from publishing what
he desires to publish, but [protection against prior restraint] in no sense
exonerates the publisher from liability for what he has published.""1 The
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals52 affirmed the judgment of the district
court and held that "the revocation of a movie house license upon a
violation of a valid state law or city ordinance forbidding the exhibition
of sexually explicit material does not violate the right of free speech
vouchsafed under the first amendment." 53
Restraint, therefore, is not placed upon the publisher or theatre
operator with respect to what he intends to express, but calls upon him
to account for his past abuses.5 Thus, the use of prior obscenity convic-
tions by civil authorities could become a significant tool in the control
of commercialized obscenity.55
45. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973).
46. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
47. Id.
48. 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1044 (1975).
49. 362 F. Supp. 1389, 1396 (M.D. Ga. 1972).
50. 283 U.S. 697.
51. 362 F. Supp. at 1396.
52. 482 F.2d at 281.
53. Id.
54. 362 F. Supp. at 1396-97.
55. But see Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374
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3. THE LICENSING POWER
All businesses, however designated, are subject to the reasonable
exercise of a state's police power through licensing."6 That is, the right
to engage in any commercial enterprise is subordinate to the public
welfare, as determined by the legislature, and even uncompensated obe-
dience to this authority is not a deprivation of property without due
process of law. 7 It appears, therefore, that no vested right exists in a
licensee which is superior to the police power of local governments.8
In addition, the equal protection clauses of the United States and
Florida constitutions do not forbid reasonable classifications. Under the
United States Constitution, the fourteenth amendment is violated only
if the classification rests upon grounds wholly irrelevant to the achieve-
ment of the government's objective. Florida law permits classification
made on a "reasonable basis" and taking account of "real differences
of practical conditions."5 Thus, the legislative authority may give
groups of persons certain rights or burdens not given to others so long
as there is a reasonable basis for the dichotomy."0
Implicit in the power to grant licenses is the power to deny an
application or to revoke an existing license when the licensee has com-
mitted acts in direct conflict with matters regulated through exercise of
the police power." While the revocation procedure must comply with
the essentials of due process and equal protection, such a procedure has
been recognized, by at least one Florida court, as an appropriate method
of preserving the public order. 2 The United States Supreme Court has
held that where licensing and first amendment freedoms collide:
I) There must be definite, narrow, distinct guidelines for the licensing
authority;
A.2d 502, 504 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (holding a "denial of a license because of
prior obscenity convictions constitutes an impermissible prior restraint").
56. See Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914).
57. Id. at 559. The Florida Supreme Court has used this concept several times.
See, e.g., Golden v. McCarthy, 337 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1976) (regulation of tattooing
licenses).
58. See E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 26.81 (3d ed. 1978).
59. See Chandler Services, Inc. v. Florida City, 202 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1967).
60. See Florida Sugar Distributors, Inc. v. Wood, 135 Fla. 126, 184 So. 641 (Fla.
1938).
61. MCQUILLAN, supra note 58, at § 26.80.
62. See Vicbar v. City of Miami, 330 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976).
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2) A prompt judicial determination must occur as to whether the sub-
ject speech falls within the protection of the Constitution; and
3) The burden of initiating such procedures must be borne by the
licensing authority. 3
The federal courts have considered these principles as they apply
to adult entertainment licensees on several occasions, with little agree-
ment among the circuits. In fact, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
appears to stand alone among the federal courts in permitting revoca-
tion of a book store or movie license on the basis or prior convictions
for obscenity. 4
Among the decisions most frequently cited by advocates of unre-
stricted adult entertainment is Avon 42nd Street Corp. v. Meyerson."s
In this challenge to a New York City ordinance concerning a motion
picture theatre license revocation procedure, the district court found
that the law lacked sufficient precise guidelines to restrict the discretion
of the administration in regulating licenses and, further, that revocation
of a movie house license on the basis of a past conviction for obscenity
constituted an invalid prior restraint."6
The court expressed concern that revocation of a license on the
basis of past speech which was unprotected will inevitably result in a
restraint on protected speech. That is, protected speech and obscenity
are often separated by "a dim and uncertain line" 7 and require
"sensitive tools"88 to be used in delineating this line. In addition, the
court also relied in large part on Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen 9 to
support its disapproval of license revocation where it was held that
suppression of a publication because of past offenses "is the essence of
censorship.""
63. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 and text accompanying notes 32 through 43 supra.
64. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 and text accompanying note 48
supra. For the proposition that such licenses cannot constitutionally be suspended for
prior convictions on matters of obscenity, see Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark,
supra note 55.
65. 352 F. Supp. 994 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
66. Id. at 999.
67. Id. at 997, citing the language of the Supreme Court in Bantam Books, Inc.
v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1962).
68. Id., citing the language of the Supreme Court in Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525 (1958).
69. 283 U.S. 697.
70. 352 F. Supp. at 998, discussing the holding of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S.
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This is not to say, however, that the court failed to recognize the
power of municipalities to "validly regulate and license motion picture
theatres on the basis of public health and safety by a narrowly drawn
ordinance."7 The court's concern was that terms such as "character,"
"decency" or "public morality," failed to meet the definite standards
required in Freedman72 and Shuttlesworth73
While the A von decision clearly disapproved of all but the narrow-
est restraints on adult businesses involving print or film media, the fifth
circuit has taken exactly the opposite position in 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop.74 Here, the United States district court75 and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals both found that revocation of a book store or movie
house license on the basis of a past conviction is neither vague for failure
to provide standards nor violative of first amendment as a prior re-
straint.76
In Forsyth, an Athens, Georgia, adult theatre had been convicted
of displaying obscene films. The Athens City Code provided:
Section 417. The Mayor and Council of the City of Athens shall have
the right after notice and hearing to revoke any business license issued
hereunder on the following grounds:
2(b) Violation of a law of the State of Georgia which affects the public
health, safety, and welfare and which violation occurred as a part of the
main business licensed.77
Thus, the Athens ordinance provided a three-element formula to
guide the licensing authority: (1) violation of a valid law; (2) said viola-
tion affects the public health, safety and welfare; and (3) the violation
occurred as a main part of the business licensed; e.g., sale of obscene
materials by the operator of an adult book store or theatre.
In finding these standards sufficiently explicit, the district court
determined that obscenity violations clearly affect the public health,
safety and welfare. Further, the ordinance "sufficiently indicates to both
71. 352 F. Supp. at 999.
72. 380 U.S. 51.
73. 394 U.S. 147.
74. 482 F.2d 280.
75. 362 F. Supp. 1389.
76. 482 F.2d at 281.
77. ATHENS, GA., CODE § 417 (1971), set out in the district court's opinion, 362
F. Supp. at 1393.
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Mayor and any licensee what conduct may result in a revocation." ' The
court went on to note that the revocation procedure does not intend to
restrain the licensee from future publication, but to call upon him to
account for past abuses.79
The dichotomy between the courts would appear to turn on the
perspective given the revocation proceeding. In A von, the court saw the
revocation proceeding as a "sword" aimed at eliminating future expres-
sions of unknown quality and, thus, effectively eliminating the public
commercial forum for adult materials. In Forsyth, however, the court
views the revocation proceeding as a "shield" designed to protect the
public from proven abusers of the rights of free speech.
It is significant to note that, under the Forsyth doctrine, the prob-
lem of judicial determination of obscenity raised in Freedman v.
Maryland0 is absent. The criminal proceeding resulting in the convic-
tion from which the revocation springs is the judicial determination of
obscenity.
In Jordan Chapel Freewill Baptist Church v. Dade Couny,8 ' a Flor-
78. 362 F. Supp. at 1397.
79. Id. The district court's analysis of the concept of prior restraint is most
significent in that this court and the court in A von, 352 F. Supp. 994, came to opposite
conclusions, each basing its decision on the Supreme Court's holding in Near v. Minne-
sota, 283 U.S. 697. The Forsyth court placed considerable emphasis on the penalty for
publishing unprotected speech. That is, each person is free to publish without restraint,
but "must take the consequence of (his) own temerity." 362 F. Supp. at 1397. The
Forsyth court saw no prior restraint arising from revocation based on past abuses:
The non-exhibition of films obscene or non-obscene during said period would not
be the result direct or indirect of previous restraint, but would result incidentally
from past abuses of immunity from previous restraint just as a person convicted
and imprisoned for criminal libel might incidentally and indirectly prevented and
thus practically restrained from any and all publications during the period of
incarceration.
362 F. Supp. at 1397.
On the other hand, the A von court viewed Near as an absolute prohibition against
revocation for past abuses. The court looked at revocation as a disabling of the public's
right to view certain films. Further, the Avon decision ignored the reasoning cited in
Forsyth and held that Near would tolerate only fines for abuses of the first amendment.
352 F. Supp. at 998. Such conflicting opinions defy explanation or reconciliation. Until
some higher court addresses these philosophies together, the question will remain sub-
ject to debate.
80. 380 U.S. 51. The doctrine is more fully set forth in the text accompanying
note 63 supra.
81. 334 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1976), construing DADE COUNTY, FLA.,
ORDINANCE No. 75-50 (1975).
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ida case involving a challenge to the Dade County Bingo Ordinance
which provided for revocation of a license if the licensee was convicted
of violating the ordinance, the District Court of Appeal for the Third
District of Florida held that "such a procedure provides the best possible
due process available in our judicial system since the person must be
proved guilty of violating the ordinance beyond a reasonable doubt
instead of a mere preponderance of the evidence, as is the standard in
civil cases.""2
Thus, license revocation appears, at least in a general sense, to be
an efficacious tool in the attempts of municipal governments to stem the
tide of commercialized obscenity.
It should be noted, however, that several state jurisdictions ex-
pressly reject Forsyth3 and that Florida still requires a narrowly drawn
ordinance in those instances where an administrative body is charged
with the power to deny or revoke a license. 4
In Perrine v. Municipal Court,85 the California Supreme Court
declared unconstitutional a licensing statute which provided for license
denial based on prior convictions for obscenity. Supporting that hold-
ing, the court concluded that the penalty for violating the obscenity laws
"does not include a forfeiture of First Amendment rights."" Further, it
was held that the fact that the obscenity penalties might be insufficient
to deter future violations cannot justify a prospective forfeiture of those
rights on the theory of prior convictions. 7
The subject ordinance 8 was found invalid for three reasons: (1) An
absence of objective and definite standards for issuance of the license;
(2) The ordinance conditioned issuance of a license upon qualifications
82. Id. at 668. This holding is consistent with Forsyth, 362 F. Supp. 1389, in that
both courts recognize that revocation flowed directly from the conviction. See also
Berman v. City of Miami, 17 Fla. Supp. 72 (C.C.D.C. 1960), affd, 127 So. 2d 683 (Fla.
3rd DCA 1960).
83. Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374 A.2d 502
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977); City of Seattle v. Bittner, 81 Wash. 2d 747, 505 P.2d 126
(1973); City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 11. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (App. Ct.
1975); Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
84. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
85. 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1038 (1972).
86. 488 P.2d at 653.
87. Id.
88. Los ANGELES, CAL., COUNTY ORDINANCE No. 5860 (1969), more specifically
§ 329.4.
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that allegedly bear no reasonable relationship to the occupation li-
censed; and (3) It is constitutionally impermissible to prohibit a person
from selling books solely on the basis of a past criminal conviction. 9
As to the first reason, there seems to be little debate that definite
guidelines are required to guide any licensing authority in the granting
or denying of an occupational license. Thus, amorphous terms such as
"good character" or "public welfare" are, without more, legally insuffi-
cient. 0 Florida seems to have adopted the same rule.9
As to the second and third grounds, in Perrine, the court was
concerned wiith with the applicability of the standards to the business
of selling books. The court emphatically noted that, unlike doctors,
lawyers and school teachers, sellers of books have no particular profes-
sional demands upon them such that moral character would be rele-
vant.9"
The court went on to note that "sex crimes" are not ordinarily
commited in book stores and, therefore, the standards were overbroad.
Moreover, the court rejected even a nexus between convictions for ob-
scenity and the operation of book stores where obscene materials were
sold, finding revocation on such convictions to be violative of the first
amendment.9 3
89. 488 P.2d at 652.
90. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969).
91. Vicbar v. City of Miami, 330 So. 2d 46 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1976). The Third
District Court of Appeal held that the power of refusal to renew nightclub licenses, when
left in the hands of the city manager, is impermissible unless limited by guidelines
bearing a reasonable relationship to the public health and welfare.
It should be noted, however, that the concept of revocation was notperse unlawful.
Rather, the court expressed understanding for the desires of government officials to
curtail the activities of businesses known to "engender trouble" for law enforcement
authorities and suggested that, given appropriate guidelines, the court had no legal
objection to the vesting of revocation power in the licensing authority.
92. 488 P.2d at 652.
93. Id. The California court's statements concerning crimes is not entirely cor-
rect. While no empirical data exists to show a nexus between pornographic literature
and violent sex crimes, there is clearly a nexus between adult businesses and the crime
of obscenity. The average commercial book store or theatre may occasionally utter
some unprotected speech. An adult business engages in unprotected communication on
a regular basis. Thus, adult businesses do foster frequent violations of the law governing
their business.
The United States Supreme Court, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, reached another conclusion vis-a-vis the link between obscenity and crime. Rather
than rejecting this possible connection, the court referred to the Hill-Link Report, supra
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This nexus between the crime committed and the trade practiced
has been litigated in a number of jurisdictions. Florida has recognized
that suspension of a professional license may be made for misconduct
which is "malum in se" and thus jeopardizes the interests of the profes-
sion and public it serves.94 Similarly, Florida and other jurisdictions
have upheld license denials and revocations on the basis of past convic-
tions for non-professional trades when some definite standards to con-
trol the discretion of the licensing authority were provided.,
In City of Miami Beach v. Austin Burke, Inc.,9" the Third- District
Court of Appeal held that "merchandising is a lawful business" which
one has an "inherent" right to pursue.9" In contrast, where the business
is not a "lawful business" (e.g., the sale of intoxicating beverages),98
that "right" is reduced to a mere privilege for which such definite
standards are not required.9 The determinant as to whether a business
is lawful or unlawful per se appears to be whether the license is regula-
tory or revenue producing. '
Thus, of vital concern is the status which adult entertainment may
be said to occupy. As obscenity is unprotected speech, a commercial
purveyor of such materials may fairly be said to be engaging in an
"unlawful" business or, at least, possesses no "inherent" right to do so.
While permanent revocation of a non-professional license has been held
invalid and arbitrary, a period of years required between conviction of
note 18, and its suggestion of a correlation between obscenity and anti-social behavior.
413 U.S. at 59.
Whatever socio-psychological conclusions may ultimately be drawn by medical
science, there clearly exists some judicial approval of legislative efforts to link crime
and pornography.
94. Richardson v. Florida State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231 (Fla. Ist
DCA 1976).
95. See, e.g., State ex rel. Volusia Jai-Alai, Inc. v. Board of Business Regulation,
304 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1974); Anderson v. Comm'r. of Highways, 126 N.W.
2d 778 (Minn. 1964); Green v. Silver, 207 F. Supp. 133 (D.D.C. 1962). But see City of
Mesguite v. Alladin's Castle, Inc., 559 S.W. 2d 92 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1977), where a
licensing ordinance permitting denial of a license to operate vending machines in an
amusement park on the basis of an applicant's "connection with criminal elements" was
struck as constitutionally vague.
96. 185 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1966).
97. Id. at 725.
98. In Florida the sale of intoxicating beverages has been held to be a privilege
and not a right. Id., citing Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
99. 185 So. 2d at 725.
100. 31 So. 2d at 389.
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a crime and issuance of a license has been held to be a valid regulation
designed to eliminate undue prevalence. 10
The California courts are not alone, however, in disapproving this
theory. The PerrineH2 decision was followed by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota in a 1975 decision involving revocation of an adult theatre's
occupational license. 103
This city of St. Paul's ordinance04 provided that the city council
could revoke or deny any motion picture theatre license on the ground
that the "licensee, owner, manager, lessee, employee, or financially
interested person" had been convicted of a crime pertaining to the sale,
distribution or exhibition of obscene material relative to the operation
of the movie theatre license.0 5 The St. Paul city council revoked the
plaintiff's license on the basis of a prior conviction.
In striking down the St. Paul ordinance, the Minnesota Supreme
Court specifically found that motion picture theatres are engaged in
activity protected by the first amendment and any licensing power is
subordinate to those constitutional dictates. 0 The court specifically
rejected an analogy between obscene books and businesses, such as
massage parlors or liquor stores and the concept of "unlawful" versus
"lawful and ordinary" business, on the ground that massage parlors
enjoy no first amendment protection.107 Referring to Near v.
Minnesota,0 8 the court held that the proper remedy is not in suppression
but in criminal prosecutions. Further, the court stated: "The risk that
criminal sanctions will be insufficient to deter future violations of the
ordinance cannot justify the city's attempt to revoke plaintiff's license
in the face of his right to the free speech guaranty of the first amend-
ment."' 0
This holding was also followed by the District Court of Appeals of
Illinois."0 The ordinance in question permitted the mayor to revoke any
101. 185 So. 2d at 725.
102. Note 84 and accompanying text supra.
103. Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 201, 227 N.W. 2d 370 (1975).
104. ST. PAUL LEGISLATIVE CODE, § 372.04(G) (1974).
105. 227 N.W. 2d at 371.
106. Id. at 372-73.
107. Id.
108. 283 U.S. 697.
109. 227 N.W. 2d at 373.
110. City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 111. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (3rd DCA
1975).
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occupational license "for good and sufficient cause.""'  Finding this
definition to be unduly vague, the court held that permitting revocation
on such terms creates a "danger of unduly suppressing protected expres-
sion.""'
More recently, the Superior Court of New Jersey rejected a New-
ark city ordinance," 3 which based license denial or revocation on past
convictions, for reasons similar to A von' 4 and its progeny. In this case,
a license was refused for the applicant's failure to give full and correct
answers on the license application and because the applicant had been
previously convicted of showing obscene pictures."'
The court found that failure to disclose a 1972 conviction on a
license application, in light of disclosure of more recent convictions, was
an "inconsequential and insufficient" reason to refuse a license.", The
court was silent, however, as to what effect a total failure to reveal past
convictions would have.
As to the free speech issue, the New Jersey court joined Califor-
niay 7 Illinois"' and Minnesota"9 in rejecting the use of license revoca-
tions and called for use of criminal sanctions as the only appropriate
remedy. 20
It would thus appear that the United States Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals stands alone in approving the use of past convictions for license
revocations.' 21 Yet, the division between the jurisdictions is not so clear-
I 1. DELEVAN, ILL., ORDINANCE No. 73-6 § 12 (1973). § 4 of the ordinance made
it unlawful to "offer or present any motion picture or performance which is obscene."
334 N.E. 2d at 191. A finding of obscenity, by the mayor, permitted him to exercise
his revocation powers.
112. 334 N.E. 2d at 192, citing from the Supreme Court decision of Freedman v.
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
113. Hamar Theatres, Inc. v. City of Newark, 150 N.J. Super. 14, 374 A.2d 502
(Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), discussing NEWARK, N.J., CITY ORDINANCE No. 5: 8-
13(a).
114. 352 F. Supp. 994.
115. 374 A.2d at 503.
116. Id.
117. Perrine v. Municipal Court, 5 Cal. 3d 656, 97 Cal. Rptr. 320, 488 P.2d 648
(1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1038 (1972).
118. City of Delevan v. Thomas, 31 111. App. 3d 630, 334 N.E. 2d 190 (3rd DCA
1975).
119. Alexander v. City of St. Paul, 303 Minn. 201, 227 N.W. 2d 370 (1975).
120. 374 A.2d at 504, citing Alexander, 227 N.W. 2d 370.
121. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1044 (1975).
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cut. In each of the jurisdictions in which licensing-revocation ordinances
were struck down, the courts expressed universal concern over the lack
of definite standards. In the fifth circuit, where this procedure was
approved, the court particularly noted the clarity of the revocation ordi-
nance.12
In the St. Paul ordinance, no legislative effort was made to connect
the conviction with the public health, safety and welfare.12' The Dele-
van, Illinois, ordinance allowed revocation for "good and sufficient
cause," but failed to define that term. 2 Newark's revocation ordinance
permitted a license to be suspended "for the furtherance of decency and
good order," but, again, no definition of decency or good order was
provided by the legislative authority.' 2' Lastly, the Los Angeles ordi-
nance failed to connect the enumerated offenses with the public wel-
fare.'12
In 106 Forsyth,127 however, the Athens, Georgia, ordinance suf-
fered from none of these deficiencies. It required a single standard
conviction; that the conviction be deleterious to the public welfare; and
a showing that the conviction arose from the operation of the licensed
business.' 2'
It may reasonably be said that a revocation ordinance is not per se
unconstitutional; rather, that in light of first amendment rights, there
exists a heavy presumption against its constitutionality which can be
overcome if sufficient objective standards exist to guide the licensing
authority. As the Florida Supreme Court noted in 1947:
It has been indicated that a mere lodging of discretion in public officers
or bodies to judge the fitness and character of applicants for licenses,
permits, etc., does not vest arbitrary power in such officials, but rather
calls for the exercise of a discretion of a judicial nature for which no
definite rule of action is necessary.' 21
122. Id. at 283.
123. 227 N.W. 2d at 373.
124. 334 N.E. 2d at 191.
125. 374 A.2d at 503.
126. 488 P.2d at 650.
127. 362 F. Supp. 1389.
128. Id. at 1393.
129. Permenter v. Younan, 159 Fla. 226, 31 So. 2d 387, 389 (1947).
13:1979 149 I1
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4. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
A collateral issue in the revocation of occupational licenses as a
result of criminal convictions is the problem of double jeopardy.10 That
is, in addition to whatever criminal penalty attached to the conviction,
it has been argued that the license revocation is unlawful as a second
punishment for the same offense.
Perhaps the strongest expression of this double jeopardy argument
is found in the Washington Supreme Court decision of City of Seattle
v. Bittner.'M The court presumed that persons convicted of obscenity
violations had paid the prescribed penalty provided by law for that
offense. In mixing this presumption with the doctrine of prior restraint,
the court held:
The Appellant (City of Seattle) has apparently proceeded upon the as-
sumption that a person who has been convicted of the offense of exhibit-
ing an obscene movie . . . is more likely than not to commit the offense
again. This must mean in its opinion, the imposition of penalties under
the criminal law has neither a deterrent nor a rehabilitative effect, and
further that the penalties prescribed are not adequate punishment for the
offense. Whether or not this assumption has any validity, we are con-
vinced that the constitution does not permit a licensing agency to deny
to any citizen the right to exercise one of his fundamental freedoms on
the ground that he has abused that freedom in the past.3 2
Florida, however, has taken the opposite view. Injunctive relief to
prevent future showing of films found to be obscene is not a punitive
measure but a remedial one. 33 Even an acquittal in a criminal pro-
ceeding is not a bar to maintenance of the injunctive proceedings. 34
Further, because judgments in criminal actions are inadmissible in Flor-
ida to prove facts in a civil action, 3 1 the identity of issues and claims
is absent and thus res judicata will not apply.
In essence, the civil penalty which flows from an obscenity convic-
tion is not aimed primarily at the offender. Rather, it is merely a mea-
130. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy for life and limb."
131. 81 Wash. 2d 747, 505 P.2d 126 (1973).
132. 505 P.2d at 131.
133. State ex rel. Gerstein v. Walvick Theatre Corp., 298 So. 2d 406, 408 (Fla.
1974).
134. Id.
135. Boshnack v. World Wide Rent-A-Car, Inc., 195 So. 2d 216 (Fla. 1967).
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sure of protection for the public. The Florida Supreme Court, in approv-
ing revocation of a dental license for drug abuse violations, held that
acts done in "persistent disregard" of the law: "offend generally ac-
cepted standards of conduct within the profession thereby jeopardizing
the interests of the profession and the public it serves.'""
5. ZONING
In 1926, the United States Supreme Court recognized that local
zoning ordinances represent a valid exercise of a state's police power.37
There it was argued that, where such ordinances are designed to pro-
mote public health, safety, welfare and morals, the individual's right
must give way to the particular concern of the community. 3 '
More recently, the Supreme Court applied these general zoning
principles to adult entertainment. In Young v. American Mini
Theatres,' the Court approved a Detroit city ordinance' which re-
quired a specified distance between buildings housing adult theatres.
The decision is significant for several reasons. First, the Detroit
ordinance was approved despite the fact that it singled out a particular
type of activity as a "regulated use.""'' Secondly, the ordinance was
found not to have an impermissible deterrent effect on first amendment
freedoms.' Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the Court recog-
nized a legitimate governmental interest, through its licensing and zon-
ing power, sufficient to regulate the use of commercial property for the
benefit of urban preservation.'43
In setting apart adult theatres as "regulated uses," the Detroit
ordinance defined such theatres as ones in which the material presented
was "characterized by an emphasis" on matter depicting or relating to
"specified sexual activities" or "specified anatomical areas."'4
The Court held such classifications were not void for vagueness. As
to the "characterized by an emphasis" language, the Court held that a
136. Richardson v. State Board of Dentistry, 326 So. 2d 231, 233 (Fla. 1st DCA
1976).
137. Village of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
138. Id. at 373.
139. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
140. DETROrr, MICH., CITY ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.000 (1972).
141. 427 U.S. at 62.
142. Id. at 60.
143. Id. at 71.
144. Id. at 53.
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theatre owner whose "regular fare" involved sexually oriented materials
was clearly on notice as to what was expected."' Further, the 1000 foot
distance requirement between regulated uses was not unconstitutional,
in that it was found not to be a regulation of speech on the basis of its
content, but: "Rather, it is a regulation of the right to locate a business
based on the side effects of its location. The interest in preserving neigh-
borhoods is not a subterfuge for censorship." '
What seemed of greatest importance to the Court was the fact that
this zoning law did not constitute a prior restraint on the first amend-
ment rights of the licensees. There was no claim made by the theatre
owners that they were "denied access to the market" nor that the mar-
ket denied access to them. The mere fact that the commercial exploita-
tion of material was subject to zoning and the licensing requirement was
held not to be a sufficient reason for invalidating these ordinances.4 7
The Court also recognized the city's interest in planning and regu-
lating the use of property for commercial purposes even to the extent
that different classifications existed for adult theatres.14 To support this
holding, the Court referred to those prior instances where the content
of the speech determined its level of constitutional protection.
For example, it has been held that a public rapid transit system
may accept some advertisements and reject others;'" that a state may
properly limit highway billboards to neighborhood businesses;,-" that a
regulatory commission may prohibit businesses from making state-
ments which, though literally true, are potentially deceptive.'5, Thus, the
measure of constitutional protection to be afforded commercial speech
will surely be governed largely by the content of the communication.
In recognizing a distinction between adult expression and philo-
sophical or political oratory, the Court noted:
145. Id. at 58-59.
146. Id. at 57, n. 15, citing the dissenting opinion in American Mini Theatres v.
Gribbs, 518 F. 2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1975), the lower appellate decision to the present case.
The Supreme Court did, in fact, embrace this thought in its decision by stating that the
ordinance was justified "by the city's interest in preserving the character of its neighbor-
hoods." 427 U.S. at 71.
147. 427 U.S. at 62.
148. 1d. at 62-63.
149. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
150. Markham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 316 (1968).
151. Jacob Siegel Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 327 U.S. 608 (1946).
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It is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type (adult material)
of expression is of a wholly different and lesser magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate. . .. Even though the First Amend-
ment protects communication in this area from total suppression, we hold
that the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the
basis for placing them in a different classification from other motion
pictures.'
Lastly, the Court ruled that its function did not include an appraisal
of the wisdom of the Detroit city government's desire to enact separate
treatment for adult theatres. Rather, the city's interest in attempting to
preserve the quality of urban life is one deserving of high respect and
the city. must therefore be allowed a reasonable opportunity to
"experiment with solutions to admittedly serious problems."'
The Mini-Theatres decision can be constrasted with the Supreme
Court's rejection of a Jacksonville, Florida, ordinance' which prohib-
ited nudity on outdoor theatre screens. That enactment was struck down
because it failed to explain how flashes of nudity, without regard to their
erotic purpose, could be any more distracting to traffic than non-
obscene material. In so holding, the Court noted that the presumption
of validity generally accorded statutes has less force when a classifica-
tion turns on the subject matter of expression.'
In the fifth circuit, a zoning ordinance was recently struck down
for going beyond the limitations set forth in the Mini-Theatres deci-
sion.' Here, the city of Baton Rouge adopted a resolution withholding
the certificate of occupancy from an adult book store, based on the
content of its product. The city attempted to defend this resolution on
the same basis set forth by the appellant in Mini-Theatres; that is, that
a city may provide that certain establishments shall operate only in
specified neighborhoods. " However, the court rejected this argument
because the "zoning" resolution was retroactive and piecemeal, thus
making it a "highly suspect" act.' The court held that "zoning...
connotes a non-particularized legislative process in which rules are pro-
152. 427 U.S. at 70.
153. Id. at 71.
154. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
155. Id. at 215.
156. Bayou Landing, Ltd. v. Watts, 563 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1977).
157. Id. at 1175.
158. 563 F.2d at 1175, citing Four States Realty Co., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge,
309 So. 2d 659, 672 (La. 1975).
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mulgated and land areas are designated on a general, prospective
basis." ' 9 In essence, the court found that resolutions aimed at individual
businesses, even if delineated as zoning enactments, fail to meet consti-
tutional standards in that restrictions must be" 'no greater than neces-
sary or essential to the protection of the governmental interests.' "I"
A somewhat different approach to zoning regulations was adopted
by the city of Boston in 1974.111 Rather than attempt to regulate adult
entertainment locations by dispersing them throughout particular zon-
ing classifications, the city set aside a specific geographical area, dubbed
the "combat zone," for "adult entertainment," in an effort to concen-
trate such businesses and enhance enforcement activities.' This area
became the exclusive location within the city where adult entertainment
would be permitted. Upon the passage of the enabling legislation, all
Adult Entertainment Uses, formerly classified as "Conditional," be-
came "Prohibited" outside the zone.
The zone concept, however, has proven unsatisfactory. In practical
effect, the vices contained within the zone continue to spill over to the
surrounding community. Of particular concern to law enforcement offi-
cials has been the significant increase in violent crimes, including mur-
der.'1 By 1977, the Boston model was being shunned in favor of the
Detroit spacing model.' In fact, Boston city planners are considering
the tearing down of the combat zone and its re-classification as a more
conventional commercial district.
159. 563 F.2d at 1175.
160. Id. at 1175-76, citing Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977). The Watts court also relied here in part
on Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 91 (1977).
Recently, in Bayside Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla.
1978), a Jacksonville, Florida, zoning ordinance was struck down because it was found
to have violated the parameters set down in Young. See note 139 and accompanying
text supra. More particularly, the ordinance impermissibly resulted in the total exclu-
sion of adult businesses. In so doing, the Jacksonville zoning law failed to survive the
close scrutiny ascribed to enactments which affect free expression. 450 F. Supp. at 702-
03.
161. BOSTON, MASS., CODE § 3-1 (1974).
162. STAFF DRAFT, PLANNING FOR DOWNTOWN ENTERTAINMENT DISTRICT,
STUDY DESIGN OF THE BOSTON REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY (November 26, 1973).
163. Gumpert, Problems in the Combat Zone, Wall St. J., June 30, 1977.
164. See note 140 and accompanying text supra, which deal with the Detroit
model.
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6. NUISANCE
"The nuisance doctrine operates as a restriction upon the right of
[an] owner of property to make such use of it as he pleases;"' 65 the
doctrine will not be invoked so long as this use does not interfere with
the rights of his neighbors to use their property.' More specifically, the
term applies to a "class of wrongs which arises from . . . unlawful use
by a person of his property which produces . . . material damage:"
generally, the diminution of the value or usefulness of the property
surrounding the nuisance." 7
Of particular concern is this inquiry: Does the maintenance of a
"common" or "public nuisance" constitute an act which injuriously
affects the safety, health, welfare or morals of the public? A public
nuisance must arise from an unlawful act and, therefore, its existence
is generally considered a question of law."'
As related to obscenity, the nuisance theory has been successful
with regard to specific films or books, but is generally rejected as a
blanket restraint on a class of activities.
In 1957, the Supreme Court of New Mexico prohibited the state
from relying on a nuisance abatement statute in its criminal prosecution
of a motion picture theatre owner.6 9 First, the court held that applying
the statute to enjoin the theatre owner would result in a violation of his
due process rights. The state's case rested solely on the term "lewdness"
found in the statutory language and the court determined that that term
was impermissibly "too vague and indefinite" to support the state's
action. 170 Then , in response to the state's assertion that injunctive relief
could be sought by invoking the trial court's "general equity powers for
165. '58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 1 (1971); see Reaver v. Martin Theatres of
Florida, Inc., 52 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 1951).
166. See Palm Corp. v. Waiters, 148 Fla. 527, 4 So. 2d 696 (1941).
167. 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 1 (1971).
168. See generally 58 AM. JUR. 2d Nuisances § 8 (1971).
169. State ex rel. Murphy v. Morley, 63 N.M. 267, 317 P.2d 317 (1957).
170. 317 P.2d at 320. The court offered additional support for its belief that the
term "lewdness" in the New Mexico statute could not be relied upon to enjoin the owner
from showing obscene films. The statutory construction rule of ejusdem generis was
applied when the court noted that the term "lewdness" was followed in the statute by
the words "assignation or prostitution." " 'Under this rule, general terms in a statute
may be regarded as limited by subsequent more specific terms.'" Thus, the court's view
was that the legislature intended that the proscribed "lewdness" refer only to acts of
"assignation or prostitution" and not to the showing of obscene films in theatre estab-
lishments as well. 317 P.2d at 319, citing to 50 AM. JUR. Statutes § 249 (1944).
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protection of public morals," the New Mexico court stated that it would
be prejudicial to the owner to permit a "civil action" such as that to be
introduced into a criminal proceeding brought under a criminal statute
and complaint.17 1
In 1968, the Michigan Supreme Court sustained the use of a munic-
ipal licensing ordinance to avert the "nuisance" caused by a drive-in
movie screen visible to children in residential areas.17 Township officials
had denied the theatre owner's application for license renewal and he
filed suit. In rejecting the owner's first and fourteenth amendment argu-
ment, the court held that the right of free speech did not include the right
to force material "not fit to be seen by children" on the "children of
parents who are unwilling to have [that] done ...."I"
That same year, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court took a substan-
tially more restrictive view of nuisance proceedings.174 The court rejected
injunctions issued after ex-parte hearings on complaints of the district
attorney. Instead, the court held that no such injunctions may issue
without a prompt, adversarial hearing resulting in a judicial determi-
nation of obscenity, as required by Freedman v. Maryland.'75
In 1971, a Louisiana Court of Appeals raised a unique due process
argument vis-a-vis the closure of a business premises for maintenance
of the nuisance of obscenity. 7 ' The court found unconstitutional that
portion of an injunction which prohibited any use of the building in
which the nuisance occurred. It was reasoned that an "unknowing and
unparticipating" property owner could be deprived of the use of his
property and that judicial policy against prior restraint forbade injunc-
tion of publications not contained in the nuisance category. Thus, the
maximum injunction permissible was prohibition of "permitting the
continued existence of the nuisance."'' 78
In 1971, an Ohio Court of Appeals rejected challenge to an Ohio
171. 317 P.2d at 321.
172. Bloss v. Paris Township, 380 Mich. 466, 157 N.W. 2d 260 (1968).
173. Id. at 261, 263. The court noted that the theatre owner admitted on the stand
and in his newspaper advertisements that the movies shown at his theatre were "not fit
to be seen by children below 18 years of age." Id. at 261.
174. Commonwealth v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 432 Pa. 378, 248 A.2d 45 (1968).
175. Id. at 48. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 and 63 supra.
176. Society to Oppose Pornography, Inc. v. Thevis, 255 So. 2d 876 (Ct. App.
La. 1971), cert. denied, 257 So. 2d 158 (1972), appeal dismissed, 273 So. 2d 653 (1973).
177. 255 So. 2d at 881.
178. Id.
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nuisance statute in State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch."'' The
appellate court had examined a particular film and, having found it to
be obscene upon applying the tests set forth in Roth v. United States'89
and A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Plea-
sure" v. A tty General of Massachusetts,' also found it to be a nuis-
ance. 82 Thus judged as an obscene film, the appellate court held it to
be outside the penumbra of the first amendment's protection. Therefore,
held the court, the injunctive relief granted by the trial court under the
Ohio nuisance abatement statute was not violative of the first amend-
ment.' u
In 1974, the Ohio Supreme Court granted a motion to certify which
"removed the issue of obscenity from [the] case," leaving the court to
rule on the constitutionality of the Ohio nuisance abatement statute.'84
Although theatre owners who had been enjoined from showing the
movie "Without a Stitch" made repeated attacks on the statute, it was
upheld."" To their dismay, the court found that, despite the fact that the
nuisance abatement statute was directed toward enjoing the exhibition
of obscene "films" (in the plural), "the statute was broad enough to
include the exhibition of a single obscene film, which is composed of a
number of film positives," as are all motion pictures. 8 The court found
valid the statute's procedural sections under which temporary and per-
manent injunctions had been issued. Those sections passed the
Freedman v. Maryland8' test in that they allowed the issuance of injunc-
tions only after full judicial adversary hearings on the allegation of
obscenity.'s The court rejected the theatre owners' argument that the
statute was "overbroad" because it provided that "any place which
exhibits filmed obscenity" is a "nuisance."'8 9 The court also rejected
the theatre owners' contention that the statutory scheme was
179. 28 Ohio App. 2d 107, 276 N.E. 2d 655 (Ct. App. 1971), modified, 307 N.E.
2d 911 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
180. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
181. 383 U.S. 413 (1966).
182. 276 N.E. 2d at 660.
183. Id. at 657.
184. State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E. 2d
911, 913 (1974), appeal dismissed, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
185. 307 N.E. 2d at 917-18.
186. Id. at 913.
187. See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 and 63 supra.
188. 307 N.E. 2d at 914.
189. Id. at 915.
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"unconstitutionally deficient" because it failed to require scienter, i.e.,
knowledge on the part of the nuisance abatement defendants, as to the
content of the film. Although the court agreed that such knowledge is
constitutionally required, it noted the statute did, in fact, require scien-
ter, but that the theatre owners failed to assert lack of knowledge in
their first appeal.190 The court further determined that, in accordance
with the general rule, the burden of proof under the nuisance statute lay
with the complainant, even when the statute itself fails to address the
issue.'9' Among the statutory remedies upheld was a one year closing
of the theatre "in and upon which the nuisance was maintained ....19
That remedy received judicial approval because the statute provided
that, through compliance with certain prescribed measures, the theatre
owner could avoid a closure of the premises. Before giving its approval
to the closure avoidance requirements, the court scrutinized each ele-
ment to determine if any one posed "an unconstitutional prior restraint
on an activity generally protected by the first amendment."" 3 Even the
requirement that the theatre owner demonstrate "that he will prevent
...the [future] exhibition of the particular film declared obscene" was
held not to be a "prior restraint,""' 4 although the court did observe that
it would have struck a statute whose language required an owner to
show that "no film to be exhibited during the one year period will be
obscene.""15
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals again revisited
the issue of closing premises and the problems of prior restraint in 1977.
In Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance"' a split court reversed a
district court decision which had invalidated a Texas nuisance abate-
ment statute."97 In upholding the provision, the court found that a pro-
prietor enjoined under the statute was:
prohibited only from doing that which he could not lawfully do anyway,
since Texas law prohibits him from commercially exhibiting, possessing
for sale, or distributing obscene material, Tex. Penal Code Ann.
743.23(a)(1) (1974). A lawful injunction subjects him to no further guess-
190. Id. at 916.
191. Id.




196. 559 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1977).
197. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4667(a)(3) (Vernon 1976).
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work, in determining what is and is not prohibited, than he must already
engage in merely to comply with Texas law.'" In short, as we read the
Texas statutes, they authorize restraint of such expression only as is not
constitutionally protected and is prohibited by State law. This is not the
stuff of which First Amendment violations are made.'"
This holding was, however, expressly rejected in 1978 by a United
States district court in North Carolina."' In rejecting a state nuisance
abatement statute, the court found that the fifth circuit had ignored the
prior restraint issue. That is, the abatement injunction was held to have
the effect of prohibiting future speech of an unknown quality because
of a past abuse of the first amendment.201 Although the fifth circuit
decision relied on Forsyth22 the North Carolina decision relied on
Nebraska Free Press Association v. Stuart,2"3 for the proposition that:
A criminal penalty .,. . is subject to. the whole panoply of protections
afforded by deferring the impact of the judgment until all avenues of
appellate review have been exhausted. Only after judgment has become
final, correct or otherwise, does the law's sanction become fully operative.
A prior restraint, by contrast and by definition has an immediate and
irreversible sanction. If it can be said that a threat of criminal or civil
sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at
least for the time.204
In essence, the North Carolina district court saw any injunction
which went beyond specific named books or films to be an impermissi-
ble restraint.05 The fifth circuit, by contrast, felt that any purveyor of
adult materials was always running the risk of violating the obscenity
laws.2 "
198. 559 F.2d at 1292, n. 11, which states: "Under Texas law the injunctive order
must 'be specific in terms' and 'describe in reasonable detail. . . the act or acts sought
to be restrained . . .' Tex. R. Civ. P. 683. An order which enjoins the exhibition of
obscene material, as the term is defined in the Penal Code, and provides no further
guidelines is invalid under Texas Rule 683 ... "
199. 559 F.2d at 1292.
200. Felhaber v. North Carolina, 445 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. N.C. 1978).
201. Id. at 138.
202. 106 Forsyth Corp. v. Bishop, 482 F.2d 280 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1044 (1975). See text accompanying notes 35 through 37 supra.
203. 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
204. 445 F. Supp. at 139-40, citing 427 U.S. at 559.
205. 445 F. Supp. at 140.
206. 559 F.2d at 1292.
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Therefore, an injunction to abate certain unlawful activity as a
nuisance subjected the book store or theatre owner to "no further guess-
work, in determining what is and is not prohibited, than he must already
engage in merely to comply with [the] law."2 7
Florida's state courts have rejected blanket injunctions against ob-
scene materials on a nuisance theory, approving such procedure only
when specific films were considered."'~ The California Supreme Court,
in a lengthy 1976 decision, joined the ranks of those states disapproving
blanket injunctions.219 In essence, the court adopted the theory that
enjoining the, distribution of unknown material in the future, without a
prior determination of obscenity, is violative of the first amendment
proscription on prior restraint.210
In its most recent session, the Florida Legislature adopted a statute
providing that any places where obscene materials are illegally kept are
a public nuisance.' Further, drive-in theatres are prohibited from dis-
playing films depicting nudity in a manner harmful to minors, where the
film is visible from the public streets. 12
As yet, this statute is untested, but its validity will in large part rely
on the fifth circuit's disposition of Vance, which was ordered heard en
banc in December, 1977.213 If the fifth circuit follows the national trend,
207. Id.
208. Mitchem v. State ex rel. Schaub, 250 So. 2d 883, 886 (Fla. 1971); Paris
Follies, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 259 So. 2d 532, 533 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1972); See
Gayety Theatres, Inc. v. State ex rel. Gerstein, 359 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978).
209. People ex rel. Busch v. Projection Room Theatre, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 328, 550 P.2d 600 (1976), in which the court held that any injunction must be
"directed to particular books or films already adjudicated obscene." 130 Cal. Rptr. at
337.
210. 130 Cal. Rptr. at 337.
211. FLA. STAT. § 823.13(l) (1978).
212. Id.
213. The en banc decision was rendered on December 18, 1978. In an 8-6 decision
(one judge not participating) the Court of Appeals overturned the three judge decision
found at 559 F.2d 1286.
The court, per Judge Thornberry, found that the one year closure requirement of
the Texas nuisance statute was unconstitutional as applied to obscenity. In reaching this
conclusion, the court looked primarily to Near v. Minnesota, note 24 and accompanying
text supra, for the proposition that the closure requirement would be an impermissible
prior restraint on future and, thus, presumptively protected speech. The dissent sought
to distinguish the case on its facts, but cited no new precedents.
This case is significant in that it represents a change in fifth circuit thinking. The
Vance decision brings the fifth circuit more in line with its sister courts in taking a
restrictive view of prior restraints.
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then nuisance proceedings resulting in business closures will cease to be
a viable alternative for control of adult materials.
7. SELECTIVE ENFORCEMENT
The simplest method of controlling obscenity is vigorous enforce-
ment of the criminal laws prohibiting the distribution of such materials.
Yet; such a control device also possesses the greatest potential for abuse.
It is axiomatic that protection of the public from illegal activity is
a pioper purpose for the exercise of the police power.21' Furthermore,
businesses which are susceptible to the opportunity for criminal activity
are "fit subjects" for strict regulation.215
A United States district court has held, however, that overly zeal-
ous enforcement of the law can reach the proportion of an impermissible
prior restraint. In Bee See Books v. Leary, the court was faced with
considering the legality 'of a police program of stationing officers in
adult book stores. The court found such activity to have effected a prior
restraint in that it suggested the materials in the stores were unlawful
and inhibited customers from exercising their right of free expression.2 ,
The United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a simi-
lar conclusion in a case involving the repeated filing of obviously spu-
rious criminal complaints. 21 The local police had initiated over one
hundred prosecutions against a single corporation, despite the fact that
each of the first eleven complaints had resulted in acquittals. Relying
on the precedent set in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,219 the court held: "In the
vital area of First Amendment rights, it is just as easy to discourage
exercise of them by abusing a valid statute as by using an invalid one."220
Most recently, a federal district court in South Florida considered
The unanswered question is the effect of this decision on 106 Forsyth Corp. v.
Bishop, notes 48 through 54 and accompanying text supra. Forsyth permitted the revo-
cation of occupational licenses based on past obscenity convictions. Presumably, this
question will be answered at some future time. Pending that resolution, however, the
status of prior restraint in the licensing field will remain unsettled.
214. Golden v. McCarty, 337 So. 2d 388 (Fla. 1976).
215. Tally v. City of Detroit, 54 Mich. App. 328, 220 N.W. 2d 778 (Ct. App.
1974).
216. 291 F. Supp. 622 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
217. Id. at 624.
218. Kram v. Graham, 461 F. 2d 703 (9th Cir. 1972).
219. 118 U.S. 356 (1896).
220. 461 F.2d at 707.
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the problem of selective enforcement as it affects adult businesses. In
P.A.B., Inc. v. Stack,22 the court issued a restraining order against the
Fort Lauderdale police and Broward County Sheriff's Office in response
to their concentrated efforts against an adult book store. Here, as in Bee
See Books,z2 the police stationed uniformed officers in front of the book
store on a regular basis, frequently had undercover agents in the store,
checked the identification of patrons seeking to enter and exit the
premises and regularly checked employee identification.2 The court
specifically found, based in part on admissions by the Sheriff in a televi-
sion interview, that the enforcement drive was aimed at causing finan-
cial damage to the store. This pattern of conduct was found to "go
beyond that necessary to enforce criminal obscenity laws" and to "chill"
protected first amendment rights.2u The court stated:
In the area of sexually oriented literature and films, state prosecuting
authorities may vigorously enforce obscenity laws where the purpose is
to punish the promotion or sale of obscene material or to deter such
promotion or sale. However, such law enforcement will run afoul of the
Constitution if it is to force a sexually oriented enterprise to cease doing
business or to refrain from dealing in presumably protected sexually
oriented materials. In those circumstances, such activity constitutes an
invalid restraint on First Amendment rights.m
Where first amendment rights are not directly jeopardized, the
standard for selective enforcement becomes proportionately lighter. In
1976, the city of San Antonio, Texas, adopted an ordinance26 regulating
massage parlors which, in part, required each operator to record the
name, age and current address of each patron together with the date and
the name of the masseur. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly
rejected an "associational freedom" challenge to that code provision,2n
finding that massage is not protected by the first amendment. 221 In
making that finding, the court relied on Paris Adult Theatre I v.
221. 440 F. Supp. 937 (S.D. Fla. 1977).
222. 291 F. Supp. 662.
223. 440 F. Supp. at 940.
224. Id. at 944.
225. Id. at 945.
226. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CITY CODE, Chapter 18, Art. IV (1976).
227. Pollard v. Cockrell, 578 F.2d 1002, 1015 (5th Cir. 1978). See also Bayside
Enterprises, Inc. v. Carson, 450 F. Supp. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1978), discussed more fully at
note 160 supra.
228. 578 F. 2d at 1015.
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Slaton,221 where the Supreme Court rejected the argument that the right
of adults to view obscenity in the home extended to willing customers
in commercial theatres:
Even assuming that petitioners have vicarious standing to assert potential
customers' rights, it is unavailing to compare a theatre, open to the public
for a fee, with the private home of Stanley v. Georgia and the marital
bedroom of Griswald v. Connecticut. This Court has, on numerous occa-
sions, refused to hold that commercial ventures such as a motion picture
house are 'private' for the purpose of civil rights litigations and civil rights
statutes. 23
The level of interference tolerated from law enforcement officials
is thus directly related to the quality of the expression. That is, the
further an activity strays from "pure speech" toward conduct, the less
stringent the test for regulation.
8. CONCLUSION
Because of the nature of the media in which "obscene materials"
may appear (motion pictures and books), local governments encounter
formidable constitutional obstacles in their attempts to regulate the
distribution of these items. The United States Supreme Court appears
reluctant to authorize procedures which would have a "chilling effect"
upon the distribution of "legitimate" materials through the same media.
The Court's dilemma appears to rise out of a concern for the
fundamental rights of individuals and an equally profound recognition
of the compelling interests of the states in protecting the health, safety,
welfare and morals of their citizens. The constitutional problems are
further compounded by the existence of competing policy considerations
in interpreting the constitution as it relates to obscenity.
Is the regulation of obscenity a sword to be used against the exer-
cise of individuals' rights to distribute books and films or a shield to
protect the public from being exposed to those materials which may be
offensive to their sense of morality? The resolution of this question, it
appears, would depend upon whether states are empowered to determine
what is "good" for their citizens and, more importantly, whether the
states and their subdivisions may eliminate .what they determine to be
"bad."
229. Id. at 1016, citing to Paris, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
230. Id.
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The courts are divided as to whether the states may be parens
patriae to adults as well as to minors. Many courts appear to have
decided that the states must protect their citizens from themselves, by
ensuring that access to obscene materials is made difficult by strict
regulations, while other courts have decided that unless there is a de-
monstrably compelling state interest in regulating the distribution of
obscene materials-this interest to have been judicially legitimated as
to each piece of questionable material-then the right must be unim-
paired by regulatory processes.
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In 1975, the Florida Legislature recognized that the delivery of quality
health care to the citizens of Florida was threatened. Faced with what
was termed a "crisis," the Legislature passed the Medical Malpractice
Reform Act of 1975.1 The preamble2 to this comprehensive legislation
is evidence of the intent of the Legislature to address what were per-
ceived to be the causes of the crisis and make it clear that the provisions
of the medical mediation statute are not designed as a "toll-gate" ap-
proach to the problem, wherein the claimant is required to stop at the
mediation panel and pay his toll before proceeding further. Rather, the
provisions of the Act are, in the words of the preamble, fundamental
reforms of tort law or liability insurance system.
Because a formal medical malpractice trial is a cumbersome, time
consuming, expensive, painful and traumatic experience for both plain-
* B.B.A. Temple University (1969); J.D. University of Toledo (1972); LL.M.
(Medical Jurisprudence) Case Western Reserve University (1976); Professor of Law and
Medicine, Nova University Law Center; Member of the Pennsylvania, Washington
D.C. and Florida Bars; Co-chairperson American Bar Association-Professional Liabil-
ity Litigation Committee, Member-Dade County Bar Association Medical Profes-
sional Liaison; American College of Legal Medicine.
Mr. Winitz was counsel for Defendant and Petitioner Doctors' Hospital in Herrera
vs. Doctors' Hospital and Elbert Fisher, M.D. through his association with the Miami
law firm of Thornton, Conroy & Herndon, P.A.
The author acknowledges the research assistance of Gloria Jones, R.N., Nova Law
Center.
1. Medical Malpractice Reform Act, Ch.75-9, 1975 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. I
(West)(hereinafter referred to as the Act).
2. WHEREAS, the cost of purchasing medical professional liability insurance
for doctors and other health care providers has skyrocketed in the past few
months; and WHEREAS it is not uncommon to find physicians in high-risk
categories paying premiums in excess of $20,000 annually; and WHEREAS, the
consumer ultimately must bear the financial burdens created by the high cost of
insurance, and WHEREAS, without some legislative relief, doctors will be forced
to curtail their practices, retire or practice defensive medicine at increased cost
to the citizens of Florida; and WHEREAS the problem has reached crisis propor-
tion in Florida. . ..
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tiff and defendant, alternatives have been sought for resolving medical
malpractice disputes. One such alternative is the use of a medical liabil-
ity mediation panel. The goal of mediation is to permit early settlement
of meritorious claims and discourage frivolous litigation.' The follow-
ing advantages have been said to be present where medical mediation
panels are used:
1. The unsophisticated jury is replaced by knowledgable fact finders
who, because of their expertise, are more capable of distinguishing a
meritorious claim from a frivolous, nuisance claim.
2. Lonj delays between the initiation and final disposition of lawsuits
may be avoided, thus providing the opportunity for rapid resolution of
cases.
3. The enormous expense of actions-at-law is reduced because the tech-
nical, formal time-consuming procedure characteristic of a trial are re-
placed by an informal and simple process.
4. Unjustified, embarrassing lawsuits can be avoided if the panel is
successful in identifying nuisance claims.'
By providing an impetus toward settlement and earlier resolution
of disputes, the mediation procedure provides immediate benefits to the
parties and to the judicial system. The claimant benefits when the case
is settled rather than tried, because he receives compensation at a time
when he may be out of work and in need of funds for medical expenses.
The defendant benefits in that a rapid resolution of controversies sub-
jects him to minimal embarrassment and potential damage to his repu-
tation by an unwarranted claim.' The judicial system benefits in that, if
the number of malpractice suits that reach the trial stage is reduced,
then the backlog is reduced and personnel and facility costs are avoided.
3. In Dade County, the clerk's statistics indicate that, in 1975 when the statute
became effective, there were 74 requests for mediation filed and only 43 of those were
subsequently filed in the circuit court. In 1976 there were 262 cases filed for mediation.
One hundred sixteen cases subsequently were filed in the circuit court. Seventy-four of
the cases were dismissed, either by settlement or by the statutory dismissal by the clerk.
Of the 262 medical malpractice cases filed in 1976, 45 of the 100 cases tried were filed
in the circuit court for litigation. The statistics affirmatively show a reduction in the
filing of circuit court law suits, which reduced the need and expenses for the preparation
of jury trials. Interview with Barbara Roberson, Medical Mediation Clerk, Dade
County, Florida, May 18, 1977.
4. Hooks, The Florida Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, 4 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
77, 78 (1976).
5. HEW, Appendix. Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical
Malpractice (DHEW Pub. No. (05) 73-89, 1973).
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The 1975 Florida Legislature saw mediation of medical malprac-
tice disputes as a partial resolution of the crisis it faced with the delivery
of quality health care to the citizens of the state. As a provision of the
Medical Malpractice Reform Act, the Legislature enacted Section
768.44, Florida Statutes (1977),6 which provided that, before a person
6. §768.44, FLA. STAT. (1977) (amending §768.133 (1975)) states:
768.44 Medical liability mediation panels; membership hearings
(1)(a) Any person or his representative claiming damages by reason of
injury, death, or monetary loss on account of alleged malpractice by any medical
or osteopathic physician, podiatrist, hospital, or health maintenance organization
against whom he believes there is a reasonable basis for a claim shall submit such
claim to an appropriate medical liability mediation panel before that claim may
be filed in any court of this state.
(b) Claims shall be made on forms provided by the circuit court and shall
be filed initially with the clerk of that court, with copies mailed to the person
against whom the claim is made and to the administrative board licensing such
professional. Service of process shall be effected as provided by law. Constructive
service of process may be effected as provided by law.
(c) All parties named as defendants in the claim shall file an answer to
such claim within 20 days of the date of service. No other pleadings shall be
allowed. If no answer is filed within such time limit, the jurisdiction of the media-
tion panel over the subject matter shall terminate, and the parties may proceed
in accordance with law.
(2) The chief judge of each judicial circuit shall prepare a list of persons
available to serve on medical liability mediation panels whose purpose shall be
to hear, and facilitate the disposition of, all medical malpractice actions arising
within the jurisdiction of the circuit. The number of persons on the list shall be
determined by the chief judge, but they shall be in sufficient numbers to efficiently
carry out the intent of this section. Each hearing, as hereinafter provided for, shall
be before a three-member panel, hereinafter referred to as the "panel,"
"mediation panel," or "hearing panel," composed as follows: a judicial referee,
who shall be the presiding member of the hearing panel; a licensed physician; and
an attorney. The judicial referee shall be a circuit judge. Such appointments of
judicial referees shall be made by a "blind" system. The other panel members
shall be selected in accordance with the following procedures ...
(3) The clerk shall, with the advice and cooperation of the parties and their
counsel, fix a date, time, and place for a hearing on the claim before the hearing
panel. The hearing shall be held within 120 days of the date the claim was filed
with the clerk unless, for good cause shown upon order of the judicial referee,
such time is extended. Such extension shall not exceed 6 months from the date
the claim is filed. If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months of the date
the claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter
shall terminate, and the parties may proceed in accordance with law.
(4) The filing of the claim shall toll any applicable statute of limitations,
and such statute of limitations shall remain tolled until the hearing panel issues
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or his representative may file a damage suit for alleged malpractice
against a health care provider, he must first submit his claim to a
mediation panel. The panel, pursuant to the statute, shall decide the
issue of liability, Le., whether the defendant was actionably negligent in
his care and treatment of the patient.
Requiring a party to comply with certain jurisdictional prerequis-
ites is not new in this jurisdiction and, therefore, the Florida Courts have
already determined that it is not a denial of procedural due process for
a statute to impose jurisdictional prerequisites to suit as well as prere-
quisites to the granting of relief.7 The appellate courts in this jurisdiction
its written decision or the jurisdiction of the panel is otherwise terminated. In any
event, a party shall have 60 days from the date the decision of the hearing panel
is mailed to the parties or the date on which the jurisdiction of the panel is
otherwise terminated in which to file a complaint in circuit court.
(5) All parties shall be allowed to utilize any discovery procedure provided
by the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Any motion for relief arising out of the
use of such discovery procedure shall be decided by the judicial referee. The
judicial referee may in his discretion make reasonable limitations on the extent
of discovery.
(6) The claim shall be submitted to the hearing panel under such procedural
rules as may be established by the Supreme Court, however, strict adherence to
the rules of procedure and evidence applicable in civil cases shall not be required.
Witnesses may be called; all testimony shall be under oath; testimony may be
taken either orally before the panel or by-deposition; copies of records, x-rays,
and other documents may be produced and considered by the panel; and the right
to subpoena witnesses and evidence shall obtain as in all other proceedings in the
circuit court. The right of cross-examination shall obtain as to all witnesses who
testify in person. Both parties shall be entitled, individually and through counsel,
to make opening and closing statements. No transcript or record of the proceed-
ings shall be required, but any party may have the proceedings transcribed or
recorded. The judge presiding at the hearing shall not preside at any trial arising
out of the claim or hear any application in the case not connected with the hearing
itself. No other hearing panel member shall participate in a trial arising out of
the claim, either as counsel or witness.
(7) Within 30 days after the completion of any hearing, the hearing panel
shall file a written decision with the clerk of the court who shall thereupon mail
copies to all parties concerned and their counsel. The panel shall decide the issue
of liability and shall state its conclusion in substantially the following language:
(a) "We find the defendant was actionably negligent in his care or treat-
ment of the patient and we, therefore, find for the plaintiff"; or
(b) "We find the defendant was not actionably negligent in his care or
treatment of the patient and we, therefore, find for the defendant." The decision
shall be signed by all members of the hearing panel; however, any member of the
panel may file a written concurring or dissenting opinion . . ..
7. See text accompanying notes 9 through 15 infra.
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have consistently affirmed orders dismissing complaints for failure to
comply with a condition precedent to obtaining relief.
In one such case, Millstream Corp. v. Dade County,' the corpora-
tion sought to have certain county tax assessments declared void and
to enjoin the collection of ad valorem taxes on its property, pending a
determination by the circuit court as to whether the corporation's prop-
erty should have been classified as agricultural lands. The Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's order of dismissal of the
corporation's (taxpayer) suit, for failure to comply with certain stat-
utes"° requiring a taxpayer, as a prerequisite to suit, to pay those taxes
which are admittedly owing. The court held that appellant (Millstream)
was not denied due process since it had both the opportunity and the
means to comply with the statute and there was no doubt that the state
could properly and validly impose such requirements."
Similarly, compliance with Section 770.01, Florida Statutes," is a
condition precedent to the maintenance of a libel or slander action.
Failure to comply with the provisions of the aforementioned statute was
held, in Ross v. Gore,1 3 to justify entry of final judgment for defendant,
since compliance was a condition precedent to plaintiff's ability to main-
tain his action. Similar results are found in Gannett Florida Corp. v.
8. Id.
9. 340 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977).
10. §§191.171(3) and (4) FLA. STAT. (1977).
11. The appellant in this action had such an opportunity, and it was only
through its failure even to tender payment of those taxes which were admittedly
owing that it was deprived of a hearing. There is little doubt that the state may
validly impose such a requirement. Were it not so, it would be an easy matter to
avoid paying legitimate taxes simply by challenging one facet of an otherwise
valid assessment.
340 So. 2d at 1278.
12. §770.01 FLA. STAT. (1977) states: "Before any civil action is brought for
publication or broadcast, in a newspaper, periodical or other medium, of a libel or
slander, the plaintiff shall at least five days before instituting such action, serve notice
in writing on the defendant, specifying the article or broadcast, and the statements
therein, which he alleges to be false and defamatory."
13. In Ross v. Gore, 48 So.2d 412 (Fla. 1950), Julian Ross (Appellant) filed a
libel suit against Gore and others based on an allegedly defamatory editorial which
appeared in a newspaper published by defendant. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the final judgment for defendants holding, inter alia, that a statute which requires
certain prerequisites does not violate the due process and equal protection clauses of
the Constitution.
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Montesano4 and in Orlando Sport Stadium, Inc. v. Sentinel Star
Company. 15
Indeed, the above libel statutory provisions are phrased in terms
nearly identical to those of Section 768.44(l)(a), Florida Statutes, deal-
ing with jurisdiction prerequisites to filing a circuit court action in a
medical malpractice case.16
The fact that a medical malpractice plaintiff and defendant are
treated differently is not the result of some invidious and unconstitu-
tional discrimination. On the contrary, the State of Florida prescribed
a reasonable and appropriate condition to the bringing of a lawsuit, of
a specified kind or class, and this distinction is not only real but the
condition imposed has a reasonable relation to a legitimate object.
Currently on appeal to the Florida Supreme Court is Herrera v.
Doctors' Hospital and Elbert L. Fisher, M.D.7 This case had been
certified by the Third District Court of Appeal as being a case passing
upon a question of great public interest, to-wit:
whether a medical malpractice complaint filed in the Circuit Court may
be dismissed, with prejudice, by a trial judge when the plaintiff has filed
a medical mediation claim pursuant to Section 768.44, Florida Statutes
then failed to submit evidence in support of the claim before the media-
tion panel but has accepted the statutory conclusion of the panel as to
liability, to-wit: "We find the defendants were not actionably negligent
in their care and/or treatment of the -patient and we, therefore, find for
the defendants."''
On December 29, 1975, the Herreras (claimants) filed a request for
medical mediation within the scope of Section 768.44, Florida Statutes.
They alleged the customary allegations against the defendants regarding
negligence which resulted in injuries and damages to them on or about
14. 308 So.2d 599 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 317 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1975).
15. 316 So.2d 609 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
16. See Rocky Riccobono v. Cordis Corp., 341 So.2d 805 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977);
Mt. Sinai Hospital of Greater Miami, Inc. v. Wolfson, 327 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3rd DCA
1976).
17. 360 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1978), appeal docketed, Nos. 53,646 and
53,699, - So.2d - (Fla.).
18. Certified question of the Third District Court of Appeal, February 28, 1978.
The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction pursuant to FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)
(2) (A) (ii) which states that certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be sought
to review decisions of the district courts of appeal that pass upon a question certified to
be of great public interest.
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Pursuant to the mediation statute, a mediation panel was chosen
and the hearing was scheduled to last three days beginning September
27, 1976.
At that hearing, the claimants chose not to present any evidence,
testimony, expert or otherwise, nor any documentary evidence to estab-
lish any basis for a medical malpractice claim. The record on appeal
indicates claimants' deliberate circumvention and subversion of the Act:
[Claimants' Attorney]: It is a horrible, hideous trauma, and he
says I am trying to subvert it. He is absolutely right . . . It's a
law that should be subverted.'
The Judicial Referee, finding that no evidence had been presented,
stated:
[Blut in the eyes of the law, there has been no evidence presented
. . . there can be no ruling on the merits."0
The medical mediation hearing concluded with the entry of the
following order:
We find the Defendants were not actionably negligent in their care
and/or treatment of the patient and we, therefore, find for the
Defendants, because the claimants chose not to present any evi-
dence before this Mediation Panel.2'
On October 1, 1976, the Herreras commenced a malpractice action
in the circuit court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit in and for Dade
County, Florida. The defendants filed their respective motions to dis-
miss the complaint asserting, inter alia, that plaintiffs did not present
any testimony or other documentary evidence to support their claim of
malpractice at the medical mediation hearing and, therefore, they
avoided and subverted the purposes and intention of the Medical Media-
tion Statute. As a result, the plaintiffs deprived the defendants of a
19. 360 So.2d 1092, Record at 37.
20. Id., Record at 71.
21. Id., Record at 7 (emphasis added). It should be noted that the additional
language of the order itself was not a question presented on appeal when the Herreras
appealed the trial court's order dismissing their complaint with prejudice.
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valuable legal right, without due process of law which was extended to
them pursuant to the statute.22 The hospital also moved to dismiss the
complaint for failure to comply with the applicable Florida statute of
limitations, however, this issue was not decided because of the court's
order.
The trial court, after having heard argument from all parties, dis-
missed the Herrerras' complaint with prejudice and held that they failed
to comply with the requirements of the statute; that such failure was
a deliberate attempt to circumvent and evade the provisions of the statute;
that the procedure followed by the plaintiffs in this case attempted to
make a mockery and a sham of the procedure enacted by the Legislature
and upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida; [and that compliance with
the mediation procedure is] a jurisdictional prerequisite to the bringing
of a medical malpractice suit in the Court of Florida.3
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Herreras filed an appeal with
the Third District Court of Appeal arguing the following point of law;
Whether the trial court properly dismissed with prejudice the subject
cause of action for failure of appellants (Herreras) to comply with the
Medical Mediation Act. On this point, the court reversed and remanded
with instructions to permit the Herreras to reinstitute the suit on the
condition that the conclusion of the mediation panel be admissible in
evidence at trial and that counsel be prohibited from informing the jury
about the stricken portion of the panel's decision. Judge Pearson, dis-
senting, held that where a trial judge found that there had not been a
good faith compliance with the statute, he had the jurisdiction to dismiss
the complaint. Further, Judge Pearson wrote that he would affirm the
trial judge's order upon the holding of the mediation panel judge.24
22. See note 6 supra.
23. See note 18 supra, Record at 83-85.
24. It appears abundantly clear to this Court from an examination of the
Act itself, and its intent and purpose, that the Florida Legislature intended that
the Medical Mediation panels provided for would conduct a hearing on the merits
of the case before it. It appears to be eminently clear that the Legislature in its
approach to the public health crisis in Florida, by this Act, seeks to remove from
the Court system of this State those medical malpractice cases which are patently
frivolous, or clearly meritorious, and those which are subject to settlement after
the parties have been brought together with a disinterested mediator and to act
as preliminary screening panels to determine the issues of liability and damages.
A compliance with this medietion procedure is and should be a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the bringing of a medical malpractice suit in the Courts of Florida.
The procedure followed by the plaintiffs in this case attempt to make a mockery
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The defendants argued that under the Medical Mediation Statute,
a claimant must present evidence in support of his claim at the media-
tion hearing as a condition precedent to this right to sue. The Third
District Court, placing great emphasis on the precatory language used
in the statutory provision as it relates to the presentation of evidence
before a panel, held that a claimant had satisfied the jurisdictional
requirement when he submitted his claim for mediation whether or not
he presented any evidence. To affirm this decision will occasion a repeat
of the crisis which existed in 1975, thus subverting the very intent and
purpose of the Act.2
The issue presented by the Herreras' case, therefore, was whether
the Herreras complied with the jurisdictional prerequisites of Section
768.44, Florida Statutes. Does the mere filing of a claim for medical
mediation constitute a submission of the claim to a mediation or is it
the presentation of evidence to the mediation panel which constitutes
submission of the claim to mediation within the meaning of Section
768.44(l)(a)? In other words, does the mere filing of the claim form and
payment of filing fee, concomitant with a voluntary intentional and
informed decision to refuse to present any evidence at the hearing,
comply with the requirement that the claimant "shall submit such
claim" to a mediation panel. By the words of the statute itself, there is
a distinction between submitting a claim and the mere filing of a claim
form. Subsection (1)(b) of the Act provides that "claims shall be" made
on forms provided by the circuit court and shall be "filed" with the
clerk. Subsection (1) (c) provides that defendant shall "file" an answer.
Subsection (4) indicates that the "filing" of the claim shall toll the
applicable statute of limitation. Subsection (3) further provides that the
clerk "shall" set a time and place for "a hearing on the claim before
the hearing panel." "The hearing shall be held" within a specified time
after the "date the claim is filed." Within 60 days of the date of the
decision of the hearing panel, the claimant may "file" a complaint in
and a sham of the procedure enacted by the Legislature and upheld by the Su-
preme Court of Florida and appears to be a deliberate attempt to circumvent and
evade the provisions of the Act. To permit and condone the procedure followed
by the claimant before the medical mediation panel would make an absurdity of
the Act.
316 So.2d 609.
25. The author agrees with the Third District Court of Appeal that the conclusion
reached by the mediation panel went beyond the limits prescribed by the statute when
the panel included a reason (beginning with the word "because") for its decision as a
part of its conclusion, thus transgressing the limitations of §768.44(7) FLA. STAT. (1977).
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court. Subsection (6) requires that "It]he claim shall be submitted to the
hearing panel under such procedural rules as may be established by the
Supreme Court. 2 6
The plaintiffs and the Third District Court of Appeal took the
position that, where the statute requires them to submit a claim, this
only means that the claim has to be filed with the clerk. The majority
of the Third District Court would hold that the terms "submit" and
"file" have identical meanings. Such a determination is erroneous for
two reasons. First and most important is that these terms are words of
common usage and, when used in a statute, should be construed in their
plain and ordinary sense.2 To file a claim, as required by the statute,
means to deliver and deposit the required document with the clerk of
court. On the other hand, to submit the claim, once the claim was filed,
as required by Section 768.44(l)(a) and 768.44(6), Florida Statutes,
means to present evidence to the panel allowing it to take the claim
under advisement for purposes of reaching an informed and intelligent
decision required by subsection (7).2 Second, since the legislature used
two different terms (submit and file), case law holds that it must be
presumed that different meanings are to be ascribed to them. 29 Thus, the
legislative intent expressed by the choice of differing terms in various
parts of this statute was that "submit" was to have a different meaning
than the word "file." That is to say, more is involved in submitting a
claim to mediation than simply filing the claim. As stated in Sharer v.
Hotel Corp. of America," "[ilt should never be presumed that the
Legislature intended to enact purposeless and therefore useless, legisla-
tion. [The court] must avoid statutory construction which would impair,
nullify or defeat the object of the statute." 1
26. See note 6 supra.
27. American Bankers Life Assurance Co. v. Williams, 212 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1968).
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, revised, 4th ed. at 1594 (1968) defines "submit"
as follows:
To commit to the discretion of another. .. To propound; to present for determi-
nation; as an advocate submits a proposition for the approval of the court...
That is to say, a cause is not "submitted" by the mere filing of a form, but
rather is "submitted" only when probative evidence in support of the moving
party's case has been introduced.
29. See Florida State Racing Commission v. Bourquardez, 42 So.2d 87 (Fla.
1949).
30. 144 So.2d 813 (Fla. 1962).
31. Id. at 817. See also Van Pelt v. Hilliard, 78 So. 693 (Fla. 1918); City of Indian
Harbour Beach v. City of Melbourne, 265 So.2d 422 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972).
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The Florida Supreme Court has enunciated its interpretation of the
legislative intent embodied within the mediation panel provisions inso-
far as the. main issue in Herrera is concerned, by stating in Carter v.
Sparkman2 that: "[T]he statutes involved here deal with matters re-
lated directly to public health and obviously have for their purpose an
effort to have the parties mediate claims for malpractice thereby reduc-
ing the cost of medical malpractice insurance and ultimately medical
expenses."' 3
Similar language reaching to legislative intent and public policy is
contained within Justice England's concurring opinion where he writes
"[iut troubles me that persons who seek to bring malpractice lawsuits
might be put to the expense of two full trials on their claim . ...
To require the claimant to come forward with probative evidence
in support of his claim fosters the clear legislative intent, and such
interpretation of the statutory phrase "submit such claim" prevents this
Act from becoming meaningless. Since claimants in Herrera did not
submit such claim, but simply filed the claim within the meaning of
subsection (1) (b) of the statute, they failed to meet the jurisdictional
prerequisite and, accordingly, the circuit court was unable to try the
claim since jurisdiction to do so was lacking. Hence, it is this writer's
belief that the trial court was correct in dismissing the cause.
32. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So.2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, - U.S.
97 S. Ct. 740 (1977) upheld the constitutionality of the medical mediation statute. In
so doing, the court stated;
Although courts are generally opposed to any burden being placed on the rights
of aggrieved persons to enter the courts because of the constitutional guarantee
of access, there may be reasonable restrictions prescribed by law. Typical exam-
ples are the fixing of a time within which suit must be brought, payment of reason-
able cost deposits, pursuit of certain administrative relief such as zoning matters
or workmen's compensation claims, or the requirement that newspapers be given
the right of retraction before an action for libel may be filed.
Cases are legend which hold that the police power of the state is available in
the area of public health and welfare, and we must, therefore, consider matters
pursued under the law sub judice as being separate and distinct from those gener-
ally flowing from the marketplace. At the time of enactment of the legislation in
question sub judice, there was an imminent danger that a drastic curtailment in
the availability of health care services would occur in this state. The Legislature's
recognition of the crisis in the area of medical care and the need for legislation
for the benefit of public health in this state is evidenced by the Preamble . . ..
Id. at 805.
33. Id. at 806.
34. Id. at 807.
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The Third District Court of Appeal failed to consider, when render-
ing its opinion, that it was an uncontroverted fact and admission that
the Herreras deliberately circumvented the Medical Mediation Act.
Dismissal of their complaint was justified since it is clearly provided for
by rule and case law. Such deliberate tactics fall within the spirit of Rule
1.420(6) Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides, in part, that:
Any party may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against
him for failure of any adverse party to comply with these rules or any
order of court. . . . unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not pro-
vided for in this rule, . . . operates as an adjudication on the merits."
Even apart from the aforementioned Rules, the courts have the
inherent power to impose the sanction of dismissal with prejudice for
failure to comply with their orders. In Surrency v. Winn and Lovett
Grocery Co.," The Florida Supreme Court stated:
When a plaintiff invokes the jurisdiction of a Court and seeks to avail
himself of it he does so with the understanding that he must abide by all
lawful statutes, rules and order applicable to him, and the Court has
inherent power to impose the sanction of dismissal, for its coercive effect.
(Citations ommitted)37
The question which then arises, and which was advanced by the
Herreras on appeal, is what quantum of proof is required to be pre-
sented by a claimant at the mediation hearing. This argument had noth-
ing to do with the order of dismissal in the trial court since the issue
before that court was whether uncontroverted subversion of the law and
total failure to mediate justified dismissal of the circuit court complaint.
The claimants ignored the statute by refusing to present any evidence
and by refusing to submit the merits of their claim to mediation. The
claimants failed to present any evidence and the court felt that some was
required-that a good faith effort had to be made to comply with the
law.
What then is the burden of proof in any medical malpractice case,
despite the forum where it is litigated? Section 768.45, Florida Statutes
states:
35. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b).
36. 34 So.2d 564 (Fla. 1948).
37. Id. at 565.
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[Tihe claimant shall have the same burden of proving by the greater
weight of evidence that the alleged actions of the health care provider
represented a breach of the accepted standard of care for that health care
provider. The accepted standard of care for a given health care provider
shall be that level of care, skill, and treatment which is recognized by a
reasonably prudent similar health care provider as being acceptable under
similar conditions and circumstances. 8
This statutory enactment simply codified the Florida common law on
this subject. The cases in Florida are legend in number which hold that
the plaintiff may not recover against a defendant in a malpractice action
in the absence of proof of the following elements: Standard of care,
breach of standard of care or duty, proximate cause and damages or
injuries. In Hunt v. Gerber,39 the court stated that in the absence of a
showing of what the standard of care is, and coupled with the absence
of showing that the hospital's actions were a departure from the ac-
cepted standards of care, and that such departure was the proximate
cause of the injury sustained by the plaintiff, it would not submit the
case to a jury, for to do so would be granting a jury a license to speculate
as to what caused the injury in the particular case.4" Actions of medical
malpractice cannot be grounded on speculation.4"
Because case law requires that the standard of care and breaches
of it, as well as proximate causation, be established by the plaintiff,
Florida case law has also required that such must be proven by expert
testimony. The leading Florida case on the subject is O'Grady v.
Wickman.4" In O'Grady, the court held that expert testimony is required
to ascertain the skills and means that are recognized as necessary and
customarily followed in the particular community.43 There is, of course,
one exception to the rule requiring expert testimony, and that is where
the duty and its breach are so obvious as to be apparent to persons of
common experience."
38. §768.45 FLA. STAT. (1977).
39. 166 So.2d 720 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1964).
40. Id. at 722.
41. See Blackwell v. Southern Florida Sanitarium and Hospital Corp., 174 So.2d
45 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1965); Barber v. North Shore Hospital, Inc., 145 So.2d 760 (Fla. 3rd
DCA 1962); Memorial Hosp., South Broward Hosp. District v. Doring, 106 So.2d 565
(Fla. 2nd DCA 1958), for similar statements of the law.
42. 213 So.2d 321 (Fla. 4th DCA 1968).
43. Id. at 324.
44. The discovery of the presence of a foreign body, such as a sponge, clamp,
forceps, surgical needle, or other paraphernalia, commonly used in diagnosing and
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There was a simple, direct method of dealing with the crisis in
health care services existing not only in this state but throughout the
United States, to-wit: express legislative and fundamental reforms. The
trial court, in dismissing the Herreras' complaint, construed the statute
in accordance with the legislative intent. More particularly, it examined
the language of the statute, the subject sought to be regulated, the
purpose to be accomplished, and the means adopted for accomplishing
the purpose. 5 The district court failed to recognize the intended purpose
of the legislation enacted to deal with the malpractice crisis. Adoption
of its opinion and of the Herreras' "deliberate attempt to circumvent
and evade the provisions of the Act" will reduce the medical mediation
hearing to little more than a judicially supervised social hour and will
destroy any useful purpose intended for mediation panels. If the claim-
ant fails to present testimony then the intent and purpose of the Act,
i.e., to screen out nonmeritorious claims and encourage settlement of
meritorious claims, will never be accomplished because a hearing on the
merits will not be held. Hence, the method for evaluating the claim is
rendered useless and the mediation process will only result in an enor-
mous waste of extremely valuable judicial time and labor."
treating a patient, is prima facie evidence of negligence. Amputation of the wrong
extremity or removal of the wrong tooth or organ are other cases falling within this
exception.
45. See, e.g, Deltona Corp. v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm., 220 So.2d 905 (Fla.
1969).
46. The Florida Supreme Court, in an opinion filed December 21, 1978, affirmed
the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal and held that it is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite to the bringing of a medical malpractice lawsuit that the plaintiff present
evidence at the mediation hearing but only that the plaintiff submits the claim to
mediation. I Fla. L. W. 17 (January 1, 1979).
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Legislative Overview: Florida Automobile
Reparations Act, 1972-1978: A Review of the
Modifications in the Tort Threshold
THE HONORABLE TERENCE T. O'MALLEY*
The "Automobile Reparations Reform Act"' became law on January
1, 1972. Florida became the second state2 to adopt a pure no-fault3
automobile insurance law. The adoption of no-fault in Florida was a
response by the Legislature to rising public pressure and outcry reflect-
ing frustration with Florida's existing automobile insurance rates. The
1970 campaign for Insurance Commissioner pitted a no-fault propo-
nent, Thomas D. O'Malley, against the incumbent Insurance Commis-
sioner, Broward Williams, a supporter of the existing system of auto
insurance in Florida.4
The potential for insurance rate relief promised by no-fault advo-
cates, including Commissioner-Elect O'Malley,5 resulted in the 1972
Act. To assure at least an initial rate reduction, the Legislature included
* Elected to Florida House of Representatives November, 1976; Member of House
Commerce Committee; Chairman of Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Auto Insurance Rates
of House Commerce Committee; Member of Subcommittee on Insurance of House
Commerce Committee; Member of Subcommittee on Hospitalization Insurance of
House Commerce Committee; Member of Firestone Commission on Auto Insurance
Rates, 1977 (Chairman of Joint Underwriting Association Committee of Firestone
Commission); Member of Joint Legislative Committee on Workmen's Compensation
Insurance.
I. FLA. STAT. §§627.730-.741 (1971).
2. Massachusetts adopted a no-fault law in 1970. A. WIDISS, J. LIrLE, R.
CLARK, T. JONES, NO-FAULT AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE IN ACTION at 8 (1977).
3. A pure no-fault system contains these essential elements:
(1) no-fault coverage is compulsory by statute,
(2) or alteration and partial elimination of tort liability,
(3) a system of first party insurance was substituted for the eliminated portion
of the tort liability.
4. Until the adoption of no-fault in Florida, insurance was not compulsory. Flor-
ida operated under a financial responsibility law which required insurance or other proof
of financial responsibility after any accident.
5. See O'Malley, Is No-Fault Insurance Best for Florida, 45 FLA. B. J. 187
(1971).
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in the 1972 Act a mandatory 15% reduction in liability rates, reflecting
its expectation of a reduction in third-party lawsuits. This discussion will
examine the original intent of the Legislature, the expectations of the
Legislature in adopting no-fault and the modifications of the 1972 Act
reflecting the legislative and public frustration with the failure of the
original statute to provide all that was promised at the time it was first
proposed. This article will not include any discussion of the attempt by
the Legislature to apply the no-fault concept to the property damage
insurance coverage. Although the 1972 Act included such a provision,
the Legislature never attempted to correct the deficiencies cited by the
Florida Supreme Court in its decision in Kluger v. White,' in which the
no-fault property section was stricken.
In Lasky v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company,7 the court
addressed for the first time the constitutionality of partially eliminating
tort actions in Florida. The concept of no-fault is the limitation of the
right to recover in tort for certain damages offset by the benefit of
recovery for certain damages from one's own first party insurer without
the requirement of establishing fault. In its decision, the court consid-
ered the threshold8 and found a portion of that threshold deficient.9
6. 281 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
7. 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
8. The threshold is the barrier as to the type of injury or amount of medical
expenses before an action in tort is allowed.
In any action of tort brought against the owner, registrant, operator or occupant
of a motor vehicle with respect to which security has been provided as required
• . . or against any person or organization legally responsible for his acts or
omissions, a plaintiff may recover damages in tort for pain, suffering, mental
anguish, and inconvenience because of bodily injury, sickness, or disease arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, operation or use of such motor vehicle only
in the event that the benefits which are payable for such injury . . . or which
would be payable but for any exclusion deductible . . . exceeded one thousand
dollars or the injury or disease consists in whole or in part of permanent disfigure-
ment, a fracture to a weight-bearing bone, a compound comminuted, displaced
or compressed fracture, loss of a body member, permanent injury within reasona-
ble medical probability, permanent loss of a bodily function, or death. Any person
who is entitled to receive free medical and surgical benefits shall be deemed in
compliance with the requirements of this section upon a showing that the medical
treatment received has an equivalent value of at least one thousand dollars. Any
person receiving ordinary and necessary services normally performed by a nurse
from a relative or a member of his household shall be entitled to include the
reasonable value of such services in meeting the requirements of this subsection.
FLA. STAT. ANN. §627.737(2) (1974).
9. In Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1974), the Florida Supreme
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Appellants had asserted that the tort threshold in the new no-fault
law had violated appellants' right of access to the courts and to trial by
jury, denying them due process and equal protection of the law. In
considering this question, the court found:
[Insurance coverage as to the personal injury benefits provided by the
no-fault insurance law is compulsory . . . . [Al1 right of recovery is not
denied, but only recovery for particular intangible elements of damage
in a few situations; there is no immunity from tort liability for tangible
damages resulting from injury except where the benefits provided in F.S.
§627.736 are payable to the injured party by his insurer or would be so
payable but for an authorized deduction or exclusion. Thus the injured
party will receive such benefits as payment of his medical expenses and
compensation for any loss of income and loss of earning capacity under
the insurance policy he is required by law to maintain, up to applicable
policy limits, and may bring suit to recover such of these damages as are
in excess of his applicable policy limits."
The court did, however, uphold the severability of the stricken portion
and found the remainder of the statute complete in itself and capable
of being executed in accordance with the original legislative intent.
Following Lasky, the Florida Automobile Reparations Reform
Act remained intact until the 1976 Legislature. In the four years tht
had passed since its original adoption, automobile insurance rates had
started to climb despite the initial reduction mandated by the 1972 law
and a further 197.3 reduction ordered by the Insurance Commissioner
after a review of company experience under the law. During the first
year of no-fault, because of the $1,000 threshold, a substantial reduction
in the number of third-party lawsuits filed had occurred." Gradually,
the number of lawsuits stabilized and then began to climb once again,
reflecting both the inflation of medical costs causing the $1,000 thresh-
old to be pierced, and the practice of "building" of claims for the sole
purpose of piercing the $1,000 threshold so a tort action could be filed.
In 1976, in response to the apparent targeting of the $1,000 amount,
Court invalidated all thresholds except $1,000 medical expenses, death, and permanent
injury, finding the other injury thresholds arbitrary and unreasonable, and thus denying
equal protection.
10. Id. at 14.
!1. For a detailed study of litigation trends after the adoption of no-fault in
Florida, see Little, No-Fault Auto Reparation in Florida, 9 U. MICH. J. LAw REFORM
1 (1975) reprinted in A. WIDIss, J. LITTLE, R. CLARK, T. JONES, No-FAULT AUTOMO-
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the Legislature replaced the monetary threshold with a verbal threshold
which allowed recovery in tort only if the injury or disease consisted in
whole or in part in:
(a) Loss of a body member.
(b) Permanent loss of a bodily function.
(c) Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical probability
other than scarring or disfigurement.
(d) Significant permanent scarring or disfigurement.
(e) A serious non-permanent injury which has a material degree of
bearing on the injured person's ability to resume his normal activity and
life-style during all or substantially all of the ninety day period after the
occurrence of the injury, and the effects of which are medically or scientif-
ically demonstrated at the end of such period.
(f) Death.12
Almost immediately the 1976 Act came under fire. The public was
frustrated by the continuing escalation of auto insurance rates. Even
though it might have been reasonable to assume that there would be a
time lag between a legislative modification of the law and an actual
reduction in rates, the public outcry was for immediate relief. As a
result, the 1977 Legislative Session was inundated with a myriad of
proposals for auto insurance reform. The most far-reaching proposal
was that of Insurance Commissioner Bill Gunter.13 Commissioner
Gunter's proposal was rejected by the 1977 Legislature, but it served as
the catalyst for the changes made in the tort threshold in the 1978
Session. The Commissioner proposed the complete abolition of the right
to recover in tort for "speculative"14 or non-economic damages. His
proposal included a plan for insurance companies to offer an optional
first party coverage to those who wished to have the ability to recover
for non-economic losses.
The 1977 Legislative Session adjourned without acting on the Gun-
ter Proposal. Hence, the Commissioner sought to pursue his plan via
the initiative process and wrote a proposed constitutional amendment
12. FLA. STAT. §627.737(2) (1977).
13. FLORIDA DEP'T. OF INSURANCE, A SOLUTION TO THE AUTOMOBILE INSUR-
ANCE CRISIS (1977).
14. "Speculative" damages were defined by Gunter as those which have no dollar
value. The damages to be eliminated were identical to those included as elements in
personal injury and property damages in Florida Standard Jury Instructions 6.2: injury,
pain, disability, disfigurement, and loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life.
186
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
Florida Automobile Insurance Reform
1 3:1979
to be placed upon the ballot in November of 1978. The Floridians for
Auto Insurance Relief Amendment was to be an addition to Article X
of the Florida Constitution and provided:
Limitation of damages-motor vehicle accidents-
(a) Damages recoverable by any person in a civil suit against the
owner or operator of a motor vehicle for injuries resulting from a motor
vehicle accident shall be limited to the following:
(1) Medical expenses, past and future;
(2) Lost earnings and lost earning capacity;
(3) Funeral, burial or cremation expenses;
(4) Property damage;
(5) Out of pocket expenses; and
(6) Punitive damages where the owner or operator of a motor
vehicle is found to have caused injury to another by willful or wan-
ton misconduct or a reckless indifference to the rights of others.
While the controversy raged over the proposed constitutional
amendment, some 300,000 Floridians signed the petitions to place this
item on the 1978 General Election Ballot. The Legislature, led by Sena-
tor Dempsey Barron, readdressed the tort threshold issue and attempted
to provide a compromise reform bill that would be sufficiently accepta-
ble to Commissioner Gunter to cause him to abandon his efforts to
enact the Floridians for Auto Insurance Relief Amendment by the initi-
ative process. The result, Senate Bill 1308, represented the latest modifi-
cation of the tort threshold and became effective on January 1, 1979.
The newly revised tort exemption in Section 627.727(2) permits
recovery in tort only in the event that the injury consists in whole or in
part of:
(a) 44 Significant and permanent loss of an important bodily function.
(b) -e)- Permanent injury within a reasonable degree of medical proba-
bility, other than scarring or disfigurement.
(c) * Significant and permanent scarring or disfigurement.
-(-- (Struck in entirety)
(d) - Death.
The revised law eliminates the right to recover for nonpermanent
injuries by striking the language added in 1976, and offsets the elimina-
tion of that right with an increase from $5,000 to $10,000 in the required
mandatory personal injury protection. The 1978 changes leave Florida
with one of the strongest tort restrictions in the nation. Even before the
effective date of the law, constitutional attacks loomed on the horizon.
83 1
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CONCLUSION
From 1972 to 1978 the tort restrictions evolved from a dollar
threshold with the ability to recover for nonpermanent injury upon
exceeding that $1,000 threshold to a total abolition of the right to re-
cover in tort for any nonpermanent injury.
What may we expect from future Legislatures in relation to the tort
threshold? If the constitutional challenges are withstood, it is unlikely
that the tort threshold will be modified or altered at any time in the near
future. The Legislature has modified that threshold three times in six
years and evidences a reluctance to further restrict the right to a tort
action. Further, it has been the position of a substantial number of
Legislators, as well as the Insurance Commissioner, that Florida's auto-
mobile insurance climate is improving, that much of that improvement
is a reflection of the changes that have occurred, and that further
changes of a substantial nature should be postponed until there is clear
statistical data from the insurance companies on which to base any
additional changes.
A review of the legislative debate"5 surrounding the initial adoption
of the no-fault concept in Florida confirms that the intent"6 in adopting
no-fault revolved around a desire to:
(1) Reduce insurance premiums;
(2) Reduce litigation (and its attendant costs to the insurance system);
(3) Reduce the delay in providing relief to injured parties; 7
(4) Elimination of overcompensation of minor injuries and under-
compensation of serious injuries."8
15. See, e.g., Fla. H.R. Jour. 599-605 (May 19, 1971).
16. Little, supra note I.
17. Id.
MEDIAN ELAPSED TIME IN DAYS BETWEEN THE DATE AN ACCIDENT
CLAIM WAS FILED AND THE DATE FIRST PAYMENT WAS MADE-
FLORIDA
Type of Claim 1971 1972 1973
First 37.3 25.3 29.1
Third Party 83.5 102.5 136.5
18. Reporting on a six year study conducted by the Department of Transporta-
tion, Brock Adams, Secretary of Transportation, stated:
The existing system unfairly overcompensated the small accident victim and inad-
equately compensated or did not compensate at all the major accident victim.
Where out-of-pocket victim losses were under $500, victims recovered an average
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Florida Automobile Insurance Reform
These concerns continue to be foremost in the minds of Legislators. If,
however, the Legislature is reluctant to further alter the tort threshold
and the insurance rate climate does not stabilize or decline, it is my
opinion that the legislative direction will next occur in the following
areas:
(1) Changes in the classification system which would eliminate
age, sex, and marital status as a basis for determining insurance pre-
miums and replace them with some sort of merit-rating proposal based
upon use of car, driving experience, and/or driving record.
(2) Elimination or modification of territorial ratings.
(3) Restructuring of surcharge system for accidents and moving
violations.
(4) Statewide charge for company expenses replacing percentage
of premium currently employed for such charges.
Many of these alternatives are currently being evaluated both in
Legislative Committees and by the Department of Insurance. The allo-
cation of company expenses referred to in (4) above has been mandated
by a recent order of the Insurance Commissioner.9 All four alternatives
have the potential of reducing rates for some drivers by shifting the
premium burden to other drivers. The real dilemma and challenge fac-
ing future Legislatures will be to ascertain which premium burdens may
be shifted from one sector or group to another without causing an
inequitable result.
of four and a half times their economic losses. Where losses were $25,000 or more,
even successful tort claimants averaged a net recovery of only about one-third of
their out-of-pocket loss.
Standards for No-Fault Motor Vehicle Accident Benefits Act: Hearings on S.1381
Before the'Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(July 15, 1977).
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Copyright, Fair Use and Photocopying:
A Stone Conundrum*
"Copyright admits of philosophic thinking more than most other parts
of the law."' While it is universally recognized that copyright is open
to the objection that it burdens both competitiors and the public, the
monopoly is permitted and encouraged by the law for the public advan-
tage it serves. By protecting the property rights of the author in his
work, copyright attempts to assure that the public may enjoy the bene-
fits of a continuing supply of creative works. Constant attention must
be paid and adjustments made to the copyright law to assure that the
burdens of such protection do not outweigh the benefits. The broad and
as yet inadequately defined "fair use" doctrine2 has increasingly been
relied upon when considering the proper scope of the monopoly in any
particular case. Due to the pervasiveness of philosophical uncertainties,
the fair use doctrine has proven a difficult and ponderous area of copy-
right law. It has on occasion been confused with issues of initial infringe-
ment and damages.
I suggest that the fair use doctrine might better be understood after
analysis of several related and more fundamental issues. Does the Con-
stitution mandate a fair use doctrine, or, may fair use more helpfully
be characterized as a defense which would arise after an initial determi-
nation of infringement? If a defense, some cases may turn on more
palatable issues such as when a work is deemed "copied" or when works
in question are "substantially similar." This article shall also explore the
impact of reprography3 on the quantity and quality of information
* This article, in somewhat different form, has been entered in the 24th annual
Nathan Burkan Memorial Writing Competition.
I. Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I (pt. 1), 45 COLUM. L. REV.
503 (1945).
2. The most widely accepted definition is that "fair use" is a "privilege in others
than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner
without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner. . . ." BALL,
COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944). The fair use doctrine now appears at
§107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976)(to be
codified as 17 U.S.C. §§101-810) [hereinafter cited as New Act]. This Act became
effective on January 1, 1978.
3. "The reproduction of graphic material especially by electronic means."
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available. Further, thoughts and perspectives are offered on the relation-
ship of educational and library photocopying to fair use. Lastly, sections
107 and 108 of the new Copyright Act' are examined in light of the
legislative history5 as they relate to photocopying.
1. FAIR USE: QUESTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
"The Congress shall have Power. . . To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies."' It has been said that the constitutional statement of purpose was
intended by the framers as a preamble to the grant of congressional
power and not as a limitation of its exercise.7 This view is supported by
the fact that the power of Congress to grant copyright has not been
confined to those works which actually and undeniably promote the
progress of science and the useful arts.' This broad power of Congress
to grant copyright does not, however, necessarily aid in defining the
scope of power granted in any particular case. For, if the statement of
purpose is construed as a limitation on the exclusivity of the rights
granted by Congress, is this not a constitutional mandate for the fair
use doctrine?
This issue encompasses any discussion of the two basic directives
within the Copyright Clause: that the rights granted be for "limited
times"' and that the rights of the author be "exclusive." The Constitu-
BARNHART DICTIONARY OF NEW ENGLISH SINCE 1963 at 402 (1st ed. 1973).
4. New Act, supra note 2.
5. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT] reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659; S. REP. No. 473,
94th Cong. 1st Sess. 47 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT1, Conf. Rep.
H.R. REP. No. 1733, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 65 [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE
REPORT], reprinted in [19761 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5810.
6. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8.
7. 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 [A], at 1-30 (1978).
8. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903), where the
Court per Holmes, J. found a circus poster a suitable subject for copyright, and there-
fore within the constitutional statement of purpose. The arguable utility of this litho-
graph poster in the promotion of the useful arts is evidenced by the dissenting opinion
per Harlan, J.: "A mere advertisement. . . would not be promotive of the useful arts,
within the meaning of the constitutional provision . . . ." Id. at 252.
9. The following discussion of "exclusivity" may be applied by analogy to this
constitutional limitation on the duration of the copyright, a specific discussion of which
is not within the scope of this writing. See New Act, supra note 2, at §§302-05.
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tion, be it for better or worse, does not provide guidance as to the
balancing which must inevitably and constantly be performed in deter-
mining that degree of "exclusivity" which will best promote the progress
of science and useful arts. It may be this "balancing" which is both the
initial and ultimate dilemma in copyright law, that which has caused
copyright to be called the ultimate jurisprudential area of the law."
Although it has been argued that there exists a constitutional mandate
that any copyright provided by Congress be exclusive," the survival of
compulsory licensing, statutory recognition of fair use and limitations
on the right found generally at 17 U.S.C. §§107-18 are evidence of the
current reality that a copyright, at least in the final analysis, is some-
thing less than an exclusive right. 12
Regardless of a court's final determination of the degree of exclu-
sivity of the right in any particular case, it would seem helpful to a
logical consideration of all of the issues to isolate as much as possible
issues of constitutional limitations on the right. Such isolation of the
issues could prove especially helpful where questions of "fair use" arise.
The scope and limits of the doctrine have evaded definition for so long
that the entire fair use issue is widely recognized as "the most trouble-
some in the whole law of copyright."' 3 Judicial considerations of the
fairness of the complained of use should be confined to situations in
which it is properly raised as a defense:" that is, after plaintiff's state-
10. Complete vindication of the creator's economic interest would logically re-
quire that the statutory monopoly be absolute. Likewise, the logic of full vindica-
tion of the immediate public interest in free access would require that no statutory
monopoly at all be permitted. The copyright statute reflects a reasoned compro-
mise between these competing interests.
Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 983, 1006 (1970)
(emphasis added). See generally Chafee, supra note 1.
!1. See testimony of Nathan Burkan, Esq. before a congressional committee,
Hearings on S. 2328 and H.R. 10353, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 31-32 (1926); WEIL, AMERI-
CAN COPYRIGHT LAW 62-63 (1917): "[I]f it [Congress] determines to legislate, it may
[not] give more, or less, than the only thing it is empowered to give, viz: an exclusive
right."
12. See, e.g., Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529-30
(1972) wherein the Court upheld the rule enunciated in the leading case of Radio Corp.
of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1935) (restricting rights of patentees in
combination patents) despite plaintiff's argument that the Constitutional mandate of
Article I, section 8 was not properly reflected in the prevailing law.
13. Dellar v. Samual Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05, at 13-48 (1978).
14. Dellar v. Samual Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). In finding
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ment of his prima facie case. This would seem an appropriate and
prudent time for the courts to practice some judicial parsimony, thereby
forcing, if at all possible, a reduction of the fair use issue to its most
fundamental elements. Assuming the work in question is both copy-
rightable and properly copyrighted, the fair use issue may disentangle
into less complex although similarly difficult issues. Opponents of such
limited application of the fair use doctrine may be found eager to point
out that first amendment considerations would take precedence over the
statutory copyright privilege, and that an appeal of a constitutionally
based fair use defense should prove successful as a first amendment non-
infringing use. Supreme Court consideration and discussion of this ripe
and thorny issue could only prove helpful.
Perhaps there may never be a final resolution of the seeming con-
flict between Article I, section 8 and the freedom of speech and press
provided by the first amendment, but an airing of the countervailing
considerations is becoming overdue.15 The advocates of greater public
access and a constitutionally grounded fair use doctrine would be quick
to remind the court that precedent exists for such a belated finding of
constitutional mandate. 6 Defenders of the exclusive monopoly of the
copyright holder would no doubt argue that the policy of public access
is best served in the long run not by narrowing the scope of copyright
but by assuring a continued flow of creative information by maintaining
that the Southern District Court of New York had prematurely decided the case on the
fair use issue to the prejudice of plaintiffs, the per curiam opinion of Circuit Court
Judges L. Hand, Augustus N. Hand and Patterson counseled the district courts:
We doubt the convenience of dividing the trial in this way: the issue of fair use,
which alone is decided, is the most troublesome in the whole law of copyright,
and ought not to be resolved in cases where it may turn out to be moot, unless
the advantage is very plain. At least we should regret seeing the procedure become
the custom, as it is apparently tending to become in the Southern District of New
York.
But cf. Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 50
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 790, 804 (1975), where Mr. Rosenfield maintains that first
amendment constitutional considerations demand that fair use be something more than
an affirmative defense.
15. Sobel, Copyright and the First Amendment: A Gathering Storm? 19 ASCAP
COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 43, 44 (1971).
16. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970), the majority found a constitu-
tional mandate for a criminal suspect to have the opportunity to have counsel present
at a preliminary hearing. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger characterizes
this discovery, made some two centuries after the writing of the Constitution, as "an
odd business."
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the incentives of publication and dissemination. This position is essen-
tially Goldstein's "second accommodative principle"1 7 which differs
from the "first accommodative principle" (identifying the accused in-
fringer with the short range public interest) in that "it identifies the
copyright owner with the long range public interest in the promotion of
expression.""'
Regardless of the final determination on the fair use issue in any
particular case, such an orderly presentation of the issues may find the
fair use issue narrowed to one less enigmatic than one of constitutional
conflict. The question of what constitutes "a copy," 1' 9 or "copies," is
one which is inextricably intertwined in the initial question of infringe-
ment in all cases yet calls to question the fairness of the use in but a
limited number of situations. That "copying" is an essential element of
plaintiff's prima facie case is undisputed.21 Further, it is generally recog-
nized that this burden is met by a showing that defendant had "access"
to the copyrighted work and that the allegedly infringing work is
"substantially similar" to the plaintiff's copyrighted work32 In cases of
reprographic infringement, proof of access poses little problem to plain-
tiff, if indeed the court is not willing to find the access conclusively
shown by the photocopy itself. One might also conclude that reprogra-
phy cases also render the element of substantial similarity moot, though
this would be to ignore the helpful distinction drawn by Professor Nim-
mer between "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" and "fragmented
literal similarity."
It is "fragmented literal similarity" which may form a defense
17. Goldstein, supra note 10, at 988.
18. Id. at 1015.
19. Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §1 (1976)(substantially revised by New Act,
supra note 2).
20. New Act, supra note 2, at §106. The use of the plural "copies" in the New
Act does not thereby sanction singular copying, but appears to be merely a grammatical
difference from the 1909 Act. Both the House and Senate Committee Reports contain
the same explanatory sentence: "The references to 'copies or phonorecords,' although
in the plural, are intended here and throughout the bill to include the singular." HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 61; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 58.
21. 2 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §§8.01, 13.01, 13.03 (1978).
22. Sid & Marty Kroft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonalds Corp., 562
F.2d 1157 (C.A. Cal. 1977); Musto v. Meyer, 434 F. Supp. 32 (D.C.N.Y. 1977); 3 M.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.01 [B], at 13-6 (1978).
23. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03 [A], at 13-16 (1978); see also
L. Hand's discussion of these concepts in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d
119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930).
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prior to an initial finding of infringement in reprography cases.24 How
much literal borrowing of a copyrighted work is "substantial" within
the "substantial similarity" element of plaintiff's prima facie case?
Where reprography is the alleged infringement, an answer to this ques-
tion may prove as difficult of determination as convincing a court to
consider the question as part of the prima facie case. In United States
v. Taxe,2 a criminal prosecution under the Copyright Act of 1909, the
testimony of defendant Taxe conclusively showed that the complained
of infringement was the result of re-recording or pirating phonorecords
some of whiph were copyrighted post-1972. Although acknowledging
that substantial similarity must be found prior to a finding of infringe-
ment, the district court unreasonably deduced that any re-recording is
of necessity substantially similar to the initial recording and therefore
found that no substantial similarity need be shown where re-recording
is evident.26 Professor Nimmer points out that the question of substan-
tial similarity necessarily involves a consideration of defendant's use of
the copyrighted work (its importance to or the extent to which it forms
the kernel of the defendant's work), but also emphasizes that this
should not be confused with factors determinative of the separate issue
of "fair use." z It is helpful to an understanding of this puzzle to remain
aware that the substantial similarity issue goes to the initial question
of infringement: that is, has a protectible portion of plaintiff's work
been misappropriated? Has the protected work been "reproduced"
within 17 U.S.C. §106(1) or should the defendant's appropriation come
under the legal maxim of de minimis non curat lex? Any such finding
must, of course, be made after examining the extent of the alleged
infringement both quantitatively and qualitatively from the plaintiff's
24. United States v. Taxe, 380 F. Supp. 1010 (C.D. Cal. 1974) affd, 540 F.2d
961 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1040 (1977), although a case involving
infringement of phonorecords by re-recording, invites comparison to cases of alleged
photocopy infringement due to potential likeness of "fragmented literal similarity"
issues and facts.
25. Id.
26. This confusion of "access" with "substantial similarity" and thus of copying
with infringement did not, however, result in prejudice to defendants. As eloquently
expressed on appeal by Circuit Court Judge Goodwin:
We believe the instruction went beyond the law insofar as it purported to charac-
terize any and all re-recordings as infringements, but the subsequent inclusion of
a comparison test permitted the jury to consider "substantial similarity" and
cured any error in the earlier part of the instruction.
United States v. Taxe, 540 F.2d 961, 965 (9th Cir. 1976).
27. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.03[A][21, at 13-28 (1978).
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perspective. That is, the analysis must be the amount of the work taken
and its significance not to defendant's work, but to the appropriated
work as a whole.2
The question of whether personal and private use of copyrighted
works is within the scope of the Copyright Act and thus subject to its
restrictions is one which has yet to be dealt with by the courts. However,
as early as 1960, Mr. Latman foresaw that "the increasing use of photo-
duplication processes will undoubtedly require continuing attention to
this area."'" This question is of course linked to the seeming conflict
betw'een the first amendment and the Copyright Clause, 0 and may be
avoided by application of the fair use doctrine. Given such an approach,
it is likely that any private use by photocopying, short of
"publication,"3 would be found "fair" by use of the now statutory
factors test. It is perhaps this likelihood which has led at least one
commentator to conclude that "anyone may copy copyrighted materials
for the purposes of private study and review."32 If this is a safe conclu-
sion, what then is the significance of the "single copying for teachers"
guidelines within the House Report?3
Does not the Conference Committee's acceptance of the House
version of section 107 (1) (which includes consideration of the non-profit
educational purpose of the use), when coupled with the restricted list of
permissible single copying for teachers imply that even single copying
by the lay public is at least an initial technical infringement? Further,
what of the specific statement in both House and Senate Reports that
references to "copies" are intended to include the singular?3'
In the past, fair use was said to be grounded, inter alia, in the
implied consent of the copyright proprietor. This theory seems much
28. Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943).
A comparison of the factors therein with those of the New Act, supra note 2, at §107,
may indicate just how settled the understanding of this distinction is.
29. A. LATMAN, FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, STUDY No. 14 (1958)
prepared for the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks and Copyrights, Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1960).
30. See text accompanying notes 6 through 14 supra.
31. "'Publication' is the distribution of copies or phonorecords of a work to the
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending." New Act,
supra note 2, at §101.
32. Cohen, Fair Use in the Law of Copyright, 6 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP.
43, 58 (1955).
33. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
34. See notes 19 through 20 and accompanying text supra.
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less fictional when applied to the determination of what constitutes a
copy, more specifically whether the copying is so substantial as to be
"substantially similar." The implied consent fiction has largely been
replaced by factors which are presently determinative of the fairness of
the use. A further reason for abandonment of this basis for the doctrine
is that its logical extension may have led to the situation where, by
affixing copyright notice on every page, the proprietor could prevent any
quotation at all.35
On the other hand, there are publishers who are not adverse to
scholarly and educational copying of their copyrighted works and who
will consent to copying beyond that allowed by the 1976 Act and the
fair use doctrine. A draft report released in March 1978 by the National
Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU) 8 recommended several procedural steps and notice state-
ments which might clearly communicate such nonpossessory attitudes,
presumably without giving away what may effectively be the whole
copyright.37 There clearly should be no legal obstacle to such a practice
as long as the express grant of authority is equal to or extends that
already provided by the Copyright Act generally and the fair use doc-
trine specifically. Such a copyright holder should take care that the
wording of such notice is neither too broad nor too narrow. As an
example of a notice statement which is arguably too narrow, consider
the following, which was presented in memorandum form by the Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools [hereinafter referred to as AALS]:
Except as otherwise expressly provided, the author of each article in
this volume has granted permission for copies of that article to be made
for classroom use in a nationally accredited law school, provided that
1) copies are distributed at or below cost, 2) author and journal are iden-
tified and 3) proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.38
The legal effect of such a statement is, granted, merely an assurance that
if the conditions are complied with the user has a license to copy and
35. If the basis for fair use is implied consent, a statement by the author explicitly
removing any doubt as to his non-consent, such as ANY & ALL REPRODUCTION
IS PROHIBITED, would effectively destroy fair use and would soon frustrate constitu-
tional purposes behind the grant of a limited monopoly.
36. 371 PTCJ A-14 (March 23, 1978)(BNA).
37. Id. at A-19.
38. AALS Memorandum 78-25, Wayne McCormack, Associate Director, Asso-
ciation of American Law Schools, Washington D.C.
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need not rely upon section 107 fair use. However, when such a statement
is presented in conjunction with the legally mandated notice of copy-
right, does it not receive the imprimatur of legality thereby giving rise
to an inference that this is the extent of the rights/privileges provided
by law? Should such, albeit innocent, tampering with the public impres-
sion of legality be allowed when adherence to law is being frustrated by
the encouragement of indiscriminate photocopying? The recipients of
the same AALS memorandum were encouraged to include such a state-
ment in each issue of their law journals by the suggestion that feedback
as to the popularity of topics could be had for the asking merely by
including the added precondition to consent that notice be provided
prior to any copying.3 This goes too far."0 Regardless of one's position
as to the constitutional basis for the fair use doctrine, it is and should
remain a judicial rule of reason 1 unaffected either at law or in the
public's eye by unilateral statements of consent by the copyright holder.
It is perhaps illuminating that the "implied consent" fiction blos-
somed at a time when the state of the art was such that systematic
mechanical copying was simply not feasible for any but the few with
access to printing facilities. In later years, the mimeograph and other
stencil duplicators provided similar convenience to a wider population. 2
[Ilt is almost unanimously accepted that a scholar can make a handwrit-
ten copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use, and in the era
39. Id.
40. A more sensible, and again arguably more valid, notice statement appears in
an earlier AALS memorandum:
Except as otherwise expressly provided the author of each article in this volume
has granted permission for copies of that article to be made and used by non-
profit educational institutions provided that author and journal are identified and
that proper notice of copyright is affixed to each copy.
AALS Memorandum 78-13. For a similar statement already in use by the American
Library Association, see material cited in note 37 supra. Compare the more concise
notice appearing in Professor Treece's recent article:
A license is hereby granted to students, teachers, librarians and journal publishers
to reproduce copies of this article by any means, and to distribute copies of this
article to the public, provided that copies reproduced for distribution to the public
include a notice of copyright in the following form: "Copyright @ 1977 by
James Treece."
Treece, Library Photocopying, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1025 (1977).
41. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 65-68.
42. See I N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT-INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY-PUBLIC
POLICY, 28-31 (1975).
I
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before photoduplication it was not uncommon (and not seriously ques-
tioned) that he could have his secretary make a typed copy for his per-
sonal use and files.43
This statement was used by the narrow majority of the Court of Claims
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States" to further the proposition
that under the then governing 1909 Act, the word "copy" was not to be
given its ordinary meaning. Despite a rather strained argument by de-
fendant that the exclusive right to copy granted in section 1 of the 1909
Act should not apply to books and periodicals, the Court of Claims was
sufficiently c6nfused by the legislative history to abandon the basic tenet
of judicial construction that words be given their plain and literal mean-
ing.4" Chief Judge Cowen in his well reasoned dissent to the Williams
& Wilkins opinion found the meaning of "copy" apparent from the
wording of the 1909 Act and found it "not necessary to debate the
statutory history in light of the changes in the 1909 Act."
Although it is foreseeable that some photocopying cases may hinge
on the relatively narrow issue of "substantial similarity," it is probable,
at least in the foreseeable future, that the allegedly infringing photo-
copying will have been conducted on such a scale as to necessitate a
weighing of the statutory factors determinative of fair use. Any analysis
of the purpose and character of such wholesale photocopying would be
something less than intellectually honest if it were to view machine
copying as merely a substitute for hand copying and therefore fair use.,,
We live in a time when photocopies can be made in seconds and the
demand is apparently sufficient to warrant the placing of photocopiers
not only in most offices and libraries, but also in a growing number of
convenience stores. One dare not hypothesize, therefore, that hand cop-
ies would have been laboriously produced in any but an infinitesimal
proportion of the current photocopying explosion.
43. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1350 (Ct. Cl. 1973),
affd by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975).
44. 487 F.2d 1345.
45. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §46.01. For a good discussion
of policies behind what has become known as "the plain meaning rule," see ENDLICH,
THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, chapter 1 (1888).
46. 487 F.2d at 1365.
47. Id. at 1368.
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2. THE REPROGRAPHY EXPLOSION
In reprography cases, when weighing the decisive factors in an
effort to determine whether the use is fair, or whether "the value of the
original is sensibly diminished,"'8 one must bear in mind the cumulative
economic effect of the complained of photocopying. The temptation to
consider the copying in and of itself without any thought as to the
broader perspective and impact of such use upon the future market of
the copyright proprietor is strong. This is especially true where the use
itself is non-commercial and educational in nature. Such a myopic view
brushes under the carpet the effect of the reprography explosion on the
educational publishing industry.
That a reprography explosion exists is indisputable; only its size is
unknown. In 1962, the Fry Report, conducted for the National Science
Foundation, estimated that some 3.6 billion photocopies of both copy-
righted and uncopyrighted works were made annually." The president
of the Xerox Corporation reported in 1965 that roughly 9.5 billion
copies were produced in the United States in 1961.1 By 1967, this figure
had risen to 27.5 billion.5 1 The present annual total figure is unknown.
Also unknown is the number of photocopies made of copyrighted works.
It has, however, been estimated in a Dutch study that of the total
volume of photocopying about 5% contain copyrighted works. 2 This
percentage increases to 25% of all photocopying within educational in-
stitutions and to 65% of all library photocopying. 3 An American study
found that about 60% of library photocopying was of copyrighted
work." The same study found what is now generally recognized as true
in discussions of copyright and reprography: copies are made of periodi-
48. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 348, No. 4901 (C.C. Mass. 1841).
49. George Fry and Associates (1962) Survey ofCopyrightedMaterialReproduc-
tion Practices in Scientific and Technical Fields. Study prepared for the National
Science Foundation, appearing in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 69 (1963).
50. I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 59.
51. Kolle, Reprography and Copyright Law: A Comparative Law Study Con-
cerning the Role of Copyright Law in the Age of Information, 6 IIC 382, 385 (1975).
52. Id. But for exact figures, see Gerbrandy, The Netherlands Solution to the
Problem of Reprography, 1975 COPYRIGHT 47, 50.
53. Kolle, supra note 51, at 385.
54. Id. See also G. Sophar and L. Heilprin, The Determination of Legal Facts
and Economic Guideposts with Respect to the Dissemination of Scientific and Educa-
tional Information as It Is Affected by Copyright - A Status Report, Final Report:
Project No. 7-0793, Committee to Investigate Copyright Problems Affecting Communi-
cation in Science and Education, Inc. (1967).
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cals nine times as often as they are made from books, and of those
periodicals the most likely to be photocopied are scholarly, scientific
and technical journals.55
What effect does such wholesale photocopying have on the poten-
tial market for or value of these copyrighted "sci-tech" journals?58 And,
does this inquiry differ from the one answered by the Court of Claims
in Williams & Wilkins? It would seem that any attempted answer to
the first question must conclude that the potential market for "sci-tech"
journals is diminished by wholesale photocopying.57 The risks in the
"sci-tech" publishing industry are great," and the market small. The
business, when considered without subsidies, is therefore a marginal one
more critically affected by drops in already low subscription levels. 9
There is, however, as yet no empirically shown causal relationship be-
tween falling subscription levels and photocopying.
The question resolved against plaintiffs in Williams & Wilkins
called for a finding somewhat more certain than a mere tendency to
diminish the market. As Professor Nimmer charges, "The Court [Court
of Claims] fell into error by confusing the issues of damages and liabil-
ity." 0 One of three factors listed as the core of their evaluation of the
case was that "plaintiff has not . . . shown . . . that it is being or will
be harmed substantially by these specific practices of NIH and NLM."'
Must publishers of monographs now affirmatively show what publisher
Curtis Benjamin alleged in 1972, that because of photocopying "the
scientific and technical monographs will disappear by 1980T' ' 2
That this disappearance has not occurred is not evidence of mini-
mal impact of reprography on subsubscription levels, but perhaps is
55. Id. See also: I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 62; Soaring Prices and Sinking
Sales of Science Monographs, 183 SCIENCE 282 (1974).
56. New Act, supra note 2, at §107(4).
57. Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. REv. 497, 507 (1977).
58. The Library of Congress has commented that one periodical dies each day
but three new ones are born. G. GIPE, NEARER TO THE DUST - COPYRIGHT AND THE
MACHINE 94 (1967).
59. I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 61; PHYSICS TODAY reports that "[l1n the past
eight years the number of subscriptions to some physics journals has fallen by a factor
of two." PHYSICS TODAY, October 1977, at 104.
60. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §13.05[E[41[cl, at 13-74 (1978).
61. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F. 2d at 1354.
62. PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, April 3, 1972, at 58. The necessity for such a showing
would seem contrary to the function of §504(c) of the New Act which provides for
statutory damages in the event such a showing is not feasible. See notes 143 through
145 and accompanying text infra.
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informative as to the chief source of revenue of the monograph. The four
monographs allegedly infringed in Williams & Wilkins are the excep-
tion in that they were commercial publications"3 and therefore pre-
sumably relied for the most part on advertising and subscriptions for
revenue. Advertising revenues are not as significant a form of income
for most non-profit journals due to limitations imposed by the Internal
Revenue Code on the tax-exempt income of qualifying non-profit organ-
izations." Non-profit monographs rely in the most part, and to varying
degrees, on subscription revenues and "page charges." The page charge
is a fixed rate per page charged to the author of a published article which
covers at least part of the cost of publication but is usually paid by the
institution supporting his research. 5 When underwritten by the federal
government, the page charge amounts to at least partial public subsidi-
zation of the journal. In 1961, the federal government, by far the largest
source of research funds, endorsed the page charge principle under the
rationale that research is not complete until its results are published.6
That government page charge revenues are substantial is evidenced by
the report that in 1970 the National Institute of Health paid out between
4 - 6 million dollars, or 1.5% of its total research awards, in page
charges.67 What portion of the publishing costs of non-profit mono-
graphs are met by page charges and to what extent they are reliant on
subscription revenue is not known. 6 The question is nonetheless posed:
should an organization largely supported by public monies be permitted
63. A 1962 survey of 262 representatives [sic] scientific journals conducted by
the National Science Foundation revealed that 211 were published by non-profit scien-
tific societies, 18 by university presses and 33 by commercial publishing firms." I N.
HENRY, supra note 42, at 66.
64. I.R.C. §§501(b), 501(c)(3), 511(a), 512(b), 513(c). Most non-profit publishers
would likely qualify for tax-exempt status under §501(c)(3). §513(c) specifically includes
advertising as an unrelated business activity of any such tax-exempt organization. Ad-
vertising revenues are therefore taxable as unrelated business income. The tax is, how-
ever, computed with the modifications provided in §512(b), many of which are excluded
as deductions "directly connected" with the income.
65. 3 SCHOLARLY PUBLISHING 62, 62-69 (October, 1971).
66. Id. at 64.
67. Id. at 67.
68. The Editor-in-Chief of the Americal Physical Society publications, THE
PHYSICAL REVIEw and Physical Review Letter, is reported as having said in 1968 that
about 70% of the cost of publishing comes from page charges and 30% from subscrip-
tions. Id. at 63; see also Sophar and Heilprin, supra note 54, which indicates a somewhat
smaller figure in that non-profit journals surveyed reported that 41% of their incomes
were derived from subscriptions.
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to limit public access to their publication by asserting copyright? Any
question of the copyrightability of such publication should be dealt with
legislatively. For judicial attempts to account for such an equitable
argument would almost certainly skew consideration of the time tested
and now statutorily imposed fair use factors and would serve to lessen
their usefulness when applied in more classic fair use situations. 9 In
short, the fair use doctrine must be applied as it appears at 17 U.S.C.
§107 which specifies that the inquiry to be made should be: "the effect
on the potential market" and not whether plaintiff has successfully
shown substantial harm as in Williams & Wilkins.70 This "probable
effects test"" based as it is on logic rather than on concrete evidence72
has been used successfully in the past73 to assure the economic incentive
of copyright and will hopefully survive Williams & Wilkins.
3. PHOTOCOPYING: THE STATUTE AND THE LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY
If there was ever any but the most philosophical doubt that the fair
use doctrine extended to photocopying, it could not stand in the face of
the language in section 107. 71 The House Report makes this clear.
"[T]he reference to fair use 'by reproduction in copies or phonorecords
or by any other means' is mainly intended to make clear that the doc-
trine has as much application to photocopying and copying as to older
forms of use."75 This appears as one of the more bold statements of
69. See notes 13 and 14 And accompanying text supra.
70. 487 F. 2d at 1354; see also Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films
Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D. N.Y. 1970) where, after finding defendant's film
on the life of Lenny Bruce infringing, the district court per Lasker, J. said, "[lit seems
as certain as it can be, except after the fact, that the distribution and public showing of
Dirtymouth [defendant's film] will operate to reduce the demand for Worth's [plaintiff]
film." (emphasis added).
71. Fried, supra note 57, at 505.
72. Id.
73. The probable effects test was applied in granting preliminary injunctions in:
Inge v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 143 F. Supp. 294, 302 (S.D. N.Y. 1956);
Marvin Worth Productions v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1276 (S.D.
N.Y. 1970); Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302, 304
(E.D. Pa. 1938); Addison-Wesley Publishing Co. v. Brown, 223 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. N.Y
1963).
74. "[Flair use . . . including such use by reproduction in copies ...... New
Act, supra note 2, at §107.
75. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 66.
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congressional intent behind section 107. The desire not to "freeze" the
fair use doctrine accounts both for the circumspect statement of intent
as to section 107 and for the absence of a specific education section in
the new Act.7" Even though choosing to specifically include photocopy-
ing within the scope of fair use, Congress had provided guidance as to
the permissible scope of photocopying only in the areas of teacher use,
classroom and library reproduction. As the statistics would indicate,77
these are the areas most ripe for confrontation between the holders and
users and are most deserving of specific legislative consideration.
A. Guidelines for Educational Photocopying
It should initially be made clear that the specific guidelines for
educational reproduction, appearing in the House Report as an agree-
ment between negotiating representatives of authors, publishers and
educational institutions7 s [hereinafter "guidelines"], are twice removed
from actual law. The presentation of the guidelines in agreement form7
rather than as a formally adopted statement of the intention of the
House of Representatives casts a peculiar light on their legal signifi-
cance. Both the House Judiciary Committee and the guidelines them-
selves caution that the negotiated agreement is not intended in any way
to interfere with the judicial application of the fair use doctrine.,, Since
this warning could most certainly be found to apply to those situations
specifically anticipated by the guidelines, an opening is thereby created
for judicial modification, hopefully without destroying the certainty and
protection they were intended to provide. Another perspective on the
relationship and impact of the guidelines on fair use is offered by the
76. "[T]here is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute, especially
during a period of rapid technological change." Arguments on the subject of a specific
educational section, presented in the 1967 House Judiciary Committee Report, are
unofficially incorporated by reference in the HousE REPORT. After rejecting an educa-
tion section, the Committee wrote, "The fullest possible use of the multitude of technical
devices now available to education should be encouraged." H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th
Cong., I st Sess. 31 (1967). For an example of an educational section, see 46 F. L. REv.
91, 129 (1977).
77. See notes 49 through 55 and accompanying text supra.
78. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 67-70; parts of the following discussion apply
equally to the similar agreement reached by representatives of music teachers, schools
and publishers, appearing in the HoUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 70-71.
79. Id. at 67.
80. Id. at 68, 70.
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Conference Committee who "accept [the guidelines] as part of their
understanding of fair use."'"
The practical significance of the agreement is more clear.
"Teachers kill [sic] know that copying within the guidelines is fair use.
Thus, the guidelines serve the purpose of fulfilling the need for greater
certainty and protection for teachers.""2 Although teachers may fairly
assume that any copying within the guidelines is allowed as fair use, at
what point beyond the guidelines should a teacher feel that he or she
may be infringing and choose to either surreptitiously proceed with or
abandon the proposed photocopying? This undoubtedly is the question
being asked by teachers. The authors and publishers are perhaps happy
with a compromise agreement which raises the question so acutely3 in
the minds of educators who, as late as 1975, were somewhat less likely
to consider the rights of the copyright proprietor before photocopying.
Educators, on the other hand, may appreciate the fact that the agree-
ment provides for the first time some "minimum standards" for educa-
tional fair use."
By distinguishing single copying for teachers from multiple copies
for classroom use, the guidelines acknowledge important differences in
the purpose and character of the respective uses. A single copy may be
made by or for a teacher at his or her request for the purposes of
scholarly research, use in teaching or preparation to teach a class.,
Under the guidelines, these rights extend only to a specified list of
materials.86
Multiple copies may be made for classroom use provided that tests
of brevity and spontaneity are met, the cumulative effect considerations
are complied with and each copy includes a notice of copyright. The
brevity test(s) are specific and vary with the nature of the copyrighted
work be it prose, poetry, illustration or "special" work. 7 "Spontaneity"
81. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 70.
82. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 72.
83. New Copyright Law: What's It To You? 67 ENGLISH JOURNAL 16, 17 (Febru-
ary, 1978); Stedman, New Copyright Law: Photocopying for Educational Use. 63
AAUP BULL. 5 (February, 1977).
84. Although most references to the "minimum standard" language found by this
researcher seem to assume benefit to educators, one definition of the word, "standard,"
i.e., a requirement of moral conduct, suggests the possibility at least that the phrase is
double-edged. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2223 (1971).
85. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
86. See notes 31 through 34 and accompanying text supra.
87. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68-69.
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requires both that the inspiration to copy be that of the individual
teacher (as opposed to a directive from administration) and that the
time between the inspiration to make copies and the moment of their
use is such that it would be unreasonable to expect a timely reply to a
request for permission." This time element of the spontaneity test.pre-
cludes photocopying the same material for classroom use term after
term.8 The cumulative effects test limits the number of works which
may be copied from the same author, collective work or periodical
volume during one class term. The instances of such multiple copying
are limited to nine for the term of each course within the school where
the copies are made. 0
The specific prohibitions within the agreement apply both to single
copying for teachers and multiple copying for classroom use. "Copying
shall not be used to create or to replace or substitute for anthologies,
compilations or collective works."'" There should be no copying from
"consumable" works such as tests, answer sheets, workbooks and like
material. General prohibitions against copying which: (1) substitutes for
purchase; (2) is directed by a higher authority; (3) is repeated from term
to term; or (4) is charged to the student beyond cost, 2 similarly apply
to both single and multiple copying.
B. Section 108: Library Photocopying
By including section 108 in the 1976 Act, Congress provided librar-
ies with limited statutory protection against infringement actions in
addition to that provided by section 107 fair use.' A library having no
privilege specifically granted by section 108 may find a defense within
the scope of section 107 fair use. More specifically, although section 108
details the conditions under which libraries may reproduce and distrib-
ute copies, it should be remembered that where the library is copying
88. Id.
89. This practice is further specifically prohibited by the guidelines. Id. at 69.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 70.
93. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(4). "Nothing in section 108 impairs the
applicability of the fair use doctrine to a wide variety of situations involving photocopy-
ing or other reproduction by a library of copyrighted material in its collections, where
the user requests the reproduction for legitimate scholarly or research purposes."
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 78-79.
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for a teacher, it, as agent, may depend on the teacher's fair use privi-
lege.94
The section 108 privileges "to reproduce and distribute . . .no
more than one copy of a work,"" are initially subject to three general
conditions. The first being that "[t]he reproduction or distribution is
made without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advan-
tage."9 Problems of defining "direct or indirect commercial advantage"
are allayed by the House Report which reads: "[TIhe advantage referred
to in this clause must attach to the immediate commercial motivation
behind the reproduction or distribution itself, rather than to the ultimate
profit-making motivation behind the enterprise in which the library is
located."97 This would allow "corporate libraries" in such places as
clinics, law firms and research and development corporations to single
copy and distribute to their employees, provided there is compliance
with the other general and specific conditions of section 108.11
The Congress evidently had such "corporate libraries" in mind
when drafting the second general condition, that "the collections of the
library or archives are (i) open to the public, or (ii) available not only
to researchers affiliated with the library or archives or with the institu-
tion of which it is a part, but also to other persons doing research in a
specialized field."99 The quid pro quo for the privileges given these
"subsection (a) libraries"' ® is the making of their collections "open"
and "available," thereby furthering the policy of greater public access
and broader dissemination of information. But what of libraries such as
those of some private colleges and universities which are freely accessi-
ble to the university population, but are open to the general public only
upon payment of a license fee? The plain meaning of the word "public"
would indicate that such libraries should more likely be characterized
as "private" and hence not granted section 108 privileges. However,
the argument may be made that by the use of "open to the public,"
Congress intended section 108 privileges to extend to a broader category
94. Treece, supra note 40, at 1039.
95. These are more clearly words of limitation which, when applied to use by an
entity capable of wide distribution (such as a library), do not seem to raise the same
inference as to technical infringement of "single copying" as does single copying by
teachers discussed in the text accompanying note 33 supra.
96. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(a)(l).
97. House REPORT, supra note 5, at 75.
98. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 74.
99. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(a)(2).
100. Treece, supra note 40, at 1033.
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than would have been included by use of the more common phrase
"public libraries."'' 1 Assuming that such private libraries are not within
subsection (a) some may find the protection provided by section 108(d)
sufficient incentive to open their collections to the general public.
The third general condition or prerequisite to the privileges granted
by section 108 is that "the reproduction or distribution of the work
includes a notice of copyright."'02 It is not specified whether this notice
must be according to form required by the notice provision of the new
Act'03 or whether a notice in the form of a warning would suffice. For
example: WARNING: THIS WORK MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE
PROTECTION OF FEDERAL COPYRIGHT LAWS 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810. While not of paramount legal significance, this difference
could have great impact on library photocopying of material which does
not display section 40 1(b)'0' copyright notice on each page. For while it
would be a simple matter to include the above warning/notice as a flap
fixed to the copier which could appear along the margin of each photo-
copy, considerable employee time would be spent locating and properly
affixing the individualized section 401(b) notice to all copies made from
protected works.
In examining the conditions which accompany the various specific
privileges within section 108, one must remember that the general condi-
tions of section 108(a) discussed above are criteria which must be satis-
fied prior to qualification for any of the specific privileges provided by
section 108.
Subsection (b) extends the rights of reproduction and distribution
of one copy of an unpublished work for the purposes of preservation,
security or deposit in another subsection (a) library if a copy of the
unpublished work is currently in the collection of the copying library.0 5
Subsection (c) allows reproduction of a published work solely for the
purpose of replacement of a copy that is damaged, deteriorating, lost
or stolen if, after a reasonable investigation, an unused replacement
cannot be found at a fair price.' °0 Both the Senate and House Reports
101. An otherwise private college library may, by involvement in interlibrary loan
programs, make its collection "available" to the public and thus arguably qualify as a
subsection (a) library. 46 F. L. REV. 91, 107 (1977).
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provide guidance as to what constitutes a reasonable investigation, 0 but
acknowledge that the scope of a reasonable investigation will vary ac-
cording to the circumstances of a particular situation.'" Both subsec-
tions (b) and (c) limit reproduction to facsimile form. "Thus a library
may reproduce from its own microform holdings a microform user copy
. . ,"0 However, transfer from an original form (such as printed
matter) to a microduplication or computerized system is not within the
privileges granted by subsection (b) or (c).
Subsection (d) grants rights of reproduction and distribution of
single copies of a small part of any copyrighted work"0 to both individ-
ual libraries and those participating in interlibrary loan arrangements."'
Conditions imposed are: (1) that the copy become the property of the
user; (2) that the library have no notice that the copy is to be used for
any purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research; and, (3)
that the library display the warning of copyright issued by the Register
of Copyrights."' That the second "no notice" condition does not require
the library to affirmatively seek out information as to the status and
identity of the user"3 is significant in light of what appears to be a
growing trend amongst other western countries to impose such a duty
of inquiry even in situations of in-house copying performed by, instead
of for, the user."4
Subsection (e) grants rights of reproduction and distribution of
single copies of whole, or substantial parts of copyrighted works both
107. "It will always require recourse to commonly-known trade sources in the
United States, and in the normal situation also to the publisher or other copyright owner
(if such owner can be located at the address listed in the copyright registration), or an
authorized reproducing service." HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 76; SENATE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 68.
108. HousE REPORT, supra note 5, at 75; SENATE REPORT, supra note 5, at 68.
109. Treece, supra note 40, at 1050.
110. "Any copyrighted work" specifically includes articles or other contributions
to collective works or periodical issues, but does not extend to those works specifically
excluded from §108 by §108(h). See generally New Act, supra note 2, at §108(d), (h).
11l. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(d).
112. 42 Fed. Reg. 59,264 (1977) (to be codified in 37 C.F.R. 201.14).
113. Treece, supra note 40, at 1050.
114. Soci&t6 Masson v. CNRS, [1974] D.S. JUR. 337 (Trib. gr. inst. 1974) where
defendant, state-operated Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, was held liable
for infringement because of its failure to practice suitable supervisory measures, such
as requiring proof of user's identity and purpose, prior to allowing copies to be made
on its machines. Cf University of New South Wales v. Moorhouse et al., 6 AUSTL. L.
R. 193 (High Ct. 1975).
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to individual libraries and those participating in interlibrary loan ar-
rangements. 1 5 In addition to the conditions imposed by subsection (d),11
a reasonable investigation" 7 must be undertaken to find a copy at a fair
price.
Subsection (f)(1) makes it clear that libraries are not liable under
section 108 for any infringement resulting from unsupervised use of
copiers located on library premises."8 The copier must, however, display
a notice that the making of a copy may be subject to the copyright
law."' Subsection (0(2) places the liability for any infringement in such
a situation with the user.' Subsection (0(4) asserts that a fair use
defense is unaffected by section 108. It further provides that contractual
obligations assumed at the time that the copy was obtained shall domi-
nate the privileges granted by Section 108.
C. Section 108(g)
Congress has responded to the call for legislative guidance made
by the Court of Claims in the Williams & Wilkins case by the enactment
of subsection (g).111 Generally, subsection (g) attempts to establish limits
on both in-house and interlibrary loan photocopying. Subsection (g)(1)
warns that the rights of section 108 do not extend to cases where the
library has actual or substantial reason to believe that it is involved in
related or concerted reproduction or distribution of multiple copies of
the same material, whether made at one time or over a period of time.
Furthermore, it is- irrelevant whether such copying is for aggregate use
by one or more individuals or for individual use of members of a
group.'2
Addressing itself to the specific question of interlibrary loan photo-
copying, subsection (g)(2)
prohibits systematic photocopying of copyrighted materials but permits
interlibrary arrangements "that do not have, as their purpose or effect,
115. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(e).
116. See note I I I and accompanying text supra.
117. See note 107 and accompanying text supra.
118. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(1). See note 114 supra.
119. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(0(1).
120. Id. §108(0(2).
121. Id. §108(g).
122. Id. §108(g)(1). For an example of such prohibited conduct, see SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 5, at 70 [Example 2].
1 3:1979
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that the library or archives receiving such copies or phonorecords for
distribution does so in such aggregate quantities as to substitute for a
subscription to or purchase of such work."'"
To paraphrase: purposeful or effective systematic copying is prohibited,
but only in such "aggregate quantities"124 as to "substitute for a sub-
scription . . . or purchase."''2
Some guidance as to the meaning of the key phrases "aggregate
quantities" and "substitute for a subscription . . . or purchase" is pro-
vided by the CONTU guidelines12 1 on which there has been substantial
agreement by the principal library, publisher and author organiza-
tions.127 With respect to periodicals, the guidelines apply only to issues,
or articles therein, published within five years prior to the date of the
request for the copy. Requests filled for six or more articles from any
given periodical title28 within a year shall be considered such an aggre-
gate quantity as to substitue for a subscription or purchase and thus a
use not protected by section 108.129 Limited protection for the subscrip-
tion levels of scientific and technical journals has thus been provided.13'
The absence of guidelines as to quantities which will substitute for sub-
scription or purchase of periodicals or articles published more than five
years prior to the date of request indicates that libraries shall be given
somewhat greater latitude in copying these materials. This is perhaps
because of the minimal effect of the use upon the market and value of
the copyrighted work.'
Works other than periodical articles which are also within the pur-
view of subsection (d)32 are similarly protected against copying which
may substitute for purchase. The guidelines provide that filled requests
of six or more copies of or from such a work within a year may be
123. CONTU Guidelines for Inter-Library Arrangements. Circular R-
21-Reproduction of Copyrighted Works by Educators and Librarians, a Copyright
Office Publication 7 (November 7, 1977).
124. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(g)(2).
125. Id.
126. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 72-74.
127. Id. at 72.
128. The actual language of the guideline reads "periodical (as opposed to any
given issue of a periodical) .... " Id.
129. Id.
130. See generally notes 48 through 73 and accompanying text supra.
131. See New Act, supra note 2, at §107(4).
132. Works such as fiction, poetry and collective works are contemplated by the
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
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considered to substitute for purchase. 33 Further, these works are pro-
tected equally, and without prejudice as to the date of publication,
throughout the copyright term. 34
Subscription and purchase are further encouraged in the guidelines.
If the requesting entity has within its collection, or has ordered a copy
of the copyrighted work, the copying shall be treated as if performed
within its own library. 13 Similar protection is provided to requests for
copies of periodicals a subscription to which has been ordered. This
policy offers the dual reward of both increasing public access and en-
couraging subscription. After placing five interlibrary loan requests
from the same periodical within a year, a library could recognize its
need for an added subscription, subscribe, and provide an interlibrary
loan copy of the requested article without delay to the user or prejudice
to its quota.
In the interest of enforcement, the guidelines provide two further
substantive recommendations: first, that each request for a copy should
be accompanied by a representation that the request is being made in
conformity with the guidelines, and second, that the requesting entity
should keep a record of all requests for copies covered by the guidelines
and that records be maintained until the end of the third calendar year
after the end of the calendar year of any particular request.'
The caution with which both Congress and CONTU approached
section 108 is evidenced by subsections within both section 10813 and
the guidelines' calling for a re-examination of this section of the Act
five years from the effective date. Reports to be solicited from authors,
publishers and libraries will hopefully shed light on the extent to which
section 108 has proven effective in balancing the rights of creators with
the needs of users.13 9
Although this recognition of the need for review of the library
photocopying provisions may detract from the efficacy of section 108,
placing the burden for final resolution of issues therein on the concerned





137. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(i).
138. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 73.
139. New Act, supra note 2, at §108(i).
140. Ringer, The Unfinished Business of Copyright Revision, 24 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 951, 967-68 (1977).
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that this burden for final resolution of the "unfinished business" of
section 108 may encourage libraries to make a good faith effort to
comply with both section 108 and the CONTU guidelines, thereby pro-
moting a greater "spirit of comity"'' in future negotiations. In light of
prospective developments in information storage and retrieval sys-
tems,4 2 no legislation attempting to proscribe practices in this area is
likely to be of long lasting significance. Section 108 shall then hopefully
prove to meet its intended purpose of complementing, at least in the
interim, the fair use doctrine.
A final mention should be made of the section 504111 damages
provision as it applies in cases of innocent photocopying of protected
works by employees or agents of educational institutions and libraries.
Section 504(c)(2) mandates that statutory damages shall be remitted so
as to protect a specified class of defendant. This does not, of course,
preclude a plaintiff from obtaining a judgment in the amount of dam-
ages actually suffered (which may or may not be found to include lost
profits).
The class protected by the section 504 remission of statutory dam-
ages includes not only the employees or agents of non-profit schools and
libraries, if acting within the scope of their employment, but also the
institutions themselves.
Any member of the protected class must have "believed and had
reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted
work was a fair use under section 107."' This language seems to aim
at situations in which an infringing use has been made of a work which
has for some reason appeared without notice of copyright. However,
section 405 of the new Act' (permitting as it does new latitude as to
omission of notice and copyright validity) specifically removes liability
for such innocent infringement not only for statutory damages but also
for actual damages. Does then this language of section 504(c)(2) have
an exclusive function or does this subsection generally attempt to insure
that statutory damages shall be awarded in an equitable fashion?
Due to the lack of any mention in section 504(c)(2) of section 108,
an analysis of this question may expose some painful questions as to the
interrelationship of sections 107 and 108.
141. Id.
142. Treece, supra note 40, at 1058-66; I N. HENRY, supra note 42, at 33.
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4. CONCLUSION
The problems arising from consideration of the fair use doctrine as
applied to the photocopying of copyrighted works are intricate and
difficult of solution. The changing state of technology, in both the areas
of photoduplication and information storage and retrieval systems, con-
tributes to the already complex problems by casting doubt on the dura-
bility of any potential solutions.
What will be the impact of already budding technological attempts
to prevent photocopying? 4 6
Will the dissemination of reprography related technology force the
courts to more thoroughly address the origins and basis for the fair use
doctrine? For, as Justice Cardozo has said, "Rivulets in combination
make up a stream of tendency that may attain engulfing power."' 47
Present attempts at dealing with reprography's growing "stream of
tendency" are modeled to varying degrees after performing rights socie-
ties such as the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publish-
ers (ASCAP).48 The future of this area of the law depends in no small
measure on the success of these clearinghouse systems.
Brian Anderson
146. The Xerox Corporation at one time applied for a patent on a combination
of fluorescent dyes which could render printed material uncopyable. The dyes could be
sprayed on documents without affecting legibility, but would in effect "blind" photoco-
piers dependent on intense light. TIME, April 15, 1974, at 87. A recent telephone conver-
sation with a representative of the Supplies Division of Xerox Corporation in Rochester,
New York, revealed that research and development of this product has since been halted
and the patent application withdrawn. The reason given was that the product proved
ineffective inasmuch as some copier models were able to penetrate the fluorescence and
produce legible copies. One wonders, however, if the potential impact of such a product
on the photocopier industry did not weigh heavily in the decision to "drop" the patent
application.
What perhaps is a more promising product has been patented by scientist Richard
E. Reinnagel. Copy-Trol is a paper coated with heat resistant material that does not
reflect enough light to permit, again, some copiers to distinguish between the back-
ground and the lettering. New York Times, June 7, 1975, at 33.
147. Holyoke Power Co. v. Paper Co., 300 U.S. 324, 340 (1937).
148. Strong Start for Copyright Clearance Center, PUBLISHER'S WEEKLY, Febru-
ary 27, 1978, at 78. An excellent discussion of alternate royalty collection schemes may
be found along with an interesting proposal for compulsory licensing of educational and
library photocopying in MacLean, Education and Copyright Law: An Analysis of the
Amended Copyright Revision Bill and Proposals for Statutory Licensing and a Clear-
inghouse System, 20 ASCAP COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 1 (1972).
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Joint Tenancies and the Tax Reform Act of 1976
Tenancy by the entirety ownership of real and personal property is so
widely accepted by married couples that to suggest holding the prop-
erty in the name of one spouse alone may cause nuptial unrest. Married
persons "know" that a good marrige means sharing the ownership of
family assets. For many generations they have been counseled by bank
and real estate personnel to perpetuate the traditional concept of sharing
by taking title to such assets in joint names. Lawyers have given the
same advice when it is clear that a client will never experience any estate
tax problems.' But the better rule may be expressed in these terms: "The
holding of property as joint tenants with the rights of survivorship
should be the deliberate exception rather than the general rule .... "2
It is the purpose of this article to re-examine the old estate planning
considerations and discuss the new ones made necessary by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976. 3
The essay will outline the alternatives available in planning for
jointly held property' by first discussing the non-tax reasons for holding
such property. Saving a dollar may not always be in the client's best
interest, as the tax counselor must never forget that his client has human
wants and needs. However, only a clear understanding of how many
dollars are involved will give the client a proper basis for deciding
whether to hold property jointly with his spouse. To facilitate, but in
no way exhaust, the limits of this understanding, the discussion will be
tailored to emphasize the 1976 changes5 in the estate and gift taxation
of such property. It will be apparent that the reformers solved some old
problems, created new ones and presented planners with several unex-
1. See T. SHAFFER, The Planning and Drafting of Wills and Trusts at 62 (1972).
Quaere: Is it ever clear that a client will never have such problems?
2. Worthy, Problems of Jointly Owned Property, 22 TAx LAw 601 (1969) (herein-
after cited as Worthy).
3. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1855 (codified at 26
U.S.C. §§2040 and 2515 (1976)) (hereinafter cited as TRA 1976). Note that this page
of the Statutes at Large contains both the §2515 and §2040 amendments.
4. When the terms "joint tenancy," "jointly held property," or "joint tenancy
with right of survivorship" are used in this article, the reference will pertain to such
holdings between spouses and as such constitute a tenancy by the entirety.
5. I.R.C. §2040(b), §2515(c).
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pected and probably unintended tax benefits. It should be clear, how-
ever, that the "old advice" discouraging couples from holding joint
property, except in very circumscribed instances, is still good advice.
1. NON-TAX CONSIDERATIONS
The most compelling reason for the creation of a tenancy by the
entirety is that many spouses regard marriage as a partnership in which
each should enjoy the fruits of success and the consequences of failure.
Holding title in both names reinforces family security and harmony.
These values often induce a couple to hold the majority of their assets
in this manner. In Florida, it is possible for spouses to own literally all
of their assets jointly,6 including purchase money mortages, 7 stocks,
bonds and notes,8 and bank accounts.' It is also possible to own joint
property in fee, for life, for a term of years or as a chattel real (such as
a five-year lease of realty).10
Each spouse's security is well-founded because each knows to
whom the property will pass at the death of either - the entire estate
will vest, by operation of law, in the survivor." Moreover, this operation
cannot be defeated by the decedent's attempt to encumber it or subject
it to the payment of his obligations.12 Nor may one of the parties alien-
ate his share of the property without the consent of the other or act in
any way to defeat the other's rights either during his life 3 or by will. 4
As a result of the property passing by operation of law, the necessity of
probate is eliminated, along with its attendant disadvantages. The most
frequently cited evils are delay, expense and publicity.
The delay in the distribution of the probate estate can be substan-
tial. These assets are kept in a suspended state until a personal repre-
sentative has been appointed to collect and manage them. When a per-
sonal representative is appointed he must bear in mind that, until the
claims of creditors have been satisfied and death tax obligations met,
he may be subject to personal liability should he fail to retain sufficient
6. Winters v. Parks, 91 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 1956).
7. FLA. STAT. §689.15 (1975); Powel v. Metz, 55 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 1952).
8. Colclazier v. Colclazier, 89 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 1956).
9. In Re Estate of Lyons, 90 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1955).
10. Mathews v. McCain, 125 Fla. 840, 170 So. 323, 325 (1936).
11. See notes 6 and 10 supra.
12. Id.
13. Leitner v. Willaford, 306 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1975).
14. Bailey v. Smith, 89 Fla. 303, 103 So. 833 (1925).
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funds to meet such claims and obligations. 5 Naturally, this potential
liability delays distribution until the extent of the decedent's obligations
can be ascertained. Avoiding this delay is especially desirable with re-
spect to funds needed by a surviving spouse for purposes of support and
payment of death-related expenses. 6 While the simple probate-avoiding
device of a joint bank account can be used to provide the funds for such
expenses, avoiding probate altogether serves to retain the estate's
wealth. Probate expenses include executor and attorney's fees. These
claims are the first to be paid and are computed as a percentage of the
total probate estate.17Thus, the percentage is reduced when certain
gross-estate items come to rest in their post-death arrangement by a
non-probate route. Subjecting an estate to probate has another disad-
vantage the client may wish to avoid. The value and destination of
probate assets are a matter of public record. However, one can assure
privacy concerning the disposition and value of personalty, at least, by
taking advantage of the survivorship feature of joint ownership.
There is, of course, some appeal to a joint tenancy, but a revocable
trust will accomplish the same result, as the property subject to its
administration escapes the purview of probate"s without incurring the
disadvantage of the inflexibility inherent in jointly held property. This
lack of flexibility does not allow one to freely deal with unforseen
changes in his family situation. Should the surviving spouse become
15. 31 U.S.C. §192 (1970) provides:
Every executor, administrator or assignee, or other person, who pays, in whole
or in part, any debt due by the person or estate for whom or for which he acts
before he satisfies and pays the debts due to the United States from such person
or estate, shall become answerable in his own person and estate to the extent of
suchpayments for the debts so due to the United States, or for so much thereof
as may remain due and unpaid.
Treas. Reg. §20.2002-1 (1958) points out that the possible personal liability of the
executor under the above-quoted statute is present if he makes distributions to benefici-
aries of the estate.
16. Florida ameliorates the harshness of delay by providing the spouse and lineal
heirs with an allowance of up to $6,000 for their maintenance during administration.
§ 732.403 FLA. STAT. (1977).
17. §733.707(l)(9) FLA. STAT. (1977).
18. Registration of an oral trust required identification of "terms of the trust,
including subject matter, beneficiaries and time of performance" with a resulting loss
in secrecy. § 737.102 FLA. STAT. (1977), repealed by 2, ch. 77-344, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv., effective October 1, 1977. Note that, even before the repeal, there was no absolute
duty to register the trust unless the grantor or a beneficiary specifically requested it.
§737.101 FLA. STAT. (1977).
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unreasonable, the property may not be available to satisfy the specific
needs of minors, invalids, incompetents or other loved ones who may
require extraordinary treatment and support. Automatic survivorship
does not provide a method for dealing with a spendthrift and offers no
general assurance that the property will be managed responsibly.
Another disadvantage of the survivorship feature is that it has led
many couples to believe that a will is unnecessary when property is
jointly held. In such a case, the property can pass to the "wrong" hands
if common disaster strikes. For example, when spouses perish together,
the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act provides that the property shall
be distributed "one-half as if one had survived and one-half as if the
other had survived" unless otherwise provided in the will.19 In failing to
provide for such a contingency, a person loses the ability to choose the
ultimate disposition of his property.
In sum, the advantages and assurances of owning joint property
may be outweighed by the inflexibility of such a tenancy, especially
where the majority of a deceased's estate is comprised of such holdings.
If, after careful review of these non-tax considerations, a client remains
uncertain as to how his property should be held, a discussion concerning
the taxation of jointly held property may induce him to choose other
methods.
2. FEDERAL TAXATION
The creation and termination of jointly held property have differing
estate and gift tax consequences, depending on the type of joint owner-
ship, the nature of the property held, the relative amount of considera-
tion paid by the co-owners and the ownership rights in the property
provided under local law. 0 The tax laws have undergone several changes
in response to this confusion, but there remains a need for further
legislation.
A. The Gift Taxation of Personal Property
The creation of a joint tenancy is generally a taxable gift. 21 How-
19. H. R. REP. No. 97-1380, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. 10-72 (1976). (Hereinafter cited
as Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976).
20. Cuzy v. Commissioner, 8 Tax Ct. Mem. (CCH) 681 (1949), where the taxpay-
ers' joint purchase of securities (the creation) was deemed to be a taxable gift.
21. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-2(b), 1 T.D. 6334, amended T.D. 7238. It is interesting
1 216 3:1979 1
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ever, the creation may not always result in a "completed" transfer,
which is a prerequisite to the imposition of the gift tax. A gift is consid-
ered complete when the donor has so parted with dominion and control
as to leave him without the power to alter its disposition, whether for
his or another's benefit.22 For example, a transfer of securities to a trust
in which X is a beneficiary is not complete if the settlor has reserved
the power to change the beneficiary. It should be obvious, however, that
any distribution made to X will be a completed transfer, as the funds
distributed will then be beyond the reach of the settlor. This same
principle applies to joint bank accounts because the donor can regain
the entire fund up until the time the donee actually makes a with-
drawal.23
The taxable value of a transfer will depend upon both the consider-
ation supplied by each party and the type of tenancy created, as gov-
erned by local law. In an ordinary common law joint tenancy with right
of survivorship, where either party can freely dispose of his or her
interest in the property, the donee is deemed to have received a gift equal
to the fair market value of the property divided by the number of
tenants, less any consideration supplied by him. 4 If, for example, the
transferee spouse contributed twenty percent of the purchase price, the
transferor has made a gift equal to thirty percent of the value of the
property. ((Fair Market Value - 2) less twenty percent = value of the
to note that donative intent is not an essential element of a transfer under the Code.
Treas. Reg. §25.251 -1(g)(1), T.D. 6334, amended T.D. 6542; T.D. 7150; T.D. 7238;
T.D. 7296. (Hereinafter this section shall be cited without its history.) But a donor in
Florida always retains the power to negate a transfer by proving a lack of such intent.
Pollack v. Pollack, 282 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1973). In such a case, the Floridian
donor may pay a federal gift tax on property he never intended to give away and, in
fact, retained. This anomalous result can be avoided, however, if the transfer is also
surrounded by objective facts and circumstances that suggest a transfer was not to
occur. In Bouchard v. Commissioner, 285 F. 2d 556 (1st Cir. 1961), the decedent caused
securities to be issued jointly to insure a transfer to his wife at his death. His wife was
not informed of the transfer and never saw the certificates until after his death because,
while the decedent was alive, he kept the stock in a company safe to which she had no
access. The appellate court found that no transfer had occurred.
22. Treas. Reg. §25.251 14(h)(4). See note 20 for history. Note this also applies
to United States Bonds and securities on margin account. Rev. Rul. 69-148, 1969-1 C.B.
226; and Rev. Rul. 68-269, 1968-1 C.B. 399.
23. Treas. Reg. §25.2511-1(h)(5). See note 20 for history. See also Treas. Reg.
§25.2515-2(b)(1), T.D. 6334; amended T.D. 7150; T.D. 7238. (Hereinafter cited without
its history.)
24. Harris v. Commissioner, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
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gift.) While this process is simple enough, initially ascertaining the
amount of consideration flowing from one spouse to another has, at a
pace equal to the push for recognition of women's rights, become in-
creasingly vexatious.
Often a spouse wished to perform certain domestic services or
release various marital rights as her contribution to the joint acquisition.
The Supreme Court has held the release of "property" rights in a di-
vorce situation to be valuable consideration 25 but, while the Internal
Revenue Service recognizes the release of "support" rights,2 it holds the
release of dower and curtesy rights is not valid consideration .27 It distin-
guishes "support" rights from inheritance rights because the husband
has a duty to support his wife during their joint lives or until she remar-
ries and the satisfaction of this obligation does not have the effect of
diminishing the husband's estate any more than his other legal obliga-
tions32 Domestic services are not recognized 9 unless it can be proven
that they do not arise out of love and affection.3 1
In the case of a tenancy by the entirety in Florida, where neither
spouse can dispose of his or her interest without the consent of the other,
the life expectancy of both donor and donee must also be considered.31
Thus, if the husband is younger and therefore more likely to survive his
wife, he will be deemed to have received or retained an interest more
valuable than hers. Factors representing their respective interests are
determined through the use of actuarial tables prescribed by the Com-
missioner. 2 For example, assume that, in 1965, X conveyed property
worth $100,000 to himself and Y as joint tenants. X is 62 years old and
25. Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 C.B. 414 and I.R.C. §2516.
26. I.R.C. §2043. See also Merril v. Fahs, 324 U.S. 308 (1945), where the court
held that §2043 was to be read in pari materia with the estate tax sections of the Internal
Revenue Code.
27. Id. at note 25 supra.
28. Estate of Loveland, 13 T.C. 5 (1949).
29. See Estate of Trafton v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 610 (1956), where the surviv-
ing spouse actively participated in the couple's financial affairs and could trace her
contributions from sources other than her husband.
30. Note 13 supra is used in conjunction with Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2 (b)(2) and
(c). See note 22 for its history. See the discussion concerning the Technical Corrections
Act of 1978, H.R. 6715 infra.
31. Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2(c). See note 22 for its history. Treas. Reg. §25.2512-
5(e), T.D. 6334; amended T.D. 7327; T.D. 7432 (hereinafter cited without its history)
for gifts made before January 1, 1971; or Treas. Reg. §25.2512-9(e) (1970), for gifts
made after December 31, 1970.
32. Worthy, supra note 2, at 610.
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Y is 55 years old at the time of the gift. Under the Commissioner's
tables, Y is deemed to have received a sixty percent interest in the
property and X is deemed to have retained a forty percent interest. The
amount of the gift to Y is deemed to be $60,000.3
Even where a gift has been made and its value determined, the
transaction may not be a taxable event. The first $3,000 of gifts made
to any one donee during a calendar year, except gifts of future inter-
ests,3" are txcluded in determining the donor's tax liability., In addi-
tion, the donor may take a marital deduction that ranges from 100% of
the value of the gift, if the aggregate value of one's lifetime intramarital
transfers does not exceed $100,000, to fifty percent of the lifetime gifts
to a spouse totaling more than $200,000.6 These provisions apply to
both real and personal property and are quite useful in helping the
couple of moderate means avoid gift taxation.
B. The Gift Taxation of Real Property Prior to the 1976
Tax Reform Act
Prior to 1954, the principles used to determine whether a gift had
been made were uniformly applied to both personalty and realty."
After 1954, the Code was amended so that, when one spouse created a
joint interest in realty, the gift tax consequences would, unless the donor
elected otherwise, be deferred until termination of the tenancy. 8 The
election procedure was implemented because so many couples neglected
33. As defined in Treas. Reg. §25.2503-3, T.D. 6334; amended T.D. 7238 (herein-
after cited without its history) and Treas. Reg. §25.2503-4 (same history), concerning
gifts to minors.
34. I.R.C. §2503(b).
35. I.R.C. §2523. Tenancies by the entirety qualify for both the estate and gift
tax marital deductions as they ar6 not considered terminable interests. I.R.C. §2523(d);
Treas. Reg. §20.2056(b)-l(d) (1958), T.D. 6296. The Terminable Interest Rule furthers
the purpose of the marital deduction, as it ensures that the value of the property
qualifying for deferral will be taxed in the surviving spouse's estate, unless otherwise
consumed.
36. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 12, §2515, 68A Stat. 409 (now I.R.C. §2515).
37. I.R.C. §§2515(a) and (c).
38. "Frequently, real property is held in Tenancy by the Entirety (or Joint Ten-
ancy) to ensure the right of survivorship in the surviving spouse. Most couples who elect
this method of buying a home have no intention of making a gift at the time of creation
of the tenancy ... or any knowledge that they are considered as having done so." S.
REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 128 (1954).
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to pay the gift tax due on the joint purchase of their residence.39 Quaere:
If this was Congress' concern, why is the election only available for a
married couple's "real" jointly held property?0
To illustrate the harshness of perpetuating this distinction, consider
the divergent tax treatment of cooperatives and condominiums. The
corporate form of co-op (the most common type) is based on a plan
whereby a corporation is organized to hold title to the land and lease
apartments to the tenant stockholders. 41 Therefore, this type of owner-
ship falls within the property law classification of personalty and, as
such, constitutes a trap for the unwary, for it would be an automatic
gift.
On the other hand, a condominium is organized on the basis of
separate ownership of individual apartments, thus qualifying as real
property. Although they may look the same, one's relationship with the
Internal Revenue Service hinges on the difference.42
While academicians may spend an inordinate amount of time and
energy explaining or criticizing the above inquiry, the average taxpayer
sees a deferral in any form as a blessing. "Whether because of ignorance
of lack of tax planning at the time of purchase, or because of the
understandable reluctance to elect deliberately to pay a tax now for an
uncertain future gamble, such elections were rarely made.'"43
When the taxable event is deferred by not making the election,
there is, aside from the deferral itself, the additional advantage that no
gift tax need ever be paid if termination occurs by reason of a spouse's
death." Even if the property is sold or exchanged during their joint lives,
39. I.R.C. §§2515(a) and (d).
40. R. E. Boyer, 3 Florida Real Estate Transactions §39.06 at 1516 (1977); Rev.
Rul. 66-40, 1966-1 C.B. 227.
41. Rev. Rul. 77-423, 1977-2 C.B. 352. Note that the income tax sections of the
Code do not recognize this "difference without distinction" at all. Under Treas. Reg.
§1.1034-1(c)(3), T.D. 6500; amended, T.D. 6856; T.D. 6916; T.D. 7404 (hereinafter cited
without its history); the term residence, for capital gains purposes treats a co-op interest
as any other real property.
42. J. S. Bush, Planning to Meet Problems of Non-business Residential Property;
Co-ops; Condominiums; Non-exotic Realty; Exotic Types of Real Property, Time-
shared Property; Domicile and Conflict of Laws, 35TH ANNUAL NYU INST. ON FED.
TAX, 1403, 1407 (1977). Bush claims never to have found a client willing to make this
election during the entire period from 1954 to 1976.
43. I.R.C. §§2515(a) and (b). In this event, the transfer is taxed under §2040.
See text accompanying notes 64 through 96 infra.
44. I.R.C. §2515(b). Its Regulation provides that where the proceeds are not
actually divided between the spouses but are held in the name of one spouse who holds
1220
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there will be no gift if the proceeds are either divided in proportion to
the couple's respective contributions45 or reinvested in an identical ten'-
ancy. 4
Deferral often makes it difficult to trace the couple's proportionate
contributions where there exists a series of improvements or mortgage
payments. If the property appreciates in value between contributions it
is necessary to allocate such increase in relation to the contributions
previously.made." An example given in the Regulations illustrates this
rule:
In 1955 real property was purchased by H and W and conveyed to
them as tenants by the entirety. The purchase price of the property was
$15,000 of which H contributed $10,000 and W, $5,000. In 1960 when the
fair market value of the property is $21,000, W makes improvements
thereto of $5,000. The property then is sold for $26,000. The appreciation
in value of $6,000 results in an additional contribution of $4,000
(10,000/15,000 X $6,000) by H, and an additional contribution by W of
$2,000 (5,000/15,000 X $6,000). H's total contribution to the tenancy is
$14,000 (10,000 + $4,000) and W's total contributions is $12,500
($5,000 + $2,000 + $5,000).4
Another advantage to making the election to immediately tax the
property subject to appreciation is that it fixes the value of the gift. 4"
Consider the situation in which one spouse contributes the entire pur-
chase price of $100,000 for such property and immediately conveys a
one-half interest to the other. If the couple is lucky, the property will
appreciate to $250,000, at which time they will sell. When the proceeds
are evenly divided, the donee spouse will have received a gift of $125,000
for the benefit of both, each spouse is presumed to have received proceeds equal in value
to the value of his or her interest. Florida law also provides that the spouse taking
possession of such proceeds holds for the benefit of both. Dodson v. National Title Ins.
Co., 59 Fla. 371, 31 So. 2d 402 (1947).
45. Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2(d)(2) and (3), added T.D. 6334, amended T.D. 6542;
T.D. 7150; T.D. 7238; T.D. 7296 (hereinafter cited without its history). The savings
made possible as a result of the deferral should, however, be compared with the estate
tax consequences stemming from the demise of a co-tenant either during the terms of
the initial estate or while owning the property for which it was exchanged.
46. Treas. Reg. §25.2515-1(c)(2). See history Id.
47. Id. at (c)(2)(ii).
48. The estate taxation of these elected gifts may also provide the motivation to
elect. See text accompanying notes 65 through 96 infra.
49. I.R.C. §2515(c); and Treas. Reg. §25.2515-2(b)(1). See note 22 for its history.
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as a result of deferring the tax until termination. Had they made the
election to treat the creation as the taxable event, the donor would have
paid a gift tax on $50,000. While this result occurs only ih those jurisdic-
tions giving a spouse the unilateral right to sever the tenancy, 0 the result
in Florida before the 1976 Tax Reform Act required couples to consider
their respective actuarial interests in calculating the gift tax.
3. POST-1976 CHANGES
The Tax Reform Act was an attempt by Congress to solve some
of the administrative problems stemming from the ownership of joint
property. However, it appears that they have solved one problem by
replacing it with another.
Before the Tax Reform Act of 1976, a donor was required to make
an election by filing a gift tax return both at the creation of the tenancy
and after every subsequent investment.5' These tax returns were to be
filed quarterly,5 which created a tremendous amount of paper work for
the donor spouse. This burden has now been alleviated to some extent.
While the present law still requires an election to be made at the creation
of a joint tenancy, even when the value of the taxable property is less
than $3,000, the original. election will automatically apply to all subse-
quent additions so that no additional returns are required unless the
subsequent addition is greater than $3,000.13
The reformers also eliminated the divergent valuation principles
which, in some jurisdictions, required the use of actuarial tables to
determine a couple's respective interests. These tables are no longer
needed as the individual interests are deemed to be equal in value. In
acquiring joint property, a gift results only to the extent that one
spouse's contribution exceeds one-half of the value of the property.
These solutions have created both anomalous situations and inter-
esting questions. One apparent conflict stems from the fact that section
2515(c)(1) requires filing the election-making gift tax return in the
quarter in which the tenancy is created, while section 6075 does not
require gift tax returns to be filed until the last quarter of the year for
cumulative gifts under $25,000.
50. See note 36 supra.
51. I.R.C. §2503(b).
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Another problem results from Congress' efforts to alleviate the
burden of filing a return every quarter in which an addition is made. A
review of the Act shows that Congress simply assumed that any such
additions will be made by the original donor. Quaere: When the original
donee makes the addition, will the first election apply or must the donee
make another election? If the original donee must make an election,
there is a possibility that it will not be deemed a "creation" and thus
fail to become a "qualified joint interest."55
In rejecting the need for actuarial computations, a problem has
arisen for spouses who make the election with the intent to create a
qualified joint interest. If the tenancy is unilaterally severable, the cou-
ple must not contribute equally. If, in an effort to be fair to each other,
they do make equal contributions, there will be no gift on the creation
and there will be a failure to qualify." In states like Florida, however,
"the matter is less clear." 7 Section 2515(c) provides that an election can
be made to the extent that the transfer was a "gift determined without
regard to section 2515." If each spouse happened to make contributions
equalling his or her respective actuarial interests, then the ordinary gift
principles would indicate that no gift was made. "Presumably, however,
section 2515(c)(3) was intended to eliminate resort to actuarial values
in all respects."5 s This same section clearly states that the actuarial
consideration need not be made on the creation of the estate. The ques-
tion arises as to which method of valuation should be used when the
tenancy is terminated by circumstances other than death. The presump-
tion quoted above would seem to answer the question, but some regula-
tions should be drafted to clear up any further confusion. Those who
wish to qualify under section 2040(b) have a problem if they created
their joint tenancy before 1977. However, the House Ways and Means
Committee had purportedly solved this dilemma. It explains the conse-
quences of severing and recreating tenancies as follows:
[I]f a severance or partition of an existing joint tenancy is made after
December 31, 1976, and the joint tenancy between the spouses in that
property is then recreated, the creation of the new joint tenancy would
be eligible for the election so long as the other requirements ar6 satisfied
55. See text accompanying notes 64 through 96 infra.
56. I.R.C. §2040(b).
57. S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, Federal Wealth
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and the creation of the new joint tenancy is valid under local law. The
tax consequences, if any, of the severance or partition of the existing joint
interest would be determined in accordance with the provisions of present
law, e.g., no property interests or proceeds are distributed or reinvested
in proportion to the consideration furnished by each. The amount of gift
resulting from the recreation of the joint tenancy would also be deter-
mined under the principles of present law. The election provided under
the bill would then be available with respect to the amount of the gift
determined."9
Although there are various ways to sever and recreate a joint ten-
ancy, 0 the taxpayer must be careful to avoid certain pitfalls. He must
make the termination properly and then make a gift on the recreation.
For example, if no election had been made, then simply executing a new
deed would not be sufficient to qualify, because it would merely result
in a reinvestment." The taxpayer can terminate his previous estate in
proportion to his contribution, but he must recreate his tenancy in
different proportions. In addition, the House Report states that the gift
will be determined under "present law", which would seem to dictate
that the 50-50 interest rule contained in the amended section would not
apply. This is an additional complication for persons owning joint ten-
ancies before 1977.
Fortunately, the Technical Corrections Act of 1978 was proposed
in order to smooth out several of these problems. The Act would allow
a taxpayer to avoid possible adverse tax consequences involved in a
severance and recreation by providing that one's estate can become
qualified merely by filing a gift tax return making the election." The
amount of the gift would depend on whether the creation of the pre-1977
joint tenancy was treated as a gift. If it was, the applicable tax would
be computed on the basis of the appreciation accruing between the time
of creation and the time of the post-1976 election. If the election was
not made at the creation, the gift would then equal one-half of the fair
market value of the property, less the donee's co ntributions.
The House Bill would also modify section 2515 to eliminate the
need for actuarial computations in valuing gifts of personalty, except
59. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 18.
60. D. Holdsworth, How to Undo a Joint Tenancy, Thus Escape Numerous Tax
and Non-tax Complications, 2 ESTATE PLANNING 142 (1975). (Hereinafter cited as
Holdsworth.)
61. Treas. Reg. §25.2515-1(d)(2)(ii).
62. Qualified for §2040(b).
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when the fair market value of the interest or of the property (determined
as if each spouse had a right to sever) cannot reasonably be ascertained
except by reference to the life expectancy of one or both spouses.3
Whether it is advisable for a taxpayer to make the election will
depend upon the frequency and extent to which he makes life-time gifts
in relation to the various deductions and credits available in both the
gift and estate tax sections of the Code. A better understanding of the
interrelationship between the two sections will manifest itself upon the
reaching of a complementary understanding of the estate taxation of
real and personal property.
4. ESTATE TAX
A. §2040(a) Joint Interests
The use of a §2515 election prior to 1977 was restricted to occasions
where the spouses contemplated the sale of jointly held appreciable
realty during the existence of the tenancy. The election would fix the
value of the gift at the time of the transfer, thereby eliminating a gift
tax on any appreciation once the property was sold and the proceeds
divided. Jnfortunately, if the donor spouse died prior to sale and divi-
sion of proceeds, §2040 would cause the total market value of the prop-
erty to be included in his taxable estate. Renumbered as §2040(a) by the
Tax Reform Act of 1976,"1 this remains the general rule of §2040.
Under §2040(a) the decedent's gross estate includes the value of all
property jointly owned at the time of death, except that portion which
was acquired with the survivor's contributions, but only to the extent
that it was obtained from the decedent for adequate consideration. In
the case of gifts to both spouses from third parties, only half of the value
of the property is included in the decedent's gross estate.
This contribution exception is best explained by Treasury Regula-
tion §20.2040(l)(C) which gives the following rules of application:
I. The amount to be included in the decedent's gross estate is that part
of the purchase price furnished by him over the total purchase price
multiplied by the fair market value of the property at his death."
63. H. R. 6715, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) and recommending passage as the
Technical Corrections Act of 1978, S. REP. No. 95-745, 95th Cong. 2d Sess. (1978).
(Hereinafter cited as Technical Corrections Act of 1978).
64. T.R.A. 1976, supra note 3.
65. The alternate valuation date may be substituted if chosen. See I.R.C. §2032.
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2. Any money or property given by decedent to his spouse which in turn
was used to pay for the joint property would be treated as if the decedent
had made that contribution.
3. If the above property or money generated income in the hands of the
surviving spouse and that income was contributed toward the joint prop-
erty, then such income would be deemed her contribution.
4. If the survivor realized capital gains from the sale of property pre-
viously given by the decedent and contributed those gains, such gains
would be treated as a contribution by the survivor." Yet, this probably
would not be true if the appreciated property had been contributed with-
out prior realization of gain."
5. If the decedent and survivor acquired the property from a third party
by gift, bequest, devise or inheritance in tenancy by the entirety, then only
one-half will be in the decedent's gross estate.
Since the burden is on the surviving spouse to prove contribution
to the purchase price of the property,"8 it is often easier to allege contri-
bution than to prove it. Generally, it is the widow who must prove her
contribution.69 In meeting this burden of proof, she faces the difficulty
66. This rule is contra to the Regulations, example (4), but is supported by
Harvey v. United States, 185 F. 2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950). In Harvey, the donee spouse
contributed gains from the sale of gift property from her husband toward the purchase
of the joint property. The court treated these gains as belonging to the donee spouse
and therefore part of her contributions. However, if the appreciated property merely
changed character without a corresponding change in ownership, then it will not fall
within the contribution exception of §2040(a) (i.e., sale of joint appreciated property to
joint proceeds to purchase of new joint property). See Endicott Trust Co. v. United
States, 305 F. Supp. 943 (N.D. N.Y. 1969).
67. Treas. Reg. §20.2040-1(c), example (4) (1960).
68. Tuck v. United States, 282 F. 2d 405 (9th Cir. 1960).
69. Generally the Internal Revenue Service recognized contributions of the widow
from:
I. Outside sources prior to marriage. I.R.C. §2040(a).
2. Income earned from work outside of marriage after marriage. I.R.C.
§2040(a).
3. Gift or inheritance. I.R.C. §2040(a).
4. Income from property previously given by her husband. Estate of Howard v.
Comm., 9 T.C. 1192 (1947).
5. Realized gains from property previously given by her husband. Harvey v.
United States. 185 F.2d 463 (7th Cir. 1950).
6. Income from the jointly owned property. Estate of Giuliani v. Comm., I I Tax
Ct. Mem. (CCH) 673 (1952).
7. Support rights. Rev. Rule 68-374.
8. Assumption of mortgage. Bremmer v. Luff, 7 F. Supp. 148 (N.D. N.Y. 1933).
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of convincing the Internal Revenue Service to recognize not only her
contribution of income, but also the contribution of her services to the
acquisition of the joint property.' The repeated refusal of the Internal
Revenue Service and the courts to recognize these services as considera-
tion was the impetus behind Congress' enactment of §2040(b).71 The
problem of tracing contributions was also a factor in this 1976
"reform."72
70. If the husband and wife purchase the jointly held property with funds acquired
frorlh a business enterprise carried on together, the court will recognize the wife's services
as adequate consideration. See Berkowitz v. Comm., 108 F. 2d 319 (3rd Cir. 1939) and
Singer v. Shaugnessy, 198 F. 2d 178 (2nd Cir. 1952). This appears to be the rule even if
the business is purchased in the name of one spouse for a low down-payment and,
through the joint effort of the other spouse, the mortgage is paid off before the property
is transformed to a tenancy by the entirety. See Estate of Otte v. Comm., 31 Tax Ct.
Mem. (CCH) 301 (1972). However, if a court feels these business services were rendered
out of love and affection, it will refuse to recognize them as consideration. See Bushman
v. United States, 8 F. Supp. 694 (Ct. Cl. 1934). Generally, all domestic services fall in
this category and are not recognized by the court. See Estate of Lyons v. Comm., 35
Tax Ct. Mem. (CCH) 605 (1976). In Lyons, the entire value of the jointly owned
property was included in the decedent's gross estate even though his wife contributed
her savings from the household allowance he gave her. The scope of domestic services
has been expanded by the courts to include the nursing of one's spouse. In Estate of
Loveland v. Comm., 13 T.C. 5 (1949), the court ignored a written contract between the
spouses regarding the dollar payment of such services and stated that, since the wife
was under a legal duty to render them, they were not adequate consideration. For a more
expanded discussion of the widow's problems, see Kruse, Estate Tax Section 2040:
Homemaker's Contributions to Jointly Owned Property, 29 TAx LAw 623 (1976).
71. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19, at 19 and 20. The report explains
that "it is often difficult, as between spouses, to determine the degree to which each
spouse is responsible for the acquisition and improvement of the jointly owned prop-
erty." In justifying the new act, the committee claims that "the effect of including only
one-half the value of the property in the gross estate in these situations is to implicitly
recognize the services furnished by a spouse toward the accumulation of the jointly
owned property even though a monetary value of the services cannot be accurately
determined."
72. Id. Most often joint property owners do not keep adequate records of respec-
tive contributions. In such cases the courts will step in and make an arbitrary determina-
tion. See Estate of Ehret v. Comm., 35 Tax Ct. Mem. (CCH) 1432 (1976). An astute
estate planner should foresee this and prepare a financial history of the property. For a
more in depth analysis, see Cantwell, House and Home-Some Estate Planning
Architecture for the Family Dwelling and Its Contents, 1972 U. OF M. INST. ON EST.
PLAN. 72.1703.
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B. §2040(b) Certain Joint Interests of Husband and Wife
Section 2040(b) was to be the panacea for the evils of §2040. If a
taxpayer could qualify under this section he could avoid the
"unnecessarily complex""3 provisions of §2040(a) which often resulted
in double taxation and difficulty in determining each spouse's respective
contribution. 7
Admittedly, §2040(b) appears to be an easier solution. Utilizing a
fractional formula, as opposed to §2040(a)'s contribution test, it in-
cludes fifty percent of the value of jointly held property in the decedent's
gross estate if the statute's requirements can be met.
To qualify, the joint tenancy must:
I. Be created by either the husband, wife, or both;
2. Be created by a gift,"
A. and, in the case of real property, one must elect to treat
the creation of the joint tenancy as a gift at that time;"
3. Have as its sole tenants the decedent and the decedant's spouse;
and
4. Be created after December 31, 1976.
Despite the appearance of simplicity, this new amendment has ac-
tually created more complications than it was designed to avoid. One
of the main goals of the House Ways and Means Committee in creating
this section was to avoid subjecting the same piece of property to a gift
tax on the creation of the joint tenancy and to an estate tax upon the
death of the donor.77 However, the double taxation problem was not as
harsh as it appeared. Since one had a choice as to whether to pay a gift
tax upon the creation of a joint tenancy in realty or to pay the tax after
the subsequent sale of the property, most individuals opted to defer the
tax until the time of the sale." Moreover, even if a gift tax was paid upon
the creation of the joint tenancy, the property was never actually sub-
jected to a double tax. The old law, which remains the general rule of
§2040, merely exposed the property to the highest transfer tax. This is
73. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19, at 19-21.
74. Id.
75. Technical Corrections Act of 1978, supra note 63, proposes to do away
with actuarial computations in valuing joint interests in gifts of personalty.
76. One must make an election under §2515.
77. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19, at 19.
78. I.R.C. §2515.
1 22 8
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true because §2012 allowed as a credit against the decedent's estate tax
the amount of the gift tax previously paid on that property. Since the
gift tax rate prior to 1976 was only three-quarters -that of the estate tax
rate," there would always be an additional tax to the estate even if the
fair market value of the property remained constant from the time of
the creation of the joint tenancy. However, if the property had appre-
ciated in value before the donor's death, an estate tax would also be
levied against the appreciation. Thus, the payment of the gift tax was
merely a partial prepayment of the higher estate tax on the property.
The solution under §2040(b) is not as beneficial as the Committee
claims.8 An election under this section eliminates payment of an estate
tax on one-half of the appreciation of jointly held property, but also
requires the immediate payment of a gift tax when the election is made.81
This tax would be determined under the new single unified rate schedule
for estate and gift taxes. 2
Therefore, §2040(b) does no more than eliminate estate taxation on
half of the appreciation of the property. Moreover, to qualify, the tax-
payer is required to make a §2515' s election in the case of real property
and in the case of personal property which falls under the proposed
Technical Corrections Bill of 1978.81 The effects of making such an
79. 1975 I.R.C. §§2001, 2501, 2502.
80. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19.
81. A prerequisite for qualification under §2040(b) is that the creation of the joint
tenancy constitutes a gift. I.R.C. §2040(b)(2)(B).
82. I.R.C. §§2502, 2001.
83. Congress attempted to make the §2040(b)(1) exclusion of 50% conform to the
amended §2515(c) gift of 50%. However, as SuRREY, supra note 57, at 493 points out,
this apparent internal consistency is not always achieved.
For example, assume A makes a cash gift of $100 to her spouse B in 1977.
Subsequently A and B purchase stock for $200 to chase price the $100 he was
previously given by A. A predeceases B when the stock is worth $300. The creation
of the joint tenancy in these circumstances, assuming A and B have a 50 percent
interest in the jointly held property, is not in whole or part a gift. Thus, on A's
death section 2040(a) would apply and, due to the fact that no part of the consid-
eration for the purchase of the property belonged originally to B or was acquired
by him from A for full and adequate consideration, the entire $300 value of the
property will be included in A's gross estate. If, however, A had not given the
$100 outright to B but rather had invested the same $200 in securities to which
title was taken in joint names, the acquisition of the securities would be a com-
plete gift of $100 from A to B and at A's death only $150 would be included in
her estate.
84. Technical Corrections Act of 1978, supra note 63, would allow a taxpayer
to make an election as to whether to treat the creation of a joint tenancy in personal
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election to prepay the tax can be determined under a fairly complex
mathematical formula.1 This formula requires the user to make an
assumption as to the growth rate of the property, the present value of
the dollar and the time of disposition of the property."s
The House Ways and Means Committee Report also claimed that
§2040(b) implicitly recognizes the services of a spouse, even though the
monetary value of those services cannot be determined. s7 The legislative
intent behind §2040(b) was to arbitrarily set the value of such services
as a fifty percent contribution to the value of the joint property for
purposes of qpplying the estate tax contribution test." However, this
legislative purpose has not been accomplished. The Internal Revenue
Service in no way recognizes the value of such services because, to
qualify for §2040(b), the joint tenancy must be treated as a gift. If, in
determining the amount of that gift, the donee spouse wished to consider
her services as contribution, these services would be susceptible to the
property as a gift "for §2040(b) purposes if he failed to file a gift tax return in the past.
85. Banks and Due, Joint Realty and the Gift Tax Election, 54 TAXEs 250 (1976)
presents a formula approach to the problem of whether to make a gift election. The
authors use a number of assumptions; for instance, applying a reasonable growth rate
to the property enables one to predict the market value at termination. They admit that
it may not apply to all situations, but state that, at the very least, it is more systematic
than a purely subjective approach. Basically, there are five steps in calculating the
formula. One must:
I. Determine the present value of the dollar;
2. Apply a reasonable growth rate to estimate the fair market value of the
property at termination;
3. Compute the gift tax on the donor's transfer;
4. Calculate the estimated tax on the property at termination of the joint ten-
ancy if no gift tax had been paid at creation and reduce to present value; and
5. Compare tax on creation to tax on termination after reduced to present value.
To use the formula, let:
P= cost of realty at creation of tenancy;
M= marital deduction;
E= annual exclusion;
T= applicable gift tax rate;
V= appreciated fair market value of property at time of termination;
T1= effective rate on taxable gift due to the cumulative nature of gift tax
computation;
RA= relative disadvantage/advantage; and
PV= present value.
+ -(M - E)T' (PV) - (V - M - E)T (PV) RA
2 2
86. Id.
87. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19, at 19 and 20.
88. Id.
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same tests of valuation used under pre-1977 §2040.1 These tests would
also apply in a post-1977 severance-recreation situation. For instance,
if no election is made to treat the formation of the joint tenancy as a
taxable event, its severance will result in a taxable gift to the extent that
either spouse received proceeds in excess of his or her proportional
contribution to the total purchase price of the property.
The Report" makes a helpful suggestion for those tenants with pre-
1977 joint tenancies. If they wish to qualify under the amended rules of
§2040(b), all that is required is a severance and recreation of the existing
joint interest. Yet, this provision has created new complications for the
taxpayer. Aside from the previously discussed problems of severance
and recreation,92 there also remain unanswered questions as to what will
occur where a third party is involved in this process. For example, in
some jurisdictions a person cannot transfer property which he owns
individually, to himself and his spouse in joint tenancy, without the use
of a "straw man. 9 3 Technically, then, since the "straw man" recreated
the joint tenancy, it would not meet the requirements of §2040(b)(2)(A)9'
and therefore would not qualify under §2040(b). This also raises the
question as to what would occur if the joint property was acquired from
the third party in a part-sale, part-gift transaction. Quaere: Does the
third party's gift exclude the complete transaction from §2040(b) or is
the property treated as if a portion qualified under §2040(b) with the
remaining portion governed by §2040(a)?95
Section 2035 adds another twist to the severance-recreation prob-
lem. A probable situation would be where the taxpayer, in contempla-
tion of death, wishes to exclude from his taxable estate one-half of the
value of joint property he purchased without contribution from his
spouse. He could terminate the joint interest, collect all the proceeds,
then recreate the joint tenancy and make a §2515 election. However, if
he died within three years of making the election, his plans would be
foiled. While it is true that only one-half of the joint interest would be
brought into his gross estate under §2040(b), §2035 would bring the
89. See note 71 supra; See also I.R.C. §§251 1, 2512 and 2043.
90. Id.
91. Cong. Rep. on T.R.A. 1976, supra note 19, at 20.
92. See text accompanying notes 59 through 62 supra.
93. SURREY, supra note 57, at 492, discusses this problem in more detail.
94. §2040(b)(2)(A), which is one of the requirements for qualifying under
§2040(b), states that "such joint interest was created by the decedent, the decedent's
spouse, or both."
95. Note 94 supra.
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remaining one-half in as a gift made within three years of death. Ulti-
mately, a tax would be paid on the entire value of the jointly held
property.
The preceeding discussion illustrates why the new amendment does
not meet the Committee's expectations. Section 2040(b) does not specif-
ically recognize a spouse's services as contribution to a joint tenancy
and, while it has eliminated the burdensome treatment of appreciation
on half of the property, it does no more than that which would be
effectuated by a lifetime gift. That is, it removes certain property from
a decedent's gross estate after a gift tax has been exacted. Yet, in doing
so, it has originated many complexities.
5. THE COMPLEXITIES OF §2040(b) AND
ESTATE PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
Since qualification under §2040(b) has the same effect as a gift of
one-half of the joint property to the spouse, it is important for the estate
planner to know if and when he should use this qualified joint interest
as opposed to another format. The traditional estate planning advice,
as discussed in the introduction to this article, was to avoid the use of
joint ownership as an estate planning device." The following analysis
should make it clear that the advent of §2040(b) has not affected the
wisdom of that recommendation.97 To understand the soundness of this
counsel, one must re-examine joint interests in light of the changes made
by the Tax Reform Act of 1976.98
Proper use of the estate tax marital deduction 9 is the key to good
estate planning. This deduction allows one spouse to pass the greater
of $250,000 or one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate to the
surviving spouse without tax consequences,110 with an adjustment for
96. This, of course, disregards any non-tax reasons for holding joint property.
97. Since an election under §2515 is necessary to qualify under §2040(b) for real
property and perhaps personal property under H. R. 6715, the above analysis is equally
applicable to §2515.
98. Prior to 1976 the gift tax rate was three-fourths that of the estate tax rate.
This difference in schedules played a significant role in estate planning, since it is
obvious that one would gain a tax advantage by transferring his property during his life
as opposed to disposing of that same property at death. However, the Tax Reform Act
of 1976 has brought the gift tax rate under a single unified tax schedle. See I.R.C. §§2001
and 2502. This unified tax rate has caused estate planners to take a second look at their
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inter vivos gifts between the spouses. The property thus passed must be
of a type that will be included in the taxable gross estate of the surviving
spouse, unless otherwise consumed.' Thus, the effect of the marital
deduction is to permit one-half of the wealthier spouse's property to
escape immediate transfer taxation by simply deferring the tax until the
death of the surviving spouse. In addition to this deferral benefit, the
deduction also allows the wealthier spouse to effectively divide his prop-
erty in such a manner so that each spouse will hold, for tax purposes,
one-half of the total property. Since the sum of two taxes, one on each
half of the assets, is less than one tax on the total possessions under the
graduated tax system, this division should reduce the total transfer tax
for the spouses.
The unified tax credit 02 adds one more factor for the estate plan-
ner's consideration. After December 31, 1980, this credit will be $47,000
and will allow one to transfer up to $175,625 without payment of a
tax.' ° If the spouses are considered as a unit, then $351,250 of their
property can escape transfer taxation.
Estate planners have derived marital deduction formulas to calcu-
late exactly how much property should pass to the surviving spouse at
the death of the testator."4 These formulas take into consideration life-
time gifts between spouses, the unified credit and the maximum marital
deduction allowance. If one does not take the maximum unified credit
but instead passes the property to his spouse under the marital deduc-
tion, the property will be included in the surviving spouse's taxable
estate. 5 Therefore, it is essential to take full advantage of the unified
credit. The surviving spouse can be afforded lifetime use of property not
qualifying under the marital deduction through the use of a non-marital
trust. In the past, joint interests have created a problem in calculating
the marital formula since such interests automatically pass to the survi-
vor's estate. If the joint interest is large enough, it will cause the marital
formula to be overfunded and consequently subject the property to
needless tax in the survivor's estate. Unfortunately, §2040(b) has not
changed this. A qualified joint interest operates in the same manner as
101. I.R.C. §2056(b).
102. I.R.C. §2010.
103. I.R.C. §§2010 and 2505.
104. Bush, Transfers Between Husband and Wife: Inter Vivos and Testamentary,
as Affected by the Marital Deduction and Property Previously Taxed, 30 N.Y.U. TAX
INST. 695 (1972).
105. I.R.C. §§2010, 2505, 2056 and 2523.
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a non-qualified joint interest, with the exception that only half of the
property is included in the decedent's gross estate.
The unification of transfer tax rates"'8 and the introduction of a
unified tax credit t1 t make it necessary in estate planning to consider all
lifetime, as well as testamentary, transfers. Prior to 1976, the main
advantage of a lifetime gift between spouses was that the property trans-
ferred was subjected to a lower tax rate08 and a separate gift tax exemp-
tion. 109 Although those benefits have been eliminated by the new unified
federal tax system, there are now other reasons why inter vivos gifts
between spouses might be advantageous. Before deciding whether a
qualified joint interest should be implemented, the tax planner must
understand these reasons. An examination of the marital deduction will
reveal two such reasons. The gift tax marital deduction is 100% of the
value of the first $100,000 of gift property, without a deduction for the
next $100,000.110 For gifts in excess of $200,000, the deduction is limited
to fifty percent of the value of the transferred property."' Section
2056(a) permits a deduction of up to the greater of $250,000 or one-half
of the decedent's adjusted gross estate less the difference between the
amount allowed for post-1976 transfers and fifty percent of the value
of such transfers. This adjustment gives rise to the first advantage of
lifetime gifts: by using such gifts, one can increase the total marital
deductions allowed. 12
The second advantage of lifetime gifts is clear from an analysis of
the purpose of using the marital deduction. Its principal effect is that
the total tax on the spouse's assets is reduced by the division of such
assets into two estates. However, the savings that result from splitting
the spouse's assets into two estates may not be achieved if the estate tax
marital deduction is used alone since, to realize these tax savings, the
wealthier spouse must predecease the other. However, spouses can in-
sure against the tax consequences arising from an "unfavorable" order
106. I.R.C. §§2001 and 2502.
107. I.R.C. §§2010 and 2505.
108. 1975 I.R.C. §§2001, 2501 and 2502.
109. 1975 I.R.C. §2521.
110. I.R.C. §2523(a).
Ill. Id.
112. The following table is reprinted from SURREY, supra note 57, at 812. An
analysis of this table will show the advantage of lifetime gifts between spouses with a
total gross estate of $485,000. The table could be modified to fit any estate planning
situation. A simple substitution of the gross estate in question would allow the estate
planner to opt for the maximum tax saving plan.
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of death by making lifetime interspousal gifts, thereby equalizing their
respective gross estates. The remainder of the estate not qualifying for
the marital deduction must bypass the spouse's gross estate, since failure
to do so will subject the property to an additional tax. Likewise, the
donee spouse's assets must bypass the other's gross estate.
The unified credit presents another reason for lifetime gifts. To
obtain the maximum benefit from this credit, two conditions must be
I. A predeceases B
A's Estate.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adjusted gross estate
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met. First, each spouse must have in his or her respective estate enough
property to take full advantage of the credit. Second, the amount of
property covered by the credit must bypass the surviving spouse's gross
estate. Lifetime gifts from the wealthier spouse to the donee spouse can
accomplish the first objective and protect against the consequences of
an unexpected order of death.113
Lifetime gifts between spouses, therefore, are used to increase the
marital deduction and to shelter each spouse's unified credit and marital
deductions. Since election under §2515 and subsequent qualification
under §2040(b) creates a lifetime gift, it is important to determine
whether this form will accomplish the above purposes. While a § 2040(b)
joint interest qualifies for the marital deduction for both gift and estate
tax purposes"' and will thus accomplish the objective of increasing the
marital deduction, it will not achieve the remaining two objectives.
The underlying requirement for effective use of lifetime gifts is that
the property be permanently removed from the donor's gross estate.
Consequently, the fact that the joint property automatically passes to
the estate of the survivor makes this format of gift undesirable, for, if
the donee dies first, the return of the property to the donor will place it
back into his tax base a second time. This return will destroy the estate-
splitting effect of the marital deduction that the lifetime gifts were used
to preserve. This return will also squander that portion of the donee
spouse's unified credit that would have been used had the joint property
passed to a younger generation.
A qualified joint interest is distinguished from a nonqualified joint
A's Estate.
Adjusted gross estate $485,000 $475,000 $375,000 $309,375 $237,500
plus: taxable trans-
fers to spouse 0 0 0 62,625 115,750
Total transfers sub-
ject to tax 485,000 475,000 375,000 372,000 353,250
Tentative tax 150,700 147,300 113,300 112,280 105,905
less: unified credit 47,000 47,000 47,000 47,000 47,000
Tax payable 103,700 100,300 66,300 65,280 58,905
Total transfer tax $103,700 $100,300 $ 66,300 $ 65,280 $ 81,905
113. The donor must live for three years after making the gift; otherwise §2035.
will include it in his gross estate.
114. I.R.C. §§2523(d) and 2056.
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interest in that it removes half of the property from the donor spouse's
estate. However, since gifts are added back for the purpose of determin-
ing the ultimate estate transfer tax, §2040(b)'s effect is to remove one-
half of the appreciation of the joint property from the donor's estate.15
Lifetime gifts will also achieve this result, but without as many compli-
cations.
On the other hand, if the donee spouse should die first, holding
§2040(b) property, half of it will be included in her gross estate. How-
ever, if that property qualified under §2040(a), it would escape taxation
in her estate. This treatment under §2040(b)might in some instances
produce an unexpected tax benefit.
Prior to 1976, many surviving joint owners who had purchased joint
property sought to include the total property in the predeceasing
spouse's gross estate. This was accomplished by withholding any evi-
dence of contribution, with the intent to achieve a stepped-up basis in
the property. However, in Madden v. Commissioner,"' the court re-
jected this scheme. It held that §1014, which allows a stepped-up basis
for property passing from a decedent, contains a qualification that such
property must be included in the deceased spouse's estate."7 The court
stated that inclusion was not required here, since available, though un-
produced, evidence of the survivor's contribution was in existence."18
Since fifty percent of a joint interest under §2040(b) is required to
be included in the donee spouse's gross estate, § 1014 should be satisfied.
However, this half of the property should only receive a fresh-start basis
as of its December 31, 1976 value 1' under the new §1023, since car-
ryover basis property is defined in §1023(b)(1) as property passing from
the decedent within the meaning of §1014. It should be noted that one
could obtain a fresh-start basis on all of the property by simply transfer-
ring it outright to the poorer spouse.
Since the creation of a joint tenancy does not remove property from
a donor's gross estate and since any possible tax advantage of this
format can be matched by lifetime gifts, it should be avoided as a tax
planning tool. The tax planner may avoid the adverse tax consequences
I 15. I.R.C. §2001(b). For a further discussion on lifetime gifts and §2040(b), see
generally, Horn, Much Ado About Nothing: New Section 2040(b), 3 ESTATES, GIFrs
AND TRUSTS JOURNAL 14 (1978).
116. 52 T.C. 845, aff'd. 440 F. 2d 784 (7th Cir. 1971).
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of joint interests by simply severing the tenancy.12 Thus, only through
a clear understanding of the negative implications involved in joint ten-
ancies can the estate planner bring the most benefit to his client.
David C. Miller
Robert C. Rogers, Jr.
120. There are nine methods of severing a joint tenancy:
I. Returning title to the donor;
2. Exchanging joint interests;
3. Converting to tenancy in common;
4. Vesting sole ownership in the donor;
5. Severance of interests;
6. Sale to a third party;
7. Gift to a third party;
8. Sale of one tenant's interest to another; and
9. Increase in mortgage indebtedness.
Each method has a different effect on estate, gift and income taxes, so care must be
taken when selecting a method. For a more complete discussion of these considerations,
see Worthy, supra note 2, and Holdsworth, supra note 60. Although these articles were
written prior to 1976, the basic tax considerations have not changed. However, one
should now consider I.R.C. §2035, gifts within three years of death, and §2513(a), gift
splitting, when making a gift to a third party. Another factor to consider is the §2515(c)
elimination of actuarial tables with regard to certain joint interests.
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Workmen's Compensation: What if the Employer
Gets the Employee Drunk?
Under Florida law, the defense of intoxication can be asserted by an
employer when his employee makes a claim for workmen's compensa-
tion. Section 440.09(3) of the Florida Statutes deals in pertinent part
with the defense of intoxication wherein: "No compensation shall be
payable if the injury was occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the
employee .. '.."I This statute, and the decisions interpreting it, stand
for the general proposition that, if an injury was caused primarily by
the claimant's intoxication and it can be shown that the intoxication was
the proximate cause of the injury, then recovery will be denied.2
In construing Section 440.09(3), Florida courts have been con-
cerned with the causal relationship of the claimant's conduct to the
injury.3 It is surprising to note, however, that the courts do not mention
the employer's possible culpability: "What if the employer gets the
employee drunk?" 4
To date, there have been no cases in Florida dealing with this
problem. This paper will explore the resolution of this issue in other
jurisdictions and apply existing Florida law to the analyses rendered.
1. SOLUTIONS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In Tate v. Industrial Accident Commission,5 the California District
Court of Appeals, when confronted with a case where the employer
bought drinks for the claimant and then sent him home in a company
car, held:
I. § 440.09(3) FLA. STAT. (1977).
2. See, e.g., Zee v. Gary, 189 So. 34 (Fla. 1939), where the Florida Supreme
Court adopted the view that an injury caused by extreme intoxication of the employee
does not arise out of the employment.
3. See, e.g., Cone Brothers Contracting Co. v. Allbrook Co., 16 So. 2d 61 (Fla.
1943); Duval Engineering and Contracting Co. v. Johnson, 16 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1944).
4. L. M. ALPERT, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 19-12 at 493
(2nd ed. 1975).
5. 120 Cal. App. 2d 657, 261 P. 2d 759 (1st DCA 1953).
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Such a state of facts, if found to exist, would support a finding of estop-
pel. Such participation by the employer amounts to an implied represen-
tation that the employer will not hold it against the employee if he drinks,
and will not deprive him of his job or of compensation benefits if he
does so.'
Thus, the employer was prohibited from raising the intoxication of the
employee as a defense to the claim for benefits.
In the leading California case, McCarty v. Workmen's Compensa-
tion Appeals Board,' the employee's estate claimed death benefits for a
fatal injury which occurred when the worker was returning home from
a company-sponsored activity where the employer had permitted and
encouraged the consumption of alcoholic beverages. The California
Supreme Court, in overruling the Workmen's Compensation Appeals
Board, held that the employer was estopped from asserting the defense
of employee intoxication since the facts demonstrated that the purchase
of intoxicants with company funds and the employer's active involve-
ment in the service of liquor at a company activity brought the em-
ployee's conduct within the scope of employment.'
The New Hampshire Supreme Court adopted an approach similar
to Tate in Henderson v. Sherwood Motor Hotel, Inc.9 There, the em-
ployee, a cocktail waitress, became intoxicated while on duty. The em-
ployer, aware of her condition, allowed her to leave work alone. In
upholding the employee's claim which arose out of an automobile acci-
dent on the way to her home, the court reasoned that, "[i]f the accident
resulted from her intoxication, her death could clearly be found to have
arisen 'out of' her employment."' 0 In reviewing the facts, the court
concluded that the employer, in effect, had directed the deceased em-
ployee to the location of the accident and contributed to her intoxicated
condition: "The fact that the accident was caused by the decedent's
intoxication is no bar to the action, since it was stated that 'the employer
knew that the employee was intoxicated.""'
6. 261 P. 2d at 764.
7. 12 Cal. 3d 677, 117 Cal. Rptr. 65, 527 P. 2d 617 (1974).
8. Id. at 684-85, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 69-70, 527 P. 2d at 622.
9. 201 A. 2d 891 (N.H. 1964).
10. Id. at 894. "The time bomb ... is started ticking during working hours, but
it happens to go off at a time and place remote from the employment. The hazards of
the employment follow the claimant beyond the time and space limits of his work and
there injure him." Id., citing 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW, § 29.22 at
450.
11. 201 A. 2d at 894.
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Workmen's Compensation: Employee Intoxication
In an important Indiana case, United States Steel Corporation v,
Mason," the employer allowed the claimant to operate a crane while
he was intoxicated. The Appellate Court found that, under those cir-
cumstances, an affirmative duty was placed on the employer by com-
mon law:
By no means do we excuse drinking or intoxication on the part of employ-
ees on any job, nor do we mean to contravene the statute that bars
recovery by employees who are intoxicated. What we are saying is that
when a violation is as evident and plain as in this case, the employer must
take some step to eliminate any semblance of approval or acquiescence.'
A review of existing case law shows that, in other jurisdictions,
when an employer allows or encourages his employee to become intoxi-
cated, such acquiescence bars him from raising intoxication as a defense
to a claim by the employee. This holds true even if the injuries are
sustained away from the employer's premises, once it can be shown that
the main activity of the worker was within the scope of his employment,
Le., a company function."
By comparison, in other states, this issue is encompassed within the
statutory framework. For example, Chapter 30, Section 61 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Maine provides:
No compensation or other benefits shall be allowed for the injury or death
of an employee where it is proved that . . . the same resulted from his
intoxication while on duty. This provision as to intoxication shall not
apply, if the employer knew that the employee was intoxicated or that
he was in the habit of becoming intoxicated while on duty. 5
Under this statute, if the claimant can show that the employer knew of
either specific intoxication or habitual drunkenness, he can prevent the
employer from raising the defense of intoxication. It is interesting to
note that Maine has carried the doctrine of employer responsibility set
forth in the common law one step further to cover the case of a worker
who has exhibited alcoholic dependency on previous occasions.
12. 227 N.E. 2d 684 (Ind. App. Ct. 1967).
13. Id. at 696.
14. See generally 47. A.L.R. 3d 566 (1973).
15. ME. REV. STAT. ch. 39, § 61 (1964) (emphasis added).
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2. DEVELOPING THE THEORY IN FLORIDA
Two of the basic postulates applied in other jurisdictions could also
be argued in Florida cases. First, the doctrine of estoppel', and second,
the scope of employment theory. 7
The application of the estoppel doctrine to workmen's' compensa-
tion cases is stated generally in Mercier v. American Refractories and
Crucible Corporation:"
[A]n employer may, by his conduct, estop himself from asserting what
under other circumstances would constitute a good defense to a claim for
consideration . . Estoppel involves the two elements of misleading con-
duct by one party and prejudicial harm resulting to the other party. 9
Unfortunately, use of the estoppel doctrine has been limited in
Florida compensation law to questions involving entitlement to compen-
sation. In Butler v. Allied Dairy Products,"0 the court held that an
employer and its insurance carrier, which had for several years provided
medical attention and treatment to an employee injured outside the
state, were estopped from disclaiming further liability for benefits on the
ground that the employment contract was not executed in Florida.',
Similarly, in Blair v. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc.,"2 the employee was
hired in Florida to do construction work in Puerto Rico and was injured
and hospitalized in Puerto Rico. When he left the hospital, his supervi-
sor purchased transportation for him to return to Florida, where he was
provided with medical treatment by the employer. The court, in holding
that the employer was estopped from insisting that the claimant return
to Puerto Rico for medical treatment and compensation, said, "[t~he
employer-carrier may not now be allowed to say there is no coverage
in Florida when their prior conduct logically led the Petitioner to believe
16. See text accompanying notes 5 and 6 supra.
17. See text accompanying notes 7 through II supra.
18. 200 A. 2d 716 (Conn. 1964).
19. Id. at 720.
20. 151 So. 2d 279 (Fla. 1963).
21. Id. at 283. The Florida Workmen's Compensation statute provides that, if the
employment contract is executed in Florida, an employee who is injured outside of the
state is entitled to compensation. Id. at 281. The court pointed out that the gist of the
statute is not whether the Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction over the
subject matter, but whether the claimant is entitled to benefits. Id. at 283.
22. 193 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1966).
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that he could expect and receive coverage here."'
Therefore, since the doctrine of estoppel is utilized in other areas
of Florida compensation law, it might also be employed to bar the
defense of employee intoxication. The two elements for estoppel enunci-
ated in Mercier"4 would be satisfied by showing: 1) misleading con-
duct by one party - the employer's acquiescence in or encouragement
of the employee's intoxication; and 2) prejudicial harm resulting to the
other party - the employee's loss of compensation benefits.,
The more fruitful approach to this issue may be found within the
framework of "scope of employment.""6 If it can be shown that em-
ployee drinking is within that "scope," the employer may be held liable
for claims arising out of injuries proximately caused by the intoxication.
The general test for connection to work is stated succinctly as
follows:
A compensable injury must arise not only within the time and space limits
of the employment, but also in the course of an activity related to the
employment. An activity is related to the employment if it carries out the
employer's purposes or advances his interests directly or indirectly.
Under the modern trend of decisions, even if the activity cannot be said
in any sense to advance the employer's interests, it may still be in the
course of employment if, in view of the nature of the employment envi-
ronment, the characteristics of human nature, and the customs or prac-
tices of the particular employment, the activity is in fact an inherent part
of the conditions of that employment."
In Florida, this doctrine has been codified at Section 440.02(6) of the
Florida Statutes, which defines "injury" as "personal injury or death by
accident arising out of and in the course of employment. . . ."2 Fol-
lowing the enactment of this statute, the Florida Supreme Court was
23. Id. at 175. The parties agreed that, since the contract was for employment
exclusively out of state, the claimant would otherwise have been barred from recovery.
But see Wainright v. Wainright, Inc., 237 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 1970) (citing Butler and Blair,
but holding that there was no waiver or estoppel in this particular case).
24. 200 A. 2d 716.
25. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
26. This doctrine, concerned with causal connection, holds that an employee's
injuries would be compensable if he could show that the injuries would not have hap-
pened but for the conditions of the employment. See generally I LARSON, THE LAW OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, Ch. III (1978).
27. LARSON, supra note 26, § 20.00 at 5-I.
28. § 440.02(6) FLA. STAT. (1978).
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confronted with an employee intoxication case in Johnson v. Koffee
Kettle Restaurant,9 where the employee was killed while walking across
the highway from his place of employment, a restaurant, to obtain
supplies from the grocery store across the street. His breath was found
to contain an odor of alcoholic beverage. Nevertheless, the court al-
lowed recovery."
In another Florida intoxication case, Maroney v. Kelly and Sons,
Inc.,31 the claimant was entrusted with the employer's truck. After he
completed a business mission, he drank beer with a fellow employee. He
then realized that he had forgotten certain documents and decided to
return to the place where he had left them. While en route, he was
injured. The court denied compensation, applying the deviation from
employment doctrine, 2 without commenting on the intoxication issue
or the employer's knowledge of the employee's drinking.33
Florida courts have been confronted with various cases involving
the liabilityof employers for injuries sustained by employees who fol-
lowed their employers' directions. For example, in Taylor v. Dixie Ply-
wood Company,34 the court awarded compensation to an employee
who was injured in an automobile accident on the way to his doctor's
office, after being directed by his employer to seek medical attention for
a job-related injury which occurred earlier that day. Similarly, in Heller
Brothers Packing Company v. Lewis, 5 the Florida Supreme Court
based its ruling for the claimant on the rationale that, when the em-
ployer "directed" the employee to take the company jeep and obtain
29. 125 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1960).
30. In allowing recovery, the following test was applied:
[Ilt is essential that claimant prove or show a state of facts from which it may be
reasonably inferred that deceased was engaged in his master's business when the
accident resulting in his injury took place. If the evidence to establish such a state
of facts is competent and substantial and comports with reason or from which it
may be reasonably inferred that deceased was engaged in his master's business
when he was injured, it is sufficient.
Id. at 299. It is interesting to note that the defense of employee intoxication was not
mentioned by the court.
31. 195 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 1967).
32. This doctrine holds that an employee who deviates from his employment
duties in order to conduct personal business is not entitled to compensation for injuries
sustained before he returns to those duties. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York
v. Moore, 196 So. 495 (Fla. 1940).
33. 195 So. 2d at 209-10.
34. 297 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1974).
35. 20 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1945).
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lunch (at which time he was injured), the employer was advancing his
own interests.-
Similar holdings may be found in cases where the employer sup-
plies transportation for the employee. In Huddock v. Grant Motor
Company,"' the Florida Supreme Court found that injuries sustained
by an employee who is provided with transportation by the employer
are compensable when that arrangement is:
the result of an express or implied agreement between the employer and
his workman or when it has ripened into a custom to the extent that it is
incidental to and part of the contract of employment, or when it is with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the employer, or when it is the result
of a continued practice in the course of the employer's business, and
which practice is beneficial to both the employer and the employee.,
This theory, by analogy, could be applied to the issue under discus-
sion. If the employee could show that the employer provided him with
the opportunity to become intoxicated, acquiesced in or encouraged his
drinking, the employee could argue that his resulting behavior should
be considered within the scope of employment. Therefore, any resulting
injury would be compensable, despite an assertion by the employer that
the defense of employee intoxication would defeat the claim.
A more restrictive approach has been taken in the area of recrea-
tion than in other employer-supplied activities. For example, in Mathias
v. City of South Daytona,"8 the Florida Supreme Court denied a peti-
tion for writ of certiorari to review the order of the Industrial Relations
Commission denying benefits to a police officer who was injured at a
36. Id. at 387. The court recognized the general principle that there is no liability
when an injury occurs during lunchtime and away from the employer's premises, even
though the employee may be riding in the employer's vehicle, "on the theory that the
accident did not arise out of or in the course of the employment." Id. at 387. Neverthe-
less, it upheld the award for compensation, stating:
The foreman well knew that a hungry fruit picker could not render very efficient
services and a lunch would enhance the interest of both the employer and em-
ployee in that food would create the strength and reserve of the employee to work,
thereby resulting in more efficient services in gathering fruit in behalf of the
employer. The interest of the employer was advanced by the foreman in directing
the employee to take the [employer's] "jeep" and go to . . . obtain lunch.
Id.
37. 228 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 1969).
38. Id. at 900.
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softball game held at his employer's home. Although at the administra-
tive hearing the Judge of Industrial Claims awarded compensation,
having found that the function fell within the scope of employment and
that pressure was brought on the employee to attend, the claim for
compensation was rejected by the Commission." Justice Sundberg, in
a dissenting opinion, argued that, in light of the general rules enunciated
in Larson,4 the view adopted in Florida is conservative and self-
defeating. 2 Recreational activities are defined as being within the course
of employment when:
1. They occur on the premises during a lunch or recreation period as a
regular incident of the employment; or
2. The employer, by expressly or impliedly requiring participation, or
by making the activity part of the services of an employee, brings the
activity within the orbit of the employment; or
3. The employer derives substantial direct benefit from the activity be-
yond the intangible value of improvement in employee health and morale
that is common to all kinds of recreation and social life.
43
While these criteria could be applied in intoxication cases by draw-
ing an analogy to employer-sponsored recreational activities, the em-
ployer may claim that, since drinking is beneficial primarily to the
employee, the claimant's attempt to prohibit the employer from raising
the intoxication defense should be defeated. In response, the claimant
could argue that an employee who becomes intoxicated while engaged
in business-related activities is serving both a personal and a business
purpose and should be compensated for resulting injuries under the
"dual purpose doctrine." 4
40. Id. at 458.
41. Supra note 26.
42. 350 So. 2d at 459-60 (Sundberg, J. dissenting). For a more enlightening
approach, see Tedesco v. General Electric Co., 305 N.Y. 544, 114 N.E. 2d 33 (Ct. App.
1953) (holding that, under the facts of the case, injuries sustained during a softball game
were compensable as arising out of the course of employment).
43. LARSON, supra note 26, § 22.21 at 5-71.
44. The "dual purpose doctrine" is stated in Krause v. West Lumber Co., 227
So. 2d 486 (Fla. 1969), where the Florida Supreme Court upheld a claim for injuries
suffered in a car accident by the employee who was on the way to an employer-
sponsored sales meeting. The employer had directed the employee to take the em-
ployee's own automobile for the trip. "The fact that claimant's personal convenience
was being served, as well as the interest of the employer, does not preclude recovery.
An employee whose activities are serving a personal and business purpose is within the
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3. CONCLUSION
The question of employer encouragement with respect to the de-
fense of employee intoxication is unanswered in Florida, although other
jurisdictions resolve the issue through case law or statute. Nevertheless,
through the application of the doctrine of estoppel, as well as argument
by analogy to scope of employment situations where the employer either
directs, encourages or allows certain employee conduct, the Florida
claimant has legal authority to prevent the employer from successfully
raising the defense.
However, the employer can limit the effectiveness of the claimant's
position by asserting that, since drinking is solely in the employee's
beneficial interest, any claim for workmen's compensation benefits for
injuries to an intoxicated employee should be denied. Although the
Florida Supreme Court has not yet ruled on this issue, its reluctance in
some areas, e.g., recreation, to disturb holdings of lower courts which
upheld the defense of employee intoxication suggests that the Florida
claimant will have difficulty in successfully pursuing a claim for work-
men's compensation when his intoxication is caused, even in part, by
actions of his employer.
Myrna L. Black
scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act." Id. at 488 (emphasis added). See also
Zipperer v. Peninsular Life Ins. Co., 235 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1970).
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Equal Protection for Aliens: The Sliding Scale
of Judicial Review: Foley v. Connelie
Recently the Supreme Court, in the case of Foley v. Connelie,l up-
held a New York statute which limited the appointment of members
of the state police force to citizens of the United States.2 Foley, an Irish
resident alien, brought a class action seeking a declaration that the New
York statute in question 3 violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. After Foley was certified as representative of a
class of those similarly situated, a three-judge district .court granted a
summary judgment to the defendants,' from which the plaintiff appealed
to the Supreme Court of the United States. A divided Court upheld the
statute and refused to grant relief.5
Historically, aliens have often suffered discrimination of various
economic and social kinds. Starting long ago, states enacted legislation
discriminating against aliens in a wide range of activities' and, prior to
World War II, the Supreme Court displayed a great deal of tolerance
toward those state laws.7 During this period of non-interference by the
Court, the sole decision striking down a discriminatory state law against
aliens was Truax v. Raich.8 In Truax, the Court invalidated a state law
1. 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
2. N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976), which reads in part: "No
person shall be appointed to the New York state police force unless he shall be a citizen
of the United States ..
3. Id.
4. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
5. 435 U.S. 291.
6. Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (aliens forbidden to own land for
the purpose of farming); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915) (public works contracts);
Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927) (operating pool halls); Trageser
v. Gray, 73 Md. 250, 20 A. 905 (1890) (selling liquor); Commonwealth v. Hana, 195
Mass. 262, 81 N.E. 149 (1907) (peddling goods); Wright v. May, 127 Minn. 150, 149
N.W. 9 (1914) (acting as auctioneers).
A more detailed description of earlier discrimination against aliens especially in the
employment area is provided in Rosales, Resident Aliens and the Right to Work: The
Quest for Equal Protection, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1029 (1975).
7. Id.
8. 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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requiring employers of five or more persons to hire at least 80% of their
employees from among qualified electors or native-born United States
citizens. However, the Supreme Court asserted in dicta that the "special
public interest" in state regulation of a wide variety of governmental
concerns could justify less favorable state treatment of non-citizens?
This proposition became known as the "special public interest" doc-
trine' O and later became the basis upon which the Court upheld a broad
range of discriminatory practices against aliens. The decision in Truax
is best understood as an expression of the Court's devotion to the em-
ployers' liberty of contract and property during the Lochner era.' How-
ever, Truax did not prove to have a substantial impact on the continued
trend of discrimination against aliens in the area of employment. Truax
stood alone among many contrary decisions.12
The Court's indulgence in discrimination against aliens quickly
dissipated after World War II.13 Later cases greatly reduced the scope
of the "special public interest" doctrine" as a result of a broadened
interpretation of Congress' plenary authority over immigration" and a
judicial recognition that alienage itself constituted a suspect classifica-
tion. 6 The former practice of upholding discriminatory statutes was
rapidly replaced by a new trend of decisions striking down such legisla-
tion. 7 By the 1970's, the Supreme Court was insisting that states were
generally powerless to treat aliens as a distinct class for reasons of
federal supremacy s and, further, that such treatment also amounted to
9. Id. at 39.
10. Graham v. Richardson, 439 U.S. 365 (1971).
11. In Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), a statute which prohibited
employers from requiring employees of bakeries to work more than sixty hours a week
was held unconstitutional at the behest of a bakery owner, on the grounds that it
interfered with the liberty of contract of his employees. See also Hires v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52 (1940).
12. See note 6 supra.
13. In two decisions in 1948, the Supreme Court began to reformulate its position
on the equal protection doctrine as it applied to discrimination against aliens. See
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (striking down a provision of the California
Alien Land Law); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 334 U.S. 410 (1948)
(invalidating a California state law denying fishing licenses to aliens ineligible for United
States citizenship).
14. 439 U.S. 365.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also note 13 supra; In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman
v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
18. 403 U.S. at 378: "State laws that restrict the eligibility of aliens for welfare
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an invidious discrimination. 9 Thus, in Graham v. Richardson,"° the
Court declared invalid state statutes denying welfare benefits to resi-
dent aliens and, in Sugarman v. Dougall,21 the Court invalidated a
statutory prohibition against employment of aliens in the state compe-
titive civil service.22 Similarly, the Court has ruled that resident aliens
may not be excluded from practicing law2 or from practice as licensed
civil engineers." The Court became highly critical of blanket prohibi-
tions against the employment of aliens and other legislation which was
neither "narrowly confined" nor "precisely drawn" and "swept in-
discriminately" against aliens in the area of employment. 2
Today, aliens in the United States are still deprived of the right to
vote" and, consequently, are lacking "the most basic means of defend-
ing themselves in the political processes." z This is one of the major
reasons why alienage has been elevated to "suspect classification." The
usual objection to judicial intervention (i.e., that the popularly-elected
legislature is the more democratic arena for deciding public issues) is
absent, and the courts have deemed it necessary to offer their special
protection to those who are not adequately represented in the legisla-
ture. This political powerlessness, when combined with the historical
discrimination which aliens have suffered, makes it readily arguable that
alienage should be treated as a suspect classification. However, the
benefits merely because of their alienage conflict with overriding national policies in an
area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government."
19. For a definition of invidious discrimination, see Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
68 (1968).
20. 403 U.S. 365.
21. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
22. Id. While the statute rested on a legitimate state interest in having loyal
employees'and in establishing the states' own form of government, the statute was
neither narrowly confined nor precise in its application, and therefore failed.
23. In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 729 (1973), rejecting as insufficiently substan-
tial the state interest in maintaining high professional standards, and disagreeing with
the argument that "status of holding a license to practice law places one so close to the
core of the political process as to make [one] a formulator of government policy."
24. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976).
25. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 643; accord, Examining Bd. v. Flores de
Otero, 426 U.S. at 605-606.
26. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 163 (1874).
27. Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d 566, 580, 456 P. 2d 645, 654 (1969)
(en banc).
28. To determine what criteria the Supreme Court employs in deciding whether
a class is to be deemed suspect, see Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427
U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
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concept of suspect classifications is a modern phenomenon; thus, it is
not surprising that the decisions which seem to place alienage in this
category date from the 1970's.
It has been well settled by the Burger Court that states carry a
tremendous burden of justification when attempting to legitimize dis-
crimination against aliens in the employment arena.29 This is a result of
the recent extension of the equal protection doctrine to the Supreme
Court's finding that alienage is a suspect classification. However, sus-
pect classifications are not forbidden classifications. Instead, the courts
merely indicate that such classifications will be subject to close judicial
scrutiny. Whether all suspect classifications will receive the same level
of close judicial scrutiny has been the subject of great controversy in
recent years. The term "strict scrutiny" has come to mean that certain
kinds of government-imposed inequalities must be justified as necessary
for the achievement of a compelling state interest. 0 Because alienage
is a suspect classification with respect to the states,3' statutes which
preclude aliens from certain types of employment are subject to strict
scrutiny32 and a state must show some overriding "special public inter-
est" 3 in order to justify such a classification. Further, a state must
select a means to pursue that purpose which does not unnecessarily
burden constitutionally protected conduct.34 However, this standard, at
best, has been difficult to comprehend. This is due in part to the notion
of a rigid "compelling state interest" standard of review in suspect
classification cases. In reality, the level of judicial scrutiny applied by
the Supreme Court varies along a continuum depending upon the inter-
est at stake. The more the Court feels the interest at stake to be funda-
mental or the more the legislative classification approaches being sus-
pect, the higher the degree of judicial scrutiny the Court will apply.
"Several recent decisions addressing the issue of aliens' right to
work indicate that suspect class statutes of alienage is slowly eroding.
As a result, it is possible that state action against aliens will no longer
29. See note 17 supra.
30. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
31. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634
(1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
32. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
33. 379 U.S. 184 (overriding statutory purpose is required to uphold a statute
having a racial classification).
34. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
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be strictly scrutinized."3 5 This gradual erosion has been caused by the
reluctance of the Supreme Court to equate the rights of aliens with those
of United States citizens in areas that are possibly considered
"politically tinged." The idea of the "political community" has been the
basis for the Court's distinction between citizen and alien rights both in
and out of the employment area.36 Citizens, as members of the
"political community,"3 possess many political privileges to which
aliens have no constitutional right. The courts have recognized that
some state interests might justify a disqualification of non-citizens from
employment 3 and, therefore, have never held that aliens have a
"constitutional, right to vote or hold high public office." 3 The rights
to vote,40 hold high public office,4 and serve on juries," are seen as
political rights that go to "the heart of our system of government."43
This is so because these rights entail the formulation of public policy
and community standards in addition to participation in the operation
of governmental affairs. Using this conception of a "political com-
munity,"" the courts have upheld restrictions on the rights of aliens by
reasoning that a state has a compelling interest in sheltering its concept
of a "political community."45 The courts evidently feel that a state's
"political community" would slowly dissipate if it were not restricted
to those who are familiar with this country's political and social stand-
ards. 6 Whether this theory has any basis in either fact or reason is
questionable.
35. D. Chin, Aliens' Right to Work: State and Federal Discrimination, 45
FORDHAm L. REV. 835, 838 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as Chin).
36. 413 U.S. at 648-49; 405 U.S. at 334; United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518
F. 2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975).
37. Id. See also Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp. 394 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
38. 413 U.S. 634. The Court's reservations expressed in Sugarman show that the
implications are that the principle of alienage as a suspect classification is far from being
fully developed. Accordingly, the Court left the door open for a remission in the princi-
ple that alienage will continue to be a suspect classification.
39. Id. at 717.
40. Id. at 648.
41. Id. at 658.
42. 518 F. 2d at 975.
43. Perkins v. Smith, 370 F. Supp. 134, 137 (D. Md. 1974) (three-judge court),
affd. mem., 426 U.S. 913 (1976).
44. 405 U.S. at 344; 413 U.S. at 648-49; see Surmeli v. New York, 412 F. Supp.
394, 397 (S.D. N.Y. 1976).
45. 405 U.S. at 344.
46. Foley v. Connelie, 419 F. Supp. 889, 895 (S.D. N.Y. 1976), 435 U.S. 291.
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The political distinction between aliens and citizens has resulted in
a series of cases which, if not conflicting, are at the very best confusing.
It is clear that the nature of some professions requires that citizenship
be considered before hiring.17 However, the degree of consideration
which will be permitted and the occupations for which it will be allowed
is where the confusion lies. The perplexity is a result of certain profes-
sions "skirting the border between purely political functions such as
holding public office and purely apolitical positions such as driving taxi
cabs.""8 Thus, lawyers,"9 civil servants," teachers51 and state troopers,52
for example, engage in occupations that lie on the uncertain line; they
are awaiting the stamp of judicial approval permitting citizenship to be
included in the many criteria required for the particular position. In
1973, the Supreme Court rendered two key decisions on the same day,
each dealing with the political distinctions between citizens and aliens.53
Both decisions dealt with state restrictions on the rights of aliens to
employment. Sugarman v. DougaiP' addressed the validity of a New
York civil service law-" which made citizenship a requisite to holding
any permanent position in the competitive class of the state civil service.
In striking down the New York law as violative of the equal protection
clause, the Court stated:
We recognize a State's interest in establishing its own form of govern-
ment, and in limiting participation in the government to those who are
within "the basic conception of a political community." But in seeking
to achieve this substantial purpose, with discrimination against aliens, the
means the state employs must be precisely drawn in light of the acknowl-
edged purpose."
47. See text accompanying notes 41 and 46 supra.
48. Chin, supra note 35.
49. 413 U.S. 717.
50. 413 U.S. 634.
51. Norwick v. Nyquist, 417 F. Supp. 913 (S.D. N.Y. 1976) (three-judge court),
appeal filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3437 (U.S. Dec. 11, 1977) (No. 76-808).
52. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291.
53. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973); In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717
(1973).
54. 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
55. N.Y. Civil Service Law §53(1)(1976), reads in part: "Except as herein other-
wise provided, no person shall be eligible for appointment for any position in the
competitive class unless he is a citizen of the United States."
56. 413 U.S. at 642.
254
Nova Law Journal 3:979 1
255
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
S3:1979F
Evidently the Court has recognized that some employees "who partici-
pate in the formulation and execution of government policy"5 are per-
missibly vulnerable to discrimination based on alienage because it is
within a state's power to define and limit its "political community. '"' a
However, any such limitation must be "precisely drawn" and not overly
broad. The Court specifically noted in dicta that a limitation on the
employment of aliens, when narrowly confined, would be valid where
alienage was relevant in maintaining a state's conceptual "political com-
munity."59
In Sugarman, the Court left the door open to discrimination
against aliens by recognizing that some state interests might justify a
disqualification of non-citizens from employment." However, that door
was closed to but a crack on the same day when the Court decided In
Re Griffiths.1 Griffiths made it quite clear that the proposition set forth
in Sugarman would be strictly construed by invalidating a Connecticut
court rule which limited the practice of law to citizens.62 The Court
noted: "Lawyers have been leaders in government throughout the his-
tory of our country. Yet, they are not officials of government by virtue
of being lawyers. Nor does the status of holding a license to practice
law place one so close to the core of the political process as to make
him a formulator of government policy." Thus, aliens are protected
from discrimination in the legal field because lawyers are not suffi-
ciently connected with the "political community" so as to justify a
state's interest in excluding aliens from this type of employment. What
the Court seems to be seeking in order to sustain discriminatory statutes
against aliens in the employment area is a kind of loyalty to the United
States as an important requisite to faithful performance of the occupa-
tion in question. Holding high public office is an example of such an
occupation." However, it is doubtful that this standard can be applied
extensively beyond the holding of high office since the Court has re-
jected the so-called "membership in the political community" argument
57. Id.
58. 405 U.S. at 344.
59. 413 U.S. at 649.
60. Id. at 647.
61. 413 U.S. at 717.
62. Id.
63. Id. It is unclear whether the Court is referring to state attorneys and United
States attorneys as distinguished from those who practice privately.
64. 413 U.S. at 648.
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in both the civil service employment 5 and bar admission6 contexts.
Perhaps other forms of state employment are sensitive to a possible
conflict of national loyalties. The Court, in Foley v. Connelie, 7 raised
the political distinctions between aliens and citizens which, for the first
time, became the basis of the Court's decision to uphold an anti-alien
statute in the employment area.
The first issue which the majority confronted in Foley was whether
citizenship may be a relevant qualification for fulfilling important non-
elective executive, legislative and judicial positions held by officers who
participated lirectly in the formulation, execution or review of broad
public policy. Relying on language used in Sugarman, the Court upheld
this narrow exclusion6 and recognized "a State's historical power to
exclude aliens from participation in its democratic political institu-
tions,"69 as part of the sovereign's obligation "to preserve the basic
conception of a political community. '70 The Court next focused upon
the question of whether the occupation of state trooper fit into this
narrow exclusion. In holding that it does, the Court noted:
The police function fulfills a most fundamental obligation of government
to its constituency. Police officers in the ranks do not formulate policy,
per se, but they are clothed with authority to exercise an almost infinite
variety of discretionary powers. The execution of broad powers vested in
them affects members of the public significantly and often in the most
sensitive areas of daily life.7
The Court reasoned that "a policeman vested with the plenary discre-
tionary powers we have described is not to be equated with a private
person engaged in routine public employment or other 'common occu-
pations of the community' who exercises no broad power over people
generally. 7 3 Therefore, police officers fall within the category of
65. Id. at 634.
66. 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
67. 435 U.S. 291 (Upholding N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976)).
See note 2 supra.
68. 435 U.S. at 300. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973). This decision
qualified the exception stated in Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973), and shows
that this exception was to be construed within narrow limits.
69. 435 U.S. at 295.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 297.
72. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 41.
73. 435 U.S. at 298-99.
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"important non-elective. . .officers who participate directly in the...
execution. . . of broad public policy."7 The Court concluded that "in
the enforcement and execution of the laws the police function is one
where citizenship bears a rational relationship to the special demands
of the particular position."7
The final question addressed by the Court was the degree of scru-
tiny to be applied in assessing the validity of the statute in question."
The majority first acknowledged that recent cases generally reflect a
"close scrutiny of restraints imposed by States on aliens."7 Neverthe-
less, the majority states in dicta that it has never suggested that "such
legislation is inherently invalid, nor that all limitations on aliens are
suspect. 78 The rationale is that it would be inappropriate "to require
every statutory exclusion of aliens to clear the high hurdle of 'strict
structiny', because to do so would 'obliterate all the distinctions between
citizens and aliens, and thus depreciate the historic values of citizen-
ship."'7' Consequently, the Court stated: "Our scrutiny will not be so
demanding where we deal with matters firmly within a State's constitu-
tional prerogatives." 0 The Court then went on to say: "The State need
only justify its classification by a showing of some rational relationship
between the interest sought to be protected and the limiting classifica-
tion.""' According to the Court, this lessened degree of scrutiny is no
more than a "recognition of the fact that a democratic society is ruled
by its people." 82
Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, found it difficult to
reconcile the Court's judgment in this case with the full sweep of the
reasoning and authority of past decisions. "It is only because I have
become increasingly doubtful about the validity of these decisions (in at
least some of which I concurred) that I join the opinion of the Court in
the case." Justice Blackmun had no problem in agreeing with the
result reached in Foley. Citing Sugarman v. Dougall, he wrote, when a
state is acting in accordance with dictates as set out in that case, "it need
74. Id. at 300; see also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. at 647.
75. Id. at 300.
76. See note 2 supra.
77. 435 U.S. at 294.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 296, citing 413 U.S. 647, 648.
81. Id.
82. 435 U.S. at 296.
83. Id. at 300.
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justify its discriminatory classifications only by showing some rational
relationship between its interest in preserving the political community
and the classification it employs." 4
Justice Marshall, with whom Justices Brennan and Stevens joined
dissenting, disagreed with the majority opinion that state troopers per-
form functions placing them within the narrow exception as set out in
Sugarman," preferring instead to follow the usual rule that discrimina-
tion against aliens is presumptively unconstitutional:
In one sense, of course, it is true that state troopers participate in the
execution of public policy. Just as firefighters execute public policy that
fires should be extinguished, state troopers execute the public policy that
persons believed to have committed crimes should be arrested. But this
fact simply demonstrates that the Sugarman exception, if read without
regard to its context, "would swallow the rule."'
Justice Marshall evidently felt that Sugarman unambiguously holds that
a blanket exclusion of aliens from state jobs is unconstitutional. He
further expressed, in what appears to be the most cogent argument of
the entire case, his view that the phrase "execution of broad public
policy,""7 as enunciated in Sugarman, cannot be read to mean "simply
the carrying out of government programs, but rather must be inter-
preted to include responsibility for actually setting government policy
pursuant to a delegation of substantial authority from the legislature." 8
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Brennan joined, dissenting,
found a rule which disqualifies an entire class of persons from profes-
sional employment "doubly objectionable." 9 He was particularly con-
cerned with identifying the "group characteristic that justifies the unfa-
vorable treatment of an otherwise qualified individual simply because
he is an alien."9 Justice Stevens felt the disqualifying charcteristic to
be a foreign allegiance' which raised a doubt concerning loyalty and
trustworthiness so pervasive that a flat ban against the employment of
84. Id. at 302.
85. Id. at 303.
86. Id. at 303-304.
87. Id. at 304.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 307.
90. Id. at 308.
91. See In Re Griffiths, 413 U.S. at 726 (persons, other than citizens, can in good
conscience, take an oath to support the constitution); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wang, 426
U.S. 88, 111 (1976).
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any alien in "any law enforcement position"9 2 would be justified. "But
if the integrity of all aliens is suspect, why may not a State deny aliens
the right to practice law?"' 3 The dissenters here felt that, unless the
Court repudiates its holding in In Re Griffiths,4 it had to reject any
"conclusive presumption that aliens, as a class, are disloyal or untrust-
worthy."' 5 The dissenting members of the Court charged that, should
the majority reject its analysis, it should not uphold "a statutory dis-
crimination against aliens, as a class, without expressly identifying the
group characteristic that justifies the discrimination."" The dissenters
reasoned that, "[i]f there is no group characteristic that explains the
discrimination, one can only conclude that it is without any justification
that has not already been rejected by the Court."' 7
As a result of the majority's holding in Foley v. Connelie," the
standard enunciated in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,"
for reviewing legislation which is to "the peculiar disadvantage of a
suspect class,"'1 is severely weakened, as is Graham, °1 which held state
classifications based on alienage, nationality or race, inherently suspect
and subject to close judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has refused
to treat New York's classification as suspect and apply the degree of
scrutiny which past decisions seem to have mandated. These past deci-
sions of the Court have expressly held that any statute distinguishing
aliens from citizens be "precisely drawn and narrowly confined. 11 2 It
is apparent that the statute in question"' is neither "precisely drawn"
nor "narrowly confined." 1 1 To the contrary, it is overly broad and
thereby imposes an unnecessary burden on the basic right to have access
to employment. It will be difficult, indeed, for the Court to reconcile
the decision in Foley with past holdings which have been highly critical
92. 435 U.S. at 308.
93. Id.
94. 413 U.S. 717 (1973); see also text accompanying note 62 supra.
95. 435 U.S. at 308.
96. Id. at 311-12.
97. Id. at 312. "The Court has squarely held that a state may not treat employ-
ment as a scarce resource to be reserved for its own citizens."
98. 435 U.S. 291.
99. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
100. Id.
101. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
102. 413 U.S. at 644.
103. N.Y. Exec. Law §215(3) (McKinney Supp. 1976).
104. 413 U.S. at 644.
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of blanket prohibitions against employment of aliens and of statutes
which "sweep indiscriminately against aliens by restricting jobs to citi-
zens only." ' To attempt to predict the future course of the Supreme
Court on this subject would be to engage in pure speculation. Past
inconsistencies clearly demonstrate that only the Court itself is equipped
to explain the parameters of the Foley decision.
Douglas A. Blankman
105. Id.; qccord, Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 527 (1976).
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Broadcasters' First Amendment Rights
Through the Courts with "The Seven Dirty Words:"
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation
On October 30, 1973, a New York radio station broadcast comedian
George Carlin's recorded monologue, "Filthy Words,"' which consisted
primarily of the repetitive use of seven four-letter words2 depicting sex-
ual or excretory organs and activities, which could not be said on the
public airways. The recording was played near the close of a regularly
scheduled noon-time talk show on Radio Station WBAI (FM) to high-
light the preceding topic of discussion concerning the attitude of con-
temporary society toward language. Immediately prior to the broad-
cast, listeners were advised that the recording included language which
might be offensive, and those not wishing to hear it were asked to
"change the station and return to WBAI in fifteen minutes."'
On December 3, 1973, the Federal Communications Commission
received a complaint from a father who had heard the broadcast while
driving in his car with his young son.4 He wrote that, although he might
understand the "record's being sold for private use, I certainly cannot
understand the broadcast of same over the air that, supposedly, you
control."5 This complaint succinctly poses the problem: To what extent
does the F.C.C. control the programming content broadcast by the
stations it licenses?
Section 29 of the Radio Act of 1927,1 in its prohibition against
1. The monologue was from the Album "George Carlin, Occupation: FOOLE",
Little David Records. Citizens Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station
WBAI(FM), N.Y., N.Y., 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 95 (1975).
2. Id. at 99. There were seven words complained of: "fuck," "shit," "piss,"
"motherfucker," "cocksucker," "cunt" and "tit." See Appendix for text of the broad-
cast.
3. Id. at 96.
4. This was the only complaint lodged with either the F.C.C. or WBAI concerning
the broadcast. Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C., 556 F 2d 9, 11 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
5. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3030 (1978).
6. 44 Stat. 1172-1173 (1927).
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the licensing author-
ity the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted
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censorship, unequivocally denied the Commission any power either to
edit proposed broadcasts or excise any material considered inappro-
priate for the airwaves.7 "This prohibition, however, has never been
construed to deny the Commission the power to review the content of
completed broadcasts in the performance of its regulatory duties."'
The courts, both during the period between the original enactment
of the 1927 provision and its reenactment in the Communications Act
of 1934,1 and after, have consistently interpreted the provision the same
way. 0
Following its usual practice regarding the review of completed pro-
gramming in the wake of a complaint,"1 the F.C.C. forwarded the com-
plaint to WBAI licensee, Pacifica Foundation, to give it an opportunity
by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
by the licensing authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by
means of radio communications. No person within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall utter any obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.
7. 98 S.Ct. 3026, 3033 (1978).
8. id.
Zechariah Chafee, defending the Commission's authority to take into account
program service in granting licenses, interpreted the restriction on "censorship"
narrowly: "This means, I feel sure, the sort of censorship which went on in the
seventeenth century in England-the deletion of specific items and dictation as
to what should go into particular programs.
2 Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATIONS 641 (1947).
9. KFKB Broadcasting Ass. v. Fed. Radio Commission, 47 F. 2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1931). The court held that it was within the Commission's power to deny license renewal
to the station based on its evaluation that many of the programs broadcast served
private interests of the licensee. The licensee was controlled by a doctor who in the
course of a medical information program, often prescribed mixtures prepared by his
pharmaceutical association.
Trinity Methodist Church, South v. Fed. Radio Commission 62 F. 2d 850 (D.C.
Cir. 1932). The Commission refused to renew a license basing its decision on broadcasts
by a minister who frequently referred to pimps and prostitutes and made bitter attacks
on the Catholic Church.
10. See, e.g., Bay State Beacon, Inc. v. F.C.C., 171 F. 2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
Idaho Microwave, Inc. v. F.C.C., 352 F. 2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1965); National Assn of
Theatre Owners v. F.C.C., 420 F. 2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922
(1970).
11. The F.C.C. attempts to maintain a complete file on the licensee presenting
all sides of an issue which may have arisen during the course of a license period. When
the renewal application is submitted, this file will provide some basis for the Commis-
sion's action regarding the license. (Broadcast station licenses are issued for a period of
three years.) In re Applications of Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 148 (1964).
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for reply and comment. Pacifica's reply discussed its view of the validity
of the broadcast. George Carlin was described as a "significant social
satirist . . . [who] finds his material in our most ordinary habits and
language .. ".."I' In explanation as to why the particular broadcast
was made, the reply stated:
In the selection broadcast from his album, he shows us that words which
most people use at one time or another cannot be threatening or obscene.
Carlin is not mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize
as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words .....
George Carlin often grabs our attention by speaking the unspeakable, by
shocking in order to illuminate... 3
The F.C.C. did not share the view that such material merited expo-
sure on the public airwaves and issued a declaratory order to that ef-
fect. 4 The Commission based the order on the authority granted it by
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970), which provides: "Whoever utters any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio communication shall
be fined not more that $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years
or both." It found further statutory support in 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970)
which directs the Commission to "generally encourage the larger and
more effective use of radio in the public interest. . . as public conveni-
ence, interest, or necessity requires."
No sanctions were imposed, but the Commission directed that the
order be associated with the station license file. Receipt of any subse-
quent complaints would have forced the Commission to decide whether
it should utilize any of the available sanctions granted it by Congress.1"
Within the framework of the order the Commission reformulated
its definition of "indecent" in connection with Section 1464.16 The
12. 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 96 (1975).
13. Id. at 96.
14. Id. at 99. Such a order is viewed as a device to facilitate settling a controversy
between a listener and a station. Reconsideration of the Commission's action is avail-
able, and if controversy remains judicial review may be sought immediately.
15. The Congress has specifically empowered the F.C.C. to (I) revoke a station's
license, (2) issue a cease and desist order, or (3) impose a monetary forfeiture for a
violation of § 1464. 47 U.S.C. § 312 (a) § 312 (b). § 503 (6)(1)(E) (1970). The F.C.C.
can also (4) deny license renewal or (5) grant a short term renewal. 47 U.S.C. § 307, §
308 (1970).
16. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000. or
imprisoned not more than two years or both."
A A B
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previous definition of "indecent" 7 was offered by the Commission in
1970 in In Re WUHY-FM18 when it said that the standard in the
broadcast field should be that "the material broadcast is (a) patently
offensive by contemporary community standards; and (b) is utterly
without redeeming social value."19
Subsequent Court decisions, specifically Miller v. California,20 fur-
nished the basis for redefining "indecent." The Commission pointed out
that "the concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure
of children to language that describes in terms patently offensive, as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at the times of day
when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." 2'
The Miller standard which protects language with serious literary, artis-
17. The F.C.C. definition was based on the obscenity standards of Roth v. U.S.,
354 U.S. 476 (1957) and Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966). At that
time the community standard was held to be a national standard. Jacobellis v. Ohio,
378 U. S. 184 (1963). For the difficulties encountered by the Supreme Court between
the Roth and Memoirs decisions, See Note, 75 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1364 (1966).
18. 24 F.C.C. 2d 408, 409 (1970). Here, a taped interview with rock singer Jerry
Garcia of "The Grateful Dead" was broadcast between 10:00 and 11:00 P.M. on a
program with "underground" orientation. Garcia's expression of his views on life in
general was laced with some of the words under consideration in Pacifica used as
adjectives, expletives or substitutes for phrases. Examples are: "I must answer the phone
900 f---n times a day, man." "That kitid of s- t." "Political change is so
f ----- g slow."
19. Id. at 412.
20. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). In Miller, the matter of sending unsolicited sexually
explicit material through the U.S. mails, in violation of a California statute, was exam-
ined. A definition of obscenity which marked a retreat from Roth and Memoirs was
announced:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: a) whether "the average per-
son, applying contemporary community standards" would find that the work,
taken as a while, appeals to the purient interest, Roth supra at 489, b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct speci-
fically defined by the applicable state law, and c) whether the work taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 15. The Memoirs test of "utterly without redeeming social value" was rejected
as was the national standard criteria from Jacobellis. This latter holding is further
strengthened in Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The Miller Court suggested two definitions of conduct which would constitute
"patent offensiveness:" (a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ulti-
mate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive
presentations or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd exhibition
of the genitals. Id. at 25.
21. 56 F.C.C. 2d 94, 98 (1975).
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tic, political or scientific value will be considered except when children
are in the audience.22
In reaching this conclusion, the Commission reiterated its view that
the pervasive and intrusive nature of the broadcast media provide the
rationale for closer scrutiny of material that might be suitable for some
other form of expression. The Commission outlined four important
considerations to illustrate why broadcasting requires special treatment:
(1) [Clhildren have access to radios and in many cases are unsupervised
by parents;
(2) [Rladio receivers are in the home, a place where people's privacy
interest is entitled to extra deference, ...
(3) [U]nconsenting adults may tune in a station without any warning
that offensive language is being or will be broadcast and
(4) [Tlhere is a scarcity of spectrum space, the use of which the govern-
ment must therefore license in the public interest. 4
Utilizing the new definition of indecent and considering the special
nature of the broadcast media, the Commission sought to channel rather
than prohibit the broadcast of such language with its order. The implica-
tion was that a different standard might conceivably be used when fewer
22. Id. Pacifica stated in 1964 in its license renewal application that "it is sensitive
to its responsibilities to its audience and carefully schedules for late night broadcasts
those programs which may be misunderstood by children, although thoroughly accepta-
ble to an adult audience." 36 F.C.C. 147, 149 (1964).
The Commission, in its discussion of the relevance of a broadcast's being unaccept-
able for children cited also to Sonderling Corp. affirmed sub. nom. Illinois Citizens
Committee for Broadcasting, et al v. F.C.C., 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975). This is
"the first judicial decision upholding the F.C.C.'s conclusion that the probable presence
of children in the audience is relevant to a determination of obscenity." 56 F.C.C. 2d
at 94. Here the Commission dealt with two programs on radio call in shows which were
broadcast during daytime hours in which oral sex was a topic of discussion. One ex-
change is cited by the F.C.C. as follows:
Female listener: . . . of course I had a few hangups at first about-in regard
to this, but you know what we did-I have a craving for peanutbutter all that
(sic) time so I used to spread this on my husband's privates and after a while, I
mean, I didn't even need the peanut butter anymore.
Announcer: (laughs) Peanut butter, huh?
Listener: Right. Oh, we can try anything-you-know-any, any of these women
that have called and they have, you know, hangups about this, I mean they should
try their favorite-you-know, like, uh...
515 F.2d at 401, n.4.
23. 56 F.C.C. at 97.
24. Id.
I 3:1979
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children were in the audience and the program had some literary, artis-
tic, political or social value.u
COURT OF APPEALS RULES FOR PACIFICA
Those who had hoped that a definition of "indecent" might finally
be authoritatively construed by the courts in connection with Section
1464, 2 were to be disappointed when the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia relied on Section 326 of the Commu-
nications Act to vacate the Commission's OrderY
The Act provides:
Nothing in this act shall be understood or construed to give the Commis-
sion the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals
transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.8
The three judge court was split. The two judges comprising the
majority concurred on the result but did not reach the conclusion by the
same route. Judge Tamm, who wrote the opinion, reasoned that the
Miller9 obscenity standard as utilized by the Commission in its order,
required a finding that the subject matter of the Carlin broadcast was
protected speech under the first amendment,"0 and he therefore viewed
the action of the Commission as censorship under Section 326. He went
on to say that, even assuming the F.C.C. might regulate non-obscene
or "indecent" speech, the order was overbroad for failure to take con-
text into account 3' and vague for failure to define the class it sought to
25. Id. at 98.
26. See note 16 supra.
27. Pacifica Foundation v. F.C.C. 556 F.2d 9 (1977).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
29. 556 F.2d 9, 16 (1977). See note 19 supra.
30. U.S. Const. Amend. 1 (1791):
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or
the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.
31. Judge Tamm interpreted the order as, in effect, creating a sweeping ban when
there is a reasonable risk that children will be in the audience. An amicus brief indicated
that large numbers of children are in the audience until 1:30 a. m. and indicated the
number of children does not fall below one million until 1:00 a.m. 556 F.2d, at 14. He
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protect .32
In his concurring opinion, Judge Bazelon addressed the first
amendment question. He reasoned that Section 326 prohibits all censor-
ship of broadcast programming content by the F.C.C. but that Section
326 is limited by Section 1464,3 which in turn must be limited by the
first amendment .3  He then looked to the standards of protection in
other media to determine if the unique characteristics of broadcasting
justified the expansion of governmental regulation. 5 The factors he
considered included privacy in the home," the protection of unconsent-
ing adults,37 the threat of a flood of filth on the airwaves,"8 the signifi-
cance of the technological scarcity of spectrum space,"' and the pres-
ence of children in the audience.4 0 Despite this multilevel examination,
Judge Bazelon also determined that there was no justification for creat-
ing a new area of regulated speech and found the order of the Commis-
sion to be unconstitutional." Thus, the order was held impermissible as
emphasized that under this order works of Shakespeare and portions of the BIBLE might
not be considered suitable. 556 F.2d at 17.
32. Id. at 17. Judge Tamm questioned which children the Commission was trying
to protect by its order, since age of minors is not mentioned as a factor, although it is
considered a significant factor in analyzing capacity for individual choice. Rowan v.
Post Office, 397 U.S. 728 (1970). Nor did the captive audience theory impress Judge
Tamm. He found it persuasive only where it is impractical to avoid exposure, and
apparently he did not consider a twist of the dial an impractical measure. Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
33. See note 16 supra.
34. 556 F.2d at 18. The first amendment to the Constitution provides in part:
"Congress shall make no laws. . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press".
35. Id. at 20.
36. Id. at 25, citing to Rowan v. Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728 (1970). which
held individuals may require mail advertisers to remove their names from mailing lists
and to stop sending lewd or offensive materials.
37. 556 F.2d at 25, Citing to Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1925). An ordinance making it a public nuisance for a drive-in theater to show films
containing nudity where the screen was visible to the public was held invalid. The public,
if offended, must avert its eyes. This measure is advised in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15, 91 (1971) where an individual was prosecuted for entering a courthouse wearing a
jacket with the words, "Fuck the Draft" on the back.
38. 556 F.2d at 29. This fear was considered unrealistic in view of the economic
impact of a public which considers itself overwhelmed by objectionable programming.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 28. Citing to Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), where a New
York Statute prohibiting knowing sales to minors of materials which appeal to purient
interests was upheld on the basis that children lack the full capacity for choice.
41. 556 F.2d at 30.
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censorship, and the words were not to be stripped of protection without
consideration of content or redeeming value. 2
Judge Leventhal, the lone dissenter, chided the majority for treat-
ing the F.C.C. order as though the broadcast of any of the "seven dirty
words" was prohibited when it held only "that the language as
broadcast was indecent and prohibited by 18 USC 1464. '11 He pointed
out that the Commission had indeed channeled its order in that it specif-
ically stated that the prohibition of the "broadcast of 'filthy words'
considered indecent, particularly when children are in the audience"
would not force on the general listening public only those ideas "fit for
children."44 He felt that the early afternoon hour of the broadcast was
vital to the order. 5
As he construed the order, it reflected an effort to define the word
"indecent" in terms of the same underlying considerations which
prompted the decision of the Supreme Court in Miller .4 In summation
of his position, Judge Leventhal said:
As a judge of what the Constitution calls an 'inferior court,' my duty is
to apply Miller unless and until the Supreme Court modifies it . . . It
leads me to affirm the F.C.C.'s effort to apply Miller in the context of
daytime broadcasting-when the protection of children is a compelling
state interest.47
SUPREME COURT REVERSES FIVE TO FOUR
On appeal to the high Court,4 in the opinion of a majority of the
Justices, Carlin's own estimation of his words as those ". . . you
couldn't say on the public, ah airwaves, um, the ones you definitely
wouldn't say ever . prevailed.
42. Id. at 21.
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 32. Even the dissent in Miller abstained from discussing state power
over distribution of obscene material to juveniles. Judge Leventhal felt that the decision
pointed out that "exposure to children marks a special enclave in the law of freedom of
publication."
47. Id. at 37.
48. F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (1978). Strong dissent was
registered by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stewart and White in two opinions authored
by Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart.
49. See Appendix for text of the broadcast.
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The Court, limiting the scope of review, found no effect of adjudi-
cation, rule making or promulgation of regulations in the Commission's
Order.50 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated the Court's
policy of confining its review to judgments, not statements in opinions,
thus avoiding deciding unnecessary constitutional questions which
might be raised by such statements. 1 The Court's examination was
confined, therefore, to the specific fact situation of the case: Was the
Carlin recording indecent as broadcast? Whether or not the Commis-
sion's declaratory order was to be upheld hinged on the determination
of that issue. To answer the question, the Court examined the two
statutes which were prominant in the opinion of the lower court and
posed two additional questions: Was the Commission's action censor-
ship within the meaning of 48 U.S.C. § 326012 May speech which is not
obscene, nevertheless, be restricted as "indecent" under 18 U.S.C. §
1464?11
The Court did not take issue with the traditional Commission prac-
tice of reviewing completed broadcasts in the course of its regulatory
activity" and noted that until this case the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia had consistently agreed that this type of review
was not the sort of censorship at which Section 326 was directed. The
Court pointed out that "[a] single section of the 1927 Radio Act was
the source of both the anticensorship provision and the Commission's
authority to impose sanctions for the broadcast of indecent or obscene
language,"5 and, therefore, Congress plainly intended to give meaning
to both provisions. Justice Stevens concluded that Section 326 did, in-
deed, allow the Commission to sanction licensees who broadcast ob-
scene or indecent language.51
50. 98 S.Ct. at 3032.
51. Id. at 3032, 3033.
52. 48 Stat. 1091; 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970).
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the
power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any
radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the
Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970). "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane
language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned not more than two years or both".
54. 98 S.Ct. at 3033. See note 9 Supra.
55. Id. at 3034.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3035.
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The Court then examined the meaning of "indecent" as it related
to Section 1464 to determine if the F.C.C. could sanction non-obscene
language. Pacifica argued that the meaning of "indecent" was subsumed
by the definition of obscenity delineated in Miller.8 If this argument had
been accepted, the absence of prurient appeal would have been critical
in determining the validity of the Commission's order. The Commission
had determined that the manner and content was patently offensive and
indecent, but distinguished the latter concept from obscenity on the
basis of lack of appeal to prurient interests. 9 Pacifica relied primarily
on the Supreme Court's interpretation of "indecent" under Section
146160 in Hamling v. United States"' where the words "obscene,"
"lewd," "lacivious," "indecent," "filthy" or "vile" were taken as a
whole and limited to "obscene." The majority distinguished the two
statutes, however, pointing out that Section 1461 deals primarily with
printed matter in sealed envelopes traversing the mails while Section
1464 deals with the content of public broadcasts.12 While the standard
as to the mails does require a showing of obscenity, 3 the Commission
has repeatedly interpreted Section 1464 to encompass more than the
obscene. 4 Based on prior decisions and the history of Section 1464, the
Court rejected Pacifica's argument and concluded that prurient appeal
was not a component of indecent language."
58. See note 19 supra, for discussion of Miller standards.
59. 556 F.2d at 98. Pacifica did not argue that the components of the Commis-
sion's indecency definition were not present in the Carlin Broadcast.
60. Section 1461 is directed at "mailing obscene or crime inciting matter - every
obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or vile article, matter, thing, device or sub-
stance ... "
61. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
62. 98 S.Ct. at 3036.
63. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
64. [Wihile a nudist magazine may be within the protection of the First
Amendment . . . Similarly, regardless of whether the 'four letter words' and
sexual description set forth in 'Lady Chatterley's Lover,' (when considered in the
context of the whole book) make the book obscene for mailability purposes, the
utterance of such words or the depiction of such sexual activities on radio or TV
would raise similar public interest and § 1464 questions.
Programming Policy Statement, 44 F.C.C. 2303, 2307 (1960). See also WUHY-FM,
24 F.C.C. 2d 408, 412 (1970); Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 27 R.R. 2d 285, on
reconsideration, 41 F.C.C. 2d 777 (1973), aff'd on other grounds sub nom, Illinois
Citizens Committee for Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 515 F. 2d 397 (1975); Mile High
Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960); PalmettoBroadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
65. 98 S. Ct. at 3036.
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Finally, Justice Stevens addressed the constitutional attacks made
by Pacifica. By refusing to step outside the bounds of the specific
"factual context," the court rejected Pacifica's first contention that the
breadth of the Commission's interpretations required reversal whether
the broadcast of "filthy words" was protected or not.6" The Commission
had apparently emphasized the narrow scope of its order to the satisfac-
tion of the Court, thus the Court was unwilling to rule on the basis of
hypothetical situations which might or might not arise in the future.67
The Court also found its ruling to be consistent with Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. Inc. v. F.C.C.,1s where it rejected an argument that
the Commission's regulations defining the fairness doctrine were so
vague as to abridge the broadcasters' freedom of speech.69 The Court
dismissed concerns of self censorship in the context of this controversy
with the observation that "at most, however, the Commission definition
of indecency will deter only the broadcasting of patently offensive refer-
ences to excretory and sexual organs and activities" 70 and felt that the
effect would be one of form, not content, since there are very few
thoughts that could not be expressed by less offensive language.7'
Pacifica's insistence that the first amendment forbids curtailing the
right to broadcast material which is not obscene led the Court to exam-
ine the effect of the content, the context, and the medium of delivery
on any interpretations of speech as protected or not. The opinion
stopped short of finding a general power to regulate the broadcast of
"indecent" speech in any circumstances but did not indicate that such
a notion was abhorrent or even implausible.
In outlining the limitations which have emerged, the Court cited to
Shenck v. United States,73 the earliest case of significance in which the
problem of protected speech arose. There Chief Justice Holmes ob-
served that only where a "clear and present danger" to the public wel-
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3037. "Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application
to situations not before the court is 'strong medicine' to be applied 'sparingly and only
as a last resort."' Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 (1973).
68. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
69. Id. The Court rejected the notion that broadcasters would respond to ihe
vagueness by refusing to present controversial political and social programs.
70. 98 S. Ct. at 3037.
71. Id. at note 18.
72. Id. "[]f the government has any such power, this was an appropriate occasion
for its exercise."
73. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
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fare arose could expression be prohibited.7 4 The Court proceeded to note
other instances of expression where regulation has been considered ap-
propriate;7" for example, "fighting words, ' 7 distinctions between com-
mercial speech and other varieties, 77 libels against private citizens as
opposed to public officials78 and obscenity which might be wholly pro-
hibited.7 In this analysis, the specific matter of the "seven dirty words"
arose again, and the Court found no rationale for protection on a con-
tent basis. The Court recognized that the government must remain neu-
tral in the marketplace of ideas and found no political idea of opinion
at issue. It characterized the monologue as a point of view and offered
it no special protection." Two instances were cited in which one of the
seven words was afforded protection,"1 but the Court recalled there was
74. Id. at 52. This case involved the wartime mailing circulars to draftees urging
noncompliance and insubordination. Justice Holmes wrote:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in saying all
that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights.
But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done
• ..The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in
falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing panic. It does not even protect a man
from an injunction against uttering words that may have all the effect of force
... .The question in every case is whether the words are used in such circum-
stances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
75. 98 S. Ct. at 3038.
76. Id. Citing to Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) as the first
in a line of cases where the state interest in preventing violence curtailed the speaker's
rights: "the fear was that the provocativeness of the speech would so enrage either the
immediate addressee or audience generally so that violence might result." See
GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1164 (9th ed. 1975).
77. 98 S. Ct. at 3038 citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977). See also
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
78. 98 S. Ct. at 3038 citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
79. 98 S.Ct. at 3038 citing Roth v. U.S., 354 U.S. 476, rehearing denied, 355 U.S.
852 (1957) sparked the controversy concerning first amendment protection of obscenity.
See also Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 881 (1973).
See note 19 supra. C.F. Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) where
an ordinance seeking to contain the showing of explicit "adult" movies by means of
zoning regulations was upheld.
80. 98 S.Ct. at 3038. The Court in Note 22 offered no reason why it could not
accept Carlin's monologue as satire, but hints that, if it could, protection might be in
order.
81. Id. at 3039 citing Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), a reversal of a
disorderly conduct conviction. The Court noted that the words, "We'll take the fucking
street later, or again," were not obscene when uttered by an anti-war demonstrator after
1 272
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no dispute as to the "vulgar," "offensive" or shocking quality of the
language and merely assumed arguendo that the Carlin language would
be protected in other contexts.82
The Court noted that the broadcast media have historically re-
ceived the "most limited first amendment protection." 3 This may be
readily observed if the status of newspaper publishers is contrasted to
that of broadcasters in the matter of fairness in presenting issues to the
public. 4 Although newspaper publishers need not provide space for re-
plies from those they criticize, 5 broadcasters must provide reasonable
free time for reply to the targets of their criticism.88 The Court examined
the two qualities of the broadcast media which make them unique: the
pervasuve presence in the lives of all Americans, especially considering
the privacy of the home, 7 and the accessibility to children, even those
too young to read.8 In the eyes of the Court the fact that individuals
may merely turn the dial to the "off" position or another station does
not offer enough protection to the unwilling listener in his home. 9 What
the Court saw as more important, however, was the policy of supporting
"parents' claim to authority in their household and the government's
interest in the well being of its youth.""0
The Court found the Commission's examination of context and its
use of the nuisance theory appropriate. The opinion emphasized the
variables such as time of day and the content of the program in which
the questionable language is used. In addition, audience composition
and the differences between radio, television and even closed circuit
television must be considered. The opinion concluded by alluding to Mr.
police had cleared the street. See also Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), See note
25 supra. The Court in Cohen rejected the argument that unwilling viewers would be
offended by a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the Draft" as there was no evidence that
anyone had objected.
82. 98 S.Ct. at 3039.
83. Id. at 3040.
84. Id.
85. Id. citing to Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
86. 98 S. Ct. at 3040 citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 395 U.S. 367,, 390
(1969). In application of the fairness doctrine, the Court said "[ilt is the purpose of the
first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas . . . rather than to
countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the government itself or
a private licensee. .. "
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Justice Sutherland's characteristic of nuisance as "merely a right thing
in a wrong place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard"9' and
held that "when the Commission finds that a pig has entered the parlor,
the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the
pig is obscene." 2
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Black-
mun, considered the channeling of the order is an effort to protect
children in the audience most appropriate.93 He agreed that the unique
qualities of broadcasting and the resulting limitations placed on the
media's first amendment protection, as well as its widespread availabil-
ity in the home and to young chidren, were basic to the decision. He
conceded that the listener may tune out and that broadcasters may warn
before the program begins, but Justice Powell was particularly con-
cerned with the unsuspecting listener who has no warning. The covers
of books and records or the marquees of theaters were considered to
offer a warning, but the unwilling broadcast listener might be required
to "absorb the first blow" of offensive speech.94 In public, this might be
acceptable, but the listener in the home required special consideration."
He considered it sufficient protection that the Carlin material is avail-
able at live performances and on records and that it is not entirely
prohibited from the airwaves.99
Justice Powell departed from the majority in order to take issue
with the extent to which the majority examined the content of the broad-
cast. In his opinion, the Justices of the Supreme Court are not the sole
arbiters of "valuable" speech and the resulting degree of protection, and
that "line(s) may be drawn on the basis of content without violating the
government's obligation of neutrality in its regulation of protected com-
munications. 917 It appears that it was Justice Powell's belief that the
91. Id. citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
92. 98 S.Ct. at 3041.
93. Id. at 3044.
94. Id. at 3045.
95. Id. at 3046. Justice Powell did not brush aside the argument of Butler v.
Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957), that adults will be reduced to listening only to what
is appropriate for children, and instead said it is a problem to be reckoned with, but
not with the result that the Commission should have no power to regulate this type of
broadcast.
96. Id. at 3046. In addition to the late evening hours, Justice Powell writes that
there is no apparent prohibition of the broadcast of "discussions of the contemporary
use of language at any time during the day." Curiously this is how Carlin's broadcast
is characterized by Pacifica and the Court of Appeals. 556 F.2d 9 (1977).
97. 98 S.Ct. at 3046, 3047 quoting Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S.
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Commission's order would have been more appropriate if it were specif-
ically a regulation of time of broadcast.
The four dissenters unanimously disagreed with the majority's
broad interpretation of "indecent" in Section 1464.1s' The Court had
recently construed the descriptive language of Section 1461 in Hamling
v. United States," the dissenters saw no rationale for departure from
that rule. They felt "indecent" had the same meaning as "obscene" as
defined by Miller,' and that this was not a novel construction.', They
also noted that the F.C.C. had indicated it followed this construction
as to the 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1968) prohibition of "obscene, lewd, lasci-
vious, filthy or indecent" telephone calls.102 Furthermore, although Sec-
tion 1461 and Section 1464 were not enacted together, they were codi-
fied together in the 1948 Criminal Code obscenity chapter, and the
dissent read them as prohibiting nothing more."13 That the Carlin mon-
ologue was not obscene was, in the opinion of the dissenters, undisputed.
Therefore, they reasoned that the Commission had no statutory author-
ity to ban the broadcast. 04
Justice Brennan was not so temperate in his dissenting opinion
where he was joined by Justice Marshall.' In fact, in his opinion,
whether or not the pig was obscene, the majority had burned the house
to roast it!' He deplored what he viewed as a step toward the
50, 63-73 (1976) where the Court held "regulation of the places where sexually explicit
films may be exhibited is unaffected by whatever social, political or philosophical mes-
sage the film may be intended to communicate".
98. 98 S.Ct. at 3055. Justice Stewart's dissent, in which Justices Brennan, White
and Marshall join.
99. 418 U.S. 87 (1974). The words "obscene," "lewd", "lascivious", "indecent",
"filthy" or "vile," were taken as a whole and construed to mean "obscene."
100. See note 19 supra for Miller discussion and standards.
101. 98 S.Ct. at 3056. Justice Stewart cites to Dunlop v. U.S. 165 U.S. 486, 500-
501 (1897), and Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 482-484, 487 (1962).
102. 98 S.Ct. at 3056 note 7. When the Federal Communications Act was
amended in 1968 to prohibit "obscene, lewd, lasvicious, filthy or indecent" telephone
calls, Pub. L. 90-299, 82 Stat. 112, 47 U.S.C. § 223, the F.C.C. indicated that it thought
this language covered only "obscene" telephone calls. See H.R. Rep. No. 1109, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., 7-8 (1968).
103. 98 S.Ct. at 3056.
104. Id. Two additional points are addressed in the footnotes of the dissenting
opinion. First, the F.C.C.'s attempted use of 47 U.S.C. § 303(9) failed as an independent
basis for its action. Second, the general rule of levity in construction of criminal statutes
supported the dissent's position.
105. 98 S.Ct. at 3047.
106. Id. at 3049.
F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation 275[113:1979
276
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
Nova Law Journal
"homogenization of radio communications" 107 and could find no justifi-
cation for the majority holding, given either the intrusive nature of the
broadcasting media or the presence of unsupervised children in the audi-
ence."'8 Justice Brennan wrote that "the invasion of a privacy interest
must be affected in an intolerable manner before government action in
prohibiting discourse is justified.""1 9 Additionally, the action of the indi-
vidual in listening, even in the home, should more properly be viewed
as having an affirmative component, as a "decision to take part. . . in
an ongoing public discourse."' 10 This is a situation far removed from the
"intrusive modes of communiation, such as sound trucks," [since] '[tjhe
radio can be turned off' . . . -and with a minimum of effort.""' The
Pacifica decision reflected, in his opinion, an improper balancing of
interests totally unsupported by precedent. He noted that Rowan v. Post
Office Department,"2 on which the court relied, left the decision as to
the offensiveness of material, and whether or not such material may
come into the home, entirely in the hands of the individual house-
holder."'
Undeniably, he felt, the government has a special interest in the
well-being of children; this has been provided for by the "variable ob-
scenity" standard of Ginsberg v. N. Y."I The subsequent Miller decision
has not been specifically related to the Ginsberg formulation, but Justice
Brennan insisted that controlled speech, even as to children, must have
some significant erotic content." 5 He felt that "Itihe Court's refusal to
follow its own pronouncements is especially lamentable since it has the
anomalous subsidiary effect, at least in the radio context at issue here,
of making completely unavailable to adults, material which may not
constitutionally be kept even from children.""'
107. Id. at 3048.
108. Id. In Justice Brennan's opinion, there are no "limiting principles" by which
to maintain either standard.
109. 98 S.Ct. at 3048, quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 21 (1971).
110. 98 S.Ct. at 3048. See Note, Filthy Words, the F.C.C., and the First Amend-
ment: Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. REV. 579, 618 (1975).
Ill. Id. at 3049, citing Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302
(1974).
112. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). !iSee note 34 supra.
113. 98 S.Ct. at 3049.
114. Id. at 3050, citing 590 U.S. 629 (1968), Justice Brennan noted the adoption
of a standard in that case "that permits the prurient appeal of material available to
children to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of minors."
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,1 Justice Brennan was disturbed by what he termed the lack of princi-
pled limits for the two major elements on which the decision was based.
To what extent may control in the name of intrusion into the home and
the protection of children evolve? If taken to the logical extreme, much
of what was considered appropriate might be subject to regulation," 7
and he was not content to rely on either the judgement of the F.C.C. or
the ability of the Court to assess the worth of the various types of
speech."' "I would place the responsibility and the right to weed worth-
less and offensive communications from the public airways where it
belongs and where, until today, it resided: in a public free to choose
those communications worthy of its attention from a marketplace un-
sullied by the censor's hand."" 9
Justice Brennan pointed out that words chosen to express an idea
may be, in a sense, interwoven with the idea itself and that, in purging
the words, a censoring of the idea will result.' He also believed the
majority's reliance on Young v. American Mini Theatres2' was in
error since Young, unlike Pacifica, had "goals other than the channel-
ing of protected speech."' No apparent object other than the channel-
ing of speech existed in the Commission's order, and while Young did
not restrict the access of the material in the marketplace, Justice
Brennan believed the order in Pacifica totally prohibits broadcasters
from sending or listeners receiving the material.'2
Finally, he deplored the "ethnocentric myopia" of the Court for a
117. Id. at 3051: i.e., The rationale could justify the banning from the radio of
many great literary works, repress- a good deal of political speech such as the Nixon
tapes, and even some parts of the BIBLE.
118. Id. at 3052.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 3053, referring to Justice Harlan's opinion in Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 21, 23, 25 (1971).
[Miuch linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function ... In fact,
words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their cognitive force. We
cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the cognitive
content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive function
which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the
overall message sought to be communicated.
121. 427 U.S. 50 (1976). The Court in Young found zoning ordinances seeking
to contain exhibition of potentially offensive material in the interest of maintaining the
integrity of the neighborh6od to be an acceptable form of regulation.
122. 98 S.Ct. at 3053.
123. Id. at 3054. As with the words themselves, Justice Brennan believed that the
choice of the medium of delivery lies outside the hands of the government.
13:1979
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decision which he felt reflected a lack of sensitivity to at least some of
the subcultures in our nation.'24 Justice Brennan felt the holding might
be likely to affect broadcasters in serving some minority groups and,
consequently, Justice Brennan finds the character of the holding re-
flected "another of the dominant culture's inevitable efforts to force
those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of
thinking, acting and speaking."'
IN THE WAKE OF THE DECISION
The decision strikes down a major effort by the broadcasting estab-
lishment to stake out new first amendment protection for that media.12
Broadcasting magazine, the major journal of its industry, editorially
deplored and was astonished by the court ruling which, in its opinion,
had created a substitute for the eroded justification of "scarcity" of
broadcast facilities to give the government hands on control. Armed
with the criteria of broadcasting's pervasiveness and its unique access
to children, future regulators have been practically invited to intrude in
broadcast operations.'21
The National Association of Broadcasters fears that with Pacifica
under its belt, the F.C.C. will not stop with the seven dirty words and
the original list of words will be expanded, further abridging broadcast-
ers' first amendment freedom. 28 That fear may not be unrealistic.
Georgia legislator Julian Bond recently announced plans to file a suit
against the F.C.C. for failing to act on his complaint that a guberna-
torial candidate used the word "nigger" in his political advertising.
Bond attempted, unsuccessfully, to intervene in the Pacifica case to have
the word included as the eighth dirty word. Although Bond is opposed
to such censorship, he feels that if there are seven proscribed words, why
not eight?121
124. Id. Several studies were cited which indicated that in the Black vernacular
at least such words as "fuck" and "bullshit" have no obscene or even derogatory
component except in certain contexts.
125. Id. at 3054.
126. The whole commercial broadcasting industry intervened in the action in
support of Pacifica to argue against the "F.C.C.'s authority to create a new constitu-
tional exception for the prosecution of the broadcasting industry". BROADCASTING July
10, 1978, at 58.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 21.
129. INSIDE RADIO, August 14, 1978, at 1.
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The Court emphasized the narrowness of the holding. The F.C.C.,
both in speeches and in the recent decision on a Morality in Media
complaint against WGBH-TV, Boston, has indicated that it will follow
the Court's insistence that the ruling was narrow. Commissioner Tyrone
Brown in a July 23, 1978, speech to the Oklahoma Association of
Broadcasters said that the Commission would not use Pacifica "as an
excuse for increased intervention" in programming decisions.,"0 This
pledge was backed up by the Commission's July, 1978 decision to renew
the license of WGBH-TV,I3 rejecting the complaint filed by Morality
in Media of Massachusetts regarding allegedly obscene and indecent
material broadcast by the station. 3 1 In rendering the decision the Com-
mission stated: "We believe that we should construe the Pacifica holding
consistent with the paramount importance we attach to encourage free
ranging programming and editorial discretion by broadcasters...,,3
The WGBH decision, according to F.C.C. Chairman Charles D. Ferris,
"should show that the F.C.C. is not going to become a censor...
hopefully it will prevent an outpouring of audience complaints based on
occasional words.' 3 4
While the Commission disavows that the Pacifica decision will
serve as a basis for more program control, it remains to be seen whether
or not the decision will be invoked by the F.C.C. and the other regula-
tory agencies in proceedings now in progress.' 3' Is it true that, in the
words of Chairman Ferris, the holding of the Pacifica decision is so
narrow that the likelihood of its being invoked "is about as likely to
occur as Halley's Comet,'' or will Pacifica stand as marshall for a
forming parade of horribles?
Fran Avery Arnold
Cara Ebert Cameron
130. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978 at 32.
131. 43 R.R. 2d 1436 (1978).
132. Id. The Commission held that the examples cited by MMM did not meet
either the Supreme Court's definition of obscenity or "indecent" as the Court held its
ruling did not extend to the occasional use of an expletive. The words complained of as
indecent were broadcast twice in one program aired after 11:00 P.M. and one word was
broadcast in a play at 5:30 P.M. The Commission said late night programming was not
included within the Pacifica Ruling, nor would the broadcast of one word be included.
133. Id.
134. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 32.
135. Specifically both F.C.C. and F.T.C. inquiries into children's television pro-
gramming and advertising.
136. BROADCASTING, July 24, 1978, at 31.
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APPENDIX
The following is a verbatim transcript of "Filthy Words" prepared
by the Federal Communications Commission.'
"Aruda-du, ruba-to, ruba-to. I was thinking about the curse words
and the swear words, the cuss words and the words that you can't say,
that you're not supposed to say all the time, cause words or people into
words want to hear your words. Some guys like to record your words
and sell them back to you if they can, (laughter) listen in on .the tele-
phone, write down what words you say. A guy who used to be in Wash-
ington knew that his phone was tapped, used to answer, Fuck Hoover,
yes, go ahead. (laughter) Okay, I was thinking one night about the
words you couldn't say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you
definitely wouldn't say, ever cause I heard a lady say bitch one night
on television, and it was cool like she was talking about, you know, ah
well, the bitch is the first one to notice that in the litter Johnie right
(murmer) Right. And, uh, bastard you can say, and hell and damn so I
have to figure out which ones you couldn't and ever and it came down
to seven but the list is open to amendment, and in fact, has been
changed, uh, by now, ha, a lot of people pointed things out to me, and
I noticed some myself. The original seven words were, shit, piss, fuck,
cunt, cocksucker, motherfucker, and tits. Those are the ones that will
curve your spine, grow hair on your hands and (laughter) maybe, even
bring us, God help us, peace without honor (laughter) um, and a bour-
bon. (laughter) And now the first thing that we noticed was that word
fuck was really repeated in there because the word motherfucker is a
compound word and it's another form of the word fuck. (laughter) You
want to be a purist it doesn't really-it can't be on the list of basic
words. Also, cocksucker is a compound word and neither half of that is
really dirty. The word-the half sucker that's merely suggestive (laugh-
ter) and the word cock is a half-way dirty word, 50% dirty-dirty half
the time, depending on what you mean by it. (laughter) Uh, remember
when you first heard it, like in 6th grade, you used to giggle. And the
cock crowed three times, heh (laughter) the cock-three times. It's in
the Bible, cock in the Bible. (laughter) And the first time you heard
about a cock-fight, remember-What? Huh? Naw. It ain't that, are you
stupid? man. (laughter, clapping) It's chickens, you know, (laughter)
Then you have the four letter words from the old Anglo-Saxon fame.
137. 98 S. Ct. at 3041. Printed here with permission of Uptight Enterprises and
Little David Records.
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Uh, shit and fuck. The word, shit, uh, is an interesting kind of word in
that the middle class has never really accepted it and approved it. They
use it like crazy but it's not really okay. It's still a rude, dirty, old kind
of gushy word. (laughter) They don't like that, but they say it, like, they
say it like, a lady now in a middle-class home, you'll hear most of the
time she says it as an expletive, you know. it's out of her mouth before
she knows. She says, Oh shit oh shit, (laughter) oh shit. If she drops
something, Oh, the shit hurt the broccoli. Shit. Thank you. (footsteps
fading away) (papers ruffling)
Read it! (from audience)
Shit! (laughter) I won the Grammy, man, for the comedy album.
Isn't that groovy? (clapping, whistling) (murmur) That's true. Thank
you. Thank you man. Yeah. (murmur) (continuous clapping) Thank
you, man. Thank you. Thank you very much, man. Thank, no, (end of
continuous clapping) for that and for the Grammy, man, cause (laugh-
ter) that's based on people liking it man, yeh, that's ah, that's okay man.
(laughter) Let's let that go, man. I got my Grammy. I can let my hair
hang down now, shit. (laughter) Ha! So! Now the word shit is okay
for the man. At work you can say it like crazy. Mostly figuratively, Get
that shit out of here, will ya? I don't want to see that shit anymore. I
can't cut that shit, budd. I've had that shit up to here. I think you're
full of shit myself. (laughter) He don't know shit from Shi0ola. (laugh-
ter) you know that? (laughter) Always wondered how the Shinola people
felt about that (laughter) Hi, I'm the new man from Shinola. (laughter)
Hi, how are ya? Nice to see ya. (laughter) How are ya? (laughter) Boy,
I don't know whether to shit or wind my watch. (laughter) Guess, I'll
shit on my watch. (laughter) Oh, the shit is going to hit de fan. (laughter)
Built like a brick shit-house. (laughter) Up, he's up shit's creek. (laugh-
ter) He's had it. (laughter) Up, he's up shit's creek. (laughter) He's had
it. (laughter) He hit me, I'm sorry. (laughter) Hot shit, holy shit, tough
shit, eat shit, (laughter) shit-eating grin. Uh, whoever thought of that
was ill. (murmur laughter) He had a shit-eating grin! He had a what?
(laughter) Shit on a stick. (laughter) Shit in a handbag. I always like
that. He ain't worth shit in a handbag. (laughter) Shitty. He acted real
shitty. (laughter) You know what I mean? (laughter) I got the money
back, but a real shitly attitude. Heh, he had a shit-fit. (laughter) Wow!
Shit-fit. Whew! Glad I wasn't there. (murmur, laughter) All the ani-
mals-Bull shit, horse shit, cow shit, rat shit, bat shit. (laughter) Vera
reminded me of that last night, ah (murmur). Snake shit, slicker than
owl shit. (laughter) Get your shit together. Shit or get off the pot.
(laughter) I got a shit-load full of them. (laughter) I got a shit-pot full,
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all right. Shit-head, shit-heel, shit in your heart, shit for brains, (laugh-
ter) shit-face, heh (laughter) I always try to think how that could have
originated; the first guy that said that. Somebody got drunk and fell in
some shit, you know. (laughter) Hey, I'm shit-face. (laughter) Shit-face,
today. (laughter) Anyway, enough of that shit. (laughter) The big one,
the word fuck that's the one that hangs them up the most. Cause in a
lot of cases that's the very act that hangs them up the most. So, it's
natural that the word would, uh, have the same effect. It's a great word,
fuck, nice word, easy word, cute word, kind of. Easy word to say. One
syllable, short u. (laughter) Fuck. (Murmur) You know, it's easy. Starts
with a nice soft sound fuh ends with a kuh. Right? (laughter) A little
something for everyone. Fuck (laughter) Good word. Kind of a proud
word, too. Who are you? I am FUCK. (laughter) FUCK OF THE
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) Tune in again next week to FUCK OF THE
MOUNTAIN. (laughter) It's an interesting word too, cause it's got a
double kind of a life-personality-dual, you know, whatever the right
phrase is. It leads a double life, the word fuck. First of all, it means,
sometimes, most of the time, fuck. What does it mean? It means to
make love. Right? We're going to make love, yeh, we're going to fuck,
yeh, we're going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. (laughter) we're
really going to fuck, yeh, we're going to make love. Right? And it also
means the beginning of life, it's the act that begins life, so there's the
word hanging around with words like love, and life, and yet on the other
hand, it's also a word that we really use to hurt each other with, man.
It's a heavy. It's one that you save toward the end of the argument.
(laughter) Right? (laughter) You finally can't make out. Oh, fuck you
man. I said, fuck you. (laughter, murmur) Stupid fuck. (laughter) Fuck
you and everybody that looks like you (laughter) man. It would be nice
to change the movies that we already have and substitute the word fuck
for the word kill, wherever we could, and some of those movie cliches
would change a little bit. Madfuckers still on the loose. Stop me before
I fuck again. Fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump, fuck the ump,
fuck the ump. Easy on the clutch Bill, you'll fuck that engine again.
(laughter) The other shit one was, I don't give a shit. Like it's worth
something, you know? (laughter) I don't give a shit. Hey, well, I don't
take no shit, (laughter) you know what I mean? You know why I don't
take no shit? (laughter) Cause I don't give a shit. (laughter) If I give a
shit, I would have to pack shit. (laughter) You wouldn't shit me, would
you? (laughter) That's a joke when you're a kid with a worm looking
out the bird's ass. You wouldn't shit me, would you? (laughter) It's an
eight-year-old joke but a good one. (laughter) The additions to the list.
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I found three more words that had to be put on the list of words you
could never say on television, and they were fart, turd and twat, those
three. (laughter) Fart, we talked about, it's harmless It's like tits, it's a
cutie word, no problem. Turd, you can't say but who wants to, you
know? (laughter) The subject never comes up on the panel so I'm not
worried about that one. Now the word twat is an interesting word.
Twat! Yeh, right in the twat. (laughter) Twat is an interesting word
because it's the only one I know of, the only slang word applying to the,
a part of the sexual anatomy that doesn't have another meaning to it.
Like, ah, snatch, box and pussy all have other meanings, man. Even in
a Walt Disney movie, you can say, We're going to snatch that pussy
and put him in a box and bring him on the airplane. (murmur, laughter)
Everybody loves it. The twat stands alone, man as it should. And two-
way words. Ah, ass is okay providing you're riding into town on a
religious feast day. (laughter) You can't say, up your ass. (laughter) You
can say, stuff it! (murmur) There are certain things you can say its
weird but you can just come so close. Before I cut, I, uh, want to, ah,
thank you for listening to my words, man, fellow, uh, space travelers.
Thank you man for tonight and thank you also. (clapping, whistling)"
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Criminal Law: Weighing the Need for
Procedural Safeguards in Plea Bargaining:
Bordenkircher v. Hayes
On January 8, 1973, Paul Hayes was indicted by a Fayette County,
Kentucky grand jury for forgery of a check in the amount of $88.30, a
violation of a Kentucky statute punishable by a term of two to ten years
in prison.' During plea negotiations attended by Hayes, his retained
counsel, and the clerk of the court, the state prosecutor offered to
recommend a five-year sentence, provided that Hayes would plead
guilty. The prosecutor informed the accused, however, that, upon a
refusal to plead guilty, he would return to the grand jury to seek an
indictment under the Kentucky Habitual Criminal Act. Such an indict-
ment, together with a conviction on the forgery charge, would subject
Hayes to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment in light of his two
prior felony convictions.2 At the time of the original indictment, the
prosecutor was in possession of sufficient evidence to ask the grand jury
for an indictment under the Habitual Criminal Act.3 When Hayes
!. KY. REv. STAT. §434.130 (1973) (repealed 1975).
2. Ky. REV. STAT. §431.190 (1973) (repealed 1975).
At the time of Hayes' trial, the statute provided that "[any person convicted a
...third time of a felony. . . shall be confined in the penitentiary during his
life." That statute has been replaced by KY. REV. STAT. §532.080 (Supp. 1977)
under which Hayes would have been sentenced to, at most, an indeterminate term
of 10 to 20 years. §532.080(6)(b). In addition, under the new statute, a previous
conviction is a basis for enhanced sentencing only if a prison term of one year or
more was imposed, the sentence or probation was completed within five years of
the present offense, and the offender was over the age of 18 when the offense was
committed. At least one of Hayes' prior convictions did not meet these conditions.
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 359 n. 2 (1978). See note 3 infra.
3. [Hayes] was 17 years old when he committed his first offense. He was
charged with rape but pled guilty to the lesser included offense of "detaining a
female." One of the other participants in the incident was sentenced to life impris-
onment. [Hayes] was sent not to prison but to a reformatory where he served five
years. [Hayes'] second offense was robbery. This time he was found guilty by a
jury and was sentenced to five years in prison, but he was placed on probation
and served no time. Although [Hayes'] prior convictions brought him within the
terms of the Habitual Criminal Act, the offenses themselves did not result in
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subsequently refused to plead guilty, he was indicted under the habitual
criminal statute, was found guilty on the forgery charge, was found to
have two prior felony convictions and was sentenced to life imprison-
ment.4
The Kentucky Court of Appeals,5 in an unpublished opinion,' up-
held the conviction and sentence, holding that "the prosecutor's decision
to indict [Hayes] as an habitual offender was a legitimate use of avail-
able leverage in the plea bargaining process. ' 7 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky agreed and denied a
petition for writ of habeas corpus.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, relying
on Blackledge v. Perry9 and North Carolina v. Pearce," unanimously
imprisonment; yet the addition of a conviction on a charge involving $88.30
subjected [Hayes] to a mandatory sentence of imprisonment for life.
434 U.S. at 370 (Powell, J., dissenting).
4. 434 U.S. at 359.
5. The Kentucky Court of Appeals is no longer the highest state court since, by
amendment to the Constitution of Kentucky, effective January 1, 1976, the judicial
system has been changed. The highest state court is now the Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky. Ky. CONST. §109.
6. Hayes v. Commonwealth, No. 73-766 (Ky. March 1, 1974), memorandum
opinion not to be cited as authority.
7. 434 U.S. at 359.
8. Opinion of the District Court is unreported. 434 U.S. at 360 n. 4.
9. 417 U.S. 21 (1974). Perry was convicted in the District Court of North Caro-
lina on the misdemeanor charge of assault with a deadly weapon. Entitled as of right
to a trial de novo in the Superior Court, Perry filed a notice of appeal. Prior to the
trial de novo, the prosecutor returned to the grand jury and obtained an indictment
increasing the misdemeanor to "the felony of assault with a deadly weapon with intent
to kill and inflict serious bodily injury." Id. at 23. Perry pleaded guilty and "was
sentenced to a term of five to seven years in the penitentiary." Id. The Court held that
it was "not constitutionally permissible for the State to respond to defendant's invoca-
tion of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more serious charge against him prior
to the trial de novo." Id. at 28-29. In a footnote to the Perry opinion, the Court called
for a different result where the prosecution could not have brought the felony charge
initially. Id. at 29 n.7.
10. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). Pearce was convicted for assault with intent to commit
rape. Subsequently, Pearce was successful in collaterally attacking his conviction but,
upon retrial, was reconvicted and given an increased sentence. Pearce was decided with
Simpson v. Rice. Id. Pearce's sentence was increased by 2 years, II months. Id. at 713
n. 1. Rice's sentence was increased by 25 years. Id. at 714 n. 4. The Court held that
imposing an increased sentence upon reconviction, without delineating the reasons for
the increase, after a defendant had successfully appealed his original conviction, was
tantamount to punishing the defendant for having his original conviction set aside and,
therefore, *'as a violation of due process of law. Id. at 726.
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reversed and held that Hayes was denied due process of law because the
prosecutor's tactics placing Hayes "in fear of retaliatory action for in-
sisting upon his constitutional right to stand trial."'" The Sixth Circuit
remanded the case, ordering that Hayes be discharged "except for his
confinement under a lawful sentence imposed solely for the crime of
uttering a forged instrument."'"
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 3 and, in a
five to four decision," reversed and HELD: "the course of conduct
engaged in by the prosecutor in this case, which no more than openly
presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of foregoing
trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution,
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 5
The ruling in Hayes can best be explained by the Court's view that
"this case would be no different if the grand jury had indicted Hayes as
a recidivist from the outset, and the prosecutor had offered to drop the
charge as part of the plea bargain."' 6 In plea bargaining cases, the
Supreme Court has traditionally approved of procedures where the state
encourages guilty pleas by providing for a lesser penalty or by promising
to recommend a lighter sentence or to reduce charges. 7 Under such a
system, it is inevitable that the entry of a plea by a defendant will be
encouraged to some extent by the "fear of the possibility of a greater
II. Hayes v. Cowan, 547 F.2d 42-45 (6th Cir. 1976).
12. Id. at 45.
13. 431 U.S. 953 (1977).
14. 434 U.S. 357 (1978). Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
Burger, C.J., and White, Rehnquist, and Stevens, J.J., joined. Blackmun, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Brennan and Marshall, J.J., joined. Powell, J., filed a
dissenting opinion.
15. 434 U.S. at 365.
16. 434 U.S. at 360-61.
17. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). In this decision, which promotes
the legitimacy of plea bargaining, the Court held Brady's guilty plea valid as voluntary,
even though his plea may have been coerced by the death penalty provision of the
Federal Kidnapping Act (held to be unconstitutional in United States v. Jackson, 390
U.S. 570 (1968)). The Court found that Brady's plea was motivated by his "desire to
accept the certainty or probability of a lesser penalty rather than face a wider range of
possibilities extending from acquittal to conviction and a higher penalty authorized by
law for the crime charged." 397 U.S. at 751. Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790
(1970), decided the same day as Brady, involved similar issues and produced the same
judicial result. See Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEXAs L. REv. 193, 252 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Dix].
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penalty upon conviction."" The Court has also accepted as inevitable
and permissible the fact that the plea bargaining system discourages
defendants from asserting their trial rights. 9 "By tolerating and encour-
aging the negotiation of pleas, this Court has necessarily accepted as
constitutionally legitimate the simple reality that the prosecutor's inter-
est at the bargaining table is to persuade the defendant to forego his
right to plead not guilty." 2
However, the Supreme Court has also prohibited states from im-
posing penalties upon defendants for choosing to do "what the law
plainly allows them to do."21 In North Carolina v. Pearce,22 the state
was prohibited from increasing, without adequate explanation, a de-
fendant's sentence upon reconviction that followed a successful appeal.
Such an unexplained increase in sentence was found to be a product of
state vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his right to ap-
peal. "Due process of law, then, requires that vindictiveness against a
defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play
no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial." 3 In Blackledge
v. Perry,?A once the defendant had indicated his intention to exercise his
statutory right to trial de novo, the state was prohibited from bringing
a more serious charge based on the same conduct.2 The bringing of such
an increased charge was similarly found to be a product of prosecutorial
vindictiveness against a defendant for exercising his right to appeal. It
was held to be a violation of due process of law for "the State to respond
to Perry's invocation of his statutory right to appeal by bringing a more
18. 434 U.S. at 363.
19. Id. at 364. The Hayes Court cited Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17
(1973), where the Court considered inter alia the constitutionality of circumstances in
the criminal process which encourage the waiver of constitutional rights. In discussing
the holdings of the plea bargaining cases on this issue, the Chaffin Court stated:
"Although every such circumstance has a discouraging effect on the defendant's asser-
tion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices was upheld as an inevita-
ble attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation
of pleas." Id. at 31.
20. 434 U.S. at 364.
21. Id. at 363.
22. See note 10 supra.
23. 395 U.S. at 725.
24. See note 9 supra.
25. The North Carolina two-tiered system allows a misdemeanor defendant con-
victed in an inferior trial court to seek, as of right, a new trial in a court of general
jurisdiction. N.C. GEN. STAT. §7A-290 (Supp. 1977).
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serious charge against him prior to trial de novo." 6
The question before the Court in Hayes was whether the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals was correct in placing a new procedural safe-
guard on plea bargaining by applying the due process prohibition
against prosecutorial vindictiveness, established in Pearce and Perry, to
the plea bargaining procedure used by the prosecutor in Hayes.
The Sixth Circuit, in applying the rule expressed in Pearce and
Perry to the plea bargain procedure used by the prosecutor in Hayes,
had made two findings. First, the bringing of an increased charge after
plea negotiations had failed was the product of prosecutorial vindictive-
ness against Hayes for exercising his right to plead not guilty.2 Second,
the prosecutor abused his broad discretionary charging powers by using
those powers to coerce Hayes "into foregoing his right to trial. 128
With regard to the Sixth Circuit's findings, the Supreme Court
observed that, even though the prosecutor in Hayes did not procure the
indictment on the increased charge until after the plea negotiations had
ended, Hayes was fully aware of the terms of the offer.2 Further, the
26. 417 U.S. at 23.
27. 547 F.2d at 44.
28. Id.
29. 434 U.S. at 360. The Court indicated that it may have reached a different
result in "a situation . . . where the prosecutor without notice brought an additional
and more serious charge after plea negotiations relating only to the original indictment
had ended with the defendant's insistence on pleading not guilty." Id. In a footnote to
that statement, the Court cited United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, 436 F.2d
103 (2nd Cir. 1970), and United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, 534 F.2d 1367, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1976), stating that it did not necessarily endorse the decisions. Id. at 360 n. 5.
In United States ex rel. Williams v. McMann, Williams, indicted for selling heroin,
agreed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of attempted sale and was sentenced to an
indeterminate term of 3 to 7 years. A few days after sentencing, the prosecution discov-
ered that Williams had been convicted of a felony in 1949 and returned him to court
for mandatory sentencing as a second felony offender. As a recidivist, Williams faced
from 3 to 15 years in prison. Williams was granted permission to withdraw his guilty
plea and was tried and convicted on the original indictment. "At sentencing, Williams'
attorney for the first time questioned the constitutionality of the older 1949 conviction.
The prosecution did not take issue with the contention; Williams was accordingly
treated as a first felony offender." 436 F.2d at 104. Williams was sentenced to a term
of 5 to 10 years. On petition for writ of habeas corpus, Williams relied on North
Carolina v. Pearce, supra note 10, and contended that he should only have been tried
for attempted sale and, upon conviction, should only have received a maximum sentence
of 3 to 7 years (the terms of the plea bargain). The Second Circuit affirmed the lower
court's denial of the writ, distinguishing Pearce by the fact that the increased sentence
in Williams stemmed from a conviction for a more serious crime. The Williams court
Bordenkircher v. Hayes 289 113:1979
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Court noted that the effect of the Sixth Circuit's ruling would require a
finding of prosecutorial vindictiveness and a "violation of due process
of law whenver [a prosecutor's] charging decision is influenced by
what he hopes to gain in the course of plea bargaining negotiations."3
The Court went on to point out the importance and benefits of plea bar-
gaining to the criminal justice system, citing the case of Blackledge v.
Allison.31 In addition, the Court discussed the failure of the Sixth Cir-
went on to explain that, when a defendant revokes his plea, the state is not required to
maintain its part of the plea bargain. Interestingly, Circuit Court Judge Hays, who
concurred in the Williams opinion, pointed out that, in Simpson v. Rice, supra note 10
(the companion case to Pearce), "Itihe fact that Rice had reneged on his part of the
plea bargain did not prevent the Court from giving him the benefit of the lower sen-
tence which had previously been imposed upon him." 436 F.2d at 107.
In United States v. Ruesga-Martinez, the appellant was charged with the misde-
meanor of unlawful entry into the United States, even though the prosecution was aware
that appellant was a multiple offender and could have been charged with a felony. The
appellant pleaded not guilty and later refused to sign a waiver of his right to trial before
a district judge, a statutory right under 18 U.S.C. §3401(b). Subsequently, the U.S.
Attorney charged the appellant with the felony violation as a multiple offender. Appel-
lant was found guilty and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The Ninth Circuit,
applying North Carolina v. Pearce, supra note 10, and Blackledge v. Perry, supra note
9, reversed and held that there was "a significant possibility that such discretion [on
the part of the prosecutor] may have been exercised with a vindictive motive or purpose,
[and] the reason for the increase in the gravity of the charges must be made to appear."
534 F.2d at 1369. The prosecution contended, inter alia, "that it was entitled to bring
the more serious charges as a consequence of its authority to engage in plea bargaining."
534 F.2d at 1370. The Ninth Circuit conceded that it had "consistently reaffirmed the
right of the prosecution to bring a heavier charge in the event that the accused reneges
on his bargain, [but] no plea bargain was entered into in the present case." Id. Finally,
and most important in the plea bargaining/vindictiveness context, the Ninth Circuit
stated, "[w]e find no merit in [the prosecutor's] suggestion that the power of the prose-
cution to adjust the charges against an accused at will inheres in its power to engage in
plea bargaining." Id. at 1370-71.
30. 434 U.S. at 361.
31. 431 U.S. 63 (1977). In Allison, the Court held that a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus should not have been summarily dismissed where the petitioner was
challenging the validity of his guilty plea alleging an unkept promise accompanied by
specific factual allegations, the truth or falsity of which could not be determined from
the record. As to the importance and benefits of plea bargaining, the Court stated:
Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the fact is that the guilty plea
and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this coun-
try's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all con-
cerned. The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties
and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance
to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there
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cuit to consider the existing procedural safeguards in plea bargaining,
i.e., "the importance of counsel during plea negotiations, Brady v.
United States" .. .the need for a public record indicating that a plea
was knowingly and voluntarily made, Boykin v. Alabama" . . .and
the requirement that a prosecutor's plea bargain promise must be kept,
Santobello v. New York34 . . ...35
The Supreme Court clearly disagreed with the findings of the court
of appeals that the products of state vindictiveness, found to exist in the
Pearce and Perry situations, requiring a due process restraint on the
state's sentencing and charging powers, were also present in the Hayes
plea bargain situation.
In giving its reasons for finding the court of appeals "mistaken"
in its opinion, the Court first reaffirmed the principle, established in
Pearce and Perry, that vindictiveness against "a defendant who had
chosen to exercise a legal right to attack his original conviction" is a
violation of due process.38 However, the Court, citing Colten v. Ken-
tucky37 and Chaffin v. Stynchcombe3 s (both of which were decided in
light of Pearce), emphasized that the due process violations in Pearce
may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce re-
sources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with
criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal
proceedings.
Id. at 71.
32. 397 U.S. 742. Addressing the issue of procedural safeguards, the Brady Court
stated:
[Olur view ... is based on our expectations that courts will satisfy themselves
that pleas of guilty are voluntarily and intelligently made by competent defend-
ants with adequate advice of counsel and that there is nothing to question the
accuracy and reliability of the defendant's admissions that they committed the
crimes with which they are charged.
397 U.S. at 758.
33. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the Court held that it was reversible error
for the trial judge to accept a guilty plea without an affirmative showing on the record
that it was intelligently and voluntarily made.
34. 404 U.S. 257 (1971). In Santobello, the Court held that a state's failure to
keep a commitment made during plea bargaining requires that the judgment be vacated
and the case be remanded for determination as to whether the circumstances require
specific performance of the agreement, or that the defendant be given the opportunity
to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. at 262-63.
35. 434 U.S. at 362.
36. Id.
37. 407 U.S. 104 (1972).
38. 412 U.S. 17 (1973).
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and Perry "lay not in the possibility that a defendant might be deterred
from the exercise of a legal right . . . but rather in the danger that the
State might be retaliating against the accused for lawfully attacking his
conviction. ' 39 In applying the Pearce rule to Colten and Chaffin, the
Court had considered whether the allegedly vindictive state action con-
tained the requisite elements of retaliation. In Colten, the state action
was an increased fine subsequent to an exercise of right to trial de novo.
The Court considered whether the de novo court had any relationship
with the court which had originally convicted the defendant or any
relationship with the previous decision which would motivate it to retal-
iate against the defendant. Finding inter alia that the de novo court was
separate and distinct from the original court, the Supreme Court distin-
guished Pearce on the fact that Pearce's retrial and reconviction, result-
ing in an increased sentence, took place in the same court which had
first incorrectly convicted Pearce." In Chaffin, the allegedly vindictive
state action was an increased sentence imposed by a jury subsequent to
a successful appeal. The Court considered whether the jury could have
been motivated to retaliate against the defendant, but found that the
jurors had no knowledge of the prior sentence and would have been
"unlikely to be sensitive to the institutional interests that might occasion
higher sentences by a judge desirous of discouraging what he regards as
meritless appeals."41 Therefore, to apply the due process restraints
against vindictiveness on the sentencing or charging powers of the state,
there must be a clear showing that the danger of vindictiveness exists,
but such danger will be found to exist only where the requisite elements
of retaliation are present.
Arguendo, the requisite elements of retaliation born out of the
application of Pearce to Chaffin and Colten were present in the Hayes
case. The prosecutor in Hayes was certainly "sensitive to the institu-
tional interests that might occasion" (and in this case did occasion)
increased charges by a prosecutor "desirous of discouraging what he
regards as meritless" pleas of not guilty. However, in applying the
Pearce and Perry rule to Hayes, the Court was able to create a new
39. 434 U.S. at 363.
40. Other facts leading the Court in Colten to find that there was no retaliatory
motive in imposing an increased sentence were: that the de novo court was not being
"asked to do over what it thought it had already done correctly," that the de novo court
did not have to find error in the lower court's decision, and that "in all likelihood the
trial de novo court is not even informed of the sentence imposed by the inferior court."
407 U.S. at 118.
41. 412 U.S. at 27.
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element of retaliation and distinguish the cases. The Court found that
the requisite element of retaliation present in Pearce and Perry, but
lacking in Hayes, was the "State's unilateral imposition of a penalty
upon a defendant who had chosen to exercise a legal right." In support
of its finding that state action arising out of a plea bargain is not
unilaterally imposed, the Court looked to the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan in Parker v. North Carolina,3 where he characterized
plea bargaining as a "give-and-take negotiation. . . between the prose-
cution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bargain-
ing power."44 Therefore, the Court reasoned, since plea bargaining in
its ideal state is not unilateral, but rather "a give-and-take negotiation,"
the standard for measuring the possibility of vindictiveness in plea bar-
gaining is whether "the accused is free to accept or reject the prosecu-
tion's offer."'45
Having established unilateral state action as a requisite element of
retaliation, the Court rationalized its refusal to find the possibility of
vindictiveness in the Hayes plea bargaining situation by expounding on
the public policy need to preserve the state's leverage in plea negotia-
tions. "Plea bargaining flows from 'the mutuality of advantage' to de-
fendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for wanting to
avoid trial."" To protect this "mutuality of advantage," the Court re-
42. 434 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added).
43. 397 U.S. 790 (1970). In Parker, the majority held that a law which allowed
for the waiver of the death penalty on a capital charge if the accused pleaded guilty had
no effect on the validity of a guilty plea. Justice Brennan, in a separate dissenting
opinion, called for a "particularly sensitive scrutiny of the voluntariness of guilty pleas
entered under this type of death penalty scheme." Id. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Brennan reasoned that, while plea bargaining was a "give-and-take negotiation . . .
between the prosecution and the defense, which arguably possess relatively equal bar-
gaining power," the imposition of a legislative penalty as severe as a death sentence to
encourage guilty pleas upset the balance in bargaining power. Id.
44. 397 U.S. at 809 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
45. 434 U.S. at 363. Whether a criminal defendant faced with a threat from the
prosecutor is reasonably able to make an intelligent choice was questioned by Justice
Blackmun in his dissenting opinion. See text accompanying notes 54 and 55 infra.
46. 434 U.S. at 363. The Hayes Court relied on Brady v. United States, supra
note 17, for its "mutuality of advantage" argument. In Brady, the Court stated:
[Tihe State and the defendant find it advantageous to preclude the possibility of
the maximum penalty authorized by law. . . . It is this mutuality of advantage
that perhaps explains the fact that at present well over three-fourths of the crimi-
nal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty, a great many of them no
doubt motivated at least in part by the hope or assurance of a lesser penalty than
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fused to deny to prosecutors the leverage gained by threatening to bring
increased charges against a defendant subsequent to unsuccessful plea
negotiations.
The Court also addressed the court of appeals' finding that the
prosecutor in Hayes abused his broad discretionary charging powers by
using those powers as leverage in the plea negotiations. Recognizing
that the charging of defendants is entirely within the prosecutor's discre-
tion, the Court quoted Oyler v. Boles,4" which stated that "the conscious
exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal
constitutional violation" so long as "the selection was [not] deliberately
based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other
arbitrary classification."4 The Hayes Court refused to hold that a pros-
ecutor's "desire to induce a guilty plea" was an "unjustifiable standard"
on which to base his charging decision.49 Since the Hayes Court had
already expressed its intention to protect the prosecutor's leverage, it is
not surprising that the Court would not restrict that leverage by curtail-
ing the prosecutor's discretion in bringing charges. The Court found that
to hold otherwise "would contradict the very premises that underlie the
concept of plea bargaining itself."50 Although it conceded that broad
might be imposed if there were a guilty verdict after a trial by judge or jury.
397 U.S. at 752.
47. 368 U.S. 448 (1962). Oyler v. Boles was consolidated with Crabtree v. Boles.
The facts in Crabtree and the due process arguments propounded by the defendant
against the procedure used by the prosecutor to charge the defendant under the West
Virginia recidivist statute help to define the issues involved in Hayes. Crabtree had
pleaded guilty to forging a $35 check, an offense punishable by a term of 2 to 10 years
in prison. Id. at 450. In accordance with West Virginia's habitual criminal statute, W.
VA. CODE §6131 (1961), the prosecuting attorney, just prior to sentencing, filed an
information charging that Crabtree had two prior felony convictions. Id. at 450. "The
trial judge, after cautioning Crabtree of the effect of the information and his rights under
it, inquired if he was in fact the accused person. Crabtree . . . represented by counsel
. . . admitted in open court that he was such person." Id. at 450-51. The Court then
sentenced Crabtree to life imprisonment. In a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
Crabtree argued, inter alia, "that procedural due process under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment requires notice of the habitual criminal accusation before the trial on the third
offense or at least in time to afford a reasonable opportunity to meet the recidivist
charge." Id. at 451-52. The Court held that Crabtree was not deprived of due process
because "the record clearly shows that both petitioners personally and through their
lawyers conceded the applicability of the law's sanctions to the circumstances of their
cases." Id. at 454.
48. Id. at 456.
49. 434 U.S. at 364.
50. Id. at 364-65.
294
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
S3:1979B
prosecutorial discretion carries with it the potential for abuse, and that
there are constitutional boundaries on its breadth, the Court made it
clear that the conduct of the prosecutor in the instant case was well
within those boundaries."1
Finally, the Court, expressing its concern that plea bargaining had
only recently been accorded legitimacy by the Supreme Court5 2 was
wary of imposing any restrictions on the process which could have the
effect of causing plea bargaining to revert to its clandestine past.
Because plea bargaining has become the principal method of deter-
mining guilt and sentence in the American system of criminal justice, a
majority of the Court was understandably cautious in regulating a pro-
cess which plays such an enormous role in the judicial system. The
majority in Hayes held that a prosecutor's threat to reindict was no
different from the situation where a prosecutor offers to drop a charge.
The majority also found that Hayes had made a voluntary and intelli-
gent choice among his alternative courses of action. However, Justice
Blackmun, in his dissenting opinion, questioned whether a defendant
faced with a threat from a prosecutor is reasonably able to make an
intelligent choice." Where the defendant is faced with clear-cut alterna-
tives and he knows what he has been charged with and what the possible
penalties will be, he can probably make an intelligent choice. However,
when a defendant must evaluate a prosecutor's propensity for carrying
out his threats of bringing an increased charge, the possibility for an
intelligent choice among alternatives is significantly reduced.14 A con-
trary holding in Hayes would have prohibited a prosecutor from bring-
51. Id. at 365.
52. Id. The Court cited to Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977), where
it had stated:
Only recently has plea bargaining become a visible practice accepted as a legiti-
mate component in the administration of criminal justice. For decades it was a
sub rosa process shrouded in secrecy and deliberately concealed by participating
defendants, defense lawyers, prosecutors, and even judges. Indeed, it was not until
our decision in Santobello v. New York, 407 U.S. 257, that lingering doubts
about the legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled.
The Santobello opinion has the distinction of being the first Supreme Court opinion
where the Court actually stated that plea bargaining was "an essential component of
the administration of justice" which, "[piroperly administered, .... is to be encour-
aged." 404 U.S. at 260.
53. 434 U.S. at 369 n. 2.
54. Dix, supra note 17, at 257. Dix categorizes a defendant's "anticipation of
unfavorable exercise of official discretion" as an "unacceptable influence upon the
decision to waive." id.
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ing an increased charge after plea negotiations had failed. Such a prohi-
bition would have encouraged prosecutors to bring all possible well-
grounded charges against a defendant prior to plea bargaining, thereby
allowing him to make an intelligent choice among his alternatives.
The effect that such a restraint on prosecutors would have on de-
fendants was considered by Justice Blackmun in his dissenting opinion:
The consequences to the accused would still be adverse, for then he would
bargain against a greater charge, face the likelihood of increased bail, and
run the risk that the court would be less inclined to accept a bargained
plea. Nonetheless, it is far preferable to hold the prosecution to the charge
it was originally content to bring and to justify in the eyes of its public.55
Thus, it was Blackmun's view that the function of a prosecutor is to
serve the public interest, and any charge a prosecutor brings against a
defendant should be calculated. to serve the ends of the criminal justice
system. A similar view was expressed by Justice Powell in his dissenting
opinion:
[In Hayes], the prosecutor evidently made a reasonable, responsible
judgment not to subject an individual to a mandatory life sentence when
his only new offense had societal implications as limited as those accom-
panying the uttering of a single $88 forged check and when the circum-
stances of his prior convictions confirmed the inappropriateness of apply-
ing the habitual criminal statute. I think it may be inferred that the
prosecutor himself deemed it unreasonable and not in the public interest
to put this defendant in jeopardy of a sentence of life imprisonment."8
The minority in Hayes was willing to provide the accused with
procedural safeguards in the plea bargaining arena, even at a cost to
him. It was the dissenters' view that the public interest in a fair and
effective criminal justice system is not subordinate to the interest of the
prosecutor.57 Therefore, according to a minority of the Court, prohibit-
55. 434 U.S. at 368.
56. Id. at 371.
57. The view that the prosecutor's function is to serve the public interest is also
reflected in the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, §3.9 (Approved
Draft, 1971):
3.9 Discretion in the charging decision.
(a) In addressing himself to the decision whether to charge, the prosecutor
should first determine whether there is evidence which would support a convic-
tion.
296
Nova Law Journal 3:1979 1
296
Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
Bordenkircher v. Hayesi3:,979 297 1
ing a prosecutor from bringing an increased charge after plea negotia-
tions have failed would allow a defendant to make an intelligent choice
in plea bargaining, would protect the accused from prosecutorial vindic-
tiveness and would help to insure that the public interest was being
served.
The majority opinion in Hayes will maintain plea bargaining in its
status quo. The minority argues for plea bargaining reform through
restraints on prosecutorial discretion."8 In light of the fact that plea
bargaining, in its present form, is under attack by prosecuting attor-
ney's,59 defense attorneys," and commentators,"1 the majority's decision
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence might
support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent
with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that evidence exists
which would support a conviction. Illustrative of the factors which the prosecutor
may properly consider in exercising his discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the particu-
lar offense of the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complaint;
(v) prolonged non-enforcement of a statute, with community acquiescence;
(vi) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vii) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
(viii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
(c) In making the decision to prosecute, the prosecutor should give no weight
to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which might be involved
or to a desire to enhance his record of convictions.
(d) In cases which involve a serious threat to the community, the prosecutor
should not be deterred from prosecution by the fact that in his jurisdiction juries
have tended to acquit persons accused of the particular kind of criminal act in
question.
(e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree
than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial.
58. See generally National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards
and Goals, Report on Courts at 3 (1973).
The Commission recognizes that those who criticize the informal administrative
processing of criminal defendants do so primarily because the administrative
procedure involves numerous discretionary decisions made by the various partici-
pants in the process, especially the prosecutor. It is this discretionary nature of
administrative processing-and the actual or potential abuse of the power to
make discretionary decisions-that needs attention.
59. See generally M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING, THE EXPERIENCES OF PROS-
ECUTORS, JUDGES AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS (1977).
60. Id.
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may hinder the improvement of the plea bargaining process.
Robert J. Crowe
61. See, e.g., Dix, supra note 17, at 260; Note, Plea Bargaining and the Transfor-
mation of the Criminal Process, 90 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1977).
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Prevailing Defendant's Right to Recover Attorney's
Fees in an Action Under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964: Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission
Rosa Helm, a female employee at the Christianburg Garment Com-
pany, filed a Title VII action' against her employer, charging racial
discrimination. The charge was filed with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission and, in 1970, the Commission notified her that
its efforts at conciliation had failed, and that she had a right to sue her
employer on her own behalf. She did not do so. In 1972, almost two
years after the Commission notified Rosa of her right to sue, Congress
amended Title VII2 and authorized the Commission to bring prompt
judicial action on its own behalf, whenever it appears necessary, to carry
out the purposes of the Act.3 The Act, as amended, was to apply to all
"charges pending with the Commission ' 4 on the effective date of the
amendments.
As a result, the Commission filed a lawsuit' against Christianburg
Garment Company, Rosa's employer, alleging that it had engaged in
unlawful employment practices in violation of the Civil Rights Act of
1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5, Unlawful Employment Prac-
tices - Employer Practices
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer - (1) to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national
origin.
2. Pub. L. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (March 24, 1972). The amendment gives the
Commission the power to bring civil actions against an employer where the Commission
is unable to secure a conciliation agreement from the employer to refrain from further
unlawful employment practices and to obtain voluntary compliance with the Act.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2).
4. Section 14 of Pub. L. 92-261 provides that: "The amendments made by this
Act to Section 706 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. . ..shall be applicable with respect
to charges pending with the Commission on the date of the enactment of this Act...
and all charges filed thereafter."
5. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Christianburg Garment Co.,
Inc., 376 F. Supp. 1067 (W.D. Va. 1974).
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1964.6 The employer moved for summary judgment on the grounds that
Rosa Helm's charge was not "pending" on the effective date of the
amendments. The Commission contended "that charges as to which no
private suit had been brought as of the effective date of the amendments
remained 'pending' before the Commission so long as the complaint had
not been dismissed and the dispute had not been resloved through con-
ciliation." 7 The Virginia District Courts granted summary judgment on
behalf of the employer, concluding that:
[W]hen Rosa Helm was notified in 1970 that conciliation had failed and
that she had a right to sue the company, the Commission had no further
action legally open to it, and its authority over the case terminated on
that date. Section 14's reference to "pending" cases was held "to be
limited to charges still in the process of negotiation and conciliation" on
the effective date of the 1972 Amendments.?
The garment company, as the prevailing party, then petitioned the
court for an award of attorney's fees against the Commission, as pro-
vided for in Section 706(k) of Title VII. 11 The Virginia District Court,
finding that "the Commission's action in bringing the suit cannot be
characterized as unreasonable and meritless,"" refused to grant attor-
ney's fees. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed 12 and certior-
ari was granted 3 by the Supreme Court. The United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion 4 expressing the unanimous view of the eight 5
participating Justices, affirmed the court of appeals' decision denying
attorney's fees to the defendant and HELD: (1) a district court can, in
its discretion, award attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant pursuant
6. Supra note 1.
7. Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
434 U.S. 412, 414-15 (1978).
8. 376 F. Supp. 1067.
9. 434 U.S. at 415, n. 3.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e-5(k):
In any action or proceeding under this subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the Commission or the United States,
reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs, and the Commission and the
United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person.
II. 434 U.S. at 415.
12. 550 F. 2d 949 (4th Cir. 1977).
13. 432 U.S. 905 (1977).
14. 434 U.S. 412.
15. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
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to Section 706(k), but only upon a finding that the plaintiff's action was
"frivolous, unreasonable or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued
to litigate after it clearly became so,""6 (2) the district court exercised
its discretion squarely within the permissible bounds of Section 706(k)
in declining to award attorney's fees to the employer as a prevailing
defendant; 7 and (3) the Commission's action against the employer
based on its interpretation of Section 14 of Title VII was not frivolous,
unreasonable or groundless."8
In the United States, prevailing litigants are generally not entitled
to collect a reasonable attorney's fee from the losing party.1 This
"American Rule,' as it has been referred to,21 has been much criticized
and is a departure from the practice followed in England.21 There has
16. 434 U.S. at 422.
17. Id. at 424.
18. Id.
19. Alyeska Pipeline Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). (Alyeska
expressly reaffirmed the American Rule, although certain exceptions were recognized).
20. See 6 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 54.77(2) at 1703; Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); United States Steel Corp. v.
United States, 519 F. 2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975).
21. The English have been awarding attorney's fees as costs since 1275. See
Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA L. REv. 75
(1963), for an article in which the author argues in favor of adopting a system like that
of the- English in which attorneys' fees would be considered costs of litigation. It is his
feeling that a great deal of the congestion in our courts is due to the present system in
which it is financially advantageous to go to court. A plaintiff may have a groundless
claim, but may realize financial advantage by going to court because the defendant will
often settle immediately for an amount that is less than the expenses of contesting the
case. A defendant may also realize an economic advantage by continuing the litigation,
even after realizing that he has no defense, or after judgment against him, to increase
the plaintiff's attorney's fees and hope to get the plaintiff to settle for less than the true
value of the case. In essence, the author feels that the present system represents an
expense to one litigant that results in economic advantage to the other. See also Note,
Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L. REv. 1216 (1967.)
in which the author analyzes the historical reasons and philosophical basis for the
evolution of the "American Rule." The author believes that access to the courts without
fear of having to pay an opponent's fees is so deeply ingrained in our system that it is
often claimed that due process considerations demand retention of the American system
despite the many arguments and movements in favor of reform. The reform movement
is viewed as an outgrowth of a shift in emphasis from individualism to the importance
of society as a whole. At the heart of the reform movement lie two fundamental con-
cepts: the idea of resolving disputes by settlement and compromise rather than through
litigation, and the idea that justice demands that the aggrieved party be made whole
and that, to do so, attorney's fees must be included as damages.
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been no adequate historical explanation for the departure from the
English Rule.Y It is interesting to note that, in early Colonial America,
most courts adopted the English Rule and costs and fees were awarded
to prevailing parties in actions at law.2 3 However, the underlying
philosophy was not that of full compensation for the wronged party,
and a ceiling was put on the amount of fees which could be awarded.
That ceiling was never raised to reflect increased costs. In addition,
new states joining the Union rarely provided for attorney's fees to be
taxed as costs and, if they did so provide, the award was merely per-
functory. Some commentators have concluded that "it was this process
of gradual forgetting rather than a deep-seated moral argument that
has apparently caused the abolition of the prevailing party's right to
the recovery of his counsel fees."24 Others have suggested that, because
the new government had to create a willingness in its citizens to
submit to the judicial system to resolve their disputes, there was a
conscious effort on the part of the new government not to create any
deterrents to the use of the courts, but to insure free access to them.2
Another reason often cited for the historical evolution of the Amer-
ican Rule is the spirit of individualism which permeated early American
life. As a consequence of this philosophical outlook, it was only natural
that parties involved in legal disputes would resolve the issues among
themselves. Theoretically, our system established a set of laws and pro-
cedures whereby every person would be able to represent himself ade-
quately without the need for an attorney.26 Hence, the feeling arose that
attorneys were "considered a luxury, rather than a necessity, [and] one
who wished to utilize their services should not be compensated for this
indiscretion." z Further,
the assertion of individual rights was so important to the early American
that litigation flourished and was encouraged under "[w]hat Dean Wig-
more has called the sporting theory of justice, the idea that judicial ad-
ministration of justice is a game to be played to the bitter end." Inherent
22. Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney's Fees from Funds, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1974).
23. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L.
REV. at 1218.
24. Id. at 1219, n. 17.
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in the rules of this "sport" is the idea from which our rule on fees
developed, that is, the idea that each individual must bear whatever bur-
dens, including all costs, litigation might cause. 8
However, despite the general rule that attorney's fees are not taxed
as costs, Congress has provided limited exceptions and has madespe-
cific provisions for attorney's fees under certain federal statutes. These
statutory allowances can best be categorized in the following ways: (1)
those which make fee awards mandatory for prevailing plaintiffs;2 (2)
those which permit fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs" and (3) those
which are most flexible and leave it to the discretion of the court to
award attorney's fees to either plaintiffs or defendants.31 Section 706(k)
of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 falls into the category which
allows the district court to exercise its discretion in awarding attorney's
fees to the prevailing party.
The Supreme Court, in arriving at a decision in Christianburg,
reviewed cases arising under the third category of statutes which allow
for awards of attorney's fees at the court's discretion. In rendering its
decision, the Court considered Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises."
28. Note, Attorney's Fees: Where Shall the Ultimate Burden Lie? 20 VAND. L.
REv. at 1220-21.
29. "See, e.g., The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15; the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b); Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 210(f); the Truth
in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a); and the Merchant Marines Act of 1936, 46 U.S.C.
§ 1227." 434 U.S. at 415, n. 5.
30. "See, e.g., the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(g)(2)(B); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c)." 434 U.S. at 416, n. 6.
31. "See, e.g., Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77000(d); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(a); Federal Water Pollution Preven-
tion and Control Act of 1972, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,
42 U.S.C. § 1857h-2(d); Waste Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (d)." 434 U.S. at
416, n. 7.
32. 390 U.S. 400 (1968). Piggie Park involved a class action brought under the
Public Accomodations portion of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, to enjoin racial discrimina-
tion at the defendant's drive-in restaurant and sandwich shop. The appellate court found
that the defendant had discriminated against Blacks at its shops. The issue before the
Supreme Court was whether or not the prevailing party was entitled to attorney's fees
under the applicable portions of the statute. (See note 33 infra). The Supreme Court,
in a frequently quoted opinion, found that the plaintiff was entitled to attorney's fees
under the statute and that prevailing plaintiffs would usually be entitled to attorney's
fees unless there were exceptional circumstances which would render such an award
unjust. The Court based its decision on the theory that plaintiffs act in the shoes of the
government and often receive no monetary award for bringing such actions. They are
therefore entitled to be made whole. Id. at 402.
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which involved a statute almost identical to the one at issue in this
case. " In Piggie Park, the plaintiffs brought an action under Title II
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.Y The plaintiffs prevailed and the
United States Court of Appeals instructed the district court to award
them attorney's fees "only to the extent that respondents' defenses had
been advanced for purposes of delay and not in good faith."'  The
Supreme Court in Piggie Park held, however, that a prevailing plaintiff
under this statute
should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances
would render such an award unjust . . . [because] . . . when a plaintiff
brings an action under that Title he cannot recover damages. If he obtains
an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a "private
attorney general" vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the
highest priority. 6
The Court also noted in Piggie Park that, if the intent of Congress was
only to allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover an award for attorney's fees
against a defendant who had acted in bad faith and made completely
groundless contentions for purposes of delay, it would not have been
necessary to create a new statutory provision because, under certain
judicially created exceptions, "it has long been held that a federal court
may award counsel fees to a successful plaintiff where a defense has
been maintained 'in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons."' 3 7 In light of the fact that no statute was necessary to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff when the defendant's behavior
created a valid exceptional circumstance, the Court in Piggie Park con-
cluded that the statute was necessary to insure that a prevailing plaintiff
33. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b): "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchap-
ter, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be
liable for costs the same as a private person."
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, el. seq. This Act provides that "all persons shall be entitled
to full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and
accomodations of any place of public accomodation . . . without discrimination or
segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin."
The Act further allows for the bringing of a civil action for injunctive relief where
a party believes that someone is about to engage or has engaged in unlawful practices
pursuant to this Act.
35. 390 U.S. at 401.
36. Id. at 402.
37. Id. at 402, n. 4.
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in a Title 1I action would, as a matter of course, be awarded a reasona-
ble attorney's fee, unless to do so would be unjust.3
In a subsequent case also cited in Christianburg, Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody,39 the Court made it clear that the standard enunciated
in Piggie Park for awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.was
equally applicable to an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.40
Hence, it was established that, in actions arising under the category of
statutes which allow the district court to exercise discretion in awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party, the prevailing plaintiff should
ordinarily be awarded attorney's fees in all but special circumstances.
The principal case presented the Court with the question of what
standard should be applied in determining whether a successful de-
fendant in a Title VII action should be awarded attorney's fees. The
garment company, employer/defendant, contended that the same
standards which are applied to a prevailing plaintiff should equally
apply to a prevailing defendant. In other words, the garment company
espoused the theory that, barring circumstances which would make an
award unjust, prevailing defendants should receive attorney's fees as a
matter of course."1 On the other hand, the Commission/plaintiff argued
38. Id. at 402. See also Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045
(4th Cir. 1976), for an example of a situation where the court found special circum-
stances which would support a denial of attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs.
Retired male employees filed a lawsuit alleging sex discrimination in a retirement plan
which gave male retirees a smaller share of the retirement fund than similarly situated
female employees. The district court found the plan discriminatory but refused to award
attorney's fees to the plaintiffs. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial
of attorney's fees on the ground that the employer acted with reasonable speed to redress
its unintentional violation of the Act, once the violation became known, by amending
the plan to eliminate its illegally discriminatory aspects before plaintiffs' suits werefiled.
39. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). In this case, a certified class of present and former Black
employees brought an action against their employer and the employees' union, seeking
injunctive relief against any acts at the plant which violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. The
petitioners had argued that they were entitled to back pay, but the district court, relying
on Piggie Park, declined to grant it on the ground that there was no evidence of bad
faith non-compliance with the Act. The Supreme Court, however, refused to apply
Piggie Park to an award of back pay, stating, "[tlhere is, of course, an equally strong
public interest in having injunctive actions brought under Title VII, to eradicate discrim-
inatory employment practices. But this interest can be vindicated by applying the Piggie
Park standard to the attorney's fees provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Section 2000e-
5(k)." Id. at 415.
40. Id.
41. See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Bailey Co., Inc., 563 F.
2d 439 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Allegheny Ludlum Industries, Inc., 558 F. 2d
742 (5th Cir. 1977) for examples of federal courts which have expressed the same view
as the defendant company/employer in this case.
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that prevailing defendants should receive an award of attorney's fees
only if the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The Supreme Court did not
agree with either position. The Court indicated that the language of
the statute is permissive and discretionary and neither invites, nor
requires, the mechanical application which the defendant garment
company sought to impose. The Court, relying once again on its deci-
sion in Piggie Park, pointed out that there are equitable considerations
which favor an award of attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff which
do not apply to a prevailing defendant. In distinguishing the equities
involved, the Court noted that the plaintiff is viewed as the chosen
"instrument of Congress to vindicate 'a policy that Congress con-
sidered of the highest priority' "42 and that, when an award for attor-
ney's fees is given in a Title VII action to a prevailing plaintiff, it is
awarded against a violator of federal law. 3
The Court found that the legislative debate indicated that the public
policy behind allowing an award of attorney's fees is to facilitate the
bringing of meritorious suits." Reasonable attorney's fees are frequently
awarded to private litigants to encourage compliance with the well-
recognized Congressional policy of having Title VII enforced, to a large
extent, by individuals acting as "private attorneys general."' Under the
"private attorney general" theory, prevailing plaintiffs are viewed as
having vindicated a policy that Congress considered of the highest prior-
42. 434 U.S. at 419.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Carey v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 380 F. Supp. 467 (D.C. La. 1973). The
plaintiff, James Carey, brought a lawsuit against the defendants, Greyhound and the
local unions, alleging racial discrimination and seeking an injunction to prevent the
defendants from interfering with his right to equal employment opportunity. He also
sought a provision for change in the seniority system, an award for back pay and
attorney's fees. The court found that the defendants had engaged in unlawful employ-
ment discrimination and required a change in the seniority system. Although it declined
to grant back pay to the plaitiff, it did award attorney's fees. In justifying the award,
the court stated:
Notably, the awarding of attorney's fees is not conditioned on a finding that the
Title VII defendant has intentionally engaged in an unlawful employment prac-
tice. Reasonable attorney's fees are frequently awarded to private litigants in
order to encourage compliance with the well recognized Congressional policy of
having Title VII enforced to a large extent by individuals acting as "private
attorneys general." In view of this policy of citizen enforcement, plaintiff is
entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees ...
Id. at 474.
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ity. If plaintiffs are forced to bear their attorneys' fees in every case,
perhaps few aggrieved parties would be in a position to seek judicial
reliefd. In addition, the right of a plaintiff to recover an attorney's fee
under Section 706(k) has been held not to be affected by the fact that
the plaintiff instituted the action under Title VII as a "test case," 7 or
that the defenses presented were not entirely without merit,4" or that
there was no intentional violation of the Act by the defendant in that
he acted in good faith reliance on, or compliance with, a state statute.
49
46. 390 U.S. at 402.
47. Lea v. Cone Mills, Corp., 438 F. 2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971). In this case, the Black
female plaintiff sued under Title VII, alleging that the defendant, Cone Mills Corpora-
tion, had failed to hire Black females, although it hired Black males and white females.
The plaintiffs prevailed on the merits and obtained an injunction against the unfair
practices, thus opening the way for employment of Black women in defendant's plant.
The appellate court awarded attorney's fees to the plaintiffs and, in so doing, stated:
Plaintiffs prevailed on the merits. They not only obtained an injunction against
unfair employment practices but also opened the way for employment of Negro
women in the Cone Mills plant. True, specific employment was not sought, and
even if the application was solely a predicate for this suit, these facts ought not
defeat the claim for attorney's fees. This pronouncement upon their rights, and
the requirement of Cone Mills to observe them in the future, were ordered in
implementation of the Equal Employment Opportunities Act. Plaintiffs should
not be denied attorney's fees merely because theirs was a "test case."
id. at 88.
48. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F. 2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971). In this case, the
district court found that the defendant's seniority system violated the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunities Act but declined to award attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiffs.
The defendants had claimed that they were justified in discriminating because of an
overriding legitimate purpose in maintaining the racially discriminating practice. The
district court, in denying plaintiffs an award of attorney's fees, stated: "While more
meritorious defenses have in some cases been presented, the defenses here cannot be
fairly characterized as extreme. Therefore, the Court declines to award counsel fees as
part of the costs for the plaintiffs." Id. at 804. See also 319 F. Supp. 835, 843 (M.D.N.C.
1971).
The plaintiffs appealed the denial of attorney's fees. The appellate court reversed
and awarded attorney's fees, noting that: "[Aittorney's fees are to be imposed not only
to penalize defendants for pursuing frivolous arguments, but to encourage individuals
to vindicate the strongly expressed Congressional policy against racial discrimination."
444 F. 2d at 804.
49. LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co., 333 F. Supp. 602 (E.D. La. 1971).
The defendant telephone company, pursuant to a Louisiana statute, refused to allow
female employees to work more than eight hours per day or forty-eight hours per week.
An action was brought against the telephone company by female employees charging
unlawful discrimination in employment. The district court held that the Louisiana stat-
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The Supreme Court, as indicated above, did not find merit in the
viewpoint of the Commission that a prevailing defendant could recover
attorney's fees only if the plaintiff had acted in bad faith. Instead, the
Court recognized that Congress "also wanted to protect defendants
from burdensome litigation having no legal or factual basis""0 and in-
tended to award attorney's fees to help defendants defend against frivo-
lous and factually baseless actions.51 A defendant seeking attorney's fees
relies on equitable considerations other than the plaintiff's "private
attorney general" theory. An award for the defendant is conditioned
upon such considerations as the propriety of the plaintiff's conduct and
whether there was vexatiousness, bad faith, abusive conduct or an at-
tempt on the part of the plaintiff to harass or embarrass the defendant."
prevailed and were awarded attorney's fees. On appeal, defendants argued that they had
relied in good faith upon the state statute and should not be held liable for a failure to
predict that the statute would be deemed unconstitutional. The appellate court upheld
the award of attorney's fees and stated:
There is no requirement that the prevailing party be the victim of intentional
discrimination. The courts have uniformly awarded attorney's fees in these cases
even where the prevailing party was unable to recover back pay or other damages
because the defendant was relying in good faith on a state statute. . .This is a
recognition of the Congressional purpose to have Title VII enforced in large part
by the individuals wronged acting as private attorneys general . . . Awarding
attorney's fees to the prevailing party is one way of insuring that this Congres-
sional intent will be effectuated and that individuals will not be deterred from
bringing Title VII suits. These plaintiffs have been the victims of an unlawful
employment practice, it is only fair that they be allowed to recover the considera-
ble sums they have expended to vindicate not only their rights but also the rights
of many other working women.
Id. at 611.
50. 434 U.S. at 420.
51. See Lee v. Chesapeake & O.R. Co., 389 F. Supp. 84 (D. Md. 1975). An
employee brought suit against the railroad company and a local labor union under the
equal employment provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiff admitted that
he had no reasonable grounds to believe that the union had discriminated against him
because of his race. Having prevailed on motions for summary judgment, the defendant
union sought attorney's fees. The court, in granting them, quoted from Paddison v.
Fidelity Bank, 60 F.R.D. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1973):
While a defendant does not act as a "private attorney general" in a Title VII
action,. . . a prevailing defendant is entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) when required to defend against a frivolous or
factually baseless action brought under Title VII . . . "[sluch an award [of attor-
ney's fees] would normally be made to prevailing defendants only if the case
had been unreasonably brought. . ..
389 F. Supp. at 85.
52. See, e.g., Robinson v. KMOX-TV, CBS Television Station, 407 F. Supp.
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The Court, in rendering its decision in Christianburg, was influ-
enced by two recent circuit court cases. In one, United States Steel
Corporation v. United States,3 the court denied an award of attorney's
fees to a successful defendant while, in the other, Carrion v. Yeshiva
University,5 the court upheld the award to a successful defendant. .The
significance of these cases is the court's application of the same standard
in arriving at different results: that the action must have been
"unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious"5 and not merely
brought in bad faith. To define these abstract words, the Court in
Christianburg said:
"[mleritless" is to be understood as meaning groundless or without foun-
dation, rather than simply that the plaintiff has ultimately lost his case,
and that the term "vexatious" in no way implies that the plaintiff's
subjective bad faith is a necessary prerequisite to a fee award against him.
In sum, a District Court may in its discretion award attorney's fees to a
prevailing defendant in a Title VII case upon a finding that the plain-
tiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith.,
1272 (E.D. Mo. 1975). In this case, the defendant did everything possible to expedite
the lawsuit and to cooperate with the plaintiff so that the plaintiff would have prompt
adjudication of his claim. However, the plaintiff failed to pursue discovery after the
defendant had voluntarily waived time limits set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and the suit was dismissed for plaintiff's failure to proceed. In light of the
plaintiff's conduct, attorney's fees were awarded to the defendant. See also Matyi v.
Beer Bottlers Union 1187, 392 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Mo. 1974), where the defendant was
awarded attorney's fees where, prior to the filing of the lawsuit, the plaintiff had filed
charges of illegal discrimination with the National Labor Relations Board, Missouri
Commission on Human Rights, and the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission,
and each of these agencies had determined that the plaintiff's charges were without
merit.
53. 519 F. 2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1975). The appellate court upheld the denial of
attorney's fees to the prevailing defendant (U.S. Steel) in a Title VII action on the
grounds that the Commission's actions were "a bona fide effort to seek information and
there is nothing to indicate that the demand for access was brought to harass, embarrass
or abuse either the petitioner [U.S. Steel, the defendant below] or the enforcement
process, nor can we say [the E.E.O.C.'s] action was unfounded, meritless, frivolous
or vexatiously brought." Id. at 363.
54. 535 F. 2d 722 (2nd Cir. 1976). In this case, attorney's fees were awarded to a
prevailing defendant because the plaintiff had previously brought substantially similar
charges in state court and, in that suit, the trial judge determined that the plaintiff had
perjured herself. In addition, the court of appeals concluded that the suit was motivated
by malice and vindictiveness.
55. Id. at 727, 519 F. 2d at 363.
56. 434 U.S. at 421.
13:1979 309 1
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The Court's decision sets a standard which allows for the award of
attorney's fees to the defendant in a Title VII action even if the plaintiff
did not act in bad faith. This would mandate the imposition of attor-
ney's fees against the plaintiff if that plaintiff continued to litigate after
it became clear that the claim was groundless, frivolous or unreasona-
ble.5 This is logically consistent with past precedent. If bad faith was
the sole standard, it would not have been necessary for Congress to
statutorily provide for an award of attorney's fees since the common law
already provides that a prevailing party is entitled to such an award if
the opposing party acts in bad faith."
There are few areas of uncertainty left by the Christianburg deci-
sion. The Court has laid the foundation for an increase in the number
of awards of attorney's fees to prevailing defendants by clarifying the
standards for allowing their recovery and by formulating a standard
which is not grounded solely on the bad faith of the plaintiff. This could,
for example, provide a tremendous advantage to a small business-
man/defendant with limited finances who is forced to pay a substantial
cost in defending a frivolous, unreasonable and groundless lawsuit. If
such a defendant is confident of his legal position, he can aggressively
defend against frivolous or nuisance suits with the knowledge that, if he
prevails, he will recover his attorney's fees.
By setting a reasonable standard for plaintiff's liability for defen-
dant's legal fees in Title VII actions, the Court's decision may cause
prospective litigants to stop and think before commencing an action or
asserting a defense. It may thus serve as a deterrent to bringing frivo-
lous, time-consuming litigation, and court congestion may ultimately be
reduced. Perhaps the threat of having to pay the winning party's attor-
ney's fee will even encourage out-of-court settlements and/or compli-
ance with Title VII. However, inherent in the decision is the risk that
the fear of having to pay double attorney's fees may keep meritorious
litigants, especially the poor, from seeking relief through the courts.
The fact remains, though, that as a result of the Christianburg
decision, the Supreme Court has established a double standard for the
recovery of attorney's fees in Title VII actions. The Court has affirmed
that it is easier for prevailing plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees than
57. Id. at 422.
58. See Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923) and
Vaughn v. Atkinson, 369 U.S. 527 (1962), for examples of cases where, in the absence
of a statutory provision, the prevailing party received attorney's fees based on the fact
'that the opposing party had acted in bad faith.
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for prevailing defendants. 9 The prevailing plaintiff receives the award
as a matter of course (barring exceptional circumstances which would
make such an award unjust), despite the fact that the defendant is able
to present a meritorious, albeit unsuccessful, defense." On the other
hand, the prevailing defendant's right to an award is conditioned upon
a finding that the plaintiff's "claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly
became so. And,. . . if a plaintiff is found to have brought or continued
such a claim in bad faith, there will be an even stronger basis for
charging him with the attorney's fees incurred by the defense."',
Marilyn Liroff
59. The Supreme Court, in footnote 20 of its opinion, recognized that some courts
considered that there should be a distinction between awarding attorney's fees against
a losing private plaintiff and against the Commission as a losing plaintiff. However, the
Court rejected this idea and indicated that the same standard should apply.
60. Supra note 48.
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Constitutional Law: The Element of Scienter
Saves the Florida Simple Child Abuse
Statute From Being Unconstitutionally Vague:
State v. Joyce, State v. Hutcheson
Appellees, George Joyce and Alvin Leige Hutcheson were charged by
information, in the counties of Orange and Duval, respectively, with the
crime of simple child abuse' pursuant to Section 827.04(2) Florida Stat-
utes. The crime is committed by "(i) depriving a child of necessary food,
shelter, or medical treatment, willfully or by culpable negligence; and
(ii) by permitting, knowingly or by culpable negligence, the child's men-
tal or physical health to be materially endangered." 2 Hutcheson was
charged with committing both forms of child abuse against his three-
year-old daughter,3 while Joyce was charged only with permitting
"material endangerment" of his child's health.4
Each of the appellees moved to dismiss the informations filed
against them, claiming that the simple child abuse statute is unconstitu-
tionally vague, indefinite and overbroad.5 Additionally, Hutcheson con-
I. As distinguished from aggravated child abuse which is proscribed by § 827.03
FLA. STAT. (1975). In the recent case of Faust v. State, 354 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1978), the
Supreme Court of Florida upheld § 827.03 FLA. STAT. (1975) against a challenge that
the statute was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
2. State v. Joyce, 361 So. 2d 406, 407 (Fla. 1978) (Boyd, J., concurred specially
with opinion). Prior to being amended in 1977, § 827.04(2) FLA. STAT. (1975), provided:
Whoever, willfully or by culpable negligence, deprives a child of, or allows a child
to be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or who,
knowingly or by culpable negligence permits the physical or mental health of the
child to be materially endangered, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree, punishable as provided in Sections 775.082, 775.083, or 775.084.
3. The Information filed against Hutcheson specifically alleged as follows:
Alvin Leige Hutcheson, III, on the 21st day of November, 1976, in the County
of Duval, and the State of Florida, did willfully or by culpable negligence, deprive
a child, to wit: Misty Hutcheson, age three (3) years, of the necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment, or did knowingly or by culpable negli-
gence permit the physicial or mental health of said child to be materially endan-
gered, contrary to the provisions of Section 827.04(2), Florida Statutes.
Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 2, State v. Hutcheson, 361 So. 2d 406 (1978).
4. 361 So.2d at 407.
5. Id.
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tended that the phrase "materially endanger" was unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad because it did not advise the ordinary man of
specifically what conduct is prohibited by the statute.' The respective
trial courts granted each appellee's motion to dismiss, thus directly
passing upon the constitutional validity of Section 827.04(2) Florida
Statutes.7 On direct appeal8 of the consolidated cases, the Supreme
Court of Florida reversed and HELD: Section 827.04(2) Florida Stat-
utes (1975) is not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad.'
Common law required that crimes be defined with appropriate
definiteness. 0 In International Harvester Co. ofAmerica v. Kentucky,"
the United States Supreme Court held that the requirement of definite-
ness in penal statutes is an essential element of due process of law." This
standard was adopted more than forty years ago by the Supreme Court
of Florida in the case of Brock v. Hardie,3 and has since been consis-
6. Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 2, State v. Hutcheson, 361 So.2d 406 (1978).
7. 361 So.2d at 407. In dismissing the information against Hutcheson, the
trial court stated as follows:
The statute under attack is Florida Statute Section 827.04(2), child abuse. In the
case of Winters v. State (Fla. 1977), (Case No. 49,987), decided on March 31,
1977, the Florida Supreme Court struck down the negligent treatment of children
statute, Florida Statute Section 827.05, in that the statute was vague, indefinite
and overbroad, violative of due process of law. The statute sub judice suffers the
same defects and therefore is unconstitutional on its face.
Brief of Appellee Hutcheson at 3.
8. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(l) provides: "The supreme court: (1) Shall hear
appeals from final judgments of trial courts .. passing on the validity of a state statute
9. State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406, 408 (1978).
10. Pierce v. United States, 314 U.S. 306, 311 (1942).
II. 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
12. Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides: "[Nior shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." See Connally v.
General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 395 (1926) (application of the statute depends upon
the varying impressions of the juries; the constitutional guaranty of due process cannot
be allowed to rest upon support so equivocal); Collins v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638
(1914) (challenged statute violated the fundamental principles of justice embraced in the
conception of due process of law).
13. 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690 (1934). In Brock, the court in determining the
constitutional validity of a state anti-trust statute, stated as follows:
Whether the words of the Florida Statute are sufficiently explicit to inform those
who are subject to its provisions what conduct on their part will render them liable
to its penalties is the test by which the statute must stand or fall, because. . . a
"statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
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tently reaffirmed by that court."
To withstand a constitutional challenge for vagueness, a penal stat-
ute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his con-
templated conduct is forbidden by statute.15 The statute must also set
forth ascertainable standards of guilt;"8 however, such standards must
as to its application violates the first essential of due process of law."
154 So. at 694. Definiteness in penal statutes has also been held to be a requirement of
the Florida Constitution. See Steffens v. State, 343 So.2d 90 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1977). In
Steffens, the defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, after being convicted for
violating a municipal ordinance which prohibited, inter alia, topless waitresses and
entertainers. Id. The petition for the writ was granted and the state appealed. Id. In
holding the municipal ordinance to be unconstitutionally vague, the court stated:
The law is well settled that a penal statute or ordinance which forbids the doing
of an act in terms so vague that people of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates the due process clause
of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section
9, of the Florida Constitution (1968).
Id. at 91. See text accompanying note 12 supra. FLA. CONST. art. I § 9, provides: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law ...."
14. See, e.g., State v. Llopis, 257 So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971); Zachary v. State, 269
So.2d 669 (Fla. 1972); State v. Dinsmore, 308 So.2d 32 (Fla. 1975); State v. Wershow,
343 So.2d 605 (Fla. 1977).
15. Papachristov v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972); See Lanzetta v. New
Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
16. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948). In Winters, the defendant
was charged with possessing, with intent to sell, certain obscene magazines, contrary to
subsection 2 of §i141- of the New York Penal Laws (repealed and superceded 1950)
which provided as follows:
§ 1141. Obscene prints and articles
1. A person. . . who,
2. Prints, utters, publishes, sells, lends, gives away, distributes or shows, or has
in his possession with intent to sell . . . or otherwise offers for sale, loan, gift or
distribution, any book, pamphlet, magazine, newspaper or other printed paper
devoted to the publication, and principally made up of criminal news, police
reports, or accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of blood-
shed, lust or crime; ...
Is guilty of a misdemeanor ....
333 U.S. at 508. In determining that the penal statute was unconstitutionally vague
because there was no ascertainable standard of guilt, the court also noted that the
standard for certainty of a penal statute is higher than for a statute which relies on civil
sanctions for enforcement. Id. at 518. The Court observed, however, that the entire text
of the statute may furnish an adequate standard for certainty. Id. See also Raeback v.
New York, 391 U.S. 462 (1963) (per curiam). But see Smith v. Peterson, 313 Cal. App.
2d 241,280 P.2d 522 (1955) (the fact that the meaning of a statute is difficult to ascertain
or susceptible to different interpretations does not render the statute void).
315 .11 3:1979
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not be unreasonable or impossible to understand.17
Other courts have proposed additional reasons for objecting to
penal statutes which are indefinite. Some courts and commentators have
suggested that such statutes encourage the police'to rely upon criteria
outside the statute in determining whether an arrest should be made. 8
Further, statutes which are indefinite or vague in effect delegate to
judges and juries the legislative power to determine which acts shall be
criminal.19
In construing penal statutes, the courts must balance two-compet-
ing considerations. 21 It is well established that there is a presumption of
the constitutional validity of penal statutes 1 and that, if possible, a court
should construe a penal statute so as not to conflict with the constitu-
tion. 2 It is also well established that, where there is doubt as to the
17. United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1 (1946). In Petrillo, the defendant was
charged with violating a provision of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064,
1102, as amended by an Act of April 16, 1946, ch. 138, 60 Stat. 89 (1946) (current ver-
sion at 47 U.S.C. § 506 (1970)) which provides as follows:
Sec. 506(a) It shall be unlawful by the use of express or implied threat of the use
of force . . to coerce . . . a licensee - (1) to employ or agree to employ in
connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business of such licensee, any
person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such employee
to perform actual services.
332 U.S. at 3. The Court held that the statute was not unconstitutionally vague and
stated as follows: "The language here challenged conveys a definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Con-
stitution requires no more." Id. at 8. See e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
18. See Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REv. 67, 76 (1960).
19. United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 225 U.S. 81, 87 (1921) (Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the courts and juries).
20. See Brief of Appellant at 7, State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406 (Fla. 1978).
21. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). In Gitlow, the Court stated that,
when construing penal statutes: "[elvery presumption is to be indulged in favor of the
validity of the statute." Id. at 668.
22. State v. Gale Distributors, Inc., 349 So.2d 150 (Fla. 1977). In Gale, the
defendant was charged with selling sound on tape without the owner's consent in viola-
tion of Section 543.041(2) FLA. STAT. (1975). In upholding the constitutional validity
of the statute against an attack for vagueness the court stated:
This court is committed to the proposition that it has a duty, if reasonably
possible and consistent with constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the
validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality and to construe it so as not
to conflict with the Constitution.
Id. at 153.
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constitutional validity of a penal statute, it must be strictly construed
in favor of the accused.2
In Joyce, the appellees had argued that the trial court's invalidation
of Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes was consistent with the Florida
Supreme Court's earlier decision in State v. Winters.24 The court in
Winters had reiterated the requirements that penal statutes be strictly
construed and that their meaning should be sufficiently explicit so that
members of the community may determine what conduct is prohibited.2
In holding that Section 827.05 Florida Statutes was unconstitutionally
vague, the Winters court had observed that, under the statute, a person
with no intent to do wrong could be punished because the statute did
not require willfulness or culpable negligence as an essential element of
the offense.28 The Winters court also examined the language of the
statute concerning "necessary shelter" and observed that the statute
provided no guidelines for determining what specifically qualifies as
"necessary." ' While acknowledging that it is not necessary to constitu-
tional validity that the statute furnish detailed specifications of the con-
duct prohibited,28 the court stated: "Such a statute is dangerous and
does not provide due process of law."2"
23. United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209 (1937). See State v. Llopis, 257
So.2d 17 (Fla. 1971) (penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the person
against whom the penalty is sought to be imposed); Allure Shoe Corp. v. Lymberis, 173
So.2d 702 (Fla. 1965); Reino v. State, 352 So.2d 853 (Fla. 1977); United States v. Insco,
496 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.. 1974).
24. 361 So.2d at 407. In Winters, the defendant was alleged to have negligently
deprived his seven children of "necessary shelter" by allowing them to live in an insect
infested structure which had garbage strewn on the floor, a clogged toilet and no
mattresses or bedsheets for the children. Winters was charged by information with
violating § 827.05 FLA. STAT. (1975) (superseded by §827.05 FLA. STAT. (1977)) which
provides as follows: "Negligent treatment of children - whoever negligently deprives
a child of, or allows a child to be deprived of necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical
treatment is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084." State v. Winters, 346 So.2d 991, 992 (Fla. 1977).
25. 346 So.2d at 993.
26. Id. at n.l. The court in Winters observed that the language of§ 827.04(2) FLA.
STAT. (1975) and § 827.05 FLA. STAT. (1975) is similar but distinguished the former in
that it requires willfulness or culpable negligence as an element of the crime.
27. Id. at 993. The court pointed out that, under the language of the statute, a
palatial mansion might fail to qualify as "necessary shelter," if it had no heat.
28. Id. See Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972);
Smith v. State, 237 So.2d 139 (Fla. 1970).
29. 346 So.2d at 993. Boyd, J., in a dissenting opinion stated with respect to the
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In Joyce, the court distinguished its holding in Winters by stating
that the basis for its decision declaring Section 827.05 Florida Statutes
to be unconstitutionally vague and indefinite was that the statute crimi-
nalized acts of simple negligence. 0 The statute under attack in Winters
did not require scienter; however, Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes,
does require willfulness (scienter) or culpable negligence as an essential
element of the crime of child abuse. The Joyce court pointed out that
this distinction had been noted in its decision in Winters.3 1
The element of scienter or criminal intent is not always a constitu-
tional requirement for upholding the constitutional validity of penal
statutes .3  For example, most states have regulatory statutes which
have been enacted in exercise of the state's police power. The purpose
of such statutes is usually to achieve some social betterment, rather than
to punish criminals.3 3 Statutes which do not require scienter as an
element of the offense are considered mala prohibita4 rather than
mala in se, 35 and such statutes have been held to meet constitutional
muster.31
child prevents conviction of those who offer minimum support. Since economic abilities
of persons charged with the duty of care vary, a more specific standard cannot be
enacted. The statute is not vague." Id. at 994. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876).
30. 361 So.2d at 407.
31. Id. See note 26 supra.
32. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1928). In Balint, the Court discussed
the requirement of scienter in criminal statutes and stated:
While the general rule at common law was that scienter was a necessary element
in the indictment and proof of every crime, and this was followed in regard to
statutory crimes ...there has been a modification of this view in respect to




34. In Coleman v. State, 119 Fla. 653, 161 So. 89, 90 (1935), the court defined
mala prohibita as: "[Tihose things which are prohibited by statute because they infringe
upon the rights of others, though no moral turpitude may attach, and they are crimes
only because they are prohibited by statute."
35. Id. The court in Coleman defined mala in se as: "[Tlhose acts which are
immoral or wrong in themselves such as burglary, larceny, arson, rape, murder, and
breaches of the peace . . . ." 161 So. at 90.
36. Lanz v. Dowling, 92 Fla. 848, 110 So. 522, 525 (Fla. 1926), where the court
wrote, "[Wlhen a statute makes criminal an act not malum in se or infamous without
requiring the act to be knowingly or willfully done, criminal or fraudulent intent is not
an element of the offense and need not be proven."
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The Joyce court noted that the United States Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the constitutional validity of penal statutes which
require scienter as an essential element of the offense." Statutes mak-
ing it a crime to sell goods at "unreasonably low" prices with intent to
destroy competition; 8 to "knowingly" transport explosives through
congested areas, 9 or to sell meat falsely labeled "Kosher" with "intent
to defraud,"40 have all withstood constitutional challenges for vagueness
because scienter was an essential element of the offense.
In Screws v. United States," the United States Supreme Court
upheld the constitutional validity of a federal statute which was similar
to the statute under attack in Joyce in that it required "willfulness" to
commit the offense. The Court held that the statute was saved from
being held void for vagueness only because it required scienter as an
element of the offense. 2 The Court in Screws reasoned that in requiring
that the act be "knowingly" or "willfully" committed, the accused could
not later claim that he had no warning or knowledge that his act was a
violation of the law. 3 The United States Supreme Court has defined
37. 361 So.2d at 407.
38. United States v. National Dairy Products Corp., 372 U.S. 29 (1963) (selling
"below cost" with predatory intent, was held to be within the statute's prohibition
against selling at "unreasonably low" prices).
39. Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (defendant was
charged with violating a statute which made it a crime to knowingly violate a federal
regulation).
40. Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497 (1925). In Sherman, the
defendant was charged with violating the Laws of New York, 1922, cc.580, 581 (current
version at N.Y. Agriculture and Markets Law § 201-a (1972) (McKinney)) which made
it a crime for: "[Any person, who with intent to defraud sells, or exposes for sale any
meat preparation and falsely represents the same to be Kosher." Id. In upholding the
constitutional validity of the statute, the Court stated: "[Slince the statute requires
specific intent to defraud in order to encounter their prohibitions, the hazard of prosecu-
tion which appellants fear loses whatever substantial foundation it might have in the
absence of such a requirement." Id. at 502-03.
41. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
42. Id. at 101. In Screws, the defendant, a county sheriff in Georgia, allegedly
beat a negro prisoner to death while transporting him to the county jail. Screws was
charged with violating § 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C.A. § 52 (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970)) which makes it a crime to ".willfully subject" a person to
deprivation of his civil rights while acting under color of state law. Id. Justice Douglas,
in speaking for the majority stated: "[Tihe requirement of a specific intent to do a
prohibited act may avoid those consequences to the accused which may otherwise
render a vague or indefinite statute invalid." Id.
43. Id. at 102.
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"willfulness" as "bad faith or evil intent;"44 or as possessing a "bad
motive."'" The Supreme Court of Florida has similarly defined
"willfulness" as having an "unlawful intent."'" The highest courts of
Illinois 7 and Pennsylvania 8 have upheld the constitutional validity of
child abuse statutes similar to Section 827.09(2) Florida Statutes
against challenges for vagueness because the statutes required
"willfulness" (scienter).19
Additionally, with respect to the term "culpable negligence," the
court in Joyce noted that in the recent case of State v. Green,0 another
44. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 398 (1933) (conduct is defined as
criminal if one "willfully" fails to pay tax, to make a tax return, or to keep required
tax records and furnish needed information).
45. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943) (statute made it a felony to
willfully attempt to evade a tax).
46. Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So. 551 (1933).
47. People v. Vandiver, 51 Ill.2d 525, 283 N.E.2d 681 (1971). In Vandiver, the
defendant allegedly beat his three-year-old stepdaughter. He was charged by informa-
tion pursuant to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2354 (1969) which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person having the care or custody of any child,
willfully to cause or permit the life of such child to be endangered, or the health
of such child to be injured, or willfully cause or permit such child to be placed in
such a situation that its life or health may be endangered.
Id. at 682. The Illinois court also distinguished the statute on the basis that it required
that the act be done "willfully." Citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945),
the court stated: "Thus, the statute requires more than a mere voluntary doing of an
act from which injury to health may result. This additional requirement of willfulness
has been held to avoid uncertainty which may otherwise render a vague and indefinite
statute invalid." 51 11.2d 526, 283 N.E.2d at 682.
48. Commonwealth v. Mack, 359 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1976). In Mack, the defendant
was charged pursuant to a state statute which makes it a crime to endanger the welfare
of children. Id. at 771. The statute was taken, with two minor changes, from the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code § 230.4 which provides: "A parent, guard-
ian or other person supervising the welfare of a child under 18 commits a misdemeanor
if he knowingly endangers the child's welfare by violating a duty of care, protection or
support." Id. at n.2. In upholding the constitutional validity of the statute, the court
observed that the phrase "endangers the welfare of a child" is not esoteric and is easily
understood by members of the public. Id. at 772. The aforementioned statute is similar
to § 827.04(2) FLA. STAT. (1975) in that both require that the prohibited conduct be done
"knowingly." See note 2 supra.
49. Id.
50. 348 So.2d 3 (Fla. 1975). In Green, the defendant was alleged to have injured
a person by discharging a pistol. He was charged by information pursuant to § 784.05
FLA. STAT. (1975). In the opinion, the court quoted the statute which provides:
(I) Whoever, through culpable negligence, exposes another to personal injury
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree, punishable as provided in
319
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1979
3:1979 State v. Joyce, State v. Hutcheson 321
criminal statute which required "culpable negligence" had withstood a
constitutional attack for vagueness."
The court also recognized that, in Winters, the language concerning
necessary shelter had been faulted by the court for not providing suffi-
cient guidelines for determining the degree of deprivation necessary to
constitute a violation of the statute. Justice Boyd, in his dissenting
opinion in Winters, attacked the court's implication that the phrase
"necessary" was vague and thus violative of due process. 3 It is appar-
ent from the record that the trial court in Duval County may have relied
upon this language in granting the appellee's motion to dismiss and in
holding Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes to have suffered the same
defects as Section 827.05 Florida Statutes in Winters." The court in
Joyce, however, stated that the language in its opinion in Winters fault-
ing the term "necessary" was dicta and formed no basis for its holding."
The court reasoned in support of this contention that, if the lan-
guage criticizing the term "necessary" shelter had been held to suffer
from the constitutional infirmity of vagueness, then its prior decision in
Campbell v. State" would have been addressed and expressly overruled
§ 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084; (2) Whoever through culpable negligence
inflicts actual personal injury on another shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the
first degree, punishable as provided in § 775.082, § 775.083, or § 775.084.
Id. at 4. The defendant argued that the general public does not understand the meaning
of the term "culpable negligence" and therefore cannot know what acts are prohibited
by the statute. The court defined "culpable negligence" as "[Tihe omission of an act
which a reasonably prudent person would do or the commission of an act which such a
person would not do." 348 So.2d at 4. The court observed that members of the public
would recognize that reckless acts, which create a risk of danger, were prohibited by
law, whether or not they understood the meaning of culpable negligence. Id.
51. Id.
52. 361 So.2d 406 at 407.
53. 346 So.2d at 994. See State v. Joyce, 361 So.2d 406,408 (Boyd, J., concurring
specially).
54. See note 7 supra.
55. 361 So.2d at 407.
56. 240 So.2d 298 (Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 402 U.S. 936 (1971). In
Campbell, the defendant allegedly whipped and beat his seven-year-old stepdaughter.
Campbell was charged by information with violating § 828.04 FLA. STAT. (1969) (su-
perseded by § 827.04 FLA. STAT. (1977) which provides as follows:
Torturing or unlawfully punishing children-whoever tortures, torments cruelly
or unlawfully punishes, or willfully with malice, wantonly or unlawfully deprives
of necessary food, clothing, or shelter, any person under the age of sixteen (16)
years, and whoever willfully with malice or wantonly torments or deprives of
necessary sustenance or rainment, or unnecessarily or excessively chastizes or
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in Winters. In Campbell, the court upheld the constitutional validity of
the former child abuse statute,57 which contained the phrase
"unnecessarily or excessively chastizes" against a challenge for vague-
ness. The Campbell court stated: "Criminal laws are not to be consid-
ered vague simply because the conduct prohibited is described in general
language."58
Next, the court dealt with appellee Hutcheson's contention that the
term "materially endanger" was also unconstitutionally vague. The
word "materially" was defined by the Court as "to an important de-
gree" and "endanger" was defined as "to expose to danger."59 In hold-
ing that the terms were not unconstitutionally vague, the court reasoned
that the statute prohibits conduct which, in a significant way, permits
the physical or mental health of a child to be exposed to danger. 0 The
court then held that this language was sufficiently clear to inform men
of common understanding of the conduct prohibited by the statute. 1
Finally, the court held that Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes is
not unconstitutionally vague, indefinite and overbroad 2 and, in an effort
to clarify its prior holding in Winters, the court once again emphasized
that its criticism of the term "necessary" was dicta where inconsistent
with its holding in Joyce. 3
Justice Boyd, concurring specially, noted that he had dissented in
Winters because of the court's treatment of the term "necessary" and
also stated: "I am happy to see the Court, today, recede from language
in Winters which, at the very least, intimates that in matters of child
mutilates his child or ward, or whoever willfully with malice or wantonly deprives
such child or ward of necessary treatment and attention is guilty of a felony, and
upon conviction thereof shall be punished by imprisonment not exceeding two
years or by fine not exceeding- two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or both.
Id. at 299. The court held that the words complained of "unnecessarily or excessively"
were not unconstitutionally vague when considered with the entire text of the statute.
In Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), the United States Supreme Court held
that where a statute is uncertain, the entire text of the statute may provide the standard
of certainty needed to defeat a constitutional challenge for vagueness. See also State v.
Lindsey, 284 So.2d 377 (Fla. 1973).
57. 240 So.2d at 299.
58. Id.
59. 361 So.2d at 408. The court cited WEBSTERS NEw 20th CENTURY
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abuse a standard of what is 'necessary' for a child's welfare is too vague
to apprise the public of unlawful conduct.""
In State v. Joyce, the Supreme Court of Florida implicitly recog-
nized that "there are some areas of human conduct where legislatures
cannot establish standards with great precision.""5 Child abuse is one
such area. There is growing concern among the general public with
respect to acts of child abuse. Public policy demands that children be
protected from abuse. However, the specific acts which constitute child
abuse are often difficult to articulate in statutory terms. The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Constitution to forbid prose-
cution pursuant to criminal statutes which are vague. In Joyce the court
left intact an effective tool with which the state protects the welfare of
its children. The court also hastily clarified its misleading and ambigu-
ous decision in Winters in order to prevent other courts from mistakenly
following in the steps of the Orange and Duval County Courts. The
Supreme Court of Florida, while not addressing the issue of whether a
person can be convicted of violating Section 827.04(2) Florida Statutes
by culpable negligence alone, has determined that if the acts of child
abuse are done willfully, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.
Edward J. Culhan, Jr.
64. Id. (Boyd, J., concurring specially with opinion).






Nova Law Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol3/iss1/1
Wrongful Death: Florida Still Requires
"Live Birth" as Prerequisite to Recovery:
Duncan v. Flynn
Morace C. Duncan brought an action for the wrongful death of his son,
John Norris Duncan. He named as defendants Dr. John D. Flynn, an
obstetrician; St. Joseph's Hospital; and their insurers, alleging that the
doctor's negligent failure to recognize the necessity of a Caesarian sec-
tion resulted in the death of the baby during the process of delivery. The
trial court entered summary judgment in favor of all defendants, holding
that the plaintiff had no claim for the wrongful death of the "unborn
fetus."' The Sedond District Court of Appeal affirmed the summary
judgment 2 and held that: 1) as a matter of law the decedent was not
born alive, and 2) the "unborn viable fetus" was not a "person" under
Florida's former wrongful death statute.3 The Florida Supreme Court
upheld the district court's ruling on both issues in a 4-3 decision with a
dissent filed by Justice Karl.4
The facts showed that, after Dr. Flynn induced labor and the baby's
head emerged, it became apparent that his shoulders were too broad to
pass through the birth canal. Dr. Flynn and two assisting physicians
tried various procedures for about twenty critical minutes with no suc-
cess. They then realized that the baby's heartbeat had ceased and deter-
mined that the child could not be saved. At this point the physicians
concentrated their efforts on saving the mother's life. With plaintiff's
permission, they severed the child's head and removed the rest of its
body by Caesarian section. The baby was full term and weighed fourteen
pounds, eight ounces (head and torso). The death certificate listed car-
diovascular failure due to strangulation as the cause of death.5
This case marks Florida's most recent failure to divorce itself from
the ranks of the dwindling minority of states which still require a live
I. Duncan v. Flynn, 342 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
2. Id. at 127.
3. §§ 768.01-.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973).
4. Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1978), rehearing denied May 24,
1978.
5. 342 So. 2d at 124.
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birth before allowing a wrongful death claim.' It was decided under the
former Wrongful Death Act7 because the death occurred three and one-
half (31/2) months prior to the effective date of the current Wrongful
Death Act.' It is likely that the outcome would have been similar if
decided under the current Wrongful Death Act,,as each provides a cause
of action for the wrongful death of any "person." 9 Thus, it is a notewor-
thy decision because it is a reaffirmation of the view that Florida courts
have embraced under both the old and the new Wrongful Death Acts.,'
Florida has once again followed the old common law doctrine that it is
cheaper to kill someone than to hurt him. Ironically,while adhering to
this doctrine, the justices have previously conceded that the policy argu-
ments in favor of recovery are compelling."1 Why should Florida cling
6. Of the thirty-eight states which have confronted the issue to date, only twelve
states, including Florida, have required that the death be subsequent to a live birth
before allowing a claim for wrongful death. These states include, Arizona: Kilmer v.
Hicks, 22 Ariz. App. 552, 529 P. 2d 706 (1974); California: Bayer v. Suttle, 23 Cal.
App. 3d 361, 100 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Iowa: McKillp v. Zimmerman,
191 N.W. 2d 706 (Iowa 1971); Missouri: State v. Sanders, 538 S.W. 2d 336 (Mo. 1976);
Nebraska: Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W. 2d 229 (1951); New Jersey:
Graf v. Taggert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); New York: Endresz v. Friedberg,
24 N.Y. 2d 478, 248 N.E. 2d 901, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 65 (1969); North Carolina: Gay v.
Thompson, 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E. 2d 425 (1966); Pennsylvania: Marko v. Philadelphia
Transp. Co., 420 Pa. 124, 216 A. 2d 502 (1966); Tennessee: Durrett v. Owens, 212 Tenn.
614, 371 S.W. 2d 433 (1963); Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169
S.E. 2d 440 (1969).
7. §§ 768.01-.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973).
8. §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1977). This current wrongful death statute became
effective July 1, 1972, and the decedent's death occurred March 20, 1972. The current
wrongful death statute's format and language has remained the same since it became
effective in 1972. Section 768.18(2), however, was amended in 1977. See FLA. STAT.
768.18(2) as amended by ch. 77-468, § 40, 1977 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
9. The court noted this similarity in Duncan v. Flynn, 358 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1978),
where it wrote: "[Ilt is clear that our decision in Stern interpreting the scope of the term
.person' as used in the new Wrongful Death Act applies with equal force to the identical
term as it appeared in the old Wrongful Death Act." Id. at n.3.
10. See, e.g., Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern
v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
1i. The supreme court in Stern conceded, "[Tihe reasons for recovery are com-
pelling . . . it is absurd to allow recovery for prenatal injuries unless they are so severe
as to cause death." 348 So. 2d at 306. See also Simon v. United States, 438 F. Supp.
759 (S.D. Fla. 1977) where Judge Atkins wrote: "I am sympathetic to the compelling
arguments in favor of recovery and cognizant of the inequities inherent in allowing a
tortfeasor who so severely injures a fetus that it dies before birth to escape the liability
which would have been imposed had the child survived birth, however briefly." Id. at
761.
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to the minority view while recognizing the policy reasons for allowing
recovery?
This was addressed in Duncan v. Flynn,12 where the Supreme Court
of Florida relied on the principles set forth in two earlier cases 3 in
pronouncing that a baby must die subsequent to a live birth to give rise
to an action for wrongful death." In Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co."5 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an unborn fetus was not
a "minor child" under Florida's former Wrongful Death Act.' How-
ever, that court specifically noted 7 that it did not determine whether a
still-born fetus is a "person" under the old general Wrongful Death
Act.'8 It is puzzling that the court in Stokes took pains to make that
distinction, but phrased its holding in the all-encompassing terms "a
right of action for wrongful death can arise only after the live birth and
subsequent death of the child." 1' If the court truly meant to espouse such
a broad rule of law, then the distinction it made between Sections 768.01
and 768.03 of the Florida Statutes would be senseless. If the baby must
die after a live birth to give rise to a wrongful death action, then it would
follow that the unborn fetus3 can be neither a "minor child" nor a
12. 358 So. 2d 178.
13. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968); Stern v. Miller,
348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977).
14. 358 So. 2d at 178.
13. Stokes v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 213 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1968) (parents had
no cause of action for death of stillborn fetus from prenatal injuries which resulted from
negligence of a motorist).
16. Id. See § 768.03 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT.
(1973) which read:
Whenever the death of any minor child shall be caused by the wrongful act, .
the father of such minor child. . . may maintain an action. . . and may recover
not only for the loss of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such
sum for the mental pain and suffering of the parent (or both parents) if they
survive, as the jury may assess.
17. 213 So. 2d at 698.
18. Id. See § 768.01 FLA. STAT. (1971), superseded by §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT.
(1973) which read:
Whenever the death of any person in this state shall be caused by the wrongful
act,. . . of any individual. . . or. . . corporation. . . and the act. . . is such
as would, if the death had not ensued, have entitled the party thereby to maintain
an action. . . and to recover damages in respect thereof, then and in every case
the person or persons who. . . would have been liable to an action for damages,
...notwithstanding the death of the person injured. . ..
19. 213 So. 2d at 700.
20. "Unborn" and "stillborn" are used interchangeably in this discussion. Ac-
327 1
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"person." But the court in Stokes cautioned, "[w]e are not here called
upon to determine whether the still-born fetus is a 'person'."- Obviously
the court intended to leave unanswered the question of whether an
unborn fetus is a "person" under the general wrongful death statute and
merely required a live birth for a claim under the special Wrongful
Death of a Minor provisions. 2 This does not, however, preclude a claim
under the general wrongful death statute.
In Stern v. Miller,- decided under the current wrongful death
statute,2- the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the broad rule of law
mentioned i4 Stokes,- but failed to recognize the internal inconsis-
tency 26 of the Stokes decision. The court in Stern restricted the scope
of its review to a determination of the legislative intent behind the new
Wrongful Death Act.27 The court reasoned that, because Stokes was
decided before the new wrongful death statute was enacted, the legisla-
ture is deemed to have implicitly accepted the judicial construction of
the word "person" contained therein by failing to further define it when
the opportunity arose. At first glance, this argument may seem valid,
but the court ignored the immutable fact that the Stokes decision did
not even purport to construe the word "person," but expressly limited
its inquiry to the proper construction of "minor child" under the former
Wrongful Death of a Minor Child statute. 9
The Supreme Court of Florida now reaffirms that fallacy by hold-
ing in Duncan v. Flynn 31 that Sternst is dispositive of the issue-this
in the face of the clear trend toward allowing wrongful death claims for
tually, "unborn" refers to the child while it is still in utero, whereas "stillborn" refers
to the child which died in utero and has been expelled from the mother's body.
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGAUGE,
unabr. (1971).
21. 213 So. 2d at 698.
22. For the distinction between those two sections see notes 16 and 18 supra.
23. 348 So. 2d 303 (Fla. 1977) (a fetus, which was alleged to have been viable
and to have been fatally injured by defendant's negligence in an automobile accident,
was held not a "person" for purposes of the Wrongful Death Act).
24. §§ 768.16-.27 FLA. STAT. (1973). The court in Stern cited the "current wrong-
ful death statute" as shown. 348 So. 2d at 303. See note 8 supra.
25. 213 So. 2d at 700.
26. Id.
27. 348 So. 2d at 307.
28. id. at 307-08.
29. See text accompanying notes 16 and 18 supra.
30. 358 So. 2d 178.
31. 348 So. 2d 303.
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the death of a viable fetus.32 The court's rationale is that it is following
the legislative intent, yet the only convincing indication of that intent is
found in the new statute itself,3 and the result in" Duncan appears to
be contrary to the express intent of the legislature. Not only does Flor-
ida continue to adhere to the anachronistic view denying recovery for
the wrongful death of the unborn child, but it has now adopted a very
restrictive definition of "live birth."
The Florida Supreme Court found, as a matter of law, that the
32. Verkenner v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949) was the first
case to allow such an action. Since then, twenty-five other states have adopted that view.
The court in Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d at 305 listed the following cases from those
twenty-five states: Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354
(1974); Alaska: Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D. Alaska 1972); Connecticut: Gorke
v. LeClerc, 23 Conn. Supp. 256, 181 A. 2d 448 (1962); District of Columbia: Simmons
v. Howard University, 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo
& Ferrara, Inc., II Terry 258, 50 Del. 258, 128 A. 2d 557 (1956); Georgia: Porter v.
Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E. 2d 100 (1955); Illinois: Chrisafogeorgis v. Branden-
berg, 55 I1l. 2d 368, 304 N.E. 2d 88 (1973); Pleasant v. Certified Growers of Ill, Inc.,
39 III. App. 3d 83, 350 N.E. 2d 65 (1976); Indiana: Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487,
277 N.E. 2d 20 (1971); Kansas: Hale v. Manion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P. 2d 1 (1962);
Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W. 2d 901 (Ky. 1955); Orange v. State Farm
Mutual Auto Ins. Co., 443 S.W. 2d 650 (Ky. App. 1969); Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W. 2d
732 (Ky. App. 1970); Louisiana: Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923);
Valence v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 50 So. 2d 847 (La. App. 1951); Massachusetts:
Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E. 2d 916 (Mass. 1975); Maryland: State Use
of Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A. 2d 71 (1964); Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse,
385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W. 2d 785 (1971); Minnesota: Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn.
365, 38 N.W. 2d 838, 10 A.L.R. 2d 634 (1949); Pehrson v. Kistner, 301 Minn. 299, 222
N.W. 2d 334 (1974); Mississippi: Rainey v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954);
Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P. 2d 617 (1969); New Hampshire: Poliquin
v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A. 2d 249 (1957); Oklahoma: Evans v. Olson, 550
P. 2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Ohio: Stidham v. Ashmore, 109 Ohio App. 431, 11 Ohio Ops.
2d 383, 167 N.E. 2d 106 (1959); Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258,
518 P. 2d 636 (1974), rehearing denied, 520 P. 2d 361 (Or. 1974); Rhode Island: Presley
v. Newport Hosp., 365 A. 2d 748 (R.I. 1976); South Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward,
244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E. 2d 42 (1964); Todd v. Sandidge Constr. Co., 341 F. 2d 75 (4th
Cir. 1974); Washington: Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d 597, 537 P. 2d 266 (1975); West
Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184 S.E. 2d 428 (1971); Panagopoulous
v. Martin, 295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969); Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34 Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W. 2d 107 (1967).
33. § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977) entitled "[l]egislative intent" states that "[ilt is
the public policy of the state to shift the losses resulting when wrongful death occurs
from the survivors of the decedent to the wrongdoer. Sections 768.16-.27 are remedial
and shall be liberally construed." (emphasis added).
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Duncan baby was not born alive."4 This raises two questions: 1) Were
the criteria used to define "live birth" valid; and 2) Was a strict rule of
law defining "live birth" warranted?
Consider the factors used to determine whether or not there was a
live birth. The court held that the child must acquire a "separate and
independent existence of its mother ' 3 5 evidenced by "expulsion (or in
a Caesarian section, by the complete removal) of the child's body from
its mother with evidence that the cord has been cut and the infant has
an independent circulation of blood. ' 36 It appears that the court has
identified the most commonly used criteria 37 (although respiration is
often mentioned)," but has inexplicably required proof of every factor.
The plaintiff pointed out that the baby's head was born spontaneously
and life existed for at least twenty minutes until death occured by
"cardiovascular failure due to strangulation. ' ' 39 These facts would cer-
tainly tend to indicate that the baby had achieved an independent circu-
lation and respiration before the cessation of his heartbeat tones led the
doctors to believe that he could not be saved. The only elements of "live
birth" not satisfied were expulsion from the mother's body and sever-
ance of the umbilical cord. These are precisely the acts which plaintiff
claimed were prevented by defendant's negligence. Although the criteria
used were not unprecedented, the reason for requiring proof of each one
is unclear.
A strict rule of law defining live birth is neither necessary nor
useful. Justice Karl recognized this fact in his dissenting opinion, 0 in
which Justices Adkins and Hatchett joined. That such a rule is unneces-
sary becomes apparent upon perusal of the relevant case law. Several
jurisdictions allow the jury to decide the issue as a question of fact.'
Moreover, the variety of circumstances and contexts to which the rule
34. 358 So. 2d at 179.
35. 342 So. 2d at 126.
36. Id.
37. Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 413 (1975). The question of when a live birth occurs
usually arises in the context of homicide statutes.
38. See, e.g., Jackson v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 295, 96 S.W. 2d 1014 (1936);
States v. Collington, 259 S.C. 446, 192 S.E. 2d 856 (1972); Bennett v. State, 377 P. 2d
634 (Wyo. 1963).
39. 342 So. 2d at 124.
40. 358 So. 2d at 179.
41. See Bennett v. State, 377 P. 2d 634 (Wyo. 1963); State v. Toney, 98 W. Va.
236, 127 S.E. 35 (1925); Hubbard v. State, 72 Ala. 164 (1882); People v. Chavez, 77
Cal. App. 2d 621, 176 P. 2d 92 (1947); But see Justus v. Atchison, 53 Cal. App.,3d 556,
126 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1975) (restricting application of Chavez to homicide cases).
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must be applied make it somewhat less than useful, especially when
compared with the alternative. The most logical resolution of the issue
would be to present the evidence and expert medical testimony to the
jury and let that panel decide whether or not a live birth occurred. A
fact finder's determination would eliminate the need for a strict, inflexi-
ble rule of law and allow for a complete consideration of all relevant
facts in each case. The facts of the present case provide us with a sterling
example of the disadvantages of the rule adopted in Florida. The death
certificate showed cardiovascular failure due to strangulation as the
cause of death. Strangulation denotes compression of the windpipe until
death occurs by cessation of breathing.' 2 The physicians noticed that the
baby's heartbeat tones disappeared some twenty minutes after the head
had emerged from the birth canal. Surely these facts would be sufficient
to raise a permissible inference of live birth. This is especially true since
there has never been formulated a satisfactory definition of live birth
on which the courts could agree."
There are several public policy considerations which support the
majority view.4 First, the viable fetus is a human life capable of exist-
ence independent of the mother and there should be a remedy for the
wrongful extinguishment of such a life. Otherwise there is a wrong with
no remedy. Is not the purpose of tort law to avoid this situation?" The
majority view achieves the desirable goal of shifting the loss from the
survivors to the wrongdoer. Since an action for prenatal injuries can be
brought once a child is born," it seems incongruous to preclude recovery
where the injury is so severe as to cause death in utero.17 The instant
case presents the precise situation cited by commentators and courts to
discredit the position taken by the supreme court." It appears that the
42. C. TABER, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY (13th ed. 1977);
WEBSTER'S NEW THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE,
unabr. (1971).
43. Annot., 65 A.L.R. 3d 413 (1975).
44. Annot., 15 A.L.R. 3d 994 (1967).
45. Dean Prosser states that the purpose of tort law is "to afford compensation
for injuries sustained by one person as a result of the conduct of another," the goal being
to "adjust these losses." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § I at 6 (4th
ed. 1971).
46. Day v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 328 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1976); W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 55 at 336-7 (4th ed. 1971).
47. See Comment, The Conditional Liability Rule-A Viable Alternative for the
Wrongful Death of a Stillborn Child, 28 U. FLA. L. REV. 187. See also §§ 768.16-.27
FLA. STAT. (1977).
48. See generally Stern v. Miller, 348 So. 2d 303, 306 (Fla. 1977); Todd v.
Duncan v. Flynn 331 13:1979
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statute in Florida disallows a wrongful death action where the injury is
serious enough to cause death of the fetus before birth, but allows an
action for damages if the child suffers less serious injury not resulting
in death. 9 This allows the tortfeasor to avoid liability by inflicting the
ultimate injury.10 It has been argued that since this factor refers to
intentional conduct it is not relevant to cases involving the presumably
more prevalent negligent conduct."1 But the fact remains that the tort-
feasor, whether acting negligently or intentionally, is provided with a
legal incentive to prevent this "live birth" of the child. Surely such an
unthinkable Kesult was not intended by the legislature and should be
avoided by the courts.
Aside from these policy considerations, the unique facts of the
instant case emphasize the problems inherent in the position adopted in
Florida. This case can be distinguished from the cases discussed above
because here the child died during an attempt at delivery, allegedly as
the result of the negligent methods and procedures of the defendant. In
the other cases discussed, the child died either in the uterus or subse-
quent to delivery. Those cases invariably involved pre-natal or post-
natal injuries, never injuries during parturition. The facts of this case
are unique and do not admit of the simplistic characterization of the
child as an "unborn viable fetus," a "stillbirth" or a "live birth." The
requirement of live birth precluded recovery to the survivors for the
death of their child without any rational basis or justification. The pain
and suffering directly experienced by the mother may give rise to a
separate case of action, but that relates to a separate and distinct injury.
While it is true that the wrongful death statute is in derogation of
common law and might, therefore, be strictly construed, both the legis-
lature and the courts have recognized its remedial nature and have
agreed that a liberal construction is called for."2 Where is this liberal
construction?
Due to its strict rather than liberal construction of the statute, the
court entered summary judgment against the defendant. Summary judg-
ment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and
Sandidge, 341 F. 2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1964). See also note 47 supra.
49. 328 So. 2d 560.
50. 341 F. 2d at 77.
51. 62 AM. JuR. 2d Prenatal Injuries § 15 at 623 (1972).
52. See § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977); Klepper v. Breslin, 83 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1955)
(pertaining to the old wrongful death statute). § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977) states that,
"[slections 768.16-768.27 are remedial and shall be liberally construed."
1 332 3:1979 1
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the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.0 The
question of "live birth" has been held to constitute a genuine issue of
material fact in other jurisdictions." The court's insistence on infringing
upon what is generally the jury's domain is totally unjustifiable. Keeping
in mind that Florida courts have not previously ruled on when "live
birth" occurs, instituting a strict rule of law could defeat the purpose
of the Wrongful Death Act."
Case law in Florida clearly disfavors summary judgments in negli-
gence cases." This is especially true with regard to medical malpractice
cases such as the one at hand. 7 Summary judgment is a harsh remedy
which should be administered very cautiously, 8 so as not to deprive a
litigant of a full and fair trial on the merits of the case. In view of the
close question of whether a live birth ever occurred, the propriety of a
summary judgment in this case was indeed questionable.
In Duncan, a young couple lost their child through the negligence
of another, yet were not afforded the opportunity to try the case on its
merits. After recognizing the compelling nature of the public policy
arguments in favor of recovery, the Florida Supreme Court based its
position on a questionable "legislative intent" rationale. The court also
pronounced a flat rule of law defining live birth as "expulsion of the
child's body from its mother with evidence that the cord has been cut
and the infant has independent circulation of blood,"59 which seems to
be an injustice to the plaintiff in this case.
Reed B. McClosky
53. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.510(c).
54. See note 41 supra.
55. As stated, the purpose of the Wrongful Death Act is "to shift the losses
resulting when wrongful death occurs from the survivors of the decedent to the wrong-
doer." § 768.17 FLA. STAT. (1977).
56. Holl v. Talcott, 191 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1965); Visengardi v. Tyrone, 193 So. 2d
601 (Fla. 1966).
57. Id.
58. Pearson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 187 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 1st DCA
1966); Jones v. Stoutenburgh, 91 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1957); Seven-Up Bottling Co. of
Miami v. George Const. Corp., 166 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964).
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Rohan, Patrick J., Zoning and Land Use Controls, Vols. I to
V. Matthew Bender, 1978. $50.00 per volume.
Webber, Susan and Wright, Robert R., Land Use In a
Nutshell. Minnesota: West Publishing Co., 1978.
xxv, 316 pp. $5.95.
Reviewed by Ronald Benton Brown*
Two noteworthy additions to the literature of land use planning law
have arrived this year, WRIGHT and WEBBER'S LAND USE IN A
NUTSHELL1 and ROHAN'S Treatise on ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS.2 These two works employ extremely different approaches to
the same body of law. The Treatise is massive; eight volumes are
planned.3 The Nutshell, on the other hand, is a brief explanation of the
principles of land use planning law.
Few will ever read the Treatise cover to cover. Normally, an attor-
ney with a problem will attempt to pinpoint the section or sections which
provide the answer. Unfortunately, a novice to land use planning law
would not be competent to begin this search. The novice would first need
a general overview of the law, and the Treatise does not provide this.
The Nutshell could be the solution to this need in addition to being a
study aid for law students. Unfortunately, it is not a very satisfying
solution.
In three hundred small' pages, the Nutshell attempts to explain
both public and private land use controls. The Nutshell covers a wide
span of relevant law, but a result of such broad coverage in such a brief
work is superficiality. The sections dealing with private controls5 and the
English system' particularly suffer. Possibly, for the same reason, the
* B.S.M.E., 1970, Northeastern University; J.D., 1973 University of Connecticut;
L.L.M., 1976 Temple University; Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University Law
Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
The reviewer would like to thank Attorney Robert Eisen for his assistance.
1. Hereinafter referred to as Nutshell.
2. Hereinafter referred to as Treatise.
3. Matthew Bender 1978-79 Catalogue at 63.
4. Approximately 4 314 inches X 7 inches.
5. Nutshell at Chapter III.
6. Nutshell at Chapter XIII.
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Nutshell simply does not read well. Much of the text is written in an
unsure and unclear manner, as if the authors were uncomfortable with
the format or with the subject matter. The paragraphing is frequently
awkward and there are far more case citations in the text than seem
necessary for an introduction, yet it fails to give a coherent set of sec-
ondary authorities. Sometimes it cites other text books or articles, but
frequently no references are made. Further, most of the case citations
seem to perform no useful function other than possibly to relate the
Nutshell section to a particular case used in a casebook. The Nutshell
also fails to introduce the specialized research materials of land use law.7
Additionally, the Nutshell, as a device designed for a novice, suffers
from two flaws. The text occasionally compares one concept with an-
other, the latter of which has not yet been explained." Secondly, the
extremely limited space forces the authors to make certain assumptions
about their readers, but the reader is not informed what those assump-
tions are. Here, it seems that the reader is assumed to have some back-
ground in constitutional law, especially the 14th Amendment, and ad-
ministrative law. A novice, not realizing this, might miss the underlying
rationale of much of the law.
The authors of the Nutshell acknowledge their affinity for the
Beuscher, Wright and Gitelman casebook. It is possible that if these
two, the Nutshell and the casebook, were used together, the cumulative
effect would be to provide a complete .explanation.10 Nothing, at this
point, seems to suggest that the Nutshell would be more appropriate or
more effective as a secondary source for one particular casebook than
another and it seems unlikely that a neophyte, not presently enrolled in
a course, would ever use a casebook to learn the basics. The Nutshell
used alone, however, is not enough.
It seems odd that a basic concept like cumulative zoning is practi-
cally ignored by the Nutshell. It is mentioned only in the context of
discussing exclusionary zoning, and then only to the extent that "some
7. D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW
(1971) [Hereinafter referred to as HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING].
8. Easements and covenants are compared before either is explained. Nutshell at
Chapter III § 3. Both are compared with zoning in Chapter III § 14 when zoning is not
explained until Chapter VI.
9. Nutshell at xvi. For a review of that casebook, J. BEUSCHER, R. WRIGHT &
M. GITELMAN, LAND USE (2d ed. 1976), see 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 641 (Summer 1977).
10. See, e.g., J.J. Brown's book review of D. HAGMAN, PUBLIC PLANNING AND
CONTROL OF URBAN DEVELOPMENT LAW (1973) and HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING at 6
THE URBAN LAWYER 742 (Summer 1974).
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modem ordinances are not cumulative."" This is an important concept
which a beginner could not be expected to understand instinctively. 2
Despite these shortcomings, the Nutshell can provide an introduc-
tion to the Treatise. For example, a reader interested in possible limita-
tions of urban growth would find the major cases 3 explained in one
brief section of the Nutshell." As the Nutshell is only an introduction,
it is not surprising that there is no mention of the "Boca Cap," the
ordinance of the City of Boca Raton, Florida which is the apex of
growth controls attracting national attention. 5
Turning to the Treatise for in-depth coverage of growth controls,
it would be easy to locate the section which covered the "Boca Cap" in
Chapter 4, "Time Controlled Zoning," because the Treatise is logically
organized, includes a good table of contents, and very usable indexes.
Following complete and lucid explanations of Ramapo6 and
Petaluma," the "Boca Cap" is explained, complete with an extensive
factual explanation." Unfortunately, this 1978 Treatise refers only to
Arvida Corp. v. City of Boca Raton, case No. 74-1344, in the Florida
District Court of Appeal." It fails to alert the reader to the landmark
case, Boca Villas Corp. v. Pence,"' in which a Florida trial court held
the "Boca Cap" to be unconstitutional. It is unfortunate that a work of
such depth and quality should suffer from an oversight of this magni-
tude. Relying on the Treatise, a researcher would not find this critical
case.
I!. Nutshell at 145.
12. For concise explanations see BEUSCHER, et al., supra note 8, at 725; HAGMAN,
URBAN PLANNING, supra note 7, at §§ 1.02 (c), 1.05 (2)(e), and Ch. 14.
13. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town
of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972); Construction
Industry Ass'n. of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma, 552 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974);
Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Hidden
Valley Municipal Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1967); Steel
Hill Development v. Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972).
14. Chapter V, § 4.
15. See Zoning and Population Control-Courts are Reacting to New Problems
in Old Ways, 5 F.S.U. L. REv. 463 (1977).
16. Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 334 N.Y.S.2d
138, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972).
17. Construction Industry Ass'n. of Sonoma County v. City of Petulama, 552
F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
18. Treatise at § 4.03(l)(b).
19. This decision was reported at 312 So.2d 826 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
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Nevertheless, Rohan's Treatise, ZONING AND LAND USE
CONTROLS is a well written, convenient and complete resource for be-
ginning research on the law of public controls of land use. Its looseleaf
format with projected annual supplement should make it a reliable up-
to-date source, but the researcher should be cautious to check and up-
date citations or risk finding that a recent development has not yet been
processed into this massive work. It remains for the individual to decide
if this Treatise is worth the substantial price tag.
The Nutshell is unfortunately less successful. Perhaps the feeling
of dissatisfaction is a result in part of reading the back-cover advertise-
ment, "A Succinct Exposition of the Law to Which a Student or Lawyer
Can Turn for Reliable Guidance." This book, as the preface states,"'
was designed primarily for law students, but it seems unlikely that it
could do more than give a student an awareness of those areas of the
law which are involved in the control of land use. Only the final chapter z2
provides something the student is unlikely to get from the casebook, an
introduction to the conflict between the traditional values of the land
use planner and the needs to preserve energy and the environment. This
brief chapter alone does not justify purchasing the entire book.
21. Nutshell at xv.
22. Nutshell at Chapter XIV.
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Hlgglnbotham, A. In the Matter of Color: Race and the
American Legal Process, the Colonial Period. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1978. 512 p., $15.00.
Reviewed by Michael L. Richmond*
Sir Thomas More retreated to Utopia to find a place where "the simple,
the plain and gross meaning of the law is open to every man."' Mad
though it may be, the trial leading to Alice's frustrated denunciation of
Wonderland as a deck of playing cards2 is no more insane than some
of our more celebrated cases of recent years. Indeed, for as many years
as there has been a legal profession, men have criticized its body of
"literature." The history of legal writing affirms the irony in the Lord
Chancellor's pompous proclamation: "The Law is the true embodi-
ment of everything that's excellent." '3
Contemporary critics stress the negative aspects of legal writing.
"It seems lawyers have forgotten that communication is their business,"
bemoans one,' while another places the problem in its historic context,
blaming a "tradition of obscurity" for "written documents which are
incomprehensible to all but the legally qualified." 5 Admittedly, we are
seeing a slight shift in emphasis: from the breast-beating of unconstruc-
tive critics, to those who manifest efforts to improve legal writing. One
of the more outstanding examples of this approach is a fine article by
Reed Dickerson,6 long a champion of artful legislative drafting. Dicker-
son's practical advice for utilizing "talk-back" from the item being
drafted complements Gertrude Block's account of her efforts to teach
good writing habits to law students' and Donald Cohen's account of
* Director of the Law Library and Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University
Center for the Study of Law. A.B., Hamilton College, 1967; J.D., Duke University,
1971; M.S.L.S., The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1974.
I. MORE, T., UTOPIA at 213 (Harv. Classics ed. 1910) (Ist Eng. ed. London,
1551).
2. CARROLL, L., ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND (Ist ed. London, 1865).
3. GILBERT, W., IOLANTHE Act I (London, 1882).
4. Siegel, 'Plain English' Law Likely to Produce More Low Comedy Than High
Drama, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, November 27, 1978 at 27.
5. Willis, Making Legal Documents Readable: Some American Initiatives, 52 L.
INST. J. 513 (1978).
6. Dickerson, Legal Drafting: Writing as Thinking, or, Talk-Back from Your
Draft and How to Exploit It, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 373 (1978).
7. Block, Improving Legal Writing, 52 FLA. B. J. 778 (1978).
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similar efforts at the University of Michigan School of Law.'
Still, this trend continues to emphasize the negative aspect of legal
literature. Since correction of a problem requires its concomitant expo-
sition, examples of artless legal drafting obscure the obverse of the coin.
Improvement of writing skills in the legal profession more properly
stems from stressing examples of adept legal prose and urging attorneys
to follow suit. Judge Edward Re, one of the more vocal advocates of
better legal writing, noted at a recent meeting of SCRIBES that the
judiciary could encourage better briefs by citing the actual language of
the briefs in their opinions. "All lawyers will properly deem it to be high
praise for a learned justice to acknowledge 'agreement' with counsel's
statement of the issue in the brief."9 Any attorney familiar with his lucid
opinions knows that the judge practices this theory in his own drafting.
Ephraim London adopted the same approach in compiling The
Law as Literature. His Introduction comments: "Great literature
should ignite or inspire; but whether it does depends in part on the
reader. I believe each work included here met that test when I read it,
though in some instances the flame gave more light than heat.""0 James
White, in his exceptional test, The Legal Imagination, sought a similar
end.
To ask how to read and write well is to ask practically everything, one
might say, and indeed a legal education could be defined by saying that
one learns to read and write the professional language of the law, to
master a set of special ways of thinking and talking."
Thus, attorneys and law students must view and analyze the finest
examples of legal prose, in the hope they will attempt to pattern their
own communicative efforts after them. The student who emulates Car-
dozo's prose after reading the Palsgraf case 2 will have learned far more
than the one who learns the questionable rule of law it embodies. Writ-
ers can profit equally with jurisprudential scholars from reading Gray's
Nature and Sources of the Law.
The appearance of an example of legal prose of this calibre should
8. Cohen, Ensuring an Effective Instructor-Taught Writing and Advocacy Pro-
gram: How to Teach the Teachers, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 593 (1978).
9. Re, The Partnership of Bench and Bar, 16 CATH. LAW. 194, 207 (1970).
10. LONDON, E., ed., THE LAW IN LITERATURE at xi (1960).
II. WHITE, J., THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL
THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION at xxxi (1973).
12. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
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demand the attention of the profession with the same immediacy as the
pronouncement of a major decision by the Supreme Court. Attorneys
should devour the pages of such a work, discussing it in their gatherings,
and attempting to make their own writings conform to its standard. In
the Matter of Color13 merits this attention.
"Legal writing" by its very definition is writing with a purpose, and
Higginbotham gives the legal profession an example at which it should
aim. Every sentence of his work is designed to persuade, to impel the
reader inevitably to complete agreement with his conclusion: that the
courts of colonial America subverted their own values to the economic
development of the states. In the Matter of Color emerges as a dispas-
sionate, objective trial of the colonial judiciary for its role in the devel-
opment of slavery. The success of the book lies both in its approach and
in the author's polished realization of his task.
The author's manifold skills as an advocate evince themselves on
every page, as he presents a model of delicately restrained reasoning.
This is by no means a warm book; it coldly dissects the opinions of
colonial courts, using each one as yet another piece of evidence in the
development of its case. Successful lawsuits result from the thorough
marshalling of facts, and Higginbotham utilizes his experience as an
attorney to produce his book. Cases and statutes are neatly laid before
the reader in grim array, while the author seldom intrudes upon their
presentation. Only when all facts have been placed before the reader
does the author abandon the role of expositor for that of commentator;
only after the evidence has been presented does the advocate address the
jury.
Were the author to have approached his subject in any other way,
the force of his argument would have been lost in the inevitable accom-
panying rhetoric. The facts alone are sufficiently compelling; Higgin-
botham wisely avoids any gloss until they have been permitted to make
their own impression. Despite painful compulsion to write this book,"
Higginbotham holds his more eloquent prose in check for the proper
moment and, in so doing, achieves a masterpiece. His use of language
in achieving his ends exemplifies the finest in legal prose, for it is totally
integrated with the concept of the book itself.
The starkness with which Higginbotham paints his mural of perver-
sion of the judicial system suffuses his language as well. In developing
13. HIGGINBOTHAM, A., IN THE MATrER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN
LEGAL PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD (1978) (Hereinafter "HIGGINBOTHAM").
14. Discussed at text accompanying note 20 infra.
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evidence to prove his hypothesis, Higginbotham writes terse, unembel-
lished sentences designed to frame the facts they depict. Cases unfold
with brutal simplicity, the holdings laid bare on an otherwise vacant
canvas. "Thus, although he committed the same crime as the Dutchman
and the Scotsman, John Punch, a black man, was sentenced to lifetime
slavery. For the white servants, an additional four years of service was
deemed sufficient punishment."'15
Not needing to dwell at length on the Punch case, Higginbotham
does not indulge himself. His only commentary in the body of the test
is concise and direct: "Such differentiation of treatment reflected the
legal process's early adoption of social values that saw blacks as infe-
rior. To make rigid the social stratifications these values called for, the
court turned social biases, at will, into hard legal judgments."1 6
Each sentence falls on the reader's senses with the weight of an-
other count in a lengthy indictment. The writer's art lies in the very
simplicity of his words, telling their story in simple and bleak form.
Every judicial decision, every legislative enactment, parades unadorned
before the reader.
When the instances of betrayal of judicial ideals presented for each
jurisdiction concerned overwhelm the reader, Higginbotham breaks his
style and lets his unbridled writing capability come through. In his
summary segments, he demonstrates a command of language which
ranks with the most eloquent. "The black slaves' plight was one of daily
imposition of brutality by the laws which sanctioned his enslavement;
no part of the legal process was his ally, the courts not his sanctuary."'' 7
The most skillful attorney could not address a jury more effectively than
Higginbotham approaches his readers. Using language as his tool, he
inexorably guides his audience to the only conclusion possible. His final
sentence exemplifies his skill, recapitulating all of the themes he has
presented and still concluding on a note of hope.
But once the drafters and signers of our Declaration made the decision
not to weaken their moral argument for nationhood by attempting to
rationalize the lie many of them were living, they made inevitable the
irony that the truth they espoused, and not their example, would eventu-
ally guide their progeny to a society more just than their own."
15. HIGGINBOTHAM at 28.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 58.
18. Id. at 389.
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Higginbotham demonstrates the most basic tenet of legal prose:
language should contribute to reaching the goal for which the writer
strives. James Raymond comments: "Almost every brief and opinion
can be made more effective by the judicious use of literary techniques." 9
Lawyers must tailor their language to the task at hand. Expository
phrases must be brief and concise. Flights of rhetoric should be reserved
for advocacy of causes or discussion of facts developed elsewhere.
This is a remarkable volume in its scholarship and content as well
as its prose. The exhaustive research underlying its writing has produced
as complete a bibliography and set of footnotes as the most meticulous
academician could demand. These are complemented by an index as
thorough in scope as it is easy to use, and a table of cases. The legal
profession needs more examples of this marriage of research and writ-
ing, and should take pride in a member who so tastefully unearths and
interprets one of its less glorious moments.
Judge Higginbotham attributes the germ of this book to his unjust
treatment at the hands of President Edward Charles Elliot of Purdue
University. The young freshman and eleven of his black classmates had
been denied access to the heated dormitories of Purdue, solely because
the law did not specifically compel the university to grant blacks admis-
sion to that housing. Returning from his interview with Elliot, Higgin-
botham realized his compulsion to right this wrong.
Almost like a mystical experience, a thousand thoughts raced through my
mind as I walked across campus. I knew then I had been touched in a
way I had never been touched before, and that one day I would have to
return to the most disturbing element in this incident - how a legal system
that proclaims "equal justice for all" could simultaneously deny even a
semblance of dignity to a 16-year old boy who had committed no wrong. 20
That the callous bigotry of a public official could yield a brilliant work
of this scope and nature connotes the highest possible praise for its
author. The legal profession owes Judge Higginbotham a great debt for
this volume, yet we must regret the pain from which it came.
In much the same vein, we must recognize two truths. The pain
which the colonial slave laws caused human beings must be recognized
by the legal profession for it to cope with the problems thus engendered.
19. Raymond, Legal Writing: An Obstruction to Justice, 30 ALA. L. REV. 1, 16
(1978).
20. HIGGINBOTHAM at viii.
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We must also bend our skills to ensuring that the law does not again
oppress humanity for the sake of an economic system.
This is not a pleasant book to read, for it reminds us of judicial
and legislative actions which we would feel more comfortable overlook-
ing. At the same time it is a remarkably hopeful book, for it anticipates
the development of the law to the point where past inequities are recom-
pensed while having the courage to bring us to an awareness of a shame-
ful past. This is the first volume of a projected series by the judge, which
will trace the treatment of blacks in American jurisprudence. The legal
profession needs the example set by Judge Higginbotham and should
eagerly anticipate the appearance of future volumes in the series. Law-
yers must realize the power of the law to perpetrate evil, and In the
Matter of Color burns the dangers of abuse of the legal process into our
minds. Lawyers have an equally great need for examples of fine legal
prose, of which Judge Higginbotham has given us a model to emulate.
All attorneys should read this book-for what it tells us about our
profession, and for what it can show us about superb legal writing.
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